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1. Generative AI and WMD Nonproliferation: Why Diplomats and Policymakers Need to Pay Attention Now and Develop AI Literacy

Author:
Natasha Bajema
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The rapid advancement of generative AI (e.g., ChatGPT) has opened a Pandora’s box of opportunities and risks for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. A new primer from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies by Dr. Natasha E. Bajema cuts through the hype to explain what policymakers and diplomats really need to know about generative AI to understand its impact on the WMD domain. While media attention has focused on ChatGPT and other generative AI models potentially helping bad actors develop weapons, the reality for the WMD domain is more nuanced. Predictive AI tools are already being deployed in military applications. These narrow, task-specific systems can analyze data patterns to support decision-making, but also introduce new risks through cyber vulnerabilities and data biases. Meanwhile, current generative AI models still struggle with accuracy and reliability—they are prone to making up false information and are not yet capable of transferring the tacit knowledge needed for weapons development. However, this could change as the technology advances.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, Artificial Intelligence, and Generative Models
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Strategic Empathy: Examining Pattern Breaks to Better Understand Adversaries’ Acquisition, Threat, and Use of Strategic Weapons

Author:
Sarah Bidgood, Robert Carlin, Siegfried S. Hecker, Jim Lamson, and Hanna Notte
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Drawing from the work of Zachary Shore and others, we define strategic empathy as “the sincere effort to identify and assess the genuine patterns of an adversary’s acquisition, threat of use, and use of strategic weapons and the underlying drivers and constraints that shape them.” This concept encapsulates a mindset, a lens, and an approach that help us to understand an adversary’s strategic thinking. In the context of this study, we apply strategic empathy as a tool to examine U.S. adversaries’ policies and actions concerning the acquisition, threat, and use of strategic weapons. It is important to clarify that strategic empathy is not synonymous with sympathy or agreement with the adversary’s viewpoint, nor does it seek to excuse or justify its actions. Instead, it operates on a policy “agnostic” basis, facilitating a more holistic, nuanced understanding of the adversary that can inform strategies of coercion, cooperation, or a mix of both, depending on the circumstances. In this study, our approach for conducting case studies was primarily rooted in Zachary Shore’s book, A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind, which focuses on examining what Shore terms “pattern breaks.” These pattern breaks encompass surprising or shocking, high-impact occurrences, and can be either events that affect an adversary or behaviors by the adversary itself. We apply this approach to examining eight pattern breaks for Russia, North Korea, and Iran related to their acquisition, threat, and use of strategic weapons. The aim of these case studies is to shed light on the adversaries’ patterns related to strategic weapons and the underlying drivers and constraints that shape them. Through this approach, strategic empathy offers a valuable tool, but it is not intended as a stand-alone approach. Rather, it offers a complementary perspective to other analytical approaches. It is also not intended as a causal theoretical framework but rather an alternative lens that can contribute to a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the adversary.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Strategic Empathy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

3. Export Control and Emerging Technology Control in an Era of Strategic Competition

Author:
Ian Stewart
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS has been focused both on the question of emerging technology controls and on the question of export controls in an area of strategic competition. CNS has been undertaking detailed sectoral mapping in relation to several emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, aerospace and avionics, high-performance computing, biotechnology, cybertechnology, telecommunications, and semiconductor technologies. CNS will soon be launching resources intended to help governments and the private sector to manage these technologies in this new security environment. CNS is also working to benchmark and develop good practices in relation to the cybersecurity of export-controlled information. This article is intended to provide a broader framing to the work CNS is undertaking concerning export controls in an era of strategic competition. CNS staff would be happy to brief officials from governments or the private sector on these topics.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. The Final Stretch: Tackling Remaining HEU Challenges

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Margarita Kalinina-Pohl, and Artem Lazarev
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Minimizing civil commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been a longstanding goal of Global Partnership countries, as HEU represents a highly attractive target for terrorists and proliferators. HEU can be used to create the simplest nuclear explosive device, a so-called gun-type weapon. To make matters worse, because HEU is only weakly radioactive, it is relatively safe to handle and hard to detect. Even HEU waste is less radioactive than one might hope from a security-oriented standpoint. HEU’s primary civilian use is in research reactors, which carry out a range of functions from education and basic scientific research to producing medical isotopes and “doping” silicon for semiconductors. The international community has made significant progress during the last decades in converting such reactors from HEU to LEU fuels.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nonproliferation, Peace, Commerce, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Scientific Risk Assessment of Genetic Weapons Systems

Author:
Richard Pilch, Jill Luster, Miles A. Pomper, and Timothy Shaw
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
For any emerging technology, defense and homeland security analysts strive to understand (1) its dual-use potential, meaning whether the same research and technology applied for peaceful purposes may be diverted to illicit ends, for example to develop a weapon; (2) the State and sub-State actors with access to that dual-use potential, whether peacefully or illicitly directed; and (3) motivational factors and indicators of intent that might suggest these actors would divert the emerging technology to illicit ends. Precision medicine represents one such emerging technical space. Precision medicine is defined as medical care designed to optimize benefit for particular groups, especially based on genetic (or molecular) profiling. A long-speculated but incompletely understood dual-use consideration of precision medicine is the possible development of a genetic weapon system, defined as a weapon system designed to optimize effect on particular groups based on genetic profiling. This Occasional Paper assesses the potential for precision medicine to be diverted to develop a population-specific genetic weapon system, examines relevant state capabilities and motivations to pursue such an effort, and offers policy recommendations to manage the dual-use implications of this emerging biomedical field while still preserving its potential benefit for human welfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Weapons, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Dual Use in the DPRK

Author:
Margaret Croy
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Several states have succeeded in extracting “yellowcake” uranium from phosphoric acid as part of the phosphate fertilizer production process. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has both the means and motivation to undertake such work, thus significantly altering existing open-source assessments of how much yellowcake uranium North Korea could produce annually, which in turn affects estimates of how many nuclear warheads DPRK can make. There is ample rationale for the DPRK to pursue this method of uranium extraction. The dual usage of existing infrastructure would both conceal the activity and make it more difficult for international audiences to positively identify and condemn. The DPRK certainly needs fertilizer, and the information on how to extract uranium from its production is readily available. Lastly, this method of yellowcake production embodies the policy of byungjin—parallel nuclear-weapon development and economic expansion—a hallmark of Kim Jong Un’s strategy. Given these factors, the rationale for the pursuit of this method is clear. The evidence is even more so. The first section of the paper explains the science behind uranium extraction from phosphoric acid produced as an intermediary in the production of fertilizer from phosphate rock. The second section highlights some of the historical cases of states using this method to obtain uranium. The third section elucidates the reasoning and rationale for using this method in the DPRK, and the fourth section examines the open-source evidence available indicating that this method of obtaining uranium—however uncommon—is in use in the DPRK today, and is likely to continue and expand in scale.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Mining, Manufacturing, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. A Guide to Investigating Outbreak Origins

Author:
Richard Pilch, Miles A. Pomper, Jill Luster, and Filippa Lentzos
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
COVID-19 has exposed key gaps in the global community’s ability to assess infectious disease outbreaks of international concern, in particular the ability to differentiate between natural and laboratory sources of infection. The risk of natural outbreaks is increasing as unchecked population growth, industrial expansion, and corresponding ecological disruption increases the likelihood that novel disease agents will come into contact with naïve human populations. Likewise, the risk of laboratory accidents is increasing as more high-containment laboratories are built and higher risk experiments are conducted around the world. Meanwhile, a deliberate biological attack may resemble an outbreak of natural or accidental origin, and a natural or accidental outbreak may be misattributed as an attack. The purpose of this Occasional Paper is to outline a readily adoptable, stepwise methodology to guide the investigation of corresponding outbreak origins, building upon traditional epidemiological principles. We have sought to remain minimally intrusive at all times; however, an increasing level of need-to-know information, site, and personnel access becomes necessary as attention shifts toward potential laboratory sources. Accordingly, we include recommendations to ensure such access under existing international regimes, primarily the World Health Organization (WHO)’s International Health Regulations.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, World Health Organization, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Eyes on U: Opportunities, Challenges, and Limits of Remote Sensing for Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling

Author:
Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers, Scott Milne, Margaret Rowland, Ben McIntosh, Mackenzie Best, Octave Lepinard, and Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The mining and milling of uranium does not generally receive the attention that the subject deserves. Yet this overlooked aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle can offer analysts important clues about a country’s fissile-material production. This, in turn, helps inform highly sensitive inquiries, such as estimates of arsenal size and potential for growth. Geospatial technology is uniquely helpful as a discovery and verification tool. The production of fissile material is often a closely held state secret; even for states that report production levels to the International Atomic Energy Agency, these numbers can be difficult to verify. Remote-sensing technology, such as satellite imagery paired with change-detection algorithms, can help pierce the veil of state secrecy and overcome physical barriers to inform analysts about this vital first step in the nuclear fuel cycle. Occasional Paper #44—the final installment in a four-part series that uses open-source remote-sensing data to identify and monitor uranium mining and milling activities—examines these new tools and technologies in detail to demonstrate how analysts use them to detect, estimate, or verify uranium production. It explores different remote-sensing techniques and their various advantages, including traditional optical imagery, multispectral and hyperspectral images, and thermal and near-infrared images. It also discusses machine-learning algorithms as another tool for analysts examining large quantities of geospatial information in a relatively short amount of time. Though these technologies hold great promise for WMD analysts, there are limitations to their use. CNS Occasional Paper #44 discusses these current and future limits, and concludes by calling for increased collaboration between the commercial satellite industry and analytical organizations and verification regimes alike, as a way f
Topic:
Natural Resources, Mining, Minerals, Uranium, and Milling
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. WMD Capabilities Enabled by Additive Manufacturing

Author:
Christopher Daase, Grant Christopher, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Miles A. Pomper, and Robert Shaw
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Additive Manufacturing (AM)—also known as 3D printing—is a rapidly emerging technology with growing relevance for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The rapid pace of AM development makes it increasingly difficult to keep track of AM’s potential effect on proliferation pathways. So far, studies addressing the issue have mainly focused on nuclear proliferation. This has created two major problems for policy makers. First, by the time governments are able to respond to specific AM-induced proliferation risks, those risks might already have been overtaken by newer developments. Second, by focusing on nuclear proliferation pathways, governments can fail to recognize AM’s relevance to other proliferation modalities, including chemical and biological weapons and, especially, the means of WMD delivery. This report addresses these shortcomings. As an innovative pilot study, this report provides a more comprehensive approach toward explaining latest AM developments and mitigating the risk of WMD proliferation. Effectively, this report is the first beyond-the-horizon assessment of the impact of AM developments not only on potential nuclear-weapons programs, but also on other WMD modalities and their delivery systems. For this project, Negotiation Design & Strategy (NDS) assembled an expert team of well-known AM and nonproliferation specialists from Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom—three countries at the forefront of AM development. The research team’s contextual knowledge of AM facilities in Europe and the United States allowed for in-depth, on-the-ground interviews with US and European experts from the private sector, national laboratories, and research institutions. Interviews were augmented with an analytical deep dive into the latest AM developments, based on open-source technical literature, including academic papers and patents. The final report allows us to better forecast technological developments and raise awareness for the critical role that AM plays in international security. This report also demonstrates the importance of emerging technologies in the nonproliferation field and underscores the need for further research of this kind. Studies such as this are crucial to inform the broader examination of the relationship between technology and international security.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus