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111. Elections en Tunisie: vieilles blessures, nouvelles craintes

Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Le duel qui oppose le président sortant Moncef Marzouki à l'ancien chef de gouvernement Béji Caïd Essebsi dans le cadre du second tour de la présidentielle, prévu le 21 décembre 2014, révèle les lignes de fracture de la société tunisienne que les élites politiques croyaient avoir résorbées grâce à leur sens du consensus et du compromis. La cartographie électorale des législatives et du premier tour montre une Tunisie divisée entre un Nord en grande partie pro-Essebsi et son parti Nida Tounes, et un Sud majoritairement pro-Marzouki et favorable au parti islamiste An-Nahda. Afin d'éviter que les craintes réciproques finissent par conduire à des violences, le vainqueur de ce premier scrutin présidentiel libre et concurrentiel devra d'abord reconnaitre les inquiétudes de l'électorat du vaincu. Pouvoir exécutif et législatif devront s'engager de concert à traiter la question du déséquilibre régional et prévenir les risques de blocage institutionnel ou de répression des oppositions.
Topic:
Democratization
Political Geography:
Arabia

112. South Sudan: Jonglei—"We Have Always Been at War"

Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Jonglei state's combustible mix of armed political opposition, violent ethnic militias and dysfunctional political system were part of the tinder that led to the eruption of the civil war in South Sudan in late December 2013. Despite eleven months of peace talks, mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the war threatens to reintensify in the coming weeks. The negotiations do not reflect the diversity of armed groups and interests in South Sudan and the region, most of which are nominally allied with either President Salva Kiir's government or former Vice President Riek Machar's Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/ A-IO). The constellation of regional and South Sudanese armed groups in Jonglei is emblematic of the regional, national and local challenges to peace and the pattern of a war that cannot be resolved by engaging only two of the nearly two-dozen armed groups in the country and ignoring those that have not yet engaged in the fight.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Governance, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Sudan

113. The Day after Tomorrow: Colombia's FARC and the End of the Conflict

Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As a final peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) nears, negotiators face an elaborate juggling act if they are to lay out a sustainable path for guerrilla fighters to disarm and reintegrate into civilian life. A viable transition architecture not only needs to be credible in the eyes of FARC but must also reassure a society that remains deeply unconvinced of the group's willingness to lay down its arms, cut its links with organised crime and play by the rules of democracy. The failure of disarmament and reintegration would at best delay the implementation of reforms already agreed at the Havana talks since 2012. At worst, it could plunge the entire agreement into a downward spiral of renewed violence and eroding political support. Strong internal and external guarantees are needed to carry the process through a probably tumultuous and volatile period ahead. There is a lot that can go wrong. Most of the 7,000 or so combatants, and three times that number in support networks, are concentrated in peripheral zones with little civilian state presence and infrastructure. Some guerrilla fronts are involved in the drug economy and illegal mining. In most regions FARC operates in proximity to the National Liberation Army (ELN), Colombia's second guerrilla group, or other illegal armed groups, exposing its members to security threats and an array of options for rearmament, recruitment and defiance. Major doubts linger about the military's commitment to the peace process, and its readiness to take the steps necessary to end the conflict. Political violence has subsided from the paramilitary heyday but could grow again, and FARC has not forgotten the thousands of killings that decimated the Patriotic Union (UP), a party it created as part of peace talks in the 1980s. And after decades of conflict with a rising civilian toll and negotiation efforts that ended in bitter failure, the parties are feeling their way forward amid deep mutual distrust and strong political opposition. None of these problems has a perfect short-term fix. But the starting position is not all bad. Colombia can tap into three decades of experience in reintegrating members of illegal armed groups and it has more financial and human resources than most post-conflict countries. FARC's command and control structures are in decent shape and guerrilla leaders have a strong interest in a successful transition. The Havana agenda, which alongside the “end of the conflict” includes rural development, political reintegration, transitional justice and the fight against illicit drugs, is, at least on paper, broad enough to embed the reintegration of FARC into a long-term peace-building strategy, particularly focused on the most affected territories. Finally, in sharp contrast to the paramilitary demobilisation, the region and the wider international community are strongly supportive. Negotiators need to agree on a reintegration offer that allows FARC to close ranks behind a transition process riddled with uncertainty and ambiguity. Given its deep-seated distrust toward the state, the best way to achieve this is, probably, to give FARC a stake in reintegration, capitalising on its cohesion. This would minimise the risk that FARC could split over the transition. But the parties must also be aware of and care-fully manage the drawbacks to such a solution. To make a collective reintegration model palatable to a society disinclined to be generous to FARC and sceptical of its true intentions, negotiators should agree on strong measures of accountability, over sight and transparency. They also need to promote local transitional justice to avoid an intensification of communal tensions following the arrival of FARC combatants. Such a long-term reintegration offer would probably facilitate the fraught negotiations over the conditions under which FARC is willing to abandon the conflict early on in the transition. A bilateral ceasefire needs to go into effect immediately after a final accord has been signed. This will require military de-escalation well ahead of that, but a formal ceasefire will only be sustainable once FARC's forces have been concentrated in assembly zones. After the agreement has been ratified, measures for “leaving weapons behind” (or disarmament) should begin. These are irreversible, risky steps, and convincing the guerrillas to take the plunge will not be made easier by the government's refusal to negotiate broader changes to the security forces. But the shared interest in a stable post-conflict period should provide sufficient space to hammer out a workable solution. Alongside security safeguards and interim measures to stabilise territories with FARC presence, this should include early progress in implementing key elements of the peace agreement and the establishment of a joint follow-up committee to ensure that the accords will be honoured after disarmament has been completed. Implementing the agreements will largely be the responsibility of the government and FARC. But in Colombia's sharply polarised environment, international actors will have to play a crucial role. An international, civilian-led mission should be invited to monitor and verify the ceasefire and disarmament. For such monitoring to be successful, the mission needs to have the necessary autonomy from the parties and the technical as well as the political capacity to deal with the predictable setbacks and disputes. Beyond that, international actors should remain engaged by providing high-level implementation guarantees, political support for contentious reforms, including of the security sector, and long-term financial commitment. None of the elements needed to stabilise the immediate post-conflict period is entirely new in the Colombian context, but jointly they will break the mould of previous disarmament and reintegration programs. Flexibility and determination from the negotiators will be needed, alongside renewed government efforts to boost social ownership of the peace process, in particularin conflict regions. Previous transitions have faltered over high levels of violence, public indifference and timid international involvement. A bolder and faster response is needed this time to set Colombia on an irreversible path toward peace.
Political Geography:
Colombia

114. The Central African Republic's Hidden Conflict

Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Alors que la communauté internationale et le gouvernement de transition ont le re- gard braqué sur la capitale, Bangui, une bonne partie du monde rural, notamment à l'ouest et au centre de la République centrafricaine (RCA), est devenue un terroir de violence. La lutte qui oppose les combattant s de l'ex-Seleka et les milices anti-balaka a conduit à une recrudescence des affrontements entre communautés d'éleveurs et d'agriculteurs depuis 2013. Ces affrontement s forment maintenant un conflit dans le conflit loin des yeux des acteurs internationa ux et du gouvernement de transition et déstabilisent davantage la Centrafrique. A l'aube d'une nouvelle saison de transhu- mance qui risque d'intensifier la guérilla rurale en cours, les acteurs internationaux et le gouvernement de transition doivent impérativement prendre en compte cette dimension de la crise dans leur stratégie de stabilisation et prévenir les risques im- médiats de violence entre communautés d'éleveurs et d'agriculteur

115. International Conference on Asian Food Security (ICAFS) 2014. Towards Asia 2025: Policy and Technology Imperatives

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The International Conference on Asian Food Security (ICAFS) took place from 21–22 August 2014 at the Grand Copthorne Waterfront Hotel in Singapore. ICAFS 2014, themed 'Towards Asia 2025: Policy and Technology Imperatives' was aimed at understanding the mid-to-long term trends and challenges that affect Asian food security with in the horizon of 2025 and beyond as the region faces significant challenges posed by changes in demography and consumption patterns, performance decline in agriculture, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion and climate change. This conference sought to address questions relating to the future of food policy and technology that contribute to food security in Asia. The choice of the time-horizon of 2025 was specifically earmarked for a number of reasons. The first session is dedicated to highlighting the identified trends and challenges to food security in 2025. From a national planning standpoint, a decade usually represents a good medium-run timeframe for policies to be formulated and enacted. On a regional level ASEAN's post 2015 agenda will also be looking into a 10-year timeframe. The International Food Policy research Institute (IFPRI), the world's leading food policy research centre, has also chosen 2025 as the time period by when the world should aim to eradicate hunger and malnutrition. Hence there seems to be a good convergence on this particular timeframe; one we should all as institutions and individuals commit to make the region and world more food secure. Session 2 highlights the food security challenges and opportunities in the context of Post 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This session addresses issues such as how to increase productivity and supply chains; challenges and opportunities for policy, science and technology interventions as well as how to modernize food supply chains. Session 3 presents the topic of market integration and trade facility. The idea is to promote regional integration and food trade as means for sustaining food security by increasing economic access to food. This is relevant to the ASEAN Economic Community 2015 agenda, which includes tariff reduction, enhanced trade facilitation, reduction in barriers to trade among others, and aims to accelerate economic growth and development. Benefits and challenges are also discussed based on the context of the region's two biggest economies, China and India, anticipating 2025.Session 4 discusses options for financing and investing in agricultural development and technological innovation. With global reduction in public spending on research and development (R) in agriculture, options should be diversified where it allows private sectors and other alternative financing such as insurance and micro financing to help poor and vulnerable farmers. Session 5 suggests an integrated approach for Asia towards 2025. This session looks at the role of science and R in further boosting agricultural production and the need for systematic surveillance of food security through different monitoring systems using different types of indexing and benchmarking tools. These monitoring systems should be able to be responsive to potential calamities and mitigate shocks of natural disasters.
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

116. China-Myanmar Relations Since Naypyidaw's Political Transition: How Beijing can Balance Short-term Interests and Long-term Values

Author:
Chenyang Li and James Char
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In discussions on Myanmar's political reforms since the installation of a civilianised military regime in 2011, most analysts have focused on the bedevilment of bilateral ties between Beijing and Naypyidaw. To be sure, China has since become more attuned to the concerns of non-state actors with the opening up of Myanmar's political space as well as recalibrated its strategies in the face of renewed diplomatic competition from other countries in vying for the affections of the Burmese leadership. In acknowledging the corrections China's Myanmar policy has undergone, this article argues that Beijing's factoring in of Burmese national interests and development needs can help enhance its prospects. While a return to the previous robust bilateral relationship may appear inconceivable in the near future, this article concludes that there is still hope for Beijing in overcoming the challenges posed by Naypyidaw's political transition should it be able to keep up with the latter's evolution over the longer term.
Political Geography:
China, Beijing, Myanmar, and Naypyidaw

117. Old Scores and New Grudges: Evolving Sino-Japanese Tensions

Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Enmity between China and Japan is hardening into a confrontation that appears increasingly difficult to untangle by diplomacy. Positions on the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku island group are wide apart, and politically viable options to bridge the gap remain elusive. New frictions have arisen. China's announcement in November 2013 of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), overlapping that of Japan's and covering the disputed islands, deepened Tokyo's anxiety that Beijing desires both territory and to alter the regional order. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's provocative visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 triggered a bitter argument as to whether Japan has fully atoned for its Second World War aggression, a still vivid sore in the region. Amid heightened suspicion and militarisation of the East China Sea and its air space, the risks of miscalculation grow. Leadership in both countries needs to set a tone that prioritises diplomacy to calm the troubled waters: November's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit might provide such an opportunity.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Tokyo, and Island

118. Risks of Intelligence Pathologies in South Korea

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A failure of intelligence on the Korean peninsula-the site of the world's highest concentration of military personnel with a history of fraught, sometimes violent, sabre-rattling-could have catastrophic consequences. Yet the South Korean intelligence community has revealed its susceptibility to three types of pathologies-intelligence failure, the politicisation of intelligence, and intervention in domestic politics by intelligence agencies-which bring into stark relief the potential for grievous miscalculation and policy distortions when addressing the threat from North Korea. Moves by intelligence agencies to recover or bolster their reputations by compromising sensitive information have compounded the problem. Efforts are needed to reform the South's intelligence capacities, principally by depoliticising its agencies and ensuring adequate legislative and judicial oversight. Lawmakers and bureaucrats also need to fulfil their responsibilities to protect classified information and refrain from leaking sensitive intelligence for short-term personal political gains.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Sinai Peninsula

119. Eritrea: Ending the Exodus?

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The large emigration of youths is the clearest sign of extreme domestic discontent with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki's government. Social malaise is pervasive. An ever-growing number of young people have fled over the last decade, frustrated by open-ended national service – initiated in 1995 and expanded during the war with Ethiopia (1998-2000). Yet, this flight has resulted in neither reforms nor a viable movement to create an alternative to the current government. Once outside, the ties that bind émigrés to their birthplace are strong and lead them to give financial support to the very system they escaped, through the 2 per cent tax many pay the state as well as remittances sent home to family members.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Immigration, Youth Culture, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa and Europe

120. Iran and the P5+1: Getting to "Yes"

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
That nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, U.S. and Germany) were extended beyond the 20 July 2014 deadline was neither unexpected nor unwelcome. The parties ha d made enough headway to justify the extension, which was envisioned in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) that was signed in November 2013 and came into force in January, but given the political and technical complexity, they remain far apart on fundamental issues. Unless they learn the lessons of the last six months and change their approach for the next four, they will lose the opportunity for a resolution not just by the new 24 November deadline but for the foreseeable future. Both sides need to retreat from maximalist positions, particularly on Iran's enrichment program. Tehran should postpone plans for industrial- scale enrichment and accept greater constraints on the number of its centrifuges in return for P5+1 flexibility on the qualitative growth of its enrichment capacity through research and development.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, and France