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1. Iran Nuclear Deal Procurement Channel Update: Is it being bypassed?

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The procurement channel set up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, appears to be considering fewer proposals than expected and is altogether unused by a traditionally illicit conduit to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and non-nuclear programs, namely China. The procurement channel was designed to regulate Iran’s imports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods for nuclear or non-nuclear use. Given that Iran’s non-nuclear industries have often imported nuclear dual-use goods, this finding raises the question of whether the procurement channel, and its associated Procurement Working Group (PWG), is simply not being used, but illicit, nuclear dual-use supplies are still going to Iran. Although no evidence has emerged of banned sales going from the United States, Europe, or Japan, which have often been targets of Iranian illicit procurement networks, there is concern that banned sales could be going from parts of Asia. In particular, Chinese entities may be continuing to make sales of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran without using the channel. The United States and its allies should augment efforts to detect and intercept the flow of any strategic goods from China to Iran and from other potentially illicit supplier countries to Iran. China needs to reach out to suppliers or distributors of dual-use goods operating on its territory and ensure that they are informed about China’s export control laws and PWG requirements governing the sale of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran’s industries, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

2. Technical Note on a Timeline for North Korean Denuclearization

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On May 28, 2018, the New York Times reported on a technical roadmap for North Korean denuclearization written by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S. Hecker and colleagues Robert L. Carlin and Elliot A. Serbin. While we greatly respect the work of Dr. Hecker and colleagues, we disagree on the up to 15-year timeline put forth for completing full denuclearization. Our assessments are based on verified dismantlement in other countries. If North Korea agrees to denuclearize and to cooperate fully, admittedly big “ifs,” then verified dismantlement of the key parts of its nuclear weapons program can happen in parallel and be accomplished in as little as about two years. Gaining assurance that North Korea is not hiding relatively small but significant amounts of plutonium, enriched uranium, or nuclear weapons will take longer than two years and will likely fall to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle as part of bringing North Korea into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state. This whole process could take several more years, as the IAEA insists on accounting for even grams of nuclear explosive materials, as it should. Decommissioning operating reactors and plutonium separation plants will also take years longer. But within a few years, all the declared nuclear weapons and stocks of plutonium and enriched uranium could be verifiably eliminated, and all key facilities identified and rendered unable to operate. Moreover, the verification process can include a sufficient estimate of the amount of plutonium and enriched uranium North Korea has produced, allowing a first order check on whether North Korea has declared all its nuclear weapons. Of course, this process could take longer, but such a process should not be structured in a way that invites North Korea to go slowly and delays the date when North Korea demonstrates it intends to get rid of its nuclear weapons. The past two major negotiations with North Korea are a cautionary tale for avoiding a drawn-out process, where the most difficult decisions are left to the future.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3. Most Nuclear Ban Treaty Proponents are Lagging in Implementing Sound Export Control Legislation

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Using data compiled from a new index by our Institute, the Peddling Peril Index, which we will soon release, three quarters of the countries that voted in July 2017 in favor of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons lack adequate export control legislation. These countries lack a firm basis to control the export or retransfer of nuclear and nuclear-related commodities that are critical to the production and possession of nuclear weapons. If the UN Ban Treaty proponent countries truly seek a world without nuclear weapons, they should take the lead in ensuring that all countries, including their own, have effective strategic trade control systems able to prevent the spread of dangerous commodities and facilities that are critical to the production, maintenance, and improvement of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. A Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Finding a Definition More Fitting of Today’s Reality

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Trump administration has announced that it has created a new North Korea policy that is aimed at exerting maximal pressure on Pyongyang but also achieving negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. However, denuclearization negotiations do not appear imminent. The Trump administration has stated that now is the time for focusing on creating greater pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has signaled little interest in negotiations and much more interest in developing and keeping its nuclear weapons, comprised of both the warheads and missiles. But it is not too early to discuss what negotiations should look like. Many have stated that the denuclearization process should start with the creation of a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program, as was done in previous North Korean negotiations. A freeze, albeit limited, was also the starting point for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. But what should this freeze look like in new North Korean negotiations, given all its nuclear advances in the last several years?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

5. Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Although President-elect Donald Trump’s position on the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, he and his allies in the Congress are expected to at least better enforce and strengthen the Iran deal. They should start by focusing on the deal’s heavy water loophole, whereby Iran can store offshore in Oman heavy water it owns and controls in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits, awaiting its eventual sale. To date, if the stocks in Iran and Oman are counted together (a reasonable view since Iran owns and controls both stocks), Iran has far exceeded the nuclear deal’s stated limit of maintaining a stock of only 130 metric tons of heavy water. Yet, this loophole was sanctioned by the executive body of the Iran deal, the Joint Commission. Despite such generous treatment, Iran has even so twice violated the narrow limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water it can hold inside Iran since the deal started in January 2016. Iran should no longer be facilitated in its overproduction of nuclear-related heavy water. Oman would do the world a favor by halting its willingness to accept Iranian heavy water and send any back to Iran for downblending. The return of the heavy water and its blending down would dramatically signal to Iran that violations of the Iran deal are no longer going to be tolerated, or worse, facilitated. Moreover, any further overproduction should be seen by the United States as a violation of the deal. It should work to end the Oman loophole and mitigate damage caused by a U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories in South Africa

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
South Africa produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons at the Y plant at the Pelindaba nuclear center located near Pretoria. This plant, which operated from 1977 until early 1990, was designed to make weapon-grade uranium. However, it experienced operational problems that led to the production of less than expected amounts of weapon-grade uranium and a considerable amount of HEU enriched less than 90 percent. In late 1989, then-President F.W. de Klerk ordered an end to the nuclear weapons program, including the shutdown of the Y Plant, and decided to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Following the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, South Africa brought the NPT into force in 1991, subjecting its entire inventory of HEU to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As part of the IAEA’s effort to verify South Africa’s initial nuclear material declaration, it conducted an unprecedented investigation aimed at determining that South Africa had declared its HEU inventory completely. After a two year investigation into both the production and use of HEU, the IAEA concluded in September 1993 that South Africa had satisfactorily declared its HEU.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

7. Understanding the IAEA’s Mandate in Iran: Avoiding Misinterpretations

Author:
David Albright, Olli Heinonen, and Orde Kittrie
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Much attention has focused on Iran's advancing nuclear program, on the peace and security concerns which that program has raised, and on the international policy debate over how to respond to that program. Far less attention has been paid to the various legal-sounding arguments used by Iran and a few academics to call into question the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to investigate and make determinations about actual or suspected violations of Iran’s legal obligations. Although arguments used by Iran and these academics to undermine the legitimacy of IAEA activities regarding Iran are patently false, they are nevertheless dangerous to both current and future nonproliferation efforts. Unless these arguments are clearly countered, and their fallaciousness clearly demonstrated for all the world to see, these arguments may decrease the chances of Iran agreeing to comply with its international legal obligations, could provide a fig leaf to those countries disinclined to hold Iran accountable, and might undercut the IAEA's and the United Nations Security Council's potentially pivotal roles in facilitating a peaceful resolution to disputes over the nuclear programs of Iran and future proliferators. It is in that light that we have chosen to address the dangerous claim published on September 13, 2012 by Daniel Joyner, a law professor at the University of Alabama, that the IAEA has exceeded its legal mandate in applying safeguards in Iran in accordance with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the importance of the IAEA's activities regarding Iran, the persistent efforts by Iran to call into question the legitimacy of those IAEA activities, and our concern to ensure that there is no misunderstanding as to the agency's mandates, we are writing to discuss those mandates and explain why Joyner is incorrect.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

8. After the 2010 NPT Review Conference: Advancing the Non-Proliferation Pillar

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Adoption of a consensus final document action plan at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference on May 28 was a significant achievement for the parties to the NPT. It is a particular achievement for the United States, which fought hard for consensus against great odds. Success was even more important because the last review conference in 2005 ended in acrimony and without a final document. The document demonstrates and reinforces international commitment to the global nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. The parties to the NPT have agreed to implement a set of specific actions that cover a wide variety of areas in support of the three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These actions are measurable and will provide accountability at the next review conference. The unfortunate news is that the document does not substantially strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the Treaty, the more urgent priority with regard to the three pillars in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conference was unsuccessful in significantly advancing support for universal application of the Model Additional Protocol, dealing with noncompliant states such as Iran, addressing withdrawal while a state is noncompliant, and preventing illicit nuclear trade in the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

9. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region. Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America