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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Publishing Institution James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

21. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Cristina Hansell (ed) and William C. Potter (ed)
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Today two key nuclear powers, China and Russia, stand at the crossroads of nuclear policy: both Beijing and Moscow are reassessing their nuclear policies and postures. The decisions they make will affect their negotiating positions for years to come; therefore, now is the time to engage both countries in discussions about deep nuclear reductions that could ultimately lead to the elimination of their arsenals. Such actions will contribute to reaching “nuclear zero”—the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons—an idea that was the focus of two recent opinion articles coauthored by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who stressed the necessity of “turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations.”
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia and China

22. Nuclear Challenges and Policy Options for the Next U.S. Administration

Author:
Jean du Preez (ed)
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
With the support of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group (MNSG) has focused its work over the past two years on specifi c issues that have a direct bearing on the strength and vitality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, the strategy group's agenda has included ways and means to eliminate the threat of fi ssile material; renewed commitments and new approaches to verifi cation of and compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime; practical and achievable nuclear arms reduction and disarmament; the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; and nuclear challenges and policy options for the next U.S. administration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

23. New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security

Author:
James Clay Moltz
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although missiles, missile defense technology, and space issues are intricately related, most policy analysis tends to treat each in a separate category. This tendency causes policymakers to miss the linkages among them and the overlap in the issues that affect developments in each of the other sectors. For this reason, four organizations—the Mountbatten Centre of the University of Southampton, the Simons Centre of the University of British Columbia, the U.N. Center for Disarmament Research in Geneva, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies—decided to organize a joint international conference that would consciously explore these linkages and treat the relevant issues in an integrated manner, benefiting from the expertise of specialists present from each of the three fields.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Geneva and United Nations

24. Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks

Author:
Charles D. Ferguson, Tahseen Kazi, and Judith Perera
Publication Date:
07-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
This study examines the security risks posed by commercial radioactive sources. While these sources provide benefits to humanity through numerous applications in medicine, industry, and research, some of these same materials, if not secured, may end up in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs)—one type of which is popularly known as a “dirty bomb.” Though RDD use has not occurred, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, al Qaeda's expressed interest in acquiring the means to unleash radiological terror, and widespread news reporting on this topic have sparked renewed concern about the security of commercial radioactive sources.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Counterinsurgency