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1. Fog in Channel? The Impact of Brexit on EU and UK Foreign Affairs

Author:
Amelia Hadfield and Nicholas Wright
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The UK’s rejection of any institutionalised relationship with the EU in foreign, security and defence policy (FSDP) is arguably the most noteworthy feature of the post-Brexit dispensation. In a stark reversal in early 2020, the British government abandoned pledges made in the 2019 Political Declaration to ‘establish structured consultation and regular thematic dialogues [that] could contribute to the attainment of common objectives’, including on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (1). This gap was intensified by the absence of any reference to foreign affairs in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) or the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR) (2). Indeed, the IR essentially ignores the EU, referring only to British ambitions to remain a lead European defence actor, with a focus on multilateral venues (notably the UN and NATO), bilateral relations and ad hoc groupings. In short, an EU-sized hole now exists in British foreign policy thinking. This matters in London and across Europe. While in the EU, the UK exercised significant influence and leadership in FSDP, its EU membership magnifying its global capacities. In leaving, Sir Simon Fraser, formerly permanent under-secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), warned that Brexit represented ‘the biggest shock to [the UK’s] method of international influencing and the biggest structural change to our place in the world since the end of World War Two’ (3). From the EU’s perspective, as observed by High Representative Josep Borrell, ‘with Brexit, nothing gets easier and a lot gets more complicated. How much more complicated depends on the choices that both sides will make’ (4). The choices thus far indicate a rejection of ‘old obligations’ (5) and an essentially transactional relationship that will be ‘structurally adversarial for the foreseeable future’ (6). Nonetheless, Brexit also gives both the UK and the EU a once-in-a-generation opportunity to rethink and reconfigure their approaches to foreign affairs and how they navigate a profoundly changed regional context. To understand the scale of this undertaking, we offer an innovative thematic analysis focused on four ‘Rs’: reputation, responsibility, resources and relevance. Each ‘R’ represents a core element of both sides’ respective foreign policies, offering insights into possible international roles and goals. The four ‘Rs’ also help us identify the main risks and opportunities Brexit encompasses, providing a conceptual symmetry as to how the choices of both the EU and UK might align and impact each other.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

2. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Green Digital Diplomacy: Time for the EU to Lead

Author:
Patryk Pawlak and Fabio Barbero
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In the second that just elapsed, over 116 terabytes of data were exchanged throughout the internet, an amount comparable to ten times that produced by the Hubble Space Telescope in one year. Data has become an essential resource for economic growth, job creation and societal progress. It will ‘reshape the way we produce, consume and live’. However, our increasingly digital way of life comes at a cost for the environment. The 2020 speech ‘The state of the planet’ by UN Secretary-General António Guterres made it clear: the world economy needs to transform to embrace a sustainable economic model with cleaner infrastructure, including digital and internet infrastructure. It is a global problem that requires a concerted international effort. And yet the environmental impact of new technologies is hardly addressed as a foreign policy issue. The EU–Japan Green Alliance signed in May 2021, despite being relatively comprehensive, does not make any reference to the environmental challenges of digital transition. The partnership between the European Commission and Breakthrough Energy Catalyst to boost investments in critical climate technologies focuses on green hydrogen, direct air capture, long-duration energy storage and sustainable aviation fuels, but not on the information technology sector. This is puzzling given that data centres that power the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector generate up to 2 % of global carbon emissions, a number comparable to the aviation sector. The ICT sector accounts for around 7 % of global electricity use, but according to certain predictions, it could be using one fifth of all the world’s electricity by 2025. By the same year, the ICT sector may be responsible for 5.5 % of the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. If the ICT sector were a country, this would make it the fifth largest polluter in the world, after China, the United States, India and Russia. Consequently, any international actor aspiring to global leadership on climate change needs to look beyond the energy consumption, GHG emissions and natural resources related to design, production and end-of-life of the digital sector. To be responsible digital players, states need to address the environmental cost of using digital services that rely on large volumes of data and to promote green solutions as part of their international digital engagement strategies. For the EU’s foreign policy, this means embracing ‘green digital diplomacy’ as one of the priorities. Such an approach would bring digital and climate – two of the EU’s key policy priorities – under the same roof and contribute to promoting a ‘European way, balancing the flow and wide use of data, while preserving high privacy, security, safety and ethical standards’. It also offers a new opening for the EU’s commitment to strengthening multilateralism and a rules-based international order, including through setting norms and principles for the world’s digital transition, and the EU’s capacity-building and development cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Data, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Melting Ice, Frozen Heart: Russia’s posture on climate change and decarbonisation

Author:
Stanislav Secrieru and Federica Prandin
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In the span of two decades, in its relations with Russia the EU has moved from ambitious endeavours to build Common Spaces and foster the Partnership for Modernisation to a more minimalist and defensive approach, epitomised by the dictum ‘to push back, to contain and to engage’ (1). There is no shortage of ideas on how to operationalise the first two aspects of this strategy, but the third one is more problematic. As global warming and the need for comprehensive decarbonisation efforts have risen to the top of the EU’s agenda, fighting climate change has re-emerged as one of the prospective areas for positive selective interaction with Russia. Global warming knows no borders and requires transnational solutions, thus for its own sake if nothing else Russia should be interested in expanding such cooperation too. This Brief proposes to test this assumption by addressing the following questions: what is Russia’s profile as a polluter? How strong is the impact of climate change in Russia? What shapes the Kremlin’s perceptions and responses? Is there room for genuine cooperation today between Russia and the EU on climate issues? If not, what factors could change Russia’s attitudes and actions in the near and distant future?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

5. China's Data Strategy: Creating a state-led market

Author:
Camille Boullenois
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In 2019 and 2020, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States issued strategy papers on data governance acknowledging the importance of data to their economic development and national security. With different emphases, four competing objectives dominate these data strategies: innovation (using data to create new business models and boost economic growth); security (ensuring that sensitive data is not used by a hostile foreign power); privacy (protecting citizens from abusive use of personal data); and surveillance (using data to monitor and control citizens’ and companies’ behaviour). In the past two years, China has been defining its own data strategy and governance regime and, while juggling the same four competing objectives as its Western counterparts, is taking an innovative approach. While the specific data governance framework is still being debated among scholars, policymakers, industrial lobbyists and state institutions, local pilot regulations on data and stakeholders’ public positions have already hinted at its future characteristics. This Brief aims to shed light on these debates over China’s emerging data governance framework. It starts by describing the objectives of the framework, then summarises the debates around the new data rights that Chinese policymakers are establishing and analyses China’s first local pilot regulations defining those rights. The Brief then focuses specifically on health data to illustrate how China'sdata governance regime is designed to work. Finally, the Brief gives an overview of the challenges that China’s data governance framework presents for EU governments and companies. Ultimately, China’s data governance regime will have important implications for the protection of EU citizens’ data and creates a risk of data protectionism. It is therefore crucial that the EU understands early enough the direction that China is taking, so that it can respond appropriately.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Transnational Actors, and Data
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the world going?

Author:
Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Thinking about the long-term future is a prominent feature of the Russian official strategic planning and public policy debate. Speaking in 2008, for instance, President Putin indicated the horizons of strategic planning when he stated that a concrete development plan for the period through to 2010 had been elaborated, and “now we need to look beyond this horizon – look at least 10 years ahead”. “Today we are deciding one of the most important issues for Russia’s future – defining its development strategy through to 2020”, he stated, and in setting out Russia's long-term vision for the future, "our long-term references must be clear to everyone”, and “must have the support of our citizens.” By the mid-2010s, policy-oriented public organisations were looking even further ahead. The Valdai Club, for instance, was conducting a project entitled Club 2035, to “look beyond the horizon” at a number of themes, including technological and socio-cultural trends, and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was running a “World in 100 Years” project, including the series “On the eve of 2037”. Other major institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), also hold regular major events and publish substantial volumes reflecting on twenty-first century megatrends and strategic forecasting up to 2030 and beyond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

7. Under Pressure: Can Belarus resist Russian coercion?

Author:
Anaïs Marin
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Belarus is traditionally considered to be Russia’s closest ally, and their alliance is a cornerstone of post-Soviet integration projects, both military (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation - CSTO) and economic (the Eurasian Economic Union - EAEU). But bilateral relations have entered a different and more conflictual phase. The paradigm shift started in 2014, when Belarus invoked its constitutional neutrality pledge to refuse to side with Russia in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine and the West. Playing this card allowed President Lukashenka to appear as a security guarantor both in the eyes of Belarusians and the West. Irritated by such autonomy, Moscow indicated that it now wants more for its money. Russia is no longer ready to subsidise the Belarusian economy in exchange for its neighbour’s fleeting geopolitical loyalty. In linking, in 2018, the resumption of economic privileges to ‘deeper’ political integration within the Union State that the two countries nominally established 20 years ago, Russia stepped up the pressure. Yet Vladimir Putin made Belarus an offer he knew Aliaksandr Lukashenka would refuse: the Belarusian president had repeatedly stated that Belarus’s sovereignty was ‘not for sale’. Given its dependence on Russia and current economic hardships, Belarus might not be able to resist Moscow’s ‘coercion to integrate’, however. Its capacity to uphold its sovereignty is being challenged from outside, while Lukashenka’s regime survival is under stress from within: in the wake of the 9 August presidential election, unprecedented opposition forces emerged which the Belarusian regime started cracking down on.1 Should repression intensify, leading the West to reintroduce sanctions, Minsk’s efforts of the past years towards normalising relations with Brussels and Washington would come to nothing. Yet renewed (self-)isolation of Belarus is exactly what Russia needs to reach its strategic goal of keeping Belarus in its orbit, and extract more concessions from its fragile leadership. This presents the EU with a dilemma it knows all too well: how can it support Belarus’s efforts to preserve its independence, without increasing the resilience of Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime or making Russia more assertive?
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

8. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

9. The EU's Chemical Weapons Sanctions Regime: Upholding a taboo under attack

Author:
Clara Portela and Erica Moret
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Marking a worrying turn for international policymakers, the use of chemical weapons has increased in recent years in spite of the robust disarmament regime seeking to curb their use. In October 2018, the EU adopted a sanctions regime against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The 2018 sanctions regime constitutes the EU’s first coercive instrument against chemical weapons. Even though the EU had previously employed sanctions to halt nuclear proliferation, in accordance with its 2003 Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), it had never applied sanctions to chemical weapons activities. Also, previous EU non-proliferation sanctions had taken place against the background of a pre-existing mandate agreed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both Pyongyang and Tehran had been under UN sanctions before Brussels enacted its own restrictions. By contrast, the EU sanctions regime against chemical weapons is not based on a UNSC mandate. Finally, the sanctions regime takes the form of a ‘horizontal’ or thematic list, in contrast to classical sanctions regimes that address specific country crises. The chemical weapons sanctions regime was only the second thematic sanctions regime ever adopted by the EU after the UNSC-inspired 2001 terrorism list. It was the first in a series of EU autonomous horizontal regimes adopted in close sequence: a sanctions regime against cyberattacks was agreed in 2019, and another against human rights violations is currently under preparation. The sanctions regime against chemical weapons is also exceptional in that it originated in the European Council, rather than in a working group of the Council of the European Union. When the sanctions regime was first adopted, it was accompanied by a blacklist addressing two vastly different uses of chemical weapons: it combined three individuals and one entity involved in chemical attacks on civilians in the Syrian war with the two suspects in the assassination attempt on a former Russian military intelligence officer and his daughter in Salisbury in the United Kingdom. A second round of designations in January 2019 followed a similar pattern. What accounts for this unusual combination of targets? What compelled the EU to agree on this novel form of sanctions regime? And what objectives is the EU pursuing with it? The present Brief situates the EU sanctions regime in the context of the recent attacks in Syria and the UK and international efforts employed to limit the proliferation and use of chemical arsenals. It then explores why sanctions are emerging as a supplementary policy tool in tackling this shifting security challenge. A fourth section analyses the implications for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), before the final section concludes with recommendations for further action.
Topic:
Governance, Sanctions, European Union, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and North Africa

10. Stand by Me! The Sino-Russian Normative Partnership in Action

Author:
Alice Ekman, Sinikukka Saari, and Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It has become commonplace to describe the relationship between China and Russia as ‘a marriage of convenience’,1 in particular in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, this popular metaphor hides very different – even contradictory – interpretations of the nature and future of the relationship. Perhaps depending on one’s take on arranged marriages, the deepening relationship between these two states is seen as ‘stable and successful’2 and ‘durable’,3 or on the contrary, as a ‘mere’ convenient arrangement doomed to be a temporary solution.4 It seems that fuzzy and often misunderstood marriage allegories bring more confusion than clarity to understanding and explaining complex relations between states. Shared norms and worldview would certainly indicate a steady and long-term arrangement whatever the marriage metaphor used. The Sino-Russian partnership is dense and multidimensional, and it is rooted in shared norms. International norms – the standard of expected state behaviour – reflect the underlying values of the global system, and underpin international cooperation in the political, economic and security-related fields.Sino-Russian normative cooperation aims at redefining and re-interpreting existing international norms in a way that reflects their shared principles, worldviews and threat perceptions – ‘like-mindedness’ as Chinese official communication refers to it.5 Both China and Russia share a conviction that today's international order is unfairly dominated by the US and the West, and that the current international norms and their interpretation reflect Western values that should not be considered universal. They are both convinced that these need to be changed, and that the time is ripe for this. For Beijing and Moscow, a post-Western era of global governance looms on the horizon. This shared reading of the present and predilection for such a future global order has been translated into dynamically evolving normative cooperation between the partners at multilateral level. Two other important and shared convictions are, first, that neither party represents a threat to the other regime’s survival (and even has an interest in supporting the other regime) and, second, that the West would like to see the regime in both China and Russia challenged (and under the right circumstances is ready to contribute to this). The shared worldview and threat perception help to smooth out the differences between the two countries: when their interpretations differ, they show mutual self-restraint and acquiesce rather than go against each other in the name of national interest. This Brief examines the normative dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation – i.e. how the two countries advance their understanding of international rules and norms together in the international arena. It studies how the two countries advance their understanding of appropriate state behaviour internationally in three areas: human rights, non-intervention and cyber-governance. All three issues are united by a common thread – states’ sovereignty – a robust version of which both vigorously defend. As a result, in these three areas, their cooperation is particularly strong and proactive.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia