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11. Why a Ukrainian Victory Matters to Americans

Author:
Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine aid is a good investment for the US. The United States has given Ukraine $43.7 billion in military assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion last year. This is about 5 percent of America’s fiscal year 2023 defense budget, or less than two-tenths of 1 percent of its gross domestic product. Ukraine is degrading one of America’s two major adversaries. Ukraine has destroyed more than 11,350 pieces of Russian military equipment, including 2,164 main battle tanks, 2,566 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 500 pieces of towed artillery and multiple rocket launchers, 84 aircraft, 99 helicopters, and 12 naval ships—all without shedding a single drop of US blood. President Zelensky: “Ukraine never asked American soldiers to fight on our land instead of us.” Ukraine matters to the US economy. In 2021, Europe accounted for $3.19 trillion of foreign capital investment in the US (out of a total of $4.98 trillion). In 2022, 45 out of 50 states—including the largest single-state economy, California—exported more goods to Europe than to China. Ukraine shapes global commodities markets. Ukraine ranks in the top ten in the production of corn, wheat, barley, sunflower, sunflower oil, sunflower meal, and canola. It has reserves of 117 of the 120 most widely used minerals and metals in the world, including titanium, iron, lithium, coal, and other energy deposits. At present, Russia occupies Ukrainian territory containing at least $12.4 trillion worth of raw materials.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and North America

12. Reinforcing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy and Deterrence in the Pivotal Year of 2022

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine presented the world with a dramatic challenge to the rules-based international order. Ukraine’s fierce and continuing resistance has earned the backing of Western democracies. Under the leadership of the United States, democracies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have rallied to provide political, diplomatic, and military support to Ukraine. As of this writing, despite difficult coordination on sensitive military issues, that unity remains intact. In the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought preexisting security challenges into sharper relief. Across the region, security concerns were heightened and acquired greater definition in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula. More broadly, Russia’s aggression called into question the staying power of the rules-based international order and, at the same time, raised recognition of the inseparable nature of that order. As the United Kingdom’s former Foreign Secretary Liz Truss told the Atlantic Council on March 10, “conflict anywhere threatens security everywhere. Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security are indivisible.”1 This study begins with a consideration of the Indo-Pacific security environment as it evolved during 2022. It goes on to consider the measures by key regional actors—primarily but not exclusively the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and India—that strengthened deterrence in the face of an increasingly challenging environment. Expanding diplomatic coordination and security cooperation reflects a strategic commitment by the region’s democracies to support a rules-based order and advance a shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. At the same time, European democracies have continued to expand diplomatic and security engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. The policy challenge for the United States and Western democracies has been to resist Russia’s aggression in Europe in support of the rules-based international order and, at the same time in the Indo-Pacific, to strengthen deterrence against the use of force or coercion to change the status quo.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

13. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:
Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

14. Upholding a Rules-Based Order: Reinforcing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This study is focused on regional order in the Indo-Pacific, as set out in the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and on the policies that the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and European allies have adopted to support this rules-based order in the face of multifaceted challenges posed by the rise of a powerful and assertive China. This study considers the evolution of the foundational elements of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the conceptual origins as set out in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first government by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, the increasing alliance-based cooperation between and among alliance partners, the development of alliance-based strategic partnerships across the region, the evolving multilateralism as reflected in the emergence of the Quad (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), and the increasing engagement of European allies. The free and open Indo-Pacific—as advanced by Foreign Minister Aso and Prime Minister Abe, and later adopted by the US—set out a framework for regional governance and order based on democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, the market economy, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and opposition to force or coercion to change the status quo. To support this vision, alliance ties have strengthened across the Indo-Pacific. Today, the US-Japan alliance is at a historic high point, having moved toward the strategic alignment of its respective policy documents. Meanwhile, the US and Australia have made the Indo-Pacific the focal point of the alliance, and Japan-Australia security ties have deepened, as underscored by the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement. At the same time, the Quad has engaged on wide-ranging economic and security issues relating to the region in support of a rules-based free and open Indo-Pacific. And European engagement in the Indo-Pacific has continued to grow, as underscored by the United Kingdom’s “tilt” toward the region and participation in the AUKUS arrangement. Europe’s expanding engagement is well outlined in the Indo-Pacific strategy documents of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union—all reflecting the recognition of Europe’s growing economic, political, and security interests in the Indo-Pacific. This study also considers the implication of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the response of Western powers for international order in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Against a background of contemporary doubts about the staying power of the international order, the response of Western democracies, in both Europe and Asia, has been striking in their support of the rules-based international order. In Europe, NATO’s support for Ukraine has been constant. At the same time, Indo-Pacific allies, concerned about the implications of Ukraine for regional security, have joined in sanctions against Russia. Quad leaders meeting to discuss Ukraine also reaffirmed their support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, with Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida asserting that challenges to the international order, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “should not be allowed in the Indo-Pacific.” The pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific order and reaffirmation of a rules-based order in both Asia and Europe now increasingly overlap. Then Foreign Secretary Liz Truss underscored to the Atlantic Council the importance of sustaining Western unity in the face of challenges to the international order—in Europe and in Asia. In her words, “Conflict anywhere threatens security everywhere. The Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are indivisible.” The challenges going forward will be to sustain Western unity to support an international rules-based order—in Asia, this means reinforcing the free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Order, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

15. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

16. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

17. Transatlantic Paralysis: The US-EU Trade Policy Stalemate and the European Union’s Democratic Deficit

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
What is often labeled the democratic deficit in governance of the European Union (EU) is not a a flaw or bug in its architecture, it is a design feature. From its earliest days in the Second World War’s chaotic aftermath, European integration “was essentially an elite project, pursued at a distance from the daily concerns of the national populations in Western Europe.” Also formed as a response to the economic disintegration following the Depression and World War Two, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was similarly removed from national or populist politics. It too was an elite, top-down initiative designed to embed nations in a system of international rules largely articulated by technical experts, enforced by a form of international courts, and far removed from national and populist politics. Many of the intellectual proponents of both supranational institutions, from the Austrian School of economics, the ordoliberals emerging in early-20th century Germany, to the London School of Economics indeed shared a distrust of American-style democracy, let alone the various parliamentary democracies whose failure led to the disasters of the 1930s and 1940s. Over the last fifty years, the institutions put in place after World War II have been perfected and have, to a certain extent, ossified. Many of the difficulties in achieving greater US-EU economic coordination in the 21st century have their origins in the institutional design and the subsequent early implementation of early European Community rules during the post-war period. A brief overview of the history of European integration, and the political thinking behind it, helps explain the current paralysis in contemporary transatlantic cooperation, including in a joint approach to the challenge of Chinese mercantilism and its growing international reach.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Democracy, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

18. Europe's China Chimera

Author:
Peter Rough
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dreams of global domination, he worries about one thing above all else: a hostile United States backed by its allies—and on the Eurasian landmass, the US has no more important ally than Europe. As a result, Xi has worked to weaken the transatlantic alliance through a two-pronged economic stratagem. First, under the guise of globalization, China has insinuated itself into the European economy, creating dependencies. Second, Beijing is manipulating those dependencies to hollow out and supplant Europe’s advanced economies. To give this deception cover, China has built a vast political network across Europe, from basic sympathizers to outright spies. Until recently, barely anyone took notice, but the financial crisis and forever wars of the past two decades, culminating in the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, lured the self-confident Xi out into the open. During the coronavirus pandemic, China revealed an aggressive attitude toward Great Britain’s former colonies that shocked the United Kingdom. In the span of mere months, London shifted from cooperation to confrontation. In July, it became the first country in Europe to block the Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, from its next-generation networks. Germany, the continent’s most important country, still sees China as key to post-pandemic recovery and economic growth, however. Xi has exploited this attitude to strike an investment agreement with the European Union (EU), the chief purpose of which is to forestall a transatlantic approach under the new US president, Joe Biden. Together, the United States and Europe have unparalleled advantages against any competitor. Now is the time for cooperation, before Xi’s dreams become our collective nightmare.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

19. Reducing Russia-NATO Tensions: Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea

Author:
Liselotte Odgaard and Sune Lund
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report first analyzes the use of CUES in the South China Sea, which is the region they initially were designed for as an instrument to prevent unwanted escalation. In what sense have CUES in the South China Sea set a precedent for reassurance measures in other regions? Second, we discuss whether CUES could be useful to lower tension levels between Russia and NATO in their ongoing conflicts over spheres of interest, strategic space, and appropriate deterrence measures in maritime Europe. The analysis draws on the first-hand experiences of personnel engaged in implementing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). This allows us to go beyond rhetorical announcements of intention and understand how de-escalation instruments are used at the level of implementation and whether they have any effect. Third, we conclude by discussing the caveats to and advantages of adopting CUES in the Euro-Atlantic area and how they should be designed to take the specific strategic context of this area into account.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and United States of America

20. Europe under US Monetary Hegemony: How the COVID-19 Pandemic Will Undermine a 100-Year-Old Relationship

Author:
Brendan Brown
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This policy study is based on the newly released book, Europe’s Century of Crises under Dollar Hegemony: A Dialogue on the Global Tyranny of Unsound Money, by Brendan Brown and Philippe Simonnot, published by Palgrave Macmillan. One hundred years ago, the United States emerged from the First World War and its immediate aftermath, including the Spanish flu pandemic, as the global monetary hegemon, exercising immense power over the Old Continent. This new power quickly became the source of huge instability in Europe, culminating in the collapse of the Weimar Republic. After World War II, the Bretton Woods system set new contours for US monetary hegemony, ultimately resulting in the great economic crisis of 1973–75. This woeful history continues to the present day: Dollar hegemony has not been a force for good. It could have been different. The United States and Europe would both have gained from a US hegemony based on sound money principle. Instead, the guiding characteristic of US monetary power has been inflation, especially around election time. According to the doctrine made notorious by Treasury Secretary John Connally, who served under President Nixon, “the dollar is our currency but your problem.” The US monetary regime’s further lurch toward fundamental unsoundness during the COVID-19 pandemic is not getting the new century of US monetary hegemony off to a new start. The “known unknown” is whether forces will emerge in Europe that will again challenge US inflationary dominance, as occurred under Germany’s leadership in the 1970s. Could high inflation in the post-pandemic US economy cause US monetary hegemony over Europe to crumble?
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, History, Monetary Policy, Hegemony, Transatlantic Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America