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Begin New Search Publishing Institution James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

41. The US Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad

Author:
Jon Wolfsthal
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) convened an event to release its latest report “The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization Over the Next Thirty Years.” The report concludes that the United States will likely spend over $1 trillion during the next three decades to maintain its current nuclear arsenal and purchase their replacement systems. The necessary level of procurement spending, as a percentage of the defense budget, will peak at levels comparable to the Reagan-era build-up of nuclear forces. To date, few senior officials from the White House or Department of Defense or in the Congress have publicly acknowledged or laid out the full scale of these costs to the American public. This lack of public debate will likely lead to sticker shock as the full cost of these programs come due, leading to budget cuts and program delays. “The strategic and financial challenges facing our country are enormous,” said Jon Wolfsthal, CNS Deputy Director and former nuclear advisor to Vice President Joseph Biden. “Policy makers lack the basic information needed to make smart choices about our nuclear arsenal, putting both our deterrent and future reductions at risk.” The report cites particular concern over the pace of planned construction of strategic systems to replace systems that are set to retire starting in 2030. The United States plans, from 2024-29, to build five strategic submarines, 72 strategic bombers, and 240 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This represents more delivery vehicles than the combined nuclear forces of China, the United Kingdom, and France. It is unclear that the industrial and management capabilities in the United States are capable of this production rate in times of budget constraint.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Budget, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

42. New Media Solutions in Nonproliferation and Arms Control: Opportunities and Challenges

Author:
Bryan Lee
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS has released a ground breaking new report investigating the role new and social media can play in tracking nonproliferation and verifying arms control. The paper lays out how these new technologies have the potential to significantly enhance current practices in the field of nonproliferation and arms control. They stress, however, that it is critical to approach anything that is so new and fluid with caution and flexibility as technologies that might be effective today for solving a particular nonproliferation or arms control problem might not work or require a major redesign in the future. The paper contains four detailed examples that show how new media can be applied to the nonproliferation challenge. They include: 1) election mapping; 2) Github; 3) real time commercial satellite image analysis; and 4) a Twitter text mining analysis. The findings demonstrate emerging technologies and procedures that can enhance the ability of countries or organizations or even individuals to identify when weapons of mass destruction are being built or used, or in ensuring that countries live up to their international treaty obligations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Media, Social Media, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

43. US and Russia Can End Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium for Medical Uses

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
A new report co-authored by CNS Senior Research Associate Miles Pomper recommends steps for the United States and Russia to cooperate in ending Russian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in medical isotope production, an important step in keeping this nuclear weapons material from terrorists. Great progress has been achieved in recent years in minimizing civilian use of HEU as part of the international efforts to reduce the nuclear terrorism threat. In particular, the leading global suppliers of the molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) isotope, which is widely used in medical diagnostics, are taking steps to reduce and, in the medium time frame, completely eliminate the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes. Major new steps towards phasing out HEU use in medical isotopes production could be announced at the Nuclear Security Summit that will take place in The Hague on March 24-25, 2014. The Russian nuclear industry has set for itself an ambitious goal of becoming one of the three top global suppliers of Mo-99, used in 80 per cent of the medical procedures involving isotopes particularly as a diagnostic tool. Growing Russian production could help stabilize the global Mo-99 market, which faced severe shortages on several occasions in 2005-2013. According to some estimates, in 2010 during a six month period medical facilities around the world were unable to perform diagnostic procedures for several million people due to the shortage of Mo-99; the shortfall was estimated at 7 million doses. However, until recently, Russia had been bucking global trends by planning to use HEU fuels and targets rather than safer low enriched uranium (LEU) for much of this production. The ‘Ending HEU Use in Medical Isotope Production: Options for Russian-US Cooperation’ report co-authored by the Moscow-based Center for Energy for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) analyses what can be done by Moscow and Washington to harmonize the Russian producers’ plans to win a share of the global market, while at the same time facilitating the Russian nuclear industry’s transition to new market requirements for producing Mo-99 without HEU.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

44. Alternatives to High-Risk Radiological Sources

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, Egle Murauskaite, and Tom Coppen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
There is growing global awareness of the need to secure radiological sources in order to prevent terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon, such as a “dirty bomb.” A new CNS report calls for a move towards permanently reducing this threat by substituting non-isotopic alternatives for these sources in civil uses. As an initial step, the authors propose a move towards gradual phase-out of cesium chloride use in pre-transfusion blood irradiation on a global scale – a domain where non-isotopic alternatives are considered to be the most viable in the short-term. They urge United States to launch an international initiative involving the phase out of cesium-chloride and other high-risk radiological sources as a “gift basket” for the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Cesium chloride is one of the most commonly used radiological materials, despite being an IAEA Category 1 “extremely dangerous” source. Because cesium chloride is easily dispersible, water soluble, and relatively easy to handle, it is particularly suitable for terrorist purposes. The blood irradiators that use it as a source are located in many large hospitals and blood banks (inherently publicly accessible spaces), and the source is usually transported through regular civilian infrastructure at the beginning and the end of its lifecycle, giving more cause for concern. Cesium chloride based irradiators are used to treat blood and blood products prior to transfusion in order to prevent a rare but fatal Graft Versus Host Disease (GVHD). A growing number of non-isotopic alternatives are becoming available for that purpose, but there is a serious lack of awareness about the range of options and how they compare to current practices, both among the medical professionals and national regulators.
Topic:
Health, Biological Weapons, Radiological Weapons, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus

45. Mind the Gap: Regimes & Strengthening Radiological Security

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
According to a new paper from CNS Senior Research Associate Miles A. Pomper, inadequate liability and insurance regimes mean that users of high-risk radiological sources have insufficient incentive to protect those sources from terrorists or substitute less risky alternatives. Such sources are used in medicine, oil and gas exploration, and industry, among other fields, and can be used in “dirty bombs” or other forms of radiological terrorism. Since the 9/11 attacks, governments, including the United States, have taken it upon themselves to institute emergency measures to improve source security, often using public funds. However, these measures are less than optimal and are expected to take many more decades. Moreover, even the United States—the lead country in spending on these efforts—routinely sacrifices radiological security to other budget priorities. Pomper therefore recommends two potential options to improve liability and insurance regimes governing radiological sources in order to incentivize users to reduce the risk of radiological terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Budget, Radiological Weapons, and Medicine
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

46. Countering Nuclear Commodity Smuggling: A System of Systems

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
A comprehensive Center for Nonproliferation Studies report calls on the United States and other concerned countries to adopt tighter controls to stem the flow of nuclear-related goods to Iran, North Korea, and other states of proliferation concern. Even modest improvements across the spectrum of today’s nuclear technology controls could greatly strengthen overall international efforts to constrain illicit nuclear procurement networks, the study found. The now available report, Countering Nuclear Commodity Smuggling: A System of Systems, was prepared by Leonard S. Spector and Egle Murauskaite. The study was supported by the US Department of Defense.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North Korea

47. Ugly Truths: Saddam Hussein and Other Insiders on Iraq’s Covert Bioweapons

Author:
Amy Smithson
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although the inspections of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which operated from April 1991 to October 1998, unmasked Iraq’s biological weapons program and revealed a considerable amount of detail about its planning, organization, and execution, various factors about the program remain unclear. These gaps in information persisted through the activities and reporting of both the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission, which existed from December 1999 until the outbreak of the second Gulf War in March 2003, and the Iraq Survey Group, which reported on the remnants of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities after the 2003 Gulf War.1 To deepen understanding about Iraq’s biological weapons program, a team of analysts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) identified a number of research questions that, if answered, would provide a more comprehensive account of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programs. The twenty research questions ran the gamut of relevant topics. Specifically with regard to the bioweapons program, the research questions sought to clarify the reasons behind Iraq’s choice of biowarfare agents and delivery systems, the timeline and technical specifics for certain activities, possible interaction with governments and biowarfare experts outside of Iraq, the management of the program, and the details of how Iraq disposed of its biological munitions and bulk biowarfare agent. In an effort to answer some or all of these questions, CNS’s staff turned to the records of the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) database. In mid-July 2011, the time in which CNS’s staff reviewed the CRRC records for information pertinent to Iraq’s biological weapons program, it should be noted that a relatively small fraction of the documents in the possession of the CRRC had been translated into English and made available in the CRRC database. Accordingly, the review of the database did not turn up a tremendous number of documents providing insights about Iraq’s biological weapons program. Nonetheless, the review uncovered several documents that shed light largely on the political management of Iraq’s bioweapons program and how Iraq’s leaders tried to cope with UNSCOM’s inspections. This report, which begins with a brief review of the search methodology, otherwise presents the research findings in rough but not exact chronological order. To help the reader quickly grasp the relevance of the research findings in a history that is complicated and sometimes full of technical detail, the research findings are interlaced with background derived largely from Germ Gambits: The Bioweapons Dilemma, Iraq and Beyond (Stanford University Press, 2011). Germ Gambits, which tells the tale of UNSCOM’s bioweapons inspections in Iraq, is based primarily on interviews with UNSCOM inspectors, buttressed by UNSCOM documents and secondary materials. Therefore, any citation to Germ Gambits is based on numerous authoritative sources. Because this report provides the unadulterated Iraqi view on certain topics, in a certain sense it is like seeing the other side of the coin that Germ Gambits presents. CNS Senior fellow Amy E. Smithson, PhD, wrote Germ Gambits and was the principal researcher reviewing the biological weapons-related documents in the CRRC database.
Topic:
United Nations, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, Conflict, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

48. Implementation of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Action Plan

Author:
Gaukhar Mukhozhanova
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Three years after the adoption of an Action Plan by the states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), progress on implementing its disarmament section remains very limited. NPT states parties are approaching the second session of the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), which will convene in Geneva on April 22-May 3, 2013, against a mixed background. On the one hand, there is frustration with the stalemate at the traditional fora and stagnation in implementation of the Action Plan. On the other hand, many states—along with civil society—ar
Topic:
Civil Society, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. Stories of the Soviet Anti-Plague System

Author:
Raymond A. Zilinskas, James W. Toppin, and Casey W. Mahoney
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Throughout the 20th century, the USSR Ministry of Health’s 2nd Directorate headed an “anti-plague (AP) system” whose main objective was to protect the country from endemic and imported dread diseases such as plague, anthrax, and others. In addition, it had an important, two-phased role in the Soviet Union’s biological warfare (BW) program—to provide training to the BW program’s scientific workers on biosafety practices and to submit cultures of especially virulent pathogens to that program’s research and development institutions. Because the USSR considered information about endemic infectious disease, as well as BW-related activity, to be state secrets, hardly any outsiders knew about the AP system’s work and scientific accomplishments. To this day, the five Russian AP institutes remain closed to outsiders and are almost as secretive about their current activities as they were during the Soviet era.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, Public Health, Pandemic, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Europe and Soviet Union

50. Prospects for Nuclear Security Partnership in Southeast Asia

Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Many nations in Southeast Asia view their growing energy needs as a looming crisis, one that could potentially be averted by development of civil nuclear programs. Timetables for nuclear development in the region are ambitious, but these ambitions often do not correspond with practical investment plans that are economically viable or logistically feasible. The feasibility and viability of nuclear development in these states is becoming even more complex when nuclear security and nonproliferation concerns are taken into account. While the events in Fukushima have cast a shadow over the pace of this expansion, several countries in Southeast Asia continue to show interest in nuclear power as a means to meet future energy requirements. For this reason, Southeast Asia remains a salient region in any global effort to manage nuclear security risks.
Topic:
Security, Development, Economics, Energy Policy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia