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61. German-Russian relations: Will there be changes after the German elections?

Author:
Minna-Mari Salminen
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Irrespective of the German election result, the “special relationship” between Germany and Russia will continue to thrive. The global economic crisis has served to forge even closer business ties between Germany and Russia. Several struggling German industries would now welcome Russian investment, and all in all German companies are expected to stay in the Russian market in anticipation of growth. Germany is likely to concentrate on economic relations with Russia, which have proved lucrative, and to confine criticism of Russian domestic affairs to rhetoric. Even if the German general foreign policy line becomes more Atlanticist than before, Germany's Russia policy will not lose its significance.
Political Geography:
Russia and Germany

62. Russian pledge vs. business-as-usual: Impelementing energy efficiency policies can curb carbon emissions

Author:
Anna Korppoo, Aleksandra Novikova, and Maria Sharmina
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In June 2009, President Medvedev announced that the Russian Federation could limit its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions growth to-10 to 15% by 2020, compared to 1990 levels. In August 2009, this commitment was confirmed by the Russian delegation as Russia's midterm target. Russia further committed to limiting emissions by 22-25% in comparison to the 1990 level by 2020 in the EU-Russia Summit in Stockholm in November.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

63. Medvedev's amendments to the law on defence: The consequences for Europe

Author:
Yury E. Fedorov
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In November 2009, the 'Law on Amendments to the “Law on Defence”' proposed by President Medvedev entered into force. It allows the Kremlin to dispatch troops outside Russia for four purposes: to counter armed attacks against Russian armed forces, other troops and bodies deployed beyond its borders; to counter or prevent an armed attack against another country if this country has requested Russia to do so; to protect Russian citizens abroad from an armed attack; and to combat piracy and guarantee the safety of shipping. The law is an attempt to close the gap between Moscow's strategic goals, primarily the establishment of its geopolitical dominance over the former Soviet republics, and Russia's legislation, which restricted its ability to deploy armed forces beyond national borders. In effect, the amended legislation enables the Kremlin to deploy its armed forces abroad in a wide range of situations, precisely because of a lack of clear criteria. The wording of 'Medvedev's amendments' sheds light on some plans and scenarios that may be taking shape in Moscow. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that Russia may plan to ignite large-scale disturbances and ethnic clashes in Sevastopol or in Latvia and Estonia, which may be used as a pretext for Russian military intervention. A Russo-Ukrainian conflict in Crimea would pose not so much a military as a political challenge for Europe and the West. Even though Ukraine does not belong to these organizations, if NATO and the EU failed to respond to Russian intervention in Crimea with strong political and economic measures, their strategic relevance would be seriously undermined. If NATO did not defend its member states in the Baltic, the strategic role of the Alliance would be reduced to zero. The aforementioned scenarios fall into the worst-case category, yet there are numerous precedents in Russia's history which demonstrate that worst-case scenarios can become reality. European dependence on Russian energy supplies and interest in Russia's support in resolving the Iranian nuclear problem and the conflict in Afghanistan, as well as the Obama administration's interest in Russia's partnership in nuclear issues, constrain Western ability to respond. However, the West could and should make it quite clear that new Russia's military interventions will result in the country's political ostracization. Furthermore, the West could propose and develop an internationally recognised mechanism regulating the most important aspects of humanitarian intervention. In particular, it should minimise the ability of individual states to make unilateral decisions to intervene militarily if the UN Security Council were unable to make firm decisions. Such mechanisms could be discussed and developed in the frameworks of the UN, the OSCE, the so-called Corfu process and similar international forums.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Law
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

64. Russia's Security Policy Grows "Muscular": Should the West Be Worried?

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The self-assertive rhetoric of the Russian leadership, in which President Putin's Munich speech marked a shift towards a more aggressive style, has been translated into such demonstrative actions as the resumption of regular patrols by Long Range Aviation and the unilateral suspension of the CFE Treaty. Despite new funding and against confident self-assessments, Russia's strategic arsenal continues to shrink, and many key modernization projects, such as the Bulava missile for strategic submarines, have encountered setbacks. The need for brandishing the diminishing capabilities is driven by the desire to deter the perceived threat of a 'coloured revolution' sponsored by the West, the urge to assert a more solid status than just that of an 'energy super-power', and the complicated intrigues surrounding the on-going reconfiguration of the political leadership. Expanding demonstrations of the dilapidated strategic arsenal increase the risks of technical failures but fall far short of initiating a new confrontation of the Cold War type. The most worrisome point in Russia's ambivalent power policy is Georgia, which has been the target of choice for multiple propaganda attacks, but which now faces the challenge of an external intervention in its domestic crises since Moscow has built up usable military instruments in the North Caucasus. Russia's desire to secure higher international status does not amount to malicious revisionism; so over-reaction to its experiments with muscle-flexing could constitute a greater risk to the Western strategy of engagement than underestimating its ambitions.
Topic:
International Relations and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

65. The transport infrastructure in Russia - From modernization to development: fact and fiction

Author:
Katri Pynnöniemi
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
During recent years, transport and infrastructure development has acquired the status of a 'topic to be mentioned by the president' and other high-level state officials in their public appearances. The rise of transport from almost complete oblivion into the sphere of state strategic interests has been rapid, and it is a subject which is likely to maintain a high profile in the years to come. Success in implementing the current plans for infrastructure development is considered critical in order to generate further economic growth. From the longer-term perspective, it will also be critical in ensuring the diversification of the economy and securing Russia's place amongst the most advanced economies in the world. The modernization of the transport infrastructure is also seen as a lever with which Russia can reposition herself as a power-house in Eurasia. In actual fact, Russia is not a bridge but the dead-end of Eurasia. The country is faced with the enormous task of modernizing its transport infrastructures and implementing structural reforms that have been postponed for years. This would pose a tremendous challenge even in the best possible external circumstances, never mind against the backdrop of inflation and uncertainty in the world markets which exists at present. Something which has changed is that Russia now has the resources and the appropriate legislation in place to carry out these tasks. Yet, even if considerable effort has gone into defining strategic priorities, infrastructure investments are still implemented in an ad-hoc manner. The country is in dire need of massive construction projects. If the quality of the state apparatus in managing government spending does not improve – and there are few signs of that materializing – infrastructure development will become the Trojan horse of the Russian economy.
Topic:
Development, Government, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

66. Russia in 2008 and beyond: What kind of foreign policy?

Author:
Vadim Kononenko
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia's current foreign policy should be understood as an element of the political regime that was built under Vladimir Putin's leadership. The major domestic impact on foreign policy seems to stem from the inclination among the elites and the power groups to maintain the power status quo in the country whilst profiting from the economic ties with the West. In this context the West becomes perceived as an unwanted external political factor on the one hand, and as a source of profits and financial stability for the Russian elites on the other. The current political system has given rise to a specific kind of foreign policy and diplomacy that both actively criticizes and challenges the West in rhetoric, while furthering economic ties between Europe and Russia's major business players. This contradiction is not self-evident as it is often couched in the assertive discourse of “strong state” and “national interest”. In reality, it is the “special interests” of Russia's state-private power groups and networks that lie behind the country's international standing. As long as the internal order in the country remains as it is, it is not feasible to expect any critical rethinking on foreign policy. The scope for public and expert debate has shrunk tremendously as foreign policy-making becomes increasingly bureaucratic and profit-driven. The prevailing climate of tense relations and diplomatic bickering in Russia-Western relations may linger despite the change of president. This does not mean that stabilization of relations or even engagement with Russia should be ruled out, however. Western actors should pay close attention to the domestic development in Russia, particularly the economic side. Further growth in the economy will push Russia towards a more intense (both in terms of cooperation and competition) interaction with the West. It is in the interests of the West to respond to this development in a consistent and constructive way by anchoring Russia in the rule-based economic environment.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

67. False Premises, Sound Principles: The Way Forward in EU-Russia Relations

Author:
Hiski Haukkala
Publication Date:
04-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The post-Cold War EU–Russia relationship has been based on erroneous premises: Russia has not been willing to live up to its original aims of pursuing a western democratic and liberal path; nor have the European Union and its member states been able to develop a coherent policy line that would have consistently nudged Russia in that direction. The lack of a genuinely shared understanding concerning the relationship has resulted in chronic and growing political problems and crises between the parties. The increasingly fraught nature of the EU–Russia relationship has also played to Russia's strengths. It has enabled Russia to re-assert its sovereignty and walk away from the commonly agreed principles and objectives already codified in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994. The erosion of the original central aims of the partnership has not resulted in an atmosphere of working relations. Although Russia has been able to get its own way in most of the issues, a relationship worthy of the name “strategic partnership” is currently more elusive than ever. Instead of toning down its relations with Russia, the EU should seek to re-invigorate its approach to the country. It should also acknowledge that despite the current problems the EU's policy on Russia has, by and large, been based on sound principles. Democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human and minority rights, and liberal market principles are all factors that are badly needed in order to ensure a stable and prosperous future for Russia. The EU should, through its own actions, also make it clear to Russia that it deserves respect and needs to be taken seriously. It would be prudent to proceed from the sector that seems to be the key to the current relationship: energy. By pursuing a unified internal energy market and subsequent common external energy policy, the EU might be able to make Russia take the Union level more seriously again. It would also deprive some of the main culprits – Russia and certain key member states alike – of the chance of exploiting the economic and political deals cut at the bilateral level to the detriment of the common EU approach to Russia.
Topic:
International Relations and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

68. Russia And The Post-2012 Climate Regime: Foreign Rather Than Environmental Policy

Author:
Anna Korppoo
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
According to the most recent government position, Russia is reluctant to accept binding greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments under the post-2012 regime that will succeed the Kyoto Protocol. Russia joined the Kyoto Protocol in anticipation of gains and made further demands in return for its ratification. The Kyoto Protocol was never seen as an environmental pact in Russia, but rather as a means of gaining economic and political benefits. The post-Kyoto deal will be entirely different for Russia compared to the Kyoto Protocol, as Russia would be expected to reduce its emissions in order to persuade developing countries to join. The main reason for Russia's reluctance is economic growth, which is expected to automatically lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions. However, this view is open to dispute. Climate change is not regarded as an acute environmental problem in Russia. Many Russian scientists believe that Russia could actually gain from climate change, and the IPCC is also predicting initial positive effects. A significant percentage of the Russian public does not approve of spending taxpayers' money on climate change mitigation, and due to the lack of democracy their views would not put pressure on the government's climate politics. As environmental concern cannot drive Russian participation in the post-2012 regime, it would be more productive to focus on the Russian interest in being recognised as an international actor, or on certain concrete policies such as energy efficiency, which carry some economic weight.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Environment
Political Geography:
Russia

69. Russia's Politics Amidst the Global Economic Crisis An Empty Scoreboard?

Author:
Vadim Kononenko
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The global financial crisis has had both an economic and a political impact on Russia. Inasmuch as Russia's political system is infused with business interests and economic considerations, the crisis presents an external and unexpected challenge to the system in terms of rocking the balance between the elite groups. In effect, the crisis calls into question the assumption that the economic and social stability of the Putin years has been successfully sustained during Medvedev's presidency. The Kremlin's response to the rapidly changing situation has been essentially conservative and geared towards strengthening the regime rather than addressing the challenges stemming from the crisis. The anti-crisis measures that are being taken reveal that the government is relying on its finance reserves as the ultimate means to solve the problem rather than reforming state institutions. The president, the government and the key business groups have yet to define the terms of their relationship in the new situation. The plans to increase state control over companies as a means of tackling the crisis are problematic and likely to lead to an intensification of the struggle between the elites. At the same time, as the state takes on even more responsibility, the question of its efficiency becomes more pertinent in the crisis conditions. The return of Vladimir Putin as president remains uncertain despite the constitutional change initiated by Medvedev. His return becomes more probable if the crisis lingers and the overall situation worsens, thus prompting the return of the “national leader” to the driver's seat. The crisis alone cannot lead to major political or social turmoil or a regime change, but it nonetheless presents a major challenge for Russia in the short-term perspective. Ultimately, the outcome of the crisis will depend on how well the incumbent leadership is able to maintain a balance between tackling the crisis and protecting its own interests and legitimacy.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia

70. Assesment of the Finnish-Russian Border: The Case of Vaalimaa Border Crossing Point

Author:
Vadim Kononenko and Jussi Laine
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The “Friendly EU Border” project, as a part of which the present report has been prepared, commences from the assumptions that external EU borders represent an important aspect of the EU's policies in the field of security and of Justice and Home Affairs. Finland, a country with a long external border with Russia, has been a member of the EU since 1995. Thus, Finland's experience is pertinent for other EU Member States that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007, most of which share their external borders with third countries outside the EU. The EU membership has certainly affected the operations of the Finnish border control, but – perhaps even more notably – the Finnish border control expertise has had a crucial influence on the way border control has been developed on European scale.
Topic:
Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Asia