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1. Grand Strategy: Shield of the republic

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Grand strategy is a state’s theory about how to provide for its own security. Leaders must decide how to best translate scarce means into political objectives. Limited resources and the high stakes of national survival force leaders to prioritize. Military power is dependent on wealth, industry, geographical endowments, population size, and effective domestic institutions. The various conditions in which states find themselves help motivate and constrain the grand strategy formulated by their leaders. The United States is still the most powerful, secure, and prosperous country in the world, with a favorable geographic position and many internal advantages. U.S. grand strategy has historically been concerned with preventing the rise of a regional hegemon in Eurasia by maintaining the balance of power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only great power in the world. Unfortunately, it squandered the “unipolar moment” by pursuing a costly and counterproductive grand strategy of “liberal hegemony,” which has left it overextended. The United States’ secure geostrategic position and the improbability of a Eurasian hegemon allows it to adopt a grand strategy of restraint. This shift will help the United States to preserve its power, minimize risks, and adapt to the rise of new great powers. This strategy requires the United States to adopt a more rigorous definition of its vital interests and to shift to its allies the main burden of defending themselves.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. Grand Strategy: The Balance of Power

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The “balance of power” refers to the distribution of capabilities among states, as well as a possible equilibrium between them. A state’s military power is based on several factors, especially its economy and population. To survive in an anarchic world, states “balance” against rivals that threaten to become overwhelmingly powerful. This can include “internal balancing,” by which states build up their own capabilities, and “external balancing,” where states form alliances. Primacists and restrainers disagree about the balance of power. Primacists believe global hegemony is optimal and stable. Restrainers believe the pursuit of global hegemony is quixotic and self-defeating, leading to overextension and provoking counterbalancing by other powers. The United States is extremely powerful and secure thanks to its economy, geography, population, and military, among other factors. The prospect of a potential Eurasian hegemon emerging is remote. China is a formidable great power that warrants attention, but its geography makes expansion difficult, and it can be counterbalanced principally by other states in East Asia. A rough balance of power exists in both Europe and the Middle East, and therefore there’s no potential hegemon on the horizon in either region. The United States’ pursuit of primacy discourages allies from providing for their own defense to balance against threats, while uniting adversaries seeking to counterbalance the United States. The United States should instead encourage its capable allies to take responsibility for their own defense while seeking to keep its competitors divided through prudent diplomacy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Grand Strategy, and Balance of Power
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Despite having the world’s largest navy, important questions can be asked about China’s ability to challenge the U.S. Navy on a global scale. A number of factors—geography, logistical infrastructure, force structure, and command culture—all argue that China cannot do so at this time. In particular, China would need to significantly expand the number and caliber of its overseas bases in order to support large-scale, blue-water operations by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China currently has just two overseas bases—at Djibouti and Cambodia—and both are of limited capacity. Absent such a basing network, the PLAN is reliant on at-sea replenishment, a capability that is inherently vulnerable in wartime. China possesses some quality at-sea replenishment vessels but not nearly in sufficient quantities to support widespread global operations. While Chinese naval aviation has shown important improvements over the last year, the PLAN does not appear to have the logistical capacity to sustain high-tempo carrier operations outside the First Island Chain for an extended period of time. Super-quiet Chinese nuclear submarines would be game-changers in terms of Chinese blue-water operations. But thus far China has not shown mastery of the requisite technologies to build boats with this capability. It would also take China several years to grow a fleet of super-quiet submarines once the necessary technological challenges have been solved. Structural issues with the Chinese economy raise new concerns about Beijing’s ability to fund a blue-water navy over the long term. Such calculations must include the expense of ship construction, but also the massive operations and maintenance budget needed to deploy a potential navy of over 400 ships.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, Economy, and Submarines
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. A new NATO agenda: Less U.S., less dependency

Author:
Benjamin Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should aggressively reduce its force presence in Europe. This would be consistent with NATO’s original balancing purpose and U.S. expectations then that garrisoning Europe was a temporary expedient, not a permanent tool of U.S. dominance. The Russian threat, despite being energized by NATO expansion, is insufficient to demand the current defense effort devoted to it in Europe, whether it’s Americans or Europeans making that effort. The results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underline this happy point: Russia has proven weaker than conventional wisdom held, and the advantages of defense evident in the war bode well for the territorial status quo NATO defends in Europe. A U.S. drawdown in Europe is unlikely to spark a European defense renaissance, but even so, the balance of power in Europe will remain intact, and the United States will be better off with the freed-up resources and reduced risks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, Dependency, Balance of Power, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

5. Rethinking Africa Command

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
As debate grows over U.S. policy towards Africa, consideration should be given to altering the continent’s status under the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). Eliminating Africa Command (AFRICOM) under the UCP would both signify a policy shift away from a counterterrorism focus and ease the process of implementing that change within the policymaking bureaucracy. Establishing a three-star subcommand, nested under European Command (EUCOM), would still allow the United States to use force in Africa, when necessary, but would reduce the prominence of military power in U.S. policy toward the continent. AFRICOM and EUCOM essentially share much of their force structure; this unique relationship would facilitate the transition to the proposed three-star subcommand. Altering the U.S. military footprint in Africa should also be considered in the context of any changes to policy and command arrangements. Making specific recommendations at this time is complicated by the opaqueness of the current footprint.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Counter-terrorism, Africa Command (AFRICOM), and European Command (EUCOM)
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

6. A defensive approach to Ukraine military aid

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The next administration is likely to continue U.S. military aid to Ukraine to some degree, yet thus far decisions about what aid to provide have been reactive and not connected to any strategy. The United States should use its military aid to push Ukraine to adopt a defensive strategy that will be more sustainable for the Ukrainians given manpower shortfalls and more responsible and fiscally feasible for the United States, while also reducing the risk of Russian escalation. This would be in line with America’s priorities in Ukraine, including preventing a Russian victory and preserving a sovereign Ukraine at lowest possible cost and without direct involvement in the war. This strategy would also put Ukraine in a good position for a settlement that trades some land for a ceasefire and supports Ukraine’s longer-term defense. A Ukraine aid framework centered on a defensive strategy would see the U.S. provide air defense, anti-tank mines, the material and equipment to build fortifications, short-range artillery and limited short-range missile variants, small uncrewed aerial systems, and some armored vehicles for transport. In many cases, however, quantities would be limited by the needs of U.S. forces or other U.S. partners. The U.S. would not provide most types of aircraft, long-range missiles, tanks, or other weapon systems that are primarily offensive in nature and could cross a redline for Vladimir Putin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

7. How Would Europe Defend Itself?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Achieving greater European defensive autonomy is unlikely to be quick or easy. While there are alternatives, adapting NATO to this end is arguably the most realistic path. Pointing out the significant challenges to European defensive autonomy should not be construed as an endorsement of the status quo. Contending demands for limited U.S. military resources in Asia and elsewhere augur a reduced U.S. role in NATO regardless of Europe’s capacity to defend itself. Given current deficiencies with European capabilities and the failure of many NATO members to meet basic funding obligations, significant spending increases are likely needed to actualize greater independent European military capabilities. Smaller coalitions within NATO could achieve more effective solutions at the regional level, as opposed to trying to achieve full defensive autonomy among all 29 European members. In particular, defense of the Nordic-Baltic region could be an important test case. Nuclear issues will be particularly difficult to navigate. Reliance on either British or French nuclear forces as NATO’s primary deterrent comes with important challenges. Likewise, retaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella absent U.S. ground forces in Europe could prove unworkable. Russia’s capacity to rebound long term and pose a more robust threat to Europe should not be discounted. This underscores the importance of working through the difficult issues associated with European defensive autonomy in the current strategic window of Russian weakness.1
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

8. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

9. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

10. Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

Author:
William Walldorf
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Due to an overly broad definition of threat, the United States currently commits far too many military resources to counterterrorism, especially in Africa. The United States is pursuing military action against at least thirteen terrorist groups in Africa, but only one of those groups has the “global reach” to be a threat to Americans. Consequently, the U.S. military is fighting a slew of counterinsurgency—not counterterrorism—wars in Africa today, a strategy that borders on nation-building. Counterintuitively, U.S. security assistance, training, and military activity in Africa since the 2000s has inadvertently aided the growth of terrorist groups in the region. Most concerning, U.S. policy today could be helping to inspire the next generation of global jihadists tomorrow, intent on attacking the United States and its closest democratic allies. U.S. military activity in Africa has expanded significantly over the past decade and a half and this trend will likely continue even further without an intentional course correction. The potential for further mission creep and overexpansion is high. Washington should wind down direct military activity and close most military bases in Africa, while also curbing security assistance to local regimes.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa and United States of America