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21. Stabilizing and Reconstructing Iraq: A Challenging Path Ahead

Author:
Michael Pregent and Jonas Parello-Plesner
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Iraq has militarily defeated the terrorist organization ISIS. This is the good news, which was also underlined at the recent Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS meeting in Kuwait on 13 February 2018 held in conjunction with the Kuwaiti Reconstruction Conference for Iraq. Yet the task ahead is as daunting as any military campaign. Now Iraq needs to rebuild and to heal its communities to foster an inclusive national identity. Challenges remain, from funding continuing stabilization efforts to the even larger resources needed for reconstruction over the coming years. According to announcements made at the Iraqi reconstruction conference in Kuwait, donors have pledged a decent amount, around $30 billion, although $88 billion was touted as the desired amount by the Iraqi Government. The Gulf countries and Turkey are becoming new large donors. The private sector also showed significant interest, although corruption is still a major concern, which the Iraqi government seeks to address. Continued stabilization is making it possible and desirable for internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes. Over 3 million Iraqis have returned, but more await in camps or temporary accommodations. Equally important is reconciliation. The UN is working with the Iraqi government to implement this at the national level. Baghdad and Erbil should pursue continued dialogue and concrete steps forward, including on the thorny issue of Kirkuk, in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution. Inclusiveness for Sunnis is important, both during reconstruction and before and after elections, as their disenfranchisement helped produce fertile soil for ISIS. Yet reconciliation should not be only top-down, and local community efforts undertaken by Iraqi civil society organizations are essential. Reconstruction funding should be tied to government reforms and more importantly, to tangible progress on reconciliation and political accommodation efforts. A novel aspect of the conference was the US administration’s new approach to burden-sharing in the aftermath of the ISIS presence in Iraq. President Trump wants to build infrastructure at home in the US and has tweeted dismissively about the $7 trillion the US has already spent in the Middle East. The United States will not disburse public funding for reconstruction, which is seen as nation-building, although it remains among the top contributors to humanitarian and stabilization assistance and will provide loans to private companies. Yet even such investments could pose additional risk for American companies because of sanctions against Iran, whose economic presence is felt in several important sectors. Instead, the US encouraged international institutions and others to step up, and Saudi Arabia, for example, contributed $1.5 billion. Leading up to the conference, the US facilitated a diplomatic reconciliation process between Iraq and Saudi Arabia for outstanding debts owed to Riyadh. The conference also gave Prime Minister Haider al Abadi a strong platform for brandishing his vision of a united Iraq, although some areas, particularly in the Sunni parts of the country, still feel excluded from reconstruction planning. Still, it is an open question whether that positive vision is enough to bring him another governing coalition following the Iraqi parliamentary elections in May. The continued presence of American military forces is increasingly a topic of contention in the elections.
Topic:
International Relations, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Reconstruction, Radicalization, Islamic State, Humanitarian Intervention, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Kuwait, and United States of America

22. Breaking the Defense Barrier

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The key to strengthening and deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to better meet regional threats is to increase defense trade and defense industrial cooperation between the two countries. A Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT), a formal agreement between two countries which exempts their trade in certain specified defense and defense-related articles from the arms export regulations of both nations, would be an important way to achieve that goal.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Significance and Role

Author:
Seth Cropsey and Jun Isomura
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The alliance between the United States and Japan, born at the end of the Second World War, continues to play a vital role in the defense of the Japanese Islands and in U.S. regional Indo-Pacific strategy. The People’s Republic of China is challenging the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region. China has greatly increased its defense budget, expanded and modernized its navy, and increased operations that challenge the region’s status quo—including in the East China Sea, where the PRC regularly violates Japan’s territorial waters, in the vicinity of the contested Senkaku Islands. China’s belligerent behavior poses a strategic threat to Japan’s domestic security and will continue to encroach on Japanese and U.S. interests in the region. The PRC’s threatening behavior and an aggressive nuclear-armed North Korea are testing the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance as it has not been tested since the Cold War. The United States continues to serve as a guarantor of Japan’s national security. The U.S. military has stationed naval, air force, army, and amphibious forces in Japan as a strategic deterrent against would be aggressors. With U.S. forces in Japan as a deterrent, Japan has developed a pacifist strategy based on non-aggression and security limited to self-defense. The Japanese constitution’s Article 9 enshrined this principle into law. Japan’s regional strategy has paid dividends through political, diplomatic, and economic engagement with Indo-Pacific countries. This includes Japan’s increasing defensive security cooperation in the region. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces have participated alongside the United States and such neighboring states as South Korea in bilateral and multilateral exercises that build both capabilities and security relationships. Beyond diplomatic and soft power engagement, Japan has in recent years increased its defensive capabilities. To counter Chinese and North Korean missile threats, Japan has worked with the United States to build an advanced ballistic missile defense. In addition, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have acquired medium-range cruise missiles for its air forces to deter potential adversaries from launching attacks. Tokyo has expanded its defense to counter challenges below the threshold of war against Japan’s outlying islands. Improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and the establishment of amphibious forces contribute to this defense.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. The Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Interference Operations: How the U.S. and Other Democracies Should Respond

Author:
Jonas Parello-Plesner
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s interference and election meddling dominate the headlines and Washington’s attention. But beneath the radar, another country’s interference is expanding, dwarfing Russia’s short-term disruption. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under General Secretary Xi Jinping has put enormous resources into influence abroad, estimated at $10 billion a year. [...] In this report, we provide specific recommendations for the U.S. and the broader community of democracies on how to enact proactive and protective measures. First and foremost, the National Security Council should finalize a whole-of-government mapping of CCP interference and influence, mapping the boundaries between counter-intelligence and law enforcement and over to legislation and civil society initiatives. To further transparency and public scrutiny, Congress should mandate a yearly report on the issue. Civil society, think tanks, China scholars, and journalists should join together and create a “United Front tracker.” And stronger defenses are needed, such as increased donor transparency in campaign finance and tightening of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) and Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA). A civil rights approach should provide targeted protection to Chinese-American communities from foreign interference. Internationally, we suggest collaboration among democratic governments to create a “United Front of Democracies” and explore counter-measures. These could include more funding of media and education worldwide to provide Chinese diaspora communities with news not controlled by Beijing and countering the attractiveness of Confucius Institutes by securing more independent funding for Chinese-language studies and China research. In the end, transparency and legislation can only go a certain distance. Democracy is kept alive by democratic citizens and well-functioning institutions. The citizens of the United States and other democracies need to personally invest in safeguarding their democratic traditions rather than selling out. This is the genuine long-term inoculation against the challenge from authoritarian interference and influence.
Topic:
International Relations, Corruption, Elections, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, East Asia, and United States of America

25. After the West? A Positive Transatlantic Agenda in a Post-Atlantic Age

Author:
Hudson Institute
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The golden age of transatlantic relations is behind us. It is tempting to reduce the reasons for this change down to the personalities of the leaders involved, and particularly to the peculiarities of U.S. President Donald Trump, but such an approach would ignore the deeper trends that have been affecting both the European and American sides for years. The relationship between the United States and Europe does not have the centrality it once had for policymakers on either side, and matters ever less to their publics. Part of the reason for the diminution of the relationship’s importance should be cause for celebration: the main strategic adversary that justified America’s deep commitment to the European continent—the Soviet Union (USSR)—has collapsed. Despite divisions and setbacks, most of Europe is reunited and the past two decades have seen a tremendous expansion of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to new members. The Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas have given new impetus to NATO and underscored the willingness of allies to stand together. Setbacks in the rule of law in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, and divisions over the management of the Eurozone and the refugee crisis, should not obscure the tremendous success the last three decades have seen for the transatlantic alliance and European unity. Yet there is much that is sobering in the current diminution of ties and cooperation. Other challenges and threats have emerged to demand attention: terrorism, instability in the Middle East, and the rise of China all present new challenges. The financial crisis and failed foreign interventions have fueled skepticism over the role of the United States on the international stage. Internal divisions in Europe and the euro crises have turned European attention inward even as the past two American presidents have pressed Europeans to do more externally and spend more on their own security. Leaders on both sides have pursued different priorities, occasionally differing in their worldviews. The American withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) on May 8th has sparked yet another “crisis of transatlantic relations,” but focusing on specific decisions obscures the deeper trends. Successive American presidents have paid but lip service to their European allies in making decisions beyond the transatlantic sphere and examples of potential cooperation on crises such as Libya or Syria have ended in failure.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

26. Post-ISIS Challenges for Stabilization: Iraq, Syria and the U.S. Approach

Author:
Jonas Parello-Plesner
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fight in Iraq and Syria against the brutal terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIS) has been led by an unprecedented international coalition, with the U.S. as the galvanizing diplomatic and military component. ISIS was defeated militarily in Iraq at the end of last year, but even today small pockets remain as a fighting force in Syria. As the war is won, peace must be secured. Key to that effort is post-conflict stabilization through restoration of essential services and a gradual return of governance. As the U.S. National Security Strategy puts it, “instability and weak governance threaten U.S. interests.” In Iraq and Syria, reasserting stability is vital so that terrorist organizations do not find fertile ground again. This report draws some lessons from Iraq and Syria on stabilization efforts and the path forward. The backdrop is the evolving U.S. approach to stabilization under the Trump administration. On June 19, 2018, the administration published the final version of the Stabilization Assistance Review report, which provides an inter-agency definition of stabilization, including a more hard-nosed approach to sharing the burden with partners in accordance with President Trump’s priorities. The review also draws demarcation lines between humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and reconstruction. Stabilization is short-term and transitional, and thus also limits the time frame for U.S. engagement. However, the U.S. no longer provides public funding for reconstruction to avoid nation-building, which the administration has declared to be off limits.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Reconstruction, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

27. U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Strategic Island Defense

Author:
Seth Cropsey and Jun Isomura
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Japan’s southwest island chain, an archipelago of 1,200 kilometers (750 miles), is known as the Ryukyu Islands. Along with Taiwan and the Philippines, it comprises what the People’s Republic of China (PRC) perceives as the first of three strategic island chains. To China, these island chains represent geostrategic impediments to Pacific Ocean expansion and power projection, which its adversaries—including the United States and Japan—might use to counter Chinese aggression in a conflict. In particular, the first island chain represents the first geostrategic hurdle for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as it seeks access to sea lanes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Two of China’s three PLAN fleet bases are located on the East China Sea. To reach the South China Sea and the Pacific, ships or aircraft from these bases must transit through the choke points of the Taiwan or Miyako Straits, the latter passage through the Ryukyus. Japan’s southwest islands pose a significant strategic and operational challenge for China, and thus their defense is equally strategically and operationally important for Japan. China, to achieve its goal of global superpower status by the mid-twenty-first century, has sought to contest and change the status quo across the Indo-Pacific region by constructing and arming islands from the South China Sea to the East China Sea and beyond. As part of this effort, the PRC has expanded and modernized its armed forces. The immediate objective is to neutralize what Chinese rulers regard as the threat of the first island chain. This has included building a larger and more advanced surface fleet and air force, including the country’s first aircraft carrier, as well as advanced destroyers and more advanced aircraft. It also involves developing and expanding China’s amphibious assault capabilities by means of a larger and more capable PLAN Marine Corps, along with more amphibious warships, amphibious aircraft, and amphibious assault vehicles. In the PRC’s crosshairs is not only Taiwan, the keystone of the first island chain and a vigorous democracy, but also the Senkaku Islands of Japan, whose sovereignty the PRC contests, and the Ryukyu Islands. Any Chinese invasion of Taiwan or military attempt to assert sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands runs the risk of drawing the United States and Japan into a conflict with the PRC. The U.S.-Japan alliance obliges the United States to defend Japan and its sovereign islands. Both countries maintain a security presence in the Ryukyus, principally on the island of Okinawa, where the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) maintains a nineteen-thousand-strong force, alongside U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy units. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and Coast Guard also maintain ground, maritime, and aviation elements on Okinawa and conduct regular air and sea patrols throughout Japan’s southwest islands. In keeping with constitutional restrictions that limit Japan’s security forces to self-defense, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has also recently sought to bolster the country’s amphibious capabilities to counter potential Chinese aggression. In the face of a rising PRC challenge, the United States and Japan have in recent years streamlined and strengthened their security cooperation. This has included participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises to improve interoperability at tactical and operational levels. In addition, the 2015 creation of an alliance coordination mechanism (ACM) provides guidelines for the U.S. and Japanese governments to coordinate defense cooperation, including the defense of Japan’s outlying islands, at a policy level. However, the two countries still lack an integrated means—at the bilateral or multilateral level—to coordinate operations in response to regional contingencies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

28. U.S.-Russian Relations, 1989-2019: Self-Awareness and History

Author:
Bruce Jackson
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
U.S.-Russian relations, though currently intractable, are nevertheless the most discussed subject in American foreign policy today. In fact, our impressions of how relations with Russia are going are central to how we demarcate our own history. “After the wall fell” and “post-Soviet” are ways of telling historical time. And it is also how the current generation refers to the beginning of modern times, in much the same way as an earlier generation used “post-war” as shorthand for when normal life resumed after the war. The ability to make sense of the recent past should help us understand where we are and where we are going. The meaning of “post-war” seems clear to us today: It connotes the aftermath of sacrifice, accomplishment, and a certainty about the historical role and significance of the World War II generation. “Post-Soviet” does not have the same historical clarity. The words that evoke our present circumstances convey a sense of uncertainty, persistent conflict, political stasis, and historical confusion. The significance of the present remains elusive for those of us living in the first decades of the 21st century. America has spent slightly more than a century worrying about Russia without great success. Relations today between the U.S. and Russia are still as bad as they have ever been. If we look closely at the period 1989 to 2019, what significance do we find in our recent past and what does this tell us about the meaning of the present? Do we find a common history that puts the challenges of the present in the proper perspective? Or does where we come from make where we are now even more baffling? Strictly speaking, U.S.-Russian relations are a cluster of epistemological problems. What do we think we know about the events that occurred between 1989 and 2019? How much confidence should we place in our interpretation? What are the implications of how we see our recent past for how we judge our present circumstances? Why do we currently find our conjectures so unsatisfactory at the personal level and from a policy perspective? Is there another way to look at the last thirty years that connects the events from the pre-history of modern times more closely with what we see in the present? For example, why does post-Soviet Russia look so much like Soviet Russia in 1989 when Western Europe today looks so unlike the confident and self-assured Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall?
Topic:
International Relations, History, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and United States of America