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1. What next for NATO? Views from the North-East Flank on Alliance Adaptation

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Linas Kojala, Toms Rostoks, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO leaders have invited Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to present proposals at their next Summit for measures to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role. To support his reflection process, the Secretary General has appointed a group of ten experts. Only one of these represents the 14 of 30 Allies who have joined NATO since 1999. In this policy paper we set out issues, concerns and expectations about NATO’s future adaptation from the perspective of the three Baltic states and Poland, based on a series of interviews with several senior officials and members of the expert community in each of the four states. While not identical, the views of our interviewees were close. They broadly agreed that while NATO faces a multitude of threats, Russia is by far the most serious. In response, NATO should prioritise—and enhance—its core task of collective defence. However, they recognised, it is essential for NATO to maintain a balance between the security interests of all Allies. They support the 360-degree approach and are ready to back and participate in efforts to deal with threats from other regions too. NATO should also retain its core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The Covid-19 pandemic suggests that NATO should re-calibrate the crisis management task to better reflect the need for collective support to the civilian authorities in large-scale efforts to deal with crises on Alliance territory. Our interviewees were generally cautious about otherwise expanding NATO’s roles and responsibilities, arguing that the Alliance should consider where it can add value, while avoiding overreach. They saw, for example, only a modest role for NATO in dealing with the challenge from China. They were, however, supportive of the Alliance developing further its global network of partnerships, both with states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, and with other international organisations, notably the EU. NATO should also continue its cooperative security efforts with a focus on states in the immediate neighbourhood. And while further NATO enlargement is unlikely at present, the door should certainly remain open. Interviewees in all four states expressed concerns about the tensions within the Alliance and the lack of US leadership. While these tensions persist, it is probably unwise to consider drafting a new strategic concept. Nonetheless, the internal challenges might be eased if the Allies are prepared to use NATO to a greater extent as forum for consultation on a wide range of security issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

2. Stabilising the Sahel. The Role of International Military Operations

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The key question of this analysis is whether EU and/or NATO allies, including Estonia, would be willing and able to continue to support international efforts in Sahel (including military operations and missions – MINUSMA, EUTM and Barkhane), in particular following the Covid-19 pandemic. It is addressed to civilian and military decision makers and experts, especially in the countries that contribute to international military operations and missions in the Sahel.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

3. Strengthening NATO’s Cohesion Through Consultation

Author:
Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the first of a new series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation and their possible impacts in the Baltic region, Wojciech Lorenz of the Polish Institute of International Affairs examines how NATO’s mechanisms for consultation among Allies have evolved in response to shifts in the security environment, and offers suggestions as to how these mechanisms might be strengthened as a means of mitigating tensions in NATO today.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Social Cohesion
Political Geography:
Baltic States

4. Preparing for Crises in Estonia: Improvement Options for Civilian Food and Emergency Goods Supplies

Author:
Ivo Juurvee and Ramon Loik
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs commissioned the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to compile a list of civilian food and emergency goods supplies, estimated average amounts of supplies at home and in stores, and calculations for the price of national emergency goods supplies and logistics. In addition to the quantities of food and industrial goods, the contracting authorities were interested in the legal issues of stockpiling and the possibilities of storage and distribution. Water, fuel, and drug supplies were not covered by the studies. In the course of the research, the experts also reviewed the solutions of Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and other countries and took into account the recommendations of international organisations. The experience of other countries suggests that involving businesses and maintaining the operation of trading networks in the event of a crisis are of key importance. It is reasonable to organise logistics centrally, as crisis transport cannot be ordered separately by ministries and local authorities. Recommendations for the division of tasks between the state and local governments: State-level tasks: Ensure that the goods required in a crisis situation exist through purchases or pre-contracts. Ensure the timely delivery of required food products and emergency goods to distribution points in municipalities (e.g. through pre-contracts with logistics companies). Support local authorities in planning the distribution of goods and test their preparedness by organising special exercises. Local government-level tasks (preparations for distribution of goods): Have an overview of the population and where people are. Coordinate with the state-level to identify the locations of existing and potential additional distribution points that should be situated in the vicinity of shopping centres or other locations people are familiar with visiting. Plan the local distribution of supplies and find relevant partners.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Food, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Estonia and Baltic States

5. Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO’s North-Eastern Flank

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk and Lukasz Kulesa
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
While the countries of NATO’s north-eastern flank—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—are correctly putting emphasis in their security policy on strengthening deterrence, they need to take a more proactive stance on arms control. Although current prospects are not promising in the light of Russian violations and circumventions of existing treaties, demand for greater engagement with Russia on arms control is growing among NATO nations. Without a constructive input from the flank countries, NATO’s arms-control agenda and the actions of individual European Allies could become detached from deterrence efforts and weaken NATO cohesion. The north-eastern countries should thus identify and promote balanced solutions that can be used to increase the region’s security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia

6. Estonian-French Defence Cooperation – Where Estonian Pragmatism Meets French Vision

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu and Emile LeBrun
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS Research Fellow Kalev Stoicescu and Non-Resident Fellow Maxime Lebrun made a thorough analysis of the defence cooperation and partnership between Estonia and France. They concluded that this successful relationship, which evolved in a short time literally starting from mutual neglect, is based both on pragmatism and political vision. It also serves as a very good example of fruitful cooperation between rather different European partners in terms of size, military capabilities, history and culture, geography etc. France contributes to NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, a vital deterrence measure for the Baltic states and Poland, and Estonia participates actively in French, EU and UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, France promotes the European Intervention Initiative (in which Estonia participates) and the concept of European Strategic Autonomy (Estonia, as well as other Allies, are not yet convinced of its aims and utility). The analysis offers a comprehensive overview on the matter for those who are interested in the defence policy of Estonia and France, and the development of the defence dimension of the European Union.
Topic:
Defense Policy and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Estonia

7. European Strategic Autonomy: Operationalising a Buzzword

Author:
Pauli Järvenpää
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) is currently the subject of some debate and controversy. While this issue has been on the table since at least the 1990s, it was reinvigorated by the publication of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, itself a response to fundamental developments in European security. In this report, we consider the security and defence aspects of ESA, an area of particular difficulties and one in which in which Europe is presently weak. Even in this very practical area, the ESA concept is ill-defined and the term itself has become a buzzword. To move towards implementation, we discuss ESA in security and defence as the capacity to act in four dimensions: political, institutional, capabilities and industrial. Political autonomy, concerns questions such as to whom the ‘E’ in ESA refers, who is able to lead the development of ESA, and what is the level of ambition for this endeavour. Institutional autonomy refers to the availability of the governance structures required to prepare and administer these priorities, while capabilities autonomy refers to the availability of the military, civilian, financial, operational, and other capabilities to credibly implement priorities and decisions. Industrial autonomy refers to the availability of the industrial and technological base necessary to develop and deliver the required capabilities. In our report, we discuss how ESA might be attained in each of these dimensions and make policy recommendations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Autonomy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe

8. The Russian Orthodox Church: Faith, Power and Conquest

Author:
James Sherr and Kaarel Kullamaa
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Until recently, the Russian Orthodox Church was a subject that interested few outside expert circles. That dramatically changed in late 2018 when the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted autocephaly (independence) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The reverberations of this decision — religious, political and geopolitcal — underscore the importance that the Church once again plays in Russian policy. In this report, we consider the role that the Russian Orthodox Church has played as an adjunct to an imperial policy stretching back over many centuries. Today, the Russian Federation has a secular constitution. But as much as in tsarist times, the Church regards itself as one of the pillars of Russia’s political order. As much as in the time of Catherine the Great, it is also a protagonist in its wars of identity and the rewriting of the history of former imperial subjects whose experience of the relationship between church and state is different from Russia’s. This diversity is well brought out in the report’s two case studies, Ukraine and Estonia. In both countries, local Orthodox churches embodied distinctive cultural traditions and values until they felt the full force of Russian control, tsarist and Soviet. Since 2014, Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine has revived many historical controversies. It also has raised entirely new security concerns about the borderline between faith and politics. These concerns are summarised at the conclusion of the report, which closes with a section on policy recommendations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Religion, International Affairs, Governance, and Christianity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia