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31. From “Primordial” to “Pragmatic” Identity: A Search for Regional Identity in East Asia

Author:
Jun-Seok Kim
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2009, two interesting proposals for community building in East Asia were put forward: Kevin Rudd, then serving as Australia’s prime minister, proposed the creation of an Asia Pacific Community (APC) and then-Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed an East Asian Community (EAC). Claiming that Australia should get more deeply involved in Asia, Rudd described his vision of what an APC should look like. Of the most importance, it should be all-embracing. All the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region should take part, including the United States, Australia, Japan, China, South Korea, India, and Indonesia. The APC should also focus on both security and economic issues. In the meantime, Hatoyama, in a New York Times op-ed, came up with the idea of an East Asian Community as the cornerstone of his administration’s Asia policy. While the idea of the EAC was not totally fleshed out, he indicated that the group would include China, Japan, and South Korea as its core members. Hatoyama did not make it clear whether the United States would be invited, although he made no secret of his perception that the era of U.S.-led unilateralism and globalism was coming to an end. In this new period of growing multipolarity, he seemed to believe, it was imperative for Japan to reconceptualize East Asia, the world’s fastest-growing region which now accounts for one quarter of the total GDP of the world, as its own “basic sphere of being.” Prime Minister Hatoyama tried his best not to give the impression that he favored East Asia over the United States (or over the West as a whole). But, it seemed quite obvious that he wanted to see Japan more consciously autonomous from the United States than had been the case under the prolonged rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governments. What prompted Rudd of Australia and Hatoyama of Japan to propose the creation of Asia Pacific and East Asian communities upon taking office? A probable cause can be found in the shift in relative power, especially between China, Japan, and the United States, that has long been in progress over the last decade. Both Rudd and Hatoyama were aware of this change. Rudd, for instance, explained that global economic and strategic weight was now shifting to Asia. Hatoyama has also conceded that China would surpass Japan in economic size “in the not-too-distant-future.” One might suspect, therefore, that their initiatives were nothing more than temporary expedients designed to cope with the recently changed international environment. That might be the case—or not. But whatever the two leaders’ underlying intent, their initiatives no doubt constituted significant contributions to a series of efforts to bring about community-type regional organizations in East Asia. From 1989 on, when APEC was first created, and especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, a succession of regional organizations came into being in East Asia, with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, ASEAN+3 in 1997, and the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005 being the most representative. Since the first meeting of the EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2005, in particular, interest in the possibility of building an East Asian Community has become widespread. Although controversies over the proper geographical scope of such a community remain far from settled, with some countries favoring extensive, elastic membership and others favoring a limited, restrictive one, community-building in East Asia is now looked upon as a goal that is worthy of being pursued for its own sake. Australia’s and Japan’s initiatives, probably spurred by geostrategic considerations and not immediately realizable, will surely strengthen the case for an East Asian Community. At the very least, two initiatives have demonstrated the continued interest in an East Asian Community among politicians and decision-makers of East Asian countries.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Community, and Identity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, East Asia, Asia, and South Korea

32. Debunking Chinese Thinking on a Peace Agreement and Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
At least for the time being, China’s foreign policy goals are focused on the preservation of the status quo in its peripheries, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees its long absence of war or military conflict as evidence of the well-preserved peace and stability of its security environment. Conversely, it conceives that this status quo has been conducive to achieving its foremost national goal, economic modernization. It continues to strive to improve its security environment within the equilibrium. There seems to be one growing exception, however, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, however. China’s support for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice with a peace agreement and a peace regime is in stark contrast to its status quo policy. Given China’s long advocacy as a peace-loving nation, it seems only logical that putting an end to Korea’s current technically-at-war status would make sense. Beijing has its own reasoning and logic behind its supportive call for a new peace arrangement on the peninsula. A confrontational international structure around the peninsula, for instance, can only be overcome by a peace agreement, a precondition necessitated by the Armistice. Hence, a peace agreement before normalization of this structure is perceived to be path-dependent. However, serious challenges arise if a call for a peace agreement and regime is put forth without much thinking regarding the strategic implications. Chinese scholars and experts tend to overlook this factor in their appraisal. On the surface, theirs is a just and righteous call that a peace agreement must replace the Armistice. It is critical to the installment of “perpetual peace” on the peninsula. It is also logical that such peace can be guaranteed by forging a peace regime, an assurance mechanism that will supplement the “peace” endowed by the agreement. If Chinese claims are correct, why are they not embraced by others? There must be something wrong in what the Chinese widely believe. Although their analysis of the imperatives for a peace agreement and regime is undeniable, as we shall see, their call for a peace agreement and regime still remains contradictory to the status quo orientation of their mother country’s foreign policy. Moreover, their work seems to lack insight regarding the strategic and structural implications of the full implementation of such a peace arrangement. Furthermore, Chinese pundits must define the meaning of a new peace in a more articulated way in the context of a new regional order to effectively defend their nation’s support for a peace agreement and regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

33. On the Rocks: Korea and Japan Divided over the Dokdo Issue

Author:
D. Bong Youngshik
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
No serious observer of postwar relations between South Korea and Japan doubts that there is a bilateral issue between the two nations that is more persistent and volatile than their feud over the sovereign status of the two minuscule islets of Dokdo. This commentary examines the history of disputes over Dokdo, and attempts to argue that the starting point for a solution lies in the pragmatic and prudent approach, not in assertive diplomacy based on nationalistic sentiments. Since the end of World War II, Dokdo has been under the effective administrative control of the South Korean government. The Japanese government has protested at various official levels since then, arguing that the islets, which it calls Takeshima, belong to Japan in accordance with historical evidence and international law. The diplomatic feud over the territory did not flare up during the Cold War, because both countries involved in the controversy made security cooperation against the communist threat in Northeast Asia their top priority. It was only after concerns over the external regional security environment were lifted with the end of the Cold War that Japan began to fortify its claims to Dokdo in a far more assertive and diversified manner. South Korea responded to this change by making periodic departures from its traditional line of defense of “quiet diplomacy”—that is, taking the view that because its sovereignty over the islets is indisputable and its control over them remains complete, South Korea has no strategic interests in aggressively and emotionally reacting to Japan’s escalatory territorial policy. To do so would only reinforce Japan’s claim that there does exist an unresolved territorial issue between the two countries and the sovereign status of Dokdo is undetermined, when in fact South Korea’s position is the opposite.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

34. A Path Never Taken: The Options for Kim Jong-un and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since Kim Jong-il’s health deteriorated in the summer of 2008, the question of his succession has drawn attention from all over the world. Finally, on September 28 2010, Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son, rapidly emerged with his guardianship group made up of the close personnel of the “dear leader” at the Third Meeting of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Representatives. The future direction of the succession process has generated tremendous interest from all over the world, because it is not only related to internal power transition in North Korea but also directly linked with the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The political and diplomatic decisions of Kim Jong-il’s successor will crucially affect his own future, as well that of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Inter-Korean relations, and the international order of Northeast Asia. Kim Jong-un was promoted to the rank of daechang, the equivalent of a four-star general, and appointed vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, in essence holding the de facto post of second-in-command. He was named right after the four members of the politburo standing committee by North Korea's official news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and his picture was revealed to the public for the first time. This formulated that he became the successor to his father. All in all, he was named as general on the 27th, appointed vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission on the 28th, and his picture released on the 29th, which shows precisely the elaborated staging and even hastiness on the part of the North Korean regime. On October 10, Kim Jong-il effectively declared his heir apparent at home and abroad when he attended a massive military parade with Kim Jong-un, commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. This remarkable event was broadcasted live in North Korea with even foreign correspondents invited to attend. The succession process was a lot faster than expected, particularly when compared to Kim Jong-il, whose succession process only got off the ground six years after he was designated a member of the Politburo in 1974. It is premature to say which direction Kim Jong-un will go, but it cannot but be seen that his emergence puts more emphasis on ‘continuation’ rather than ‘severance’ or ‘transformation’ from the existing songun or military-first politics. Above all, it is noteworthy that Kim Jong-un took the position of vice chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission rather than positions within its Politburo or Secretariat. This is groundwork to make Kim Jong-un become the “royal” successor of the military-first politics system. Like his father, he will likely exercise the power to interpret the ruling ideology as the sole successor to the “bloodline of Mount Baekdu.” Holding onto the banner of military-first politics, Kim Jong-un will establish it as a “revolutionary” tradition that will form the basis of his succession. Secondly, it is also noticeable that Kim Jong-un’s guardianship group is filled with his father’s people. They were appointed to be heavyweights in the Party and military during the Meeting of Party Representatives. Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui became a member of the Politburo, her husband Jang Song Thaek became an alternate member of the Politburo, member of the Central Military Commission, and a department director of the Party’s Central Committee, while Vice-Marshal Ri Yong Ho became a Standing Member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. It is hard to find anyone that could be considered as Kim Jong-un’s people, which is to be understood considering his age and inexperience. There is a dilemma for Kim Jong-un in that he cannot completely rely on the military-first politics. Currently, Kim has not even been officially designated as successor; that will only come when he assumes position as a Standing Member of the Politburo. Such a move can only be possible if he accumulates considerable achievements as he has nothing to his name so far. Presumably, this process needs to be completed before the 7th Party Congress in 2012, leaving Kim Jong-un with little time. Establishing North Korea as an ‘economically strong power,’ one of the three pillars of gangseongdaeguk or strong and prosperous country is something that has yet to be achieved. Pyongyang has already claimed to have achieved the other two pillars of a strong political power and a strong military power. However, as long as the military-first politics is sustained, it is almost impossible for North Korea to pursue the path to economic recovery by itself.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Leadership, Succession, and Transition
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

35. Post-2012 U.S. Leadership and U.S. Policy toward East Asia

Author:
Young Kwon Sohn
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
2012 the United States will hold another presidential election, and it will surely be a referendum on the first term of the Obama presidency. As usual, the election will attract the attention of the public and the pundits alike, both at home and abroad, particularly at a time when an increasing number of people will be interested in how the election’s outcome will affect U.S. foreign policy and, related to it, the Sino-American bipolar configuration in East Asia. Since the Cheonan incident in the West Sea in the spring of 2009, particularly, the evolution and interaction of the Sino-American relationship in East Asia has become the focus of speculation among policy analysts and practitioners. That said, the outcome of the 2012 U.S. presidential election raises several questions. Will the 2012 presidential election bring a new leadership team to the White House? And will the outcome, new leaders or not, affect the overall tone of U.S. strategy in East Asia? If not, what other factors should be considered in forecasting the future of East Asia? Although a definitive answer to these questions cannot be had when we are still two years away from the 2012 presidential election, addressing them, nevertheless, is an intriguing mental exercise. We can say immediately that it is unlikely that the outcome of the 2012 election will be the dominant factor determining the United States’ strategy in East Asia as of 2013. Because of the rising power of China and the ever-hardening bipolarized structure of power in the region, significant changes in post-2012 East Asia are more likely to be triggered by changes from within East Asia itself, rather than from the United States. An ambitious China, taking a more aggressive posture toward both its neighbors and the United States, could be a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. Internal changes in North Korea could also be regionally destabilizing. The United States’ East Asian policy would thus be somewhat reactive in its general tone, although not passive. The U.S. stance could be firm and even assertive, however, depending on the situation, just as it was recently in dealing with China’s bid for expansion toward the South China Sea.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. The Impact of North Korea’s Artillery Strike on Public Opinion in South Korea

Author:
Nae-Young Lee and Han-Wool Jeong
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On November 23, 2010, North Korea launched a deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island; a South Korean island situated 12km off the North Korean coastline. Although ROK Marines returned fire, two Marines and two civilians were killed in the attack by the North. There have been several incidents since the Armistice Agreement that brought an end to the Korean War was signed on July 27, 1953, but this has been the first time a military attack has killed civilians. The EAI/Han-Kook Research November Public Opinion Barometer, which was conducted after the North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island, reveals that 81.5% of respondents feel they are “concerned” about insecurity (34.9% “very concerned”+ 46.6% “slightly concerned”). This is the highest number since the survey first began in 2000.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Survey
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

37. Economic Interdependence, Alliance Cooperation, and Sino-U.S. Complex Interdependence

Author:
Scott Snyder
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
China’s rising economic strength has highlighted a need to understand in greater detail the impact of complex economic interdependence on prospects for alliance cohesion, especially when an ally comes to depend on a potential adversary as its leading trading partner and engine for economic growth. This is an issue that did not come into play to any significant degree in analyzing alliance dynamics during the cold war era precisely because the development of security and economic relationships during that period were aligned with and served to reinforce each other, and the level of economic ties among potential cold-war adversaries was minimal. Analysis of trade relationships among security allies from that period shows a clear correlation of preferences for trading relationships with security partners versus adversaries, but it is not clear based on that data alone that there was necessarily causality between economic trade patterns and security alliances. In fact, structural differences between market economies (that tended to be allied with each other) and non-market economies were a significant deterrent to the development of economic relations with non-security partners during the cold war. In the post-cold war era, economically interdependent trade and investment relationships have been relatively unconstrained by political and security considerations, resulting in a situation where non-security partners such as China, a potential challenger to U.S. power, have become actively integrated in global supply chains as a leading manufacturer of goods for the global market. In considering this question, Dong Sun Lee and Sung Eun Kim have attempted to provide an empirical analysis of the influence of bilateral economic relations as a factor in shaping America’s Asian alliances, concluding that “economic ties do not markedly reinforce the security alliances of East Asia, because they have an asymmetrical structure”(Lee and Kim 2010, 4). But in making the argument that asymmetry matters, Lee and Kim assume that the economic consequences of interdependence are negative for dynamics within the alliance and that these negative consequences may cancel out positive effects of economic interdependence, even though the main argument of that the paper proves is that economic ties do not necessarily reinforce security alliances. The authors’ assertions regarding asymmetrical economic relations as having an impact on alliance dynamics are unproven and not dealt with to any significant degree by the evidence presented in the paper.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Alliance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident

Author:
Young-Sun Ha
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul. Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day. The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

39. Moving From a North Korean Nuclear Problem to the Problem of North Korea

Author:
Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea, in conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, is repeating its earlier pattern of nuclear diplomacy: raising the level of military tensions by launching a long-range rocket and performing a nuclear test, and then searching for the most favorable position once negotiations resume. This vicious circle, composed of North Korea's brinkmanship and other countries’ multilateral sanctions will continue without any prospect of solving the North Korean nuclear problem in the near future. The so-called action-to-action paradigm cannot succeed, because the most fundamental principles of North Korea and the countries conflict with each other. Japan, South Korea, and the United States hope that a "stick and carrot" approach will elicit concessions from North Korea during the process of negotiations, but North Korea will not take steps toward giving up its nuclear program, unless its leaders feel sure that they are being given reliable, material guarantees for the survival of their entire regime, system, and state. Because their nuclear program is their ultimate bargaining chip, “sticks and carrots” focusing only on specific issues of the negotiations will be fall far short of solving the problems of North Korea as a whole. Sixteen years have passed since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Geneva System, based on the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva in 1994, lasted for eight years (from October 1994 to October 2002), but failed to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation and the normalization of relations. The success or failure of the new system of Six-Party Talks is yet to be seen, but as of now in 2009, negotiations based on the approach of the George W. Bush administration and, more specifically, the February 13 agreement of 2007 seem to be in a stalemate. The North Korean problem is older than the North Korean nuclear problem. From the perspective of North Korea, the latter is its desired solution to the following questions: How will North Korea survive in the post-Cold War world, in which most socialist countries are no longer socialist? What kind of regime and system can North Korea sustain in this environment? How will North Korea compete with South Korea and resist absorption by the South? North Korea developed a nuclear program and pursued militaristic diplomacy as the most plausible shortcuts to solve the problems indicated by these questions. For countries outside of North Korea, diplomacy has failed to solve either the North Korean nuclear problem or the more general North Korean problem. The Six-Party Talks that have been held by South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russian Federation, and North Korea are stalled at the last phase of the second stage of what is termed “disablement,” and participants are now struggling to find a way to get into the third stage of the agreement of February 13. Reaching the issue of North Korea’s declaration and verification of its nuclear program is critical, because it will demonstrate a genuine intention to begin the process of giving up its program. Yet North Korea is desperately trying to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Obama administration by first launching a long-range rocket and then by testing a nuclear weapon for the second time, reversing the achievements of the disablement stage and rejecting the Six-Party Talks altogether. North Korea desires to strike a comprehensive deal with the Obama administration through bilateral talks, and seeks a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic rewards such as a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, the lifting of international economic sanctions, and possibly light-water reactors. The five countries in the Six-Party Talks except North Korea have tried to evade facing up to the North Korean problem, because it is difficult to know how best to influence the future orientation of the North Korean regime, system, and diplomatic position. The structure of the Six-Party talks has also been narrowly focused on the problem of the nuclear program, leaving broader questions aside. The Northeast Asian international order, which is based on a strict and competitive balance of power, will be gravely influenced by the future orientation of North Korea, and therefore it is appropriate for the five countries most affected to deal with the North Korean problem directly. But by focusing so narrowly on the North Korean nuclear issues, these countries have maintained only minimal agreement on how to manage the nuclear problems that are involved, sometimes showing strategic and tactical differences on various specifics. In spite of the five countries’ agreement on the Six-Party presidential statement criticizing North Korea's rocket launch on April 9, they have had a hard time finding common ground to deal with future North Korean problems. The United States has been determined to impose economic sanctions on North Korean firms by using a specifically targeted list, as well as to punish North Korea diplomatically by refusing to give serious and close attention to the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea and Japan have maintained a policy of neglecting North Korea for different reasons. The two countries seem to continue minimal interactions with North Korea even if the North fails to meet the conditions suggested by these countries. China and Russia do not want to take the initiative either to punish or to side with North Korea, and only reluctantly facilitate cooperation among the other countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

40. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity

Author:
Seongho Sheen
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America