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Begin New Search Topic Military Intervention Publishing Institution Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations

1. All eyes on Ankara: A scenario exercise focused on the 2023 elections

Author:
Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over the years, foreign policy has become a source of tension in the European Union’s relationship with Turkey. Although the EU has repeatedly disapproved of Ankara’s (military) interventions in Syria, Libya and Iraq as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean region and the South Caucasus, it has so far not been able to counterbalance Ankara’s actions. In that light, Turkey’s 2023 elections serve as a crucial moment. Seen through the lens of two theoretical scenarios – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance win the elections, versus Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance win the elections – this policy brief provides an insight into the instruments the EU has at its disposal to influence and/or respond to Ankara’s potential future foreign policy. It shows that while neither scenario will be hassle-free, the EU has most room to manoeuvre and can make best use of its instruments, ranging from diplomatic engagement to military cooperation, in a situation where Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance win the elections in 2023.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

2. The Saudi-Emirati axis and the preservation of regional order

Author:
Gertjan Hoetjes
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Arab uprisings of 2011 spurred the emergence of a Saudi-Emirati axis that sought to mitigate and – where possible – eliminate challenges posed by what these countries perceive as the so-called ‘triple threat’ to the regional order of the Middle East and North Africa: Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and violent extremist groups. Using a variety of foreign policy instruments - including military intervention and strategic outreach, funding allies and proxies as well as supporting religious networks and media outlets – the axis substantially shaped or influenced the domestic and regional events that occurred in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Broadly speaking, the Saudis and Emiratis have been successful in maintaining a monarchical/authoritarian pole in the region’s political order in their quest for domination. They have succeeded in doing so mainly through the use of soft power (finance, religious influence and media framing) in relation to weaker ‘client’ states in the region such as Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Their military interventions have generally not achieved their intended objectives and Saudi as well as Emirati shortcomings have been on full display in Yemen, Libya and Syria. While both countries were unable to prevent the emergence of a more multipolar regional order that includes Turkey and Iran, they have effectively helped smother popular calls for political renewal. Growing regional geopolitical competition has, however, not gone hand in hand with growing domestic turmoil. The vast financial reserves, increasing hard power and substantial reservoirs of soft power of both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates ensures that they will continue to act as defenders of the monarchical status quo of the Gulf region and its web of client states in the foreseeable future, even as competition between both partners increases at the same time.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates

3. Band-aids, not bullets: EU policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Nancy Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Engaging in the conflict cycle in other countries to gain outcomes favourable to one’s own interests is akin to playing in the champions league of foreign policy. Doing this effectively and responsibly requires a coherent and full-spectrum political strategy as well as the diplomatic, financial, developmental and military means to deliver it. It is clear from the scope of the security interests articulated in the European Union’s (EU) Global Strategy (2016) and its many associated foreign policy statements that the EU intends to meet these requirements. However, study of EU institutional policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars highlights that it falls well short of doing so. As a result, EU institutions are not well placed to intervene effectively in high intensity conflicts with existential features such as these two civil wars. With this problem in mind, the core recommendation of the paper is to increase the effectiveness of EU interventions in high-intensity conflicts by institutionalising full-spectrum decision making, policy implementation and force deployment modalities for the EU as a whole, as well as for EU coalitions of the willing. The parallel existence of such tracks will enable the EU to act jointly in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with matching intensity preferences, and to act in part in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with a mixed distribution of intensity preferences (like Iraq or arguably Syria). EU foreign policy inaction, including institutional paralysis, will continue to occur where Member States’ foreign policy preferences are largely not compatible and have high-intensity preferences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

4. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

5. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Libya

Author:
Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The strategic objectives of the Turkish military intervention in Libya in 2019–2020 in favour of the Government of National Accord (GNA) were geopolitical (establishing an entry point into Africa in addition to Somalia), geo-economical (related to gas exploration in the Mediterranean) and commercial (facilitating repayment of outstanding business debts and enabling future profits). The deeper drivers of Ankara’s intervention include a mix of more assertive nationalism based on a hegemonic conception of Turkey’s ‘near abroad’, a perceived need to counter the military campaign of the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s to conquer Tripolitania, and Turkey’s exclusion from Mediterranean gas politics. Ankara’s intervention and its institutionalisation proved effective in counterbalancing the LNA and its international backers – chiefly Russia and the UAE, but also France and Egypt – and produced a more stable political situation in the process. While Turkey has achieved its short- to medium-term objectives and is likely to retain a substantial permanent military, commercial and political presence in Libya, it also created tensions with the EU and US as well as antagonizing the LNA’s international backers. In brief, an improvement in Turkey’s geostrategic position might have come at the cost of its regional strategic relations.
Topic:
Politics, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Libya