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1. Iran Nuclear Deal Procurement Channel Update: Is it being bypassed?

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The procurement channel set up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, appears to be considering fewer proposals than expected and is altogether unused by a traditionally illicit conduit to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and non-nuclear programs, namely China. The procurement channel was designed to regulate Iran’s imports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods for nuclear or non-nuclear use. Given that Iran’s non-nuclear industries have often imported nuclear dual-use goods, this finding raises the question of whether the procurement channel, and its associated Procurement Working Group (PWG), is simply not being used, but illicit, nuclear dual-use supplies are still going to Iran. Although no evidence has emerged of banned sales going from the United States, Europe, or Japan, which have often been targets of Iranian illicit procurement networks, there is concern that banned sales could be going from parts of Asia. In particular, Chinese entities may be continuing to make sales of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran without using the channel. The United States and its allies should augment efforts to detect and intercept the flow of any strategic goods from China to Iran and from other potentially illicit supplier countries to Iran. China needs to reach out to suppliers or distributors of dual-use goods operating on its territory and ensure that they are informed about China’s export control laws and PWG requirements governing the sale of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran’s industries, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

2. Case Study: Fake Defense Contractor Indicted for Exporting Military Related Drawings to Turkey

Author:
Hanah Joudi and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On September 5, 2018, the owner of a New Jersey defense contracting firm, Ferdi Murat Gul, was indicted by a grand jury in the United States District Court in the District of New Jersey on charges of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, violating the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and conspiracy to violate the AECA. Gul, a Turkish citizen, is the principal owner, chief executive officer, and general manager of two U.S.-based businesses: an alleged defense contracting company, Bright Machinery Manufacturing Group Inc. (BMM), and an alleged manufacturing company, FMG Machinery Group (FMG), and also holds ownership interests in a manufacturing company in Turkey, HFMG Insaat (HFMG). From October 2010 to June 2015, BMM was awarded approximately $7 million in 346 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) contracts to manufacture military parts in the United States and provide them to DOD customers, such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. But according to the indictment, in reality, BMM was a front company set up with the purpose of defrauding the United States. The parts it manufactured included those “for torpedoes for the U.S. Navy, bomb ejector racks and armament utilized in U.S. Air Force aircraft, and firearms and mine clearance systems used by U.S. military personnel abroad.” Allegedly, Gul and two unnamed, un-indicted co-conspirators falsely claimed that BMM manufactured these parts in the United States. However, the indictment alleges that BMM illegally exported technical military drawings to manufacture the parts in Turkey, and then sold the parts – some of which had “design flaws and non-conformities and were unusable” – to U.S. customers.
Topic:
Crime, Illegal Trade, and Military Contractors
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

3. What is new in the Iran Nuclear Archive?

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Nuclear Archive seized by Israel in Iran contains much new information not previously available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or Western governments about Iran’s past work on nuclear weapons under the so-called AMAD project. I have reviewed much of the information gathered by the IAEA about Iran’s past nuclear weapons programs and it is compelling, but this information has many gaps and is unable to allow for conclusions about the current program and its intentions. The archive fills in many of these holes, and overall, according to the Israelis, it presents a relatively complete and alarming picture of Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, and in far more detailed than previously available.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

4. Nuclear Infrastructure and Proliferation Risks of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Erica Wenig, David Albright, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Apart from Saudi Arabia, which our Institute views as currently the largest proliferation risk in the Middle East, three key neighbors of Iran also warrant intensive study as to their nuclear capabilities and plans, safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and future proliferation risks. After Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt are seen by the Institute as states in the Middle East most poised to seek advanced nuclear capabilities in response to a resurgent nuclear Iran, or as the limitations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) conclude or otherwise end. Egypt has the most experience of the three in working with nuclear materials and facilities under efforts dating back decades. Turkey may pose the greatest risk as far as surprise proliferation given the state of political affairs in that country and growing impulse of President Erdogan to consolidate power. The UAE, which was the first Middle Eastern country to adopt a so-called “gold standard” of renouncing enrichment and reprocessing, will be a country to watch for reversing course on its pledge. Each of these countries has varying security concerns with regard to Iran, and each has nuanced domestic goals that could propel proliferation attempts. A common recommendation for all three countries is that the United States and its allies should seek strong defensive relationships with those countries potentially affected by the end of JCPOA limits; others include the United States should work to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in the region and use national intelligence and diplomatic capabilities to detect and work to reverse proliferation if it emerges. A summary of findings on each country follows, with a technical look at their emerging nuclear capabilities and plans, the security context with regard to Iran, status of their safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and recommendations for preventing the spread of advanced nuclear capabilities in the region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

5. Strengthening the Counter-Illicit Nuclear Trade Regime in the Face of New Threats: A Two-Year Review of Proliferation Threats Associated with the Middle East

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, Sarah Burkhard, and Erica Wenig
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The United States’ and associated global export control regime is losing ground due to several global events and trends underway in the United States and the Middle East. The developments at home and abroad are reducing controls and oversight over the flow of commodities vital to the development of nuclear weapons. Unless these trends are reversed, U.S. efforts to stem and stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and elsewhere will weaken. Events contributing to this greater proliferation danger include: 1) relaxed U.S. export control regulations and greater emphasis on global trade with streamlined exchange of intellectual property and commodities, including nuclear commodities; 2) on-going questions over the strong regulation of sensitive trade to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and 3) the expected actions of additional states to obtain nuclear capabilities to counterbalance Iran. This report provides findings from four studies that were part of a two-year Institute for Science and International Security review which identified threats to the United States’ and interconnected global export control regime and actions to take now to mitigate damages. The review found that U.S. policy goals should include strong efforts to restrict the flow of sensitive technologies to the Middle East where proliferation and security concerns are currently high. This includes examining its own export control reforms and repairing new or ongoing deficiencies that contribute to the spread of sensitive military or other technologies. It should work to negotiate or otherwise impose the extension of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), since the legitimization of Iran’s advanced nuclear program exacerbates proliferation concerns. It should counter illicit nuclear and missile trade in the Middle East and elsewhere, which could support nuclear weapons development. The United States should affirm its strong defensive commitment to allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt, while working against their development or import of advanced fuel cycle capabilities. The United States should also support the implementation of strong controls and transparency measures in the Middle East to ensure that burgeoning civilian nuclear programs remain peaceful, such as commitments not to enrich or reprocess, implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provision of secure, lifetime fuel supplies for nuclear reactors. It should monitor via national intelligence capabilities any concerning research or imports by Middle East nations that could signify proliferation intentions, and use all available diplomatic or coercive means to prevent additional nuclear proliferation. Finally, the United States and its allies should work to reduce Middle East security tensions and develop threat reduction efforts more broadly.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Middle East

6. Cobalt 60 Sources in Mosul: Recovery and Lessons for the Future

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Two years ago, in the summer of 2015, the Institute decided to investigate whether Daesh controlled dangerous radioactive material in Iraq or Syria. The result of a few months of study by Sarah Burkhard, a young scientist, and other staff surprised us all. Their investigations found that there were apparently two sources of radioactive cobalt in Mosul that posed a risk of being used in a radiological dispersal device. We could not know if Daesh was aware of these sources and their potential, or had already taken possession of them. We produced a confidential research study that we used to alert the United States and other friendly governments of the situation as we knew it, most of which were also monitoring the situation. At the same time, we decided not to publish any of our results. As we learned more, we updated our study, which remains a confidential report due to its sensitivity. We are very relieved that these two, older albeit still dangerous, cobalt 60 sources were not found and used by Daesh. They were recovered intact recently. We want to thank in particular Joby Warrick at The Washington Post, who we had alerted early on for assistance in researching the fate of these sources. He understood the importance of digging into this story while delaying its publication until the radioactive sources were in safe hands. He and his colleagues at The Washington Post recently added greatly to this important story.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Mosul

7. Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Although President-elect Donald Trump’s position on the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, he and his allies in the Congress are expected to at least better enforce and strengthen the Iran deal. They should start by focusing on the deal’s heavy water loophole, whereby Iran can store offshore in Oman heavy water it owns and controls in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits, awaiting its eventual sale. To date, if the stocks in Iran and Oman are counted together (a reasonable view since Iran owns and controls both stocks), Iran has far exceeded the nuclear deal’s stated limit of maintaining a stock of only 130 metric tons of heavy water. Yet, this loophole was sanctioned by the executive body of the Iran deal, the Joint Commission. Despite such generous treatment, Iran has even so twice violated the narrow limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water it can hold inside Iran since the deal started in January 2016. Iran should no longer be facilitated in its overproduction of nuclear-related heavy water. Oman would do the world a favor by halting its willingness to accept Iranian heavy water and send any back to Iran for downblending. The return of the heavy water and its blending down would dramatically signal to Iran that violations of the Iran deal are no longer going to be tolerated, or worse, facilitated. Moreover, any further overproduction should be seen by the United States as a violation of the deal. It should work to end the Oman loophole and mitigate damage caused by a U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

8. Israel’s Military Plutonium Inventory

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Israel developed its first nuclear weapon shortly before the 1967 Six Day War, making it the sixth nation to develop nuclear weapons.2 To this day, Israel maintains an ambiguous posture about its nuclear weapons, despite the declassification of formerly secret U.S. government documents which assert the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons. In addition, the revelations of Mordechai Vanunu in 1986 revealed a larger nuclear weapons program than commonly assessed at that time.3 The heart of Israel’s nuclear weapons production complex is the Dimona site near the city of Beersheva. This site contains a number of secret nuclear facilities for the production of plutonium, including a heavy water reactor, a fuel fabrication plant, and a plutonium separation plant, all provided by France in the 1950s and early 1960s. The site also reportedly contains facilities likely involved in tritium extraction and purification (using tritium also produced in the reactor), lithium production, and possibly facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment, at least on a research and development scale.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

9. Additional Taiwan-Based Element of Iranian Military Goods Procurement Network Exposed

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, David Schnur, and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On June 25, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas announced that Kunlin Hsieh (or Xia) of Taiwan pled guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws and transshipment of dual-use military equipment from the United States to Iran.1 The goods had uses in missile guidance systems, secure tactical radio communications, and military radar networks. According to court documents, between 2007 and 2014, Hsieh, a Taiwanese national and sales manager of JunBon Enterprises of Taiwan, along with his associate Agris Indricevs, who was charged in the same indictment, procured and brokered the purchase of U.S. goods and transshipped them to Iran. They also worked with Ryan Surrena, another employee of JunBon, who was charged in a separate indictment. Hsieh will face up to twenty years in prison at a sentencing hearing scheduled for September 25, 2015. Indricevs’ case was scheduled to go to trial on August 10, 2015. Surrena was arrested in Texas in 2013 and worked with U.S. officials to further their case. He pled guilty to reduced charges in July 2014 under a sealed plea agreement, which likely takes into consideration his believed assistance, and is due to face sentencing in October 2015. This network represents another element of an already known procurement network operating among entities in Taiwan and Iran and targeting goods made in the United States. The network sent U.S. dual-use military equipment to several companies owned by Mehrdad Foomanie in Iran, such as Sazgan Ertebat Co and Moravid Sanant Co, Ltd.2 Foomanie, who remains at large, was indicted by the Texas court in 2011. Another Taiwanese national operating in the United States, Susan Yip, was arrested and sentenced in Texas. ISIS documented the case of Yip and Foomanie here. Yip used her Taiwan based company Hivocal Technology Co to procure goods for Foomanie in Iran.3 She pled guilty in July 2012 to charges and was sentenced to two years in prison. It appears that U.S. officials gathered additional evidence for charges before seeking to indict the other participants in the network.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Military Spending, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, and Asia

10. Daesh Hype about Stealing Nuclear Weapons

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
With Daesh entrenched in Syria and Iraq and growing in influence in North Africa and Pakistan, the risk is likely to grow that the terrorist group or one of its allies will seek nuclear weapons. Or at least this is what they want the world to think since their publications imply these intentions. But Daesh’s public claims of ways to accomplish that goal are unfounded and mainly seem intended to simply incite fear. At ISIS, we assess that the risk of Daesh acquiring nuclear weapons is low. However, that characterization needs to be carefully considered. The chance of Daesh acquiring a nuclear weapon, either through theft of a functioning nuclear weapon, or of nuclear explosive material followed by the manufacturing of a crude nuclear explosive, is assessed as low, similar to the risk of a major nuclear reactor accident, such as the Chernobyl and Fukishima disasters. However, although the chance of Daesh stealing a nuclear weapon is low, the consequences would be horrible and extraordinary efforts need to be waged to ensure that the risk becomes even lower. A nuclear explosive going off in a major city would have catastrophic consequences, probably far worse than those of Chernobyl or Fukishima. While the threat of Daesh stealing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon needs to be taken seriously, Daesh writings on the subject should be discounted. In a May 2015 article in the Daesh magazine Dabiq, the British journalist John Cantlie warns of Daesh’s rapid global expansion and its capabilities to launch major terroristic attacks – including acquiring a nuclear weapon and smuggling it into the United States. It is uncertain if Cantlie actually penned the article, titled “The Perfect Storm.” However, the sentiments of the piece likely reflect Daesh ambitions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Middle East, and North Africa