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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University

41. Agricultural Biotechnology's Complementary Intellectual Assets

Author:
Gregory D. Graff, Gordon C. Rausser, and Arthur A. Small
Publication Date:
08-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University
Abstract:
We formulate and test a hypothesis for the dramatic restructuring that the plant breeding and seed industry has recently undergone: the reorganization can be explained in part by the desire to exploit complementarities between intellectual assets needed to create genetically modified organisms. This hypothesis is tested using data on agricultural biotechnology patents, notices for field tests of genetically modified organisms, and firm characteristics. The presence of complementarities is identified with a positive covariance in the unexplained variation of asset holdings. Results indicate that coordination of complementary assets have increased under the consolidation of the industry.
Topic:
Agriculture, Industrial Policy, and Science and Technology

42. Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization

Author:
Charles Tilly
Publication Date:
02-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University
Abstract:
Aristotle described democratization as a perversion. In a constitutional government, when the majority substituted its particular interest for the community's general interest, self-serving rule of the many — democracy — resulted. In his analysis of political forms, Aristotle went on to specify processes promoting a majority's pursuit of its narrow interest, for example the rise of demagogues and the increase of a polity's size beyond the limits of mutual acquaintance. He also allowed that revolution could convert a tyranny or an oligarchy (his names for degenerate forms of monarchy and aristocracy) directly into a democracy. Aristotle's Politics does not offer a causal theory sufficient to specify the process by which today's Uganda or Uzbekistan could become democratic. It does, however, provide an exemplary model of theoretically coherent explanation. It goes far beyond mapping the initial conditions and sequences of events that constitute paths to democracy. It actually features causes and effects.
Topic:
Democratization
Political Geography:
Uganda and Uzbekistan

43. "Contentious Europeans: Is There a European Repertoire of Collective Action?";

Author:
Doug Imig and Sydney Tarrow
Publication Date:
06-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University
Abstract:
The research reported here was inspired by a talk that the second author was induced to give for a seminar in West European Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford, in February 1994 by Vincent Wright, to whom we express our gratitude and to whom all complaints and cavils should be directed.
Topic:
Government and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Western Europe

44. Spaces of Contention

Author:
Charles Tilly
Publication Date:
06-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University
Abstract:
November 1830 brought London to one of its greatest nineteenth-century peaks of visible, vigorous, and often violent popular contention. When King William IV rode in state through Westminster from St. James to the opening of Parliament on 2 November, people who gathered along the streets cheered the king but jeered prime minister Wellington. Onlookers roared “Down with the New Police! No martial law!” (MC [ Morning Chronicle] 3 November 1830). Near Parliament, two people waved tricolor flags, ten or a dozen men wore tricolor cockades, and members of the crowd cried out “No police” or “Vote by ballot” (LT [ Timesof London], 3 November 1830).
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and London

45. Regimes and Contention

Author:
Charles Tilly
Publication Date:
05-1998
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University
Abstract:
How do diverse forms of political contention—revolutions, strikes, wars, social movements, coups d'état, and others—interact with shifts from one kind of regime to another? To what extent, and how, do alterations of contentious politics and transformations of regimes cause each other? These questions loom behind current inquiries into democratization, with their debate between theorists who consider agreements among elites to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy and those who insist that democracy only emerges from interactions between ruling-class actions and popular struggle. They arise when political analysts ask whether (or under what conditions) social movements promote democracy, and whether stable democracy extinguishes or tames social movements. They appear from another angle in investigations of whether democracies tend to avoid war with each other.
Topic:
Democratization and Politics

46. The Dark Side of Social Capital

Author:
Martin Gargiulo and Mario Benassi
Publication Date:
09-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University
Abstract:
Research on social capital has stressed the advantages that networks can bring to managers and other economic actors. The enthusiasm with this "bright side" of social capital, however, neglects the fact that social bonds may at times have detrimental effects for a manager. This paper tries to correct the optimistic bias by looking at the "dark side" of social capital. Continuing benefits from social capital require that managers can adapt the composition of this social capital to the shifting demands of their task environment. This often implies the ability to create new ties while lessening the salience of some of the old bonds--if not severing them altogether. Available evidence, however, suggests that this ability may be encumbered by the same relationships purportedly responsible for the prior success of the manager. When and how this may happen is the central question we address in this paper. We argue that strong ties to cohesive contacts limit the manager's ability keep control on the composition of his network and jeopardize his adaptability to changing task environments. We test our ideas with data on managers operating in a special unit of a European high-technology firm.
Topic:
Economics
Political Geography:
Europe