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1. WMD Capabilities Enabled by Additive Manufacturing

Author:
Christopher Daase, Grant Christopher, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Miles A. Pomper, and Robert Shaw
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Additive Manufacturing (AM)—also known as 3D printing—is a rapidly emerging technology with growing relevance for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The rapid pace of AM development makes it increasingly difficult to keep track of AM’s potential effect on proliferation pathways. So far, studies addressing the issue have mainly focused on nuclear proliferation. This has created two major problems for policy makers. First, by the time governments are able to respond to specific AM-induced proliferation risks, those risks might already have been overtaken by newer developments. Second, by focusing on nuclear proliferation pathways, governments can fail to recognize AM’s relevance to other proliferation modalities, including chemical and biological weapons and, especially, the means of WMD delivery. This report addresses these shortcomings. As an innovative pilot study, this report provides a more comprehensive approach toward explaining latest AM developments and mitigating the risk of WMD proliferation. Effectively, this report is the first beyond-the-horizon assessment of the impact of AM developments not only on potential nuclear-weapons programs, but also on other WMD modalities and their delivery systems. For this project, Negotiation Design & Strategy (NDS) assembled an expert team of well-known AM and nonproliferation specialists from Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom—three countries at the forefront of AM development. The research team’s contextual knowledge of AM facilities in Europe and the United States allowed for in-depth, on-the-ground interviews with US and European experts from the private sector, national laboratories, and research institutions. Interviews were augmented with an analytical deep dive into the latest AM developments, based on open-source technical literature, including academic papers and patents. The final report allows us to better forecast technological developments and raise awareness for the critical role that AM plays in international security. This report also demonstrates the importance of emerging technologies in the nonproliferation field and underscores the need for further research of this kind. Studies such as this are crucial to inform the broader examination of the relationship between technology and international security.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Improving the Security of All Nuclear Materials

Author:
Mark Fitzpatrick, Elena Sokova, Miles A. Pomper, Laura Rockwood, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, and Matthew Cottee
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
About four-fifths of the weapons-usable nuclear materials in the world are in non-civilian programmes. This means not only as the explosive core in active or reserve nuclear weapons, but also as fuel in naval and military research reactors, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium at production sites, in storage, or declared excess to military uses, but not yet transferred to other programmes or eliminated. Yet coordinated global efforts to enhance the security of nuclear materials have been almost exclusively concentrated on the estimated 17% of such nuclear materials in the civilian sector. Ideally, all HEU and plutonium of the same grade should have at least the same level of adequate security regardless of the possessor or purpose, since the materials pose the same threat. In practice, however, the security of materials can vary depending on whether they are used in the civilian or military sectors. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF – as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was renamed after the 2005 amendment came into force in May 2016), as well as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) security guidelines such as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, describe how civilian materials should be secured. No such explicit guidelines exist on how to secure materials outside of the civilian sector. Nor is there comprehensive public knowledge about the state of security of such materials in all countries with nuclear weapons programmes. It has often been asserted that nuclear materials in non-civilian use are well protected because they are under military control. However, the number of troubling security breaches involving nuclear material in military use, as well as some examples involving civilian nuclear facilities, belies this casual assumption, underscoring why the world should not simply accept the unsubstantiated ‘solemn word’ of authorities that security is as tight as needed. The list of incidents includes insider threats, peaceful incursions for demonstration purposes, theft, armed attack, and, most recently, over-flights by drones and computer hacking. Our report includes a number of examples of incidents at civilian facilities as well because they demonstrate areas of vulnerability that may also apply to the noncivilian sector. The record offers a compelling case for why security must be enhanced for all nuclear material.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Mind the Gap: Regimes & Strengthening Radiological Security

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
According to a new paper from CNS Senior Research Associate Miles A. Pomper, inadequate liability and insurance regimes mean that users of high-risk radiological sources have insufficient incentive to protect those sources from terrorists or substitute less risky alternatives. Such sources are used in medicine, oil and gas exploration, and industry, among other fields, and can be used in “dirty bombs” or other forms of radiological terrorism. Since the 9/11 attacks, governments, including the United States, have taken it upon themselves to institute emergency measures to improve source security, often using public funds. However, these measures are less than optimal and are expected to take many more decades. Moreover, even the United States—the lead country in spending on these efforts—routinely sacrifices radiological security to other budget priorities. Pomper therefore recommends two potential options to improve liability and insurance regimes governing radiological sources in order to incentivize users to reduce the risk of radiological terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Budget, Radiological Weapons, and Medicine
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Prospects for Nuclear Security Partnership in Southeast Asia

Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Many nations in Southeast Asia view their growing energy needs as a looming crisis, one that could potentially be averted by development of civil nuclear programs. Timetables for nuclear development in the region are ambitious, but these ambitions often do not correspond with practical investment plans that are economically viable or logistically feasible. The feasibility and viability of nuclear development in these states is becoming even more complex when nuclear security and nonproliferation concerns are taken into account. While the events in Fukushima have cast a shadow over the pace of this expansion, several countries in Southeast Asia continue to show interest in nuclear power as a means to meet future energy requirements. For this reason, Southeast Asia remains a salient region in any global effort to manage nuclear security risks.
Topic:
Security, Development, Economics, Energy Policy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

5. US-Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda

Author:
Anton Khlopkov
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the United States and the Russian Federation have engaged in bilateral and multilateral nuclear security efforts to secure nuclear materials and facilities in the region. This cooperation contributed to nuclear security globally and developed various tools, mechanisms, and approaches that need to be fully utilized by the international community. As new nuclear security challenges emerge, the implementation of sustainable nuclear security measures is constrained by limited expertise and resources, particularly in some key regions. For this reason, the application of US-Russian expertise and experience in cooperative threat reduction is essential to successful implementation of the global nuclear security agenda. Researchers investigate nuclear security challenges in other countries and regions—specifically in Southeast Asia and the former Soviet states of Central Asia—and examine possible ways by which the lessons learned from US-Russian nuclear security cooperation over the past two decades can be a
Topic:
Security, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Safety
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Post-Soviet Europe

6. Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
Ward Wilson, Ken Berry, Nikolai Sokov, Patricia Lewis, and Benoît Pélopidas
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The study on ―Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence‖ by Ken Berry, Patricia Lewis, Benoît Pélopidas, Nikolai Sokov and Ward Wilson was commissioned by the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and undertaken by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Peace Studies, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United Nations

7. Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Miles A. Pomper, and William Potter
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Control of tractical nuclear weapons (TNW) has remained an elusive goal since the early 1990s when the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia adopted a set of unilateral parallel political obligations to reduce and store at central locations the larger part of their TNW forces. Efforts by the international community to nudge the two countries to give these unilateral statements a legally binding, verifiable character did not succeed, and one can point to little headway with respect TNW arms control in the intervening 18years.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union

8. Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership

Author:
Nikolai Sokov, Dennis M. Gormley, Miles A. Pomper, Patricia M. Lewis, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz, and Leonard S. Spector
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
In late April 2009, the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany requested that the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) undertake studies on four emerging issues in the fields of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, to be completed by June 15, 2009. The four issues were: The need to address the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional arms reduction, if the United States wants to entice others to go along the path to Global Zero. The world after drastic nuclear arms reductions, including the fear of U.S. conventional superiority/global strike capabilities;  The need (and promising areas) to make (nuclear) arms control and disarmament a strong component of NATO's new strategic concept;  Missile Defense, also covering a possible threat from others than Iran and the need to bring missile defense into the NATO-Russia Council; and Substrategic nuclear weapons, with a description of a way to achieve mutual transparency, reduction, and elimination in Europe.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

9. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Cristina Hansell (ed) and William C. Potter (ed)
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Today two key nuclear powers, China and Russia, stand at the crossroads of nuclear policy: both Beijing and Moscow are reassessing their nuclear policies and postures. The decisions they make will affect their negotiating positions for years to come; therefore, now is the time to engage both countries in discussions about deep nuclear reductions that could ultimately lead to the elimination of their arsenals. Such actions will contribute to reaching “nuclear zero”—the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons—an idea that was the focus of two recent opinion articles coauthored by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who stressed the necessity of “turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations.”
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and China

10. New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security

Author:
James Clay Moltz
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although missiles, missile defense technology, and space issues are intricately related, most policy analysis tends to treat each in a separate category. This tendency causes policymakers to miss the linkages among them and the overlap in the issues that affect developments in each of the other sectors. For this reason, four organizations—the Mountbatten Centre of the University of Southampton, the Simons Centre of the University of British Columbia, the U.N. Center for Disarmament Research in Geneva, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies—decided to organize a joint international conference that would consciously explore these linkages and treat the relevant issues in an integrated manner, benefiting from the expertise of specialists present from each of the three fields.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Geneva and United Nations