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11. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?

Author:
Michael Elleman and Mark T. Fitzpatrick
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. The common claim that Iran’s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path. The international standard – but not treaty – for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran’s 13 current ballistic missile systems – the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East – exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the Fateh-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. Because capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran’s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were ‘capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles ‘designed to be’ capable of delivering nuclear weapons. What it means ‘to be designed’ is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran’s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America

12. The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
James Hackett
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
As US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un meet in Singapore on 12 June, it is useful to keep in mind what is at stake. The long-standing tinderbox of the Korean Peninsula, if ignited through another provocation or miscalculation, could spark a full-scale war that could well go nuclear. The prize of diplomacy – sustainable peace on the peninsula – is all the more valuable when one considers the range of military capabilities potentially in play. This information is of use in assessing both the goals of diplomacy and the risks should the current efforts fail. Weapons based on the Korean Peninsula have become faster, more precise and more powerful. North Korea has tested a thermonuclear weapon, an intercontinental ballistic missile and more accurate shorter-range missiles, all designed to offset the relative qualitative weakness of its broader conventional forces. It has also pursued advanced cyber capabilities. South Korea, meanwhile, has focused on developing military systems allowing for more rapid and precise strikes. US forces on the peninsula have introduced yet more advanced capabilities. For these reasons the IISS provides this independent, measured and detailed analysis of military dynamics on the peninsula. The report focuses on the defence policies and military capabilities of the two Koreas, and the US military forces stationed in South Korea which can be brought to bear in a crisis. While it does not ignore unconventional systems, it principally focuses on conventional capabilities. Due to its poverty and isolation, North Korea’s conventional forces have become relatively weaker, compared with those of South Korea and its US ally. Aware of this qualitative inferiority, Pyongyang has invested in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Nonetheless, Pyongyang’s armed forces remain equipped with a wide range of conventional military systems, including large numbers of artillery pieces and multiple-launch rocket systems. Its armed forces, at around 1.2 million, are the fourth-largest in the world. Its conventional military power remains significant, not least because of these numbers (for instance, 4,000 main battle tanks and 8,500 self-propelled- and towed-artillery systems) and the weight of fire they could rapidly bring to bear if employed. Seoul, for instance, is within range of many of North Korea’s artillery systems. North Korea has also developed increasingly advanced cyber capabilities as another aspect of its asymmetric power. The North will continue to improve these, if only to slow the decline in military parity between it and the South. US and South Korean defence authorities assume that the North will, in the event of major conflict, use cyber attacks against South Korean critical infrastructure and command-and-control networks. However, recent events like the Wannacry ransomware attacks have shown that North Korea is now using its cyber power for another purpose: raising revenue to support the regime. Meanwhile, South Korea’s defence policy and military posture is dominated by the security challenge from the North. This has led Seoul to pursue military capabilities, and strategies, designed to defeat North Korean provocations. These range from developments in air-defence, intended to tackle North Korea’s air force and missile capabilities, to strategies designed to pre-empt a potential North Korean provocation. To enable these strategies, South Korea has developed and procured increasingly advanced military systems, ranging from its own Hyeonmu ballistic- and cruise-missiles, to advanced air-to-ground air-launched weapons and, in the next few years, squadrons of F-35A combat aircraft. Working closely with the South Korean armed forces, the US maintains a military presence some 28,500-strong in South Korea, augmented by advanced military systems on the peninsula like the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic-missile-defence system, and the military power deployed by the US in the broader Indo-Pacific. This publication builds on the contributions of expert analysts of military power on the Korean Peninsula, and the extensive information holdings available in the IISS Military Balance+ database. It was prepared with the support of the Korea Foundation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

13. European Strategic Autonomy and Brexit

Author:
Peter Round, Bastain Giegerich, and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom is among the few European Union member states with full-spectrum military and defence-industrial capabilities. Through Brexit, the EU could lose 20% of its military and 40% of its defence-industrial capabilities, and thereby its influence and credibility as a security actor. The pertinent question is how to arrange the UK’s future participation in European defence.  Decision-making on defence matters in the international arena requires skilled diplomacy and the momentum to carry plans through the scrutiny of multiple parliaments. The EU risks inaction through inertia without the UK’s soft powers, placing strategic decision-making at risk. The Union needs the UK’s military enablers, but only until it can deliver its own. In addition, with the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States suffering, London’s influence is on the wane.  More autonomy for the EU is possible within a framework of political partners that reaches beyond the EU, incorporating actors such as the UK, and also Norway.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and North America

14. Fostering a Defense-Industrial Base for Europe: The Impact of Brexit

Author:
Torben Schütz and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The European defence technological industrial base (DTIB) represents a core element of European defence and deterrence – it is a strategic asset. Strong defence industries multiply the deterrent effect of the armed forces. However, national industries in most countries cannot offer the full range of supplies needed by national armed forces. Despite the fragmentary nature of its industries, Europe collectively has most of the range of defence-industrial capabilities, enabling, at least notionally, security of supply for EU and NATO partners. The UK’s share of defence-related turnover among European companies is almost 40%. The UK also makes defence-industrial contributions to many multi- national projects. While Brexit does not remove the UK’s defence-industrial base from the wider European environment, it will complicate its involvement. The EU’s growing role in defence-industrial matters, through regulation and financial resources, is shaping the wider European DTIB. At the same time, the Union’s ambition as a security actor creates an obligation to ensure that European partners outside the EU can contribute as effectively as possible to European defence and deterrence. In order to do this: The UK, EU institutions and EU governments should work toward as close a common understanding as possible that safeguarding a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is in the strategic interests of all political partners in Europe. The UK and its EU partners should establish politically and structurally significant flagship armament projects. Such projects would support a shared objective, namely to consolidate the still fragmented European DTIB, and in the process make it more competitive. A European Defence Industrial Review should be launched to help identify key industrial branches and companies that are of structural relevance to the European DTIB, and therefore to European defence and deterrence. For future regulations related to the defence industry, the EU should take a ‘systemic view’, i.e. also take into account how a regulation affects European partners and contributors outside the EU.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and London

15. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit

Author:
Douglas Barrie
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels

16. UK Participation in the EDA and the new EU defense package in the context of Brexit

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
To continue United Kingdom participation in European Union defence cooperation:  The UK, the European Commission and EU member states should strive to avoid near-term decisions that would shut out the UK from future participation in EU defence policies.  Pursue agreement on the nature of a ‘third-state’ position as applied to the UK, ensuring the goals of Brussels and London are met.  Identify ways for London to show its commitment to supporting the EU’s defence ambitions, signalling clearly a change from previous opposition.  Brussels and London need to agree the key preconditions that will under- pin any deal over the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).  The UK should aim to ensure a single point of entry through the European Defence Agency for defence cooperation with the EU, in the absence of a Commission directorate-general for security and defence. Reach agreement on an overarching financial contribution covering access to the EDA, the EDF and PESCO, while London also commits to contributing funding to specific projects it wishes to take part in.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

17. The UK’s potential role in enabling EU–NATO cooperation after Brexit

Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom, having expressed interest in a strong EU–UK security partnership and having indicated that, if anything, its commitment to NATO will be even stronger after Brexit, has an opportunity to be a leader and facilitator in the context of EU–NATO cooperation in meeting emerging threats. Several of the priority areas and action items defined by these two organisations, following a declaration to enhance their cooperation at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, play to the UK’s strengths: To increase the level of cooperation between the EU and NATO, and in order to implement the cooperation agenda, the UK should invest both financially and in terms of personnel, via voluntary national contributions to NATO. The UK taking on a leadership role in the area of inter-organisational cooperation would signal to EU partners that stronger support for NATO is not intended to weaken EU initiatives; it is an opportunity to stress the complementary nature of EU and NATO capabilities. Given its limited resources, the UK could, in effect, use engagement in EU–NATO cooperation to hedge its bets on both organisations. Stronger support for NATO can directly benefit the EU’s security and defence initiatives, while making sure that cooperation results in added value in both multinational frameworks, rather than fostering institutional competition.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

18. Reducing the Risk of Iran Developing an ICBM

Author:
Michael Elleman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
With the Iran nuclear accord currently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles, argues Michael Elleman in a new report. The lack of curbs on Iran’s missile programme was cited by President Donald Trump in May 2018 as one of the principal reasons for withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). With the nuclear accord consequently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles. The most promising would be to lock in, through negotiations, the 2,000 kilometre-range limit that Iran has previously stated is its maximum requirement. While this would not reduce the threat perceived by Iran’s regional neighbours, it would forestall development of systems that could target Western Europe or North America. Tehran is not likely to commit to verification measures for such negotiated range limits, however, without receiving something in return. One bargain that could be considered would be to allow Iran to continue its satellite-launch programme, under certain conditions, while capping the maximum range of its ballistic missiles. Such a trade-off may also be relevant to the North Korean case.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

19. China Global Security & Taiwan

Author:
Helena Legarda and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The focus of this issue of the China Global Security Tracker is the growing threat that China’s rapid military modernization presents to Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army has demonstrated its new capabilities through aggressive maneuvers over the last few months, simulating an attack on Taiwan. China’s party and state leader Xi Jinping has left no doubt that he views the reunification with Taiwan as key for China’s future national strength. The China Global Security Tracker is a semi-annual publication. It is part of the China Security Project, a cooperation between the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). In her analysis of events during the first half of 2018, MERICS researcher Helena Legarda tracks China’s growing military expenditures as well as steps taken by the Chinese Communist Party to extend its control over the military.
Topic:
Nationalism, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, China, Taiwan, Beijing, and Asia

20. Could the EU deliver on its military ambitions after Brexit?

Author:
Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, Marie-Louise Chagnaud, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, Christain Möelling, and Torben Schutz
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
he ability of the European Union to act in defence, today and in the future, is an important reference point in the debate about EU strategic autonomy in the context of Brexit. The EU has set itself a military level of ambition. Under the heading of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU member states want to be able to conduct a range of military operations. Together with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), this study assesses to what extent the EU is able to fulfil this level of ambition, today and with an outlook towards 2030. The IISS and DGAP have developed policy-compliant scenarios to assess where possible capability shortfalls lie. Our findings benchmark existing and future EU member state capabilities against the force requirements the EU level of ambition generates.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Germany