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11. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 and Its Implication to South Korean Security Policies

Author:
Young-June Park
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the government of Japan updated its most strategically important document entitled “National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), FY 2011-” following confirmation from both the Security Council and the Cabinet. The new defense plan released along with the “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2011-2015” addresses the objectives and the methods of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, the plan also outlines Japan’s future military strategies as well as the fundamental tenets of its defense policy. Whereas in the United States, the White House, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs all release new guidelines each time a new administration comes to power, Japan does not have such a regular format for its defense plan. This makes the National Defense Program Guidelines a comprehensive strategic document that covers every aspect of Japan’s military defense. First introduced in 1976, the Guidelines has only been updated twice in 1995 and 2004. The NDPG in 1976 reflected Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War, while the 1995 and the 2004 guidelines reflected strategies for the post-Cold War era and the beginning of 21st century after 9/11, respectively. What then do these updated guidelines in 2010 signify? And in what context should this defense plan be seen? Firstly, the structural changes that have occurred in the security environment of East Asia should be taken into consideration. North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009. In 2010, it displayed new levels of provocation by sinking the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. These actions not only threaten the Korean Peninsula but also the entire region. Added to that, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy after the United States and has become more assertive over maritime disputes with Japan. How all these military and economic changes are projected in the document deserves close analysis. Secondly, unlike previous NDPGs that were written during the long years under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 2010 Guidelines are part of the first strategic document that reflects the strategic outlook and security approach of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Since the DPJ assumed power, it has long tried to differentiate itself from LDP in its decision making procedures and actual policies. Such tendencies are naturally reflected in its security policies as well. How do these guidelines differ from the NDPGs issued under the LDP? In short, the National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 is the best resource with which to understand how Japan perceives the changed security environment, and what strategic concepts and military capability it is preparing for in face of future security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

12. China’s Strategic Shift and North Korea’s Open-Door to China Policy

Author:
Seung-Yul Oh
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In the first half of 2011, bilateral trade volume between China and North Korea doubled compared to the same period of the previous year. On August 2, North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Guan concluded his week-long visit to Washington at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Furthermore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, during his first visit to Russia since 2002, met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at a military base on the outskirts of the eastern Siberian city of Ulan-Ude to talk about bilateral economic cooperation on August 24. Seemingly, North Korea’s hectic diplomatic efforts shed light on the long-stalled Six-Party talks, and it tries to counterweigh its heavy dependency on China. Is North Korea changing its attitude toward the outside world? In order to answer the question, this paper delves into the strategic motivation of the North and China for expanding Korea-China economic relations in terms of China’s strategic shift and North Korea’s open-door to China policy. Since the global financial crisis, China’s hierarchical status in the world economic order in terms of economic volume and influence improved so fast that even China itself has been facing some difficulties in accommodating the changes in its domestic sociopolitical sphere as well as its external strategies. Premier Wen’s repeated emphasis on the imperativeness of political reform in China is, to some extent, related to the discrepancies in the speed of changes between China’s political institutions and economic power, that is, imbalances in the basis and the superstructure in terms of the political philosophy of Karl Marx. For Marx, the stubborn capitalistic superstructure was a big problem. But in today’s China, the bureaucratic and closed superstructure is in contradiction with its globalized market economy as the world’s workshop. China’s gains from its peaceful rise have not been free from the pains of growth. Such a dilemma might be understood from the example of the contradiction in China’s external political gestures: it categorically argues that it is a member of developing countries when meeting with representatives from those developing countries; nevertheless, at the same time, it deliberately releases news about its achievements in military technologies, for example, those of the J-20 stealth fighter and the super-aircraft carrier. In addition, at the news conference after the closing ceremony of the third China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington in May 2011, the Chinese delegation used the phrase “two leaders” frequently, designating the two giants, China and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

13. Weibo and “Iron Curtain 2.0” in China: Who Is Winning the Cat-and-Mouse Game?

Author:
Jongpil Chung
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
At the 2008 Chinese Internet Research Conference, Lokman Tsui, in his paper titled “The Great Firewall as Iron Curtain 2.0,” argued that the Great Firewall metaphor obscures and limits our understanding of Internet censorship in China. The term, combining “great wall” and “firewall,” is used to describe the Chinese government’s efforts to control the Internet while at the same time drawing on the Cold War term “iron curtain.” Yet the phrase “Great Firewall of China” gives outsiders the wrong impression, suggesting that in order to bring freedom of speech to the Chinese people, the wall should be pulled down to enable all good things, such as democracy, from the outside to get in. The reality, however, is much more complicated. The Chinese Internet censorship system that filters or blocks external websites from internal view is only one part of a complex set of mechanisms. The Chinese government also uses cyber police and legal regulations to censor online content, and implements various types of surveillance and punitive actions to bring about self-censorship. Most entities in the private sector in China employ people to read and censor content manually, and can be warned or shut down by the Chinese government if they violate rules of acceptable content. There are also Chinese blogs, emails, social networks, and text messaging services that have opened up new forums for exchanging ideas, and these have created new targets for censorship. Since China has never had mechanisms to accurately detect and reflect public opinion, blogs and BBS (bulletin board system) have become an effective route to form and communicate society’s public opinion. We should not underestimate the extensive consequences that the Internet has brought to every realm of global affairs. The Internet has enhanced the capabilities of traditional actors such as the state and firms, but these technologies have also empowered less privileged groups by providing information and facilitating participation in policy-making procedures. The Internet and other networking technologies have facilitated change in the dynamic between the Beijing regime and the people in China. Who is winning the cat-and-mouse game? I argue that the Internet, more specifically Weibo (微博), the Chinese version of Twitter, and the microblogging system, have strengthened both the government and the people in China. Weibo has more functions than Twitter, such as commenting on others’ posts, turning a message into a conversation, and transmitting photographs and other files with posts. More recently, a great deal of politically sensitive material survives in the Chinese blogosphere provided by blog service providers such as Sina (新浪), Tencent (腾讯), Sohu (搜狐), and so on. The Chinese government is learning to adapt to these new circumstances, and becoming more responsive. Instead of strictly monitoring every posted comment on the Web, the Chinese government is selectively tolerating Internet expression “to provide a safety valve for the release of public anger” and improve its governance. This article is organized into four sections: a debate concerning the political impact of the Internet in the context of Chinese state-society relations; an examination of how Chinese leaders censor the people’s use of the Internet and Weibo, and how their citizens use Weibo to gather information, exchange views, and organize protests and rallies; and a brief conclusion.
Topic:
Cold War, Hegemony, State Violence, and Censorship
Political Geography:
China and Asia

14. From Preponderance of Power to Balance of Power? South Korea in Search of a New North Korea Policy

Author:
Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The global and East Asian orders of power are now represented by China's economic, military, and diplomatic rise and America's decline. The result is often called Chimerica or G2, leading to U.S.-China competition in every aspect of the international agenda. After the Bush administration's foreign policy in the first years of the millennium, when many scholars and policy makers focused on U.S. unipolarity or at least its preponderance of power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the current state of affairs is a great change. While U.S.-China relations represent a set of the most important variables in world politics, the meaning of China’s rise is much greater in the East Asian regional order. The Korean Peninsula, of course, cannot escape from the influence of its neighbors. Although the world order of the 1990s saw the unprecedented economic prosperity and overwhelming military power of the United States, the recent order has been characterized by the relative decline of the United States and the fast and strong rise of China. The Chinese economy has grown more than 10 percent per year for the last thirty years and is now the world's second-largest economy. Although the Chinese GDP is still only one-third that of the United States, as TABLE 1 shows, it is not at all unheard of to say that China may economically catch up with the superpower by 2030. Moreover, China's trade with Northeast Asian countries is much larger than that of the United States. As TABLE 2 shows, China's exports and imports with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are almost twice as large when compared with those of the United States. Given America's economic recession and China's incessant growth, the gap between the two is likely to get much larger. China's increasing economic interdependence with regional powers will have a great effect on the changing balance of power in the region, and will have a much greater effect on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, China has also made every effort to build up its military capability. Supported by its strong economic growth, Chinese military spending has been hugely increased, more than 10 percent per year on average. China spent 40 billion U.S. dollars in 2001, but it spent 119 billion in 2010, an increase of almost three times in ten years. TABLE 3 indicates that Chinese military spending is still less than one sixth compared to the American figure, but one must recognize that while the United States plans to cut its military spending in the next decade due to its budget deficit, China is certain to keep increasing its, unless its economy falls into deep trouble in the near future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Military Strategy, and GDP
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

15. Russia’s “Return” to Asia: How Should South Korea Respond?

Author:
Beom-Shik Shin
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On August 24, 2011, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a joint summit in Eastern Siberia, the first such meeting between the two countries since 2002. After the summit, many speculated upon the impact this meeting would have upon the current stalemate on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea’s nuclear program. Although some experts viewed Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia as merely a form of begging bowl diplomacy, such analysis underestimates recent efforts by Russia to engage Northeast Asia. Moreover, the strategic significance of the summit is reflected in the agreement reached between the two leaders which would imply that the summit could be a watershed moment in bringing about new dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and among neighboring countries. Particularly, the proposed Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project would have a strong impact on the political geography of Northeast Asia. In November 2011, South Korea and Russia held their own summit in St Petersburg where the Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline project was reconfirmed. Moscow even expressed its willingness to build the pipeline, passing through North Korea, at its own expense. Such a very active participation from Russia though could provoke certain competition with China in the region. The future course of this project is expected to be decided during the negotiation process between Russia’s Gazprom and South Korea’s KOGAS. Yet in South Korea, domestically, this issue of building a gas pipeline could be controversial in many ways. There are concerns regarding security matters related to North Korea as well as a lack of trust in Russia. At the same time, the responses from the United States and China must be taken into account. As 2012 is the year of leadership change for many countries in the region, it is also possible that the project will become unnecessarily politicized and eventually jeopardized. Therefore, South Korea should carefully prepare an action plan for realizing this project in order to take advantage of this opportunity amid changing dynamics in the region. In recent years there has been much talk of the United States “returning” to Asia, but Russia is also making its own return. This gas pipeline project shows how Russia intends to use its vast energy resources to facilitate its ambition to play a new role in Northeast Asia. This Issue Briefing addresses the impact of Russia’s reengagement and how South Korea should respond by considering both the positive and negative effects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and South Korea

16. Kim Jong-il’s Visit to China and Its Implications

Author:
Dong Ryul Lee
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il embarked on a secretive trip to China on May 3, 2010. The five day visit was his first to China in four years and his fifth so far. Kim’s recent visit to China does not seem to be that much different from previous summit meetings between North Korea and China. Although North Korea’s nuclear test in 2009 did not provoke a longer than normal suspension in bilateral exchanges, in essence, progress has been made since the resumption of bilateral diplomatic visits in 2000. The key agenda of the recent summit has been consistent with the principle in which China provides economic assistance in exchange for North Korea’s return to the Six-Party Talks. This principle has been the backbone of Beijing’s North Korea policy, which has been in place since the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2003. Furthermore, this secretive trip to China looks very similar to Kim Jong-il’s last four visits to China, where he toured the industrial regions that have benefited from China’s economic reform and opening. There has been a lot of controversy and diverse assumptions on the reason for Kim’s visit to China. This is particularly attributable to the complicated and delicate nature of inter-Korean relations even though this China-DPRK summit shares many similarities with those of the past. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the political and security environment of the Korean Peninsula in which Kim Jong-il decided to make such a critical strategic decision to travel to China. The visit and the resulting bilateral summit were a successful conclusion to the longest gap in China-DPRK relations since the revival of bilateral ties at the beginning of 2000. Similarly, this summit carries special meaning considering the current deadlock of the Six-Party Talks that has gone on for the past eighteen months. What is more significant is the fact that Kim Jong-il’s trip immediately followed South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s official visit to China on April 30, amid the escalating tensions in inter-Korean relations over the North Korean torpedo attack on the Cheonan. Moreover, North Korea is facing dire domestic circumstances primarily caused by the health problems of Kim Jong-il, the succession issue, instability following the disastrous currency reform of late 2009, and its failing economy struggling under United Nations sanctions. The fact that the China-DPRK summit took place in such a complex environment indicates that a wide range of current issues were involved and it would have a greater impact for stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s actions immediately following the bilateral summit with China should be closely examined as it could help South Korea predict how the Cheonan incident will develop. There were no official reports or any specific details of the conversation available for the public due to the opaque nature of the talk. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize as well as analyze any subtle moves by both countries that might reflect any possible major agreements between the two sides. There are three major questions that need to be answered when evaluating this recent summit in China. First, what is the significance of the summit regarding China-DPRK relations and Beijing’s policy toward North Korea? Second, did North Korea and China agree on the North’s return to the Six-Party Talks in exchange for Chinese support for its regime? If so, what is the prospect for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks? Third, what impact will this summit have on ROK-China relations in light of the fact that the summit meeting took place while the South Korean-led international investigation into the cause of the Cheonan sinking was in progress?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

17. From “Primordial” to “Pragmatic” Identity: A Search for Regional Identity in East Asia

Author:
Jun-Seok Kim
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2009, two interesting proposals for community building in East Asia were put forward: Kevin Rudd, then serving as Australia’s prime minister, proposed the creation of an Asia Pacific Community (APC) and then-Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed an East Asian Community (EAC). Claiming that Australia should get more deeply involved in Asia, Rudd described his vision of what an APC should look like. Of the most importance, it should be all-embracing. All the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region should take part, including the United States, Australia, Japan, China, South Korea, India, and Indonesia. The APC should also focus on both security and economic issues. In the meantime, Hatoyama, in a New York Times op-ed, came up with the idea of an East Asian Community as the cornerstone of his administration’s Asia policy. While the idea of the EAC was not totally fleshed out, he indicated that the group would include China, Japan, and South Korea as its core members. Hatoyama did not make it clear whether the United States would be invited, although he made no secret of his perception that the era of U.S.-led unilateralism and globalism was coming to an end. In this new period of growing multipolarity, he seemed to believe, it was imperative for Japan to reconceptualize East Asia, the world’s fastest-growing region which now accounts for one quarter of the total GDP of the world, as its own “basic sphere of being.” Prime Minister Hatoyama tried his best not to give the impression that he favored East Asia over the United States (or over the West as a whole). But, it seemed quite obvious that he wanted to see Japan more consciously autonomous from the United States than had been the case under the prolonged rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments. What prompted Rudd of Australia and Hatoyama of Japan to propose the creation of Asia Pacific and East Asian communities upon taking office? A probable cause can be found in the shift in relative power, especially between China, Japan, and the United States, that has long been in progress over the last decade. Both Rudd and Hatoyama were aware of this change. Rudd, for instance, explained that global economic and strategic weight was now shifting to Asia. Hatoyama has also conceded that China would surpass Japan in economic size “in the not-too-distant-future.” One might suspect, therefore, that their initiatives were nothing more than temporary expedients designed to cope with the recently changed international environment. That might be the case—or not. But whatever the two leaders’ underlying intent, their initiatives no doubt constituted significant contributions to a series of efforts to bring about community-type regional organizations in East Asia. From 1989 on, when APEC was first created, and especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, a succession of regional organizations came into being in East Asia, with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, ASEAN+3 in 1997, and the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005 being the most representative. Since the first meeting of the EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2005, in particular, interest in the possibility of building an East Asian Community has become widespread. Although controversies over the proper geographical scope of such a community remain far from settled, with some countries favoring extensive, elastic membership and others favoring a limited, restrictive one, community-building in East Asia is now looked upon as a goal that is worthy of being pursued for its own sake. Australia’s and Japan’s initiatives, probably spurred by geostrategic considerations and not immediately realizable, will surely strengthen the case for an East Asian Community. At the very least, two initiatives have demonstrated the continued interest in an East Asian Community among politicians and decision-makers of East Asian countries.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Community, and Identity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, East Asia, Asia, and South Korea

18. Debunking Chinese Thinking on a Peace Agreement and Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
At least for the time being, China’s foreign policy goals are focused on the preservation of the status quo in its peripheries, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees its long absence of war or military conflict as evidence of the well-preserved peace and stability of its security environment. Conversely, it conceives that this status quo has been conducive to achieving its foremost national goal, economic modernization. It continues to strive to improve its security environment within the equilibrium. There seems to be one growing exception, however, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, however. China’s support for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice with a peace agreement and a peace regime is in stark contrast to its status quo policy. Given China’s long advocacy as a peace-loving nation, it seems only logical that putting an end to Korea’s current technically-at-war status would make sense. Beijing has its own reasoning and logic behind its supportive call for a new peace arrangement on the peninsula. A confrontational international structure around the peninsula, for instance, can only be overcome by a peace agreement, a precondition necessitated by the Armistice. Hence, a peace agreement before normalization of this structure is perceived to be path-dependent. However, serious challenges arise if a call for a peace agreement and regime is put forth without much thinking regarding the strategic implications. Chinese scholars and experts tend to overlook this factor in their appraisal. On the surface, theirs is a just and righteous call that a peace agreement must replace the Armistice. It is critical to the installment of “perpetual peace” on the peninsula. It is also logical that such peace can be guaranteed by forging a peace regime, an assurance mechanism that will supplement the “peace” endowed by the agreement. If Chinese claims are correct, why are they not embraced by others? There must be something wrong in what the Chinese widely believe. Although their analysis of the imperatives for a peace agreement and regime is undeniable, as we shall see, their call for a peace agreement and regime still remains contradictory to the status quo orientation of their mother country’s foreign policy. Moreover, their work seems to lack insight regarding the strategic and structural implications of the full implementation of such a peace arrangement. Furthermore, Chinese pundits must define the meaning of a new peace in a more articulated way in the context of a new regional order to effectively defend their nation’s support for a peace agreement and regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

19. Economic Interdependence, Alliance Cooperation, and Sino-U.S. Complex Interdependence

Author:
Scott Snyder
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
China’s rising economic strength has highlighted a need to understand in greater detail the impact of complex economic interdependence on prospects for alliance cohesion, especially when an ally comes to depend on a potential adversary as its leading trading partner and engine for economic growth. This is an issue that did not come into play to any significant degree in analyzing alliance dynamics during the cold war era precisely because the development of security and economic relationships during that period were aligned with and served to reinforce each other, and the level of economic ties among potential cold-war adversaries was minimal. Analysis of trade relationships among security allies from that period shows a clear correlation of preferences for trading relationships with security partners versus adversaries, but it is not clear based on that data alone that there was necessarily causality between economic trade patterns and security alliances. In fact, structural differences between market economies (that tended to be allied with each other) and non-market economies were a significant deterrent to the development of economic relations with non-security partners during the cold war. In the post-cold war era, economically interdependent trade and investment relationships have been relatively unconstrained by political and security considerations, resulting in a situation where non-security partners such as China, a potential challenger to U.S. power, have become actively integrated in global supply chains as a leading manufacturer of goods for the global market. In considering this question, Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim have attempted to provide an empirical analysis of the influence of bilateral economic relations as a factor in shaping America’s Asian alliances, concluding that “economic ties do not markedly reinforce the security alliances of East Asia, because they have an asymmetrical structure”(Lee and Kim 2010, 4). But in making the argument that asymmetry matters, Lee and Kim assume that the economic consequences of interdependence are negative for dynamics within the alliance and that these negative consequences may cancel out positive effects of economic interdependence, even though the main argument of that the paper proves is that economic ties do not necessarily reinforce security alliances. The authors’ assertions regarding asymmetrical economic relations as having an impact on alliance dynamics are unproven and not dealt with to any significant degree by the evidence presented in the paper.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Alliance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident

Author:
Young-Sun Ha
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul. Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day. The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America