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11. Colombia: President Santos's Conflict Resolution Opportunity

Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
President Juan Manuel Santos, in office since 7 August 2010, has an opportunity to end Colombia's generations of armed conflict by building on but adjusting and substantially broadening the strategy followed for eight years by his predecessor. Alvaro Uribe's predominantly military approach–the “democratic security policy”–did produce important security gains, but Colombia remains plagued by new illegal armed groups (NIAGs) and other criminal actors. By concentrating mainly on fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), it neglected other sources of violence and, most importantly, failed to address underlying causes of the conflict. Santos, who was elected with the largest majority in history, should use his political capital to implement a more integrated conflict resolution strategy that advances institutional and structural reforms needed to address illegality and impunity, expand access to services and tackle issues of land and victims' rights.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Colombia and Latin America

12. Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh

Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The discovery in late February 2010 of a jihadi training camp in Aceh came as a surprise in three ways. It revealed a major mutation in Indonesian jihadi ranks: a new coalition had emerged that rejected both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the best-known such organisation in the region, and the more violent splinter group led until his death in September 2009 by Noordin Top. It had chosen Aceh as a base, despite the antipathy of Acehnese to radical Islam. And it was led by Dulmatin, one of South East Asia's most wanted terrorists, whom officials in both Indonesia and the Philippines believed was in Mindanao.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Terrorism, International Affairs, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Southeast Asia

13. LRA: A Regional Strategy beyond Killing Kony

Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has become a regional problem that requires a regional solution. Operation Lightning Thunder, launched in December 2008, is the Ugandan army's latest attempt to crush militarily the one- time northern Ugandan rebel group. It has been a failure. After the initial attack, small groups of LRA fighters dispersed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), where they survive by preying on civilians. National security forces are too weak to protect their own people, while the Ugandan army, with U.S. support, is focused on hunting Joseph Kony, the group's leader. The Ugandans have eroded the LRA's numbers and made its communications more difficult. But LRA fighters, though disorganised, remain a terrible danger to civilians in this mostly ungoverned frontier zone. National armies, the UN and civilians themselves need to pool intelligence and coordinate their efforts in new ways if they are to end the LRA once and for all.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, International Cooperation, United Nations, Armed Struggle, Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, United States, and South Sudan

14. A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army

Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
For nearly a decade, the Afghan military has been promoted as the cornerstone of counterinsurgency in the country. Billed as a rare success story in a conflict with few bright spots, the Afghan armed forces will undoubtedly prove pivotal to stabilising Afghanistan. Yet nine years after the fall of the Taliban, there appears to be little agreement between the government of President Hamid Karzai and its international backers on what kind of army the country needs, how to build it or which elements of the insurgency the Afghan army should be fighting. Persistent structural flaws meanwhile have undermined the military's ability to operate independently. Ethnic frictions and political factionalism among high-level players in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the general staff have also stunted the army's growth. As a result, the army is a fragmented force, serving disparate interests, and far from attaining the unified national character needed to confront numerous security threats. There is a strong need to strengthen civilian input into military development, confront corruption and factionalism within the MOD and general staff and to place sustainability of the armed forces at the forefront of Afghanistan's national security strategy.
Topic:
Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Taliban