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1. The New U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance and Its Implications for South Korean Security

Author:
Young Ho Kim
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On January 5, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama paid a rare visit to the Pentagon and unveiled his guidelines for the Department of Defense to set the goals and priorities of its defense strategy for the next ten years. The resulting eight-page-long guidelines, entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (hereafter DSG), contain the administration’s assessment of changing global security conditions and propose the roles and shape of the U.S. armed forces for the coming decade. Prepared through “unprecedentedly” close consultations between the President himself and senior leaders in the U.S. defense department and military including both service chiefs and combatant commanders, the DSG defines the present as a historic “inflection point” and envisions the future U.S. military as “smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced.” Moreover, in accordance with the DSG the U.S. defense budget will be cut by $487 billion and the sizes of the Army and Marine Corps will shrink by 80,000 and 14,000 respectively over the next ten years. While a more detailed picture will be revealed next month with the administration’s FY2013 budget request to Congress, the DSG reflects the Obama administration’s arduous effort to rebalance and redirect its defense priorities and spending under severe fiscal austerity. Because of the unusual timing of its publication and the magnitude of the reduction in defense spending, the DSG has generated controversy and concern domestically in the United States as well as internationally. In the United States, particularly people in the conservative wing of the Republican Party have been prompted to criticize the guidelines for putting the nation’s security in danger, whereas some people on the liberal side have advocated seeking deeper and bolder cuts in defense spending. Internationally, China was understandably the first to respond negatively to the DSG. For example, rebutting the DSG’s portrayal of Beijing’s military policy as lacking transparency as “groundless and untrustworthy,” Liu Weimin, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stressed that Beijing was committed to peaceful development and “defensive” policy. What then are the implications of the DSG for South Korean security? Will there be any changes in U.S. defense policy or posture in the region under the DSG that may affect security conditions in South Korea significantly and, if so, require new measures or scrutiny by the South Korean government or the military? In fact, there have been largely four issues raised by the news media in South Korea. I will examine these four issues, and then discuss more challenging concerns that will require closer attention by South Korean foreign and security policy-makers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

2. China, the United States, and the Changing Global Architecture

Author:
Seungjoo Lee
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
With the prospect of leadership change in China and the United States in 2012, the possibility for instability and uncertainty in the East Asia region is high. Despite such concerns, it is expected that the current structure of global governance will mitigate the difficulties associated with this period of transition. Considering the importance of global governance, it becomes necessary then to follow the changes in the global and regional architecture and think about how South Korea should meet this challenge. The trio of closely-related summit meetings that took place in November 2011 was such an occasion in which China and the United States grappled to shape the regional and global architecture. These meetings included the G20 Cannes summit on November 3, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit on November 12, and the East Asia Summit (EAS) on November 19. It is important to focus on the fact that during these meetings Beijing and Washington had the chance to examine the intention and capability of each other. In that sense, these meetings were akin to that of a boxing match fought over three rounds using not force but the complex elements of international politics in the twenty-first century that interact to design the regional and global architecture. These elements include power politics in international relations, cooperation and conflict in institutions and networks, and the knowledge power which allows for a consensus among countries by sharing the vision of a new order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Hegemony, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Chinese Interest on the Korean Peninsula and the Future of North Korea

Author:
Andrei Lankov
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Few people would doubt that the continuing rise of China is the single most influential factor in the evolving geostrategic position of Korea. Over the last 35 years, China has experienced a period of rapid economic growth which is probably without parallel in world economic history, and this period is not over. While China is still far from being in a position to challenge global US hegemony, it is quite possible that it will play a dominant role in East Asia, especially if ongoing changes in the world economy press the US into reducing military spending and downsizing its global role. Indeed, in the last few years China loomed increasingly large in issues of the North Korean politics. Some of the most controversial political problems of present-day Korea are clearly related to China’s rise. The fate of the Jeju naval base, whichever is officially stated, largely depends on whether Korea will eventually chose to balance against or bandwagon with rising China. The problem of the forced deportation of the North Korean refugees attracted much attention of the Korean public to the issues of human rights in China – perhaps, first time when such issues are discussed widely. It seems that the rise of China will present Korea with many a difficult decision. In some cases, confrontation is likely to develop, but usually some kind of compromise is, probably, the best option. Like it or not, most problems in East Asia cannot be effectively solved without cooperation with (or at least the passive support of) China. This is the case with the major long-term issue of Korean politics, that is, the issue of Korean unification.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4. China, Japan, South Korea Trilateral Cooperation: Implications for Northeast Asian Politics and Order

Author:
Andrew Yeo
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
How significant are trilateral relations in Northeast Asia? Does increasing trilateral cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea undermine existing U.S. bilateral relationships? Can Japan and South Korea use trilateral relations to hedge between the United States and China? Or do these middle powers help create a buffer between great power rivals by establishing trilateral relations with both the United States and China? This essay explores trilateral cooperation in East Asia paying particular attention to developments in trilateral relations between China, Japan, and South Korea. Although trilateral cooperation among Northeast Asian states will likely continue to grow, proponents of U.S. bilateral alliances need not be alarmed about such trends. Taking a positive-sum view of trilateral relations, policymakers should encourage trilateral developments, whether they include the United States or China, to the extent that such institutional arrangements facilitate cooperation and trust-building at the bilateral and multilateral level. This essay is organized into four sections. In the first section I provide a brief overview of trilateral cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea. I also present data available from the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) website indicating trends and patterns in trilateral relations since 1999. Section two discusses the relative political significance of trilateral cooperation within Northeast Asia and its limitations. The focus here is on the micro-foundations of trilateral cooperation. Section three places the TCS and the Trilateral Summit in a broader strategic context. I address trilateral cooperation in the context of geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China and East Asia’s developing institutional architecture. Section four concludes by arguing that trilateral initiatives are not zero-sum. Although some policymakers fear that traditional U.S. allies may drift closer to China as trilateral cooperation expands, the TCS and Trilateral Summit are but one set of institutional mechanisms situated in conjunction with or on top of bilateral alliances.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and South Korea

5. Stuck in the Middle? U.S.-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Not since the visit of Deng Xiapoing in 1979 has a Chinese state visit attracted so much attention as President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States on January 19, 2011. After a rocky year in U.S.-China relations following President Barack Obama’s visit to Beijing in November 2009, attention naturally focused on the future direction of the relationship between the two countries. Further attention imbued with curiosity also centered on how a relatively declining United States and a rapidly rising China would shape the world order in the long-run. Also following North Korea’s provocations in 2010, the world carefully looked for any strong emphasis on the issue of the Korean Peninsula as a regional challenge. There have been two different interpretations in regards to the results of the U.S.-China summit: an optimistic outlook that the two countries will become cooperative partners and move forward as underscored in the Joint Statement, and pessimistic views that the two powers will merely continue the repeated pattern of conflict and check that they have been doing since November 2009. A similar mix of opinions prevails in regards to the Korean Peninsula. Some expect immediate improvement in inter-Korean relations and the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, while others criticize the U.S.-China summit for barely papering over the cracks. However, neither hasty optimism nor gloomy pessimism is appropriate at this time. There is a need to utilize a comprehensive response strategy, which goes beyond narrow political understandings, based on a precise analysis of the results of the summit.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Summit
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

6. South Korea in the Chinese Political Imagination

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
States form images of each other based on assessments of each other’s material capabilities or on interpretations of each other’s intentions. Images matter in the foreign policy making process since they form popular public opinion on official policies and, in more basic ways, construct people’s identity toward other countries. Some images are more transient and therefore manageable. Remarks by foreign leaders, official documents, or media coverage tend to belong to this category. States try to make their images favorable in the minds of a foreign audience through their public diplomacy efforts. On the other hand, some images are more fundamental and hard to change, so that foreign policies are pressed to operate within their perimeter. Political ideology, religious orientation, and accumulated bilateral historical experiences tend to form these more durable images. Today’s globalized world has witnessed the rise of the Internet as an important medium constructing popular images of a foreign country. As mass communication across countries becomes more open and instant, foreign policy makers face the increasing challenge of controlling information flows and separating foreign policy agendas from domestic interests. Citizens with less direct contact are more prone to embracing popular images mediated by mass media. Elites, in contrast, who have more direct contact and knowledge, tend to have more rationally interpreted images of foreign countries. Formerly, elites used to monopolize foreign policy inputs. In the porous world of today, however, it is difficult for elites to resist and persuade popular opinion, which is more emotionally driven. This challenge is felt in China, where the leadership is sometimes at odds with irrational populism. In this respect, it is important to understand Chinese images of South Korea. How do elites and ordinary citizens of China hold South Korea in their political imagination? What are the implications of Chinese images of Korea for Seoul’s China policy?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, and Populism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

7. The Arab Spring and Democratization in China

Author:
Youngjin Kim
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the fall of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” has reasserted the universality of democracy. The question then of whether a “Jasmine Revolution” would occur in China has drawn the attention of foreign and domestic observers as well as raised the concern of the Chinese government. Today, even at the official level, the scope of debate on so called “Western-style” democracy is very limited in China regardless of the political standing of any politician whether conservative or progressive. It would be impossible to imagine in this case that there could be any debate over democracy that would lead to sweeping political reforms in the Chinese Communist Party. While on the other end of the political spectrum, a grass roots movement for democracy is also unlikely to develop. Most of the core figures involved in the democratic movement are either in exile overseas, under heavy restrictions at home, or have lost their momentum as time has passed by. Furthermore, possibly the greatest obstacle to any democratization movement in China is the reluctance of the middle-class. While often considered as a powerful driver for democratization in the rest of the world, it would be difficult to expect them to play the same role in China. Simply, the middle-class is the greatest beneficiaries of state-led economic growth and is unlikely to take part in any rapid political transformation. In this regard, the Chinese middle-class is far more conservative than that of any other country. To what extent then would a “Jasmine Revolution” be possible? There are four possible scenarios on the prospect for democratization in China. First, continued high economic growth is destined to bring about democratization. From the perspective of functionalism, improved standards of living as well as expansion of higher education, media, and an increasing consciousness of human rights will make democratization feasible within a certain period. However, such a viewpoint has some limits in that it blindly applies the experiences of the West and a few countries in East Asia to China without any consideration for its distinct history and social conditions. Second, there is the possibility for democratization due to impending social challenges mounting in China. In other words, if a combination of social problems builds up, the Chinese government would be unable to manage them under in its current repressive way. In this situation, the government would have to introduce democratic measures, such as freedom of speech and direct elections, to a substantial extent. Such a prospect though is unlikely to happen in the near future since high economic growth, increases in consumer expenditure, and the elevation of China’s international status will continue for a while, unless a major economic crisis were to occur in China or in neighboring countries. Even if such a crisis were to occur and the Chinese government implements measures for political reform, a soft-landing through democratization would not be guaranteed. Rather, it is highly probable that the unresolved problems would weaken the political control of the government and lead to political disorder. Third, a kind of flexible authoritarianism may be sustained for a long time. China has secured its legitimacy among the population through rapid economic growth, social welfare, administrative efficiency, and an assertive foreign policy. Simultaneously, it has maintained the stability of its system through strict control, systematization, and mass mobilization. Such a flexible authoritarian government is considered a prime alternative to Western-style democracy by the Chinese leadership and pro-government scholars. From such a viewpoint, it would seem unlikely to expect democratization in China for the time being. Lastly, there is a possibility that China would experience political chaos and division, a scenario that covers neither gradual democratization nor flexible authoritarianism. Authoritarian governments unable to actively promote reforms in the political system often fail to meet the social demands which have accumulated as marketization expands. Continued corruption and incompetence in the government leads to public dissatisfaction and might bring about the collapse of the system as in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, countries had implemented ‘shock therapy’ solutions to fix the problems of the socialist system. However, such rapid changes, in some cases, caused severe chaos rather than bring about a smooth transition to democracy. This hard landing scenario cannot be excluded in regarding the future of democratization in China. From a realistic perspective, even though China cannot avert the flow of democratization in the end, top-down democratization or limited democratic reform led by the Chinese Communist Party is more likely as Chinese civil society has yet to fully mature. Nevertheless, as political reforms would weaken the Chinese Communist Party and increase social instability, top-down democratization is likely to be restricted. And this limited reform might even fail to solve social problems ahead. In this case where there is no alternative social force for the Communist Party and its leadership, the direction for the development of Chinese politics will be unpredictable and could bring about unexpected results. China will therefore go through a difficult transition period due to intricate conflicts among domestic political forces.■
Topic:
Social Movement, Democracy, Arab Spring, and Protests
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Middle East, and Asia

8. Still Lips and Teeth? China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-il`s Visit to China

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations. It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers. There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.” Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Intervention, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

9. Lost in Translation? The Clash of Core Interests and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In studying the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, one of the most important questions is what data should be used. A review of all classified documents from the two countries may be the ideal way to secure reliable data, but it is not viable. Interviews with key officials in the two governments could be the next best choice but it is still extremely hard to know whether that person is telling the truth or not. In this regard, the official statements of the two countries are the only reliable and authoritative source for research. Of course in official statements, propaganda may be included and they cannot always be taken at face value. However, as information is ubiquitous in this era of globalization, a government would pay a tremendous cost if it expresses contradictory policies in its own official statements. We can therefore assume that official statements provide information on the general direction of the two country’s policies. Which documents can be accepted as official statements? The United States, of course, makes its policies well known throughout the world and has shown high levels of consistency across different departments of the government over its foreign policy. The official statements of the United States are therefore easily accessible through various official government websites including the State Department. On the other hand, China maintains a rather closed socialist system and there are not many documents that could be identified as official statements except for the regular press conferences of the Foreign Ministry. Even with these press conferences, the spokesperson usually responds to selected questions raised by the media. This brings a considerable limitation in collecting official statements from China. In order to address this difficulty, U.S.-China Relations (UCR) Statement Factsheets include editorials of the news outlets run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as official statements. Data collection began from November 2010. This period is important because first, it marks one year since the U.S.-China summit in November 2009 and second, it coincides with the G20 Seoul Summit held in November. Particularly the G20 summit was meaningful as it “clearly demonstrated that we are in a period of transition where the United States is no longer the world’s hegemon, yet no new power emerges.” (Sohn and Cho 2010, 1) Third, Xi Jinping was appointed as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission on 18 October, 2010 and is expected to be the next leader of China. This appointment then signals a new period where the next generation of leaders in the CCP will begin to assert their influence and views. For both the statements from the United States and China, English texts are used presented by either the official government department or a CCP-affiliated media outlet. The reason for not using Chinese language sources is that official statements in Chinese tend to be directed at a domestic audience, and the focus here is on the international messages that are being conveyed. The data is collected everyday and published as a monthly report, UCR Statement Factsheet. The UCR Briefing will analyze the UCR Statement Factsheets and summarize what has happened during the period in narrative form. The UCR Briefing will also focus on critical factors and issues in understanding the present and future of U.S.-China relations. This UCR Briefing No. 1 covers official statements of the United States and China from November 2010 to February 2011.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. Troubled Waters? Seeking a New Maritime Order in East Asia

Author:
Min Gyo Koo
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Without a doubt, the most heated and persistent maritime disputes in the world are in the East Asia region. The vast bodies of water included in this region are the Northwest Pacific, the East Sea, the West Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The diplomatic spat in the fall of 2010 between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea was a strong indication that any mishandling of maritime issues can disrupt the subtle balance of power and interests in the region. Equally problematic are the disputes in the South China Sea, where China’s growing assertiveness has provoked concern among not only its Southeast Asian neighbors but also with the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the main provider of maritime security in the East Asia region but now faces the challenge of a rising China. In May 2011, a Chinese patrol boat cut the cable of a Vietnamese petroleum and gas probe vessel in the South China Sea. From this incident, tensions escalated to the brink of armed conflict. As countries in the region participate in tit-for-tat military exercises, the atmosphere has become worse. Under such conditions, many considered that the South China Sea issue, tangled with conflicts between China and ASEAN and the United States could flare up significantly. However at the 18th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held from July 22-23 2011 a new perspective developed as China stated that “the importance of the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is clear and all countries should be beneficiaries of such freedom.” Furthermore, during the China-ASEAN ministerial of the 2011 ARF Beijing stepped back by adopting the guidelines for the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which was agreed upon in 2002. Washington welcomed this move as it suggested an effort to decrease tensions with respect to the South China Sea. This is in stark contrast to the 2010 ARF meeting where confrontations arose between the United States and China with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stating “a peaceful resolution of the South China Sea conflict directly relates to U.S. national interest.” From such developments, one can assess that the ARF has made important progress with respect to the South China Sea issue. However, the 2002 Declaration of Conduct that establishes the principle for peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) lacks binding capacities and the newly adopted guidelines are mostly declaratory and lack specific details. Thus it would be too soon to consider the 2011 ARF meeting as a success with respect to the South China Sea dispute. Considering that China tends to use such multilateral channels as a ground for making peace but then is more forceful in its bilateral relations, the outcome of the recent ARF meeting could come to have less significance than expected.
Topic:
Security, International Law, Maritime Commerce, and Maritime
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South China Sea, and ASEAN