Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Asia Publishing Institution Institute for Science and International Security

1. Technical Note on a Timeline for North Korean Denuclearization

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On May 28, 2018, the New York Times reported on a technical roadmap for North Korean denuclearization written by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S. Hecker and colleagues Robert L. Carlin and Elliot A. Serbin. While we greatly respect the work of Dr. Hecker and colleagues, we disagree on the up to 15-year timeline put forth for completing full denuclearization. Our assessments are based on verified dismantlement in other countries. If North Korea agrees to denuclearize and to cooperate fully, admittedly big “ifs,” then verified dismantlement of the key parts of its nuclear weapons program can happen in parallel and be accomplished in as little as about two years. Gaining assurance that North Korea is not hiding relatively small but significant amounts of plutonium, enriched uranium, or nuclear weapons will take longer than two years and will likely fall to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle as part of bringing North Korea into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state. This whole process could take several more years, as the IAEA insists on accounting for even grams of nuclear explosive materials, as it should. Decommissioning operating reactors and plutonium separation plants will also take years longer. But within a few years, all the declared nuclear weapons and stocks of plutonium and enriched uranium could be verifiably eliminated, and all key facilities identified and rendered unable to operate. Moreover, the verification process can include a sufficient estimate of the amount of plutonium and enriched uranium North Korea has produced, allowing a first order check on whether North Korea has declared all its nuclear weapons. Of course, this process could take longer, but such a process should not be structured in a way that invites North Korea to go slowly and delays the date when North Korea demonstrates it intends to get rid of its nuclear weapons. The past two major negotiations with North Korea are a cautionary tale for avoiding a drawn-out process, where the most difficult decisions are left to the future.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

2. A Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Finding a Definition More Fitting of Today’s Reality

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Trump administration has announced that it has created a new North Korea policy that is aimed at exerting maximal pressure on Pyongyang but also achieving negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. However, denuclearization negotiations do not appear imminent. The Trump administration has stated that now is the time for focusing on creating greater pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has signaled little interest in negotiations and much more interest in developing and keeping its nuclear weapons, comprised of both the warheads and missiles. But it is not too early to discuss what negotiations should look like. Many have stated that the denuclearization process should start with the creation of a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program, as was done in previous North Korean negotiations. A freeze, albeit limited, was also the starting point for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. But what should this freeze look like in new North Korean negotiations, given all its nuclear advances in the last several years?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

3. Future Directions in the DPRK’S Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Like many secret nuclear weapons programs, the DPRK goes to great lengths to hide its capabilities to produce nuclear explosive materials and nuclear weapons. Despite these actions, a picture can be drawn of North Korea’s current and projected plutonium and weapons-grade uranium (WGU) stocks. Knowing these plutonium and WGU stocks can, in turn, allow an estimate of the DPRK’s current number of nuclear weapons and a range of projections of the number North Korea could build in the next several years. Although great uncertainty surrounds these projections, as well as the quality of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, these projections form a reasonable picture of the DPRK’s possible nuclear weapons futures, absent actions to significantly limit its nuclear programs. After summarizing estimates of stocks of separated plutonium and weapons-grade uranium as of the end of 2014, this report develops three projections of future nuclear arsenals through 2020: low-end, medium, and high-end nuclear futures. In developing these projections, which are intended to bound North Korea’s nuclear futures, a number of constraints are considered, including the number and size of nuclear production facilities, future underground testing, the extent and success of nuclear weaponization efforts, costs, and access to necessary goods and classified and proprietary technologies abroad.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

4. Additional Taiwan-Based Element of Iranian Military Goods Procurement Network Exposed

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, David Schnur, and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On June 25, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas announced that Kunlin Hsieh (or Xia) of Taiwan pled guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws and transshipment of dual-use military equipment from the United States to Iran.1 The goods had uses in missile guidance systems, secure tactical radio communications, and military radar networks. According to court documents, between 2007 and 2014, Hsieh, a Taiwanese national and sales manager of JunBon Enterprises of Taiwan, along with his associate Agris Indricevs, who was charged in the same indictment, procured and brokered the purchase of U.S. goods and transshipped them to Iran. They also worked with Ryan Surrena, another employee of JunBon, who was charged in a separate indictment. Hsieh will face up to twenty years in prison at a sentencing hearing scheduled for September 25, 2015. Indricevs’ case was scheduled to go to trial on August 10, 2015. Surrena was arrested in Texas in 2013 and worked with U.S. officials to further their case. He pled guilty to reduced charges in July 2014 under a sealed plea agreement, which likely takes into consideration his believed assistance, and is due to face sentencing in October 2015. This network represents another element of an already known procurement network operating among entities in Taiwan and Iran and targeting goods made in the United States. The network sent U.S. dual-use military equipment to several companies owned by Mehrdad Foomanie in Iran, such as Sazgan Ertebat Co and Moravid Sanant Co, Ltd.2 Foomanie, who remains at large, was indicted by the Texas court in 2011. Another Taiwanese national operating in the United States, Susan Yip, was arrested and sentenced in Texas. ISIS documented the case of Yip and Foomanie here. Yip used her Taiwan based company Hivocal Technology Co to procure goods for Foomanie in Iran.3 She pled guilty in July 2012 to charges and was sentenced to two years in prison. It appears that U.S. officials gathered additional evidence for charges before seeking to indict the other participants in the network.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Military Spending, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Taiwan, and Asia

5. North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
For years, great controversy has surrounded North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP). How large is it? Has it made weapon-grade uranium (WGU)? How much could it make in the future? But there are also broader questions. What is the role of the UEP in the larger North Korean nuclear program? Is the UEP program strictly oriented to make 3.5 percent low enriched uranium for a civilian light water reactor (LWR) under construction at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, as North Korea says? Is it to make WGU? Or could North Korea intend to further enrich uranium for use in the light water reactor to make plutonium for nuclear weapons? Although LWRs are not typically used to make weapon-grade plutonium, they can do so efficiently if the reactor core is specially designed. Finally, how should the United States respond to the UEP and the associated uncertainties in this program? This ISIS report attempts to answer these questions utilizing plausible scenarios about past and possible future operation of the centrifuge program that could result in the production of WGU and future operation of the LWR that could make weapon-grade plutonium. In doing so, the report seeks to organize the incomplete data and derive answers to the above questions that have policy relevance. The report’s results are necessarily preliminary because significant uncertainties exist about the number of North Korean gas centrifuge plants, their operation, and the amount and enrichment level of the enriched uranium produced in them. In addition, although North Korea has said that its Yongbyon LWR is for civilian purposes, this statement is unverified and doubts about its potential use are justified. This report is designed to be updated if and when additional information is obtained.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

6. FUKUSHIMA CRISIS: UNMONITORED RELEASES Preliminary Assessment of Accident Sequences and Potential Atmospheric Radiation Releases

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
instances of unmonitored radiation releases to the atmosphere from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors. The radiation readings and ground level wind directions are from the TEPCO web site. ISIS could not validate TEPCO’s information, but the data appear adequate to conduct some scoping analysis of the releases. Using this information, ISIS has sought to understand the fate of the releases and determine whether radiation monitoring stations intersected the plume of released radioactive material. We welcome any input. Since March 11, reactor units 1-4 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant have experienced hydrogen explosions, fires, partial melting of irradiated or “spent” fuel in the reactors, the uncovering and possible burning of irradiated fuel in spent fuel ponds at reactor 4 and perhaps other reactors. Table 1 lists several known accidents that occurred through March 18. These accidents, and perhaps ones that were not noticed or reported, released significant amounts of radiation into the atmosphere that the winds spread widely. They all require greater scrutiny. From an analysis of the limited data on atmospheric releases, ISIS has developed several key findings. The first is that the limited radiation detection capabilities at the Fukushima Daiichi plant following the earthquake and tsunami eliminated the ability to detect, characterize, or track a release of radiation. Many releases went partially or completely undetected by on-site monitoring. None of the releases from accidents were monitored as to their radioactive contents. Although the amount and type of radionuclides in these releases cannot be estimated from the existing on-site monitoring data, the existing data support that the potential for significant radiation doses to off-site population exists, particularly in sectors northwest and southwest of the reactors.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Nuclear Power, Nuclear Safety, Disaster Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

7. Characterizing the Crisis at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
04-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
During the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power reactors following the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, the Japanese Safety Authority issued ratings for the accident on the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES). Initially, it stated that the incident was a level 4, but it subsequently raised the levels assigned to each reactor, with the majority receiving a level 5. Table 1 indicates the latest ratings issued March 18 by the Japanese authority, where it has parsed the ratings based on accidents at individual reactors. Although the radioactivity is emitted from different reactor buildings, it represents a collective hazard to public health. As such, the accident should be judged comprehensively, not only in component parts. Simply because some aspects of the crisis were not as catastrophic as others does not lessen the overall severity of the accident. ISIS continues to assess that the accident is a level 6.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Crisis Management, Disaster Management, Fukushima Disaster, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

8. North Korea’s Plutonium Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On December 27, Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper quoted U.S. and North Korean officials saying that North Korea had declared a plutonium stockpile of about 30 kilograms. The report was subsequently picked up by several wires, including AFP and UPI. Based on discussions with a knowledgeable official, this roughly 30 kilograms of plutonium apparently refers to a stock of plutonium that North Korea separated from irradiated fuel produced in the five megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon. The separation of the plutonium occurred at the Radiochemical Laboroatory at Yongbyon. If this quantity refers to separated plutonium (and not the total quantity of plutonium produced in the spent fuel of several reactor cores), it does fall inside the lower bound of the range of the amount of separated plutonium that ISIS has assessed North Korea could now possess.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

9. Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities

Author:
David Albright and Paul Brannan
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The October 3, 2007 Six-Party Talks accord outlines a roadmap for the disablement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) core nuclear facilities. While an agreement on “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” has been secured, the specific details of the nuclear disablement process are still being developed. The primary goals of this Working Paper are twofold. First, to establish a definition for the term “disablement” which has only recently achieved widespread usage in the disarmament and nonproliferation community. Second, to outline the types of steps that will or could be taken at key facilities in the DPRK to achieve various disablement objectives. This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

10. Dismantling the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: A Practicable, Verifiable Plan of Action

Author:
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Verified dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) can be accomplished successfully. Although difficulties abound in reaching an agreement with the DPRK to achieve this goal, the methods and steps involved in the dismantlement process are well understood. Because this goal remains vital to U.S. and international security, the United States has joined with China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in working toward verified denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with the cooperation of the DPRK. These six nations have launched a series of negotiations, called the Six-Party Talks, aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear program. These nations are also attempting to create a plan to dismantle the DPRK’s program in a manner with which all the nations can feel secure.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America