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1. How the Aid Fund for Northern Syria can upgrade humanitarian aid and EU geopolitical engagement

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
UN bureaucratic inertia, weak leadership, Stockholm syndrome and a laissez-faire attitude by donors have allowed structural problems with humanitarian aid delivery in Syria to persist for too long. These problems include regime capture of aid, dependency on Damascus to deliver aid cross-border and, more recently, too much focus on lifesaving aid. The coming humanitarian funding crunch demands that these problems are finally addressed at pain of a rapid increase in the misery of millions of Syrians. This will have consequences both in terms of local predation and international migration. The Aid Fund for Northern Syria (AFNS) could be the vehicle to break existing molds due to its more diverse governance structure, independence of both Damascus and the UN, greater focus on Early Recovery and an innovative, if emergent, localisation strategy. As a bonus, it can support a pragmatic conflict management strategy for northern Syria based on the ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ concept of the 2012 Geneva Communiqué and UNSCR 2254. Donors should consider the practical actions proposed in this brief to put their money where their mouths are.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Geopolitics, and Donors
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Syria

2. A scramble for legitimacy: Iraq’s political elites since the October 2019 protests

Author:
Marsin Alshamary
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Iraqi political elites exhibited a variety of responses to the 2019 October protests, the largest demonstrations in post-2003 Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr, a cleric-turned politician and leader of the Sadrist movement, vacillated between attempting to co-opt and repressing the protests. Other Shi’a political elites portrayed the predominantly Shi’a protestors as foreign agents and encouraged violent repression. Yet others who urged reform and response went largely unheard. Iraq’s political system emerged largely unscathed from the protests, even though the threat of recurrence inspired the new government to undertake limited service-oriented reforms. However, traditional political elites continue to view reformists, including the politicians that emerged from the protest movement, as illegitimate usurpers of governing power they feel rightly belongs to them.
Topic:
Reform, Domestic Politics, Protests, Elites, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Shiite
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

3. Examining the interplay between elites and social movements in Jordan

Author:
Matteo Colombo
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Policy Brief offers insights into the bargaining process that both reflects and sets limits for political change in Jordan. It argues that neither permissiveness to organise protests nor their actual occurrence improves the prospects of meaningful political reforms. Instead, protests usually serve as a strategic tool in the interests of particular elites. In Jordan, elites and social movements commonly develop vertical ties instead of different social movements working together to press for change bottom-up, as is more usual elsewhere. Broadly, Jordan’s political context makes it possible for elites and political authorities to co-opt social movements by supporting limited changes that respond to their demands, as long as these fit within the prevailing political settlement. Ultimately, protests tend to reinforce the status quo rather than challenging it. Social movements are therefore faced with the dilemma of accepting co-optation to facilitate incremental changes, or to stick to a more radical stance that risks being ineffective or even triggering repression. But mounting economic headwinds mean that some reform of Jordan’s political system is inevitable if political instability is to be avoided. Mechanisms such as referendums and popular initiatives can provide a viable path forward if they are designed to operate on the frontiers of the existing framework and respect the position of the monarchy. Such initiatives can engage citizens more directly in reform processes and ensure their voices are heard in a more meaningful way. Jordan’s dependence on foreign funding provides European policy makers with a lever to condition continuous support on steps in this direction.
Topic:
Social Movement, Reform, Domestic Politics, Protests, Elites, and Cooptation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

4. Israel against Iran: regional conflict scenarios in 2024

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Four scenarios capture the main dynamics of conflict between Israel and the US on the one hand, and Iran and the axis of resistance on the other. They are: ‘a fight for the status quo’, ‘shifting red lines’, ‘limited war’ and ‘total war’. The first two scenarios amount to muddling through under the permanent threat of escalation, which could happen due to unintended yet possibly catastrophic incidents. The more warlike scenarios signify a shift to high-intensity war across large parts, or all, of the region. As 7 October 2023 created tighter linkages between the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the regional conflict between Israel/US and Iran, the violent dynamics of either issue can trigger each scenario. Meanwhile, scenario pathways lie so close to each other that tipping points can swiftly transform one scenario into another. Together, the scenarios point to the need to develop conflict prevention measures between Israel, the US and Iran – such as hotlines, protocols that spell out red lines and tolerable action/reaction bandwidths or even demilitarised zones – between now and the US presidential elections in November. The core strategic objectives of the conflict parties suggest that progress is possible. Israel seeks to restore the security of its northern border without an all-out war against Hezbollah or Iran. It also intends to continue occupation. It does not care enough about normalisation with Saudi Arabia to discontinue annexation, which means it will not alter the regional security order to an extent that could truly threaten Iran. Tehran, in turn, seeks good relations with the Persian Gulf states, recognition as a regional power and the isolation of Israel. The US wishes to uphold Israel’s security by reducing the risk of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but without triggering a region-wide, high-intensity conflict. A precarious balance might be achieved, for example if Israel halts the in-your-face elements of its expanding occupation, a reinforced UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) takes up position on both sides of the Israeli-Lebanese border, US sanction enforcement against Iran is somewhat loosened and the axis of resistance, including Iran, observes a longer-term ceasefire regarding Israel.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regional Politics, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

5. Drivers and strategic puzzles of Saudi modernization

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vision 2030’ set in motion a large-scale, mainly state-led and top-down modernization agenda to diversify the Saudi economy beyond oil, develop a new national development ethos, reshape Saudi identity and introduce greater lifestyle options while maintaining consolidated rule in the hands of the Al Saud. The envisaged transformation is fully in line with the vested interests of the Saudi monarchy and much of the business elite, as well as some of the country’s younger generations. Vision 2030 builds on earlier change efforts that were only partially successful, but pursues a much broader social agenda in addition to the traditional core economics tenets of prior reform efforts. Another key difference is that its main architect – Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince – has amassed all the essential inputs for transformative change: centralized executive authority, a decent strategy, heaps of money and supportive social constituencies. In the short term, there are no barriers to the realization of Vision 2030 beyond the rapid adjustment that inevitably needs to occur when plans meet reality in a complex environment. However, Vision 2030’s lack of participatory governance modalities, insufficient attention to climate change mitigation and absence of a balanced strategy to promote regional stability represent serious medium-term challenges. Success is likely to require recalibrating these issues in ‘Vision 2040’, or sooner.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Economy, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

6. How Syria, Ukraine and Gaza are transforming power dynamics in the Caucasus

Author:
Ilya Roubanis
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In 2017, Iran, Turkey and Russia met in Astana in a bid to determine the future of the Syrian Arab Republic without Western participation. As a byproduct of this episode, they started to develop a strategic policy understanding between themselves regarding the Levant: especially Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Since then, the war in Ukraine has broadened Iranian, Russian and Turkish cooperation to include the Caucasus. No longer able to ensure regional security but in need of effective sanction bypasses, Russia’s diminished profile created scope for a tighter web of economic partnerships between itself, Iran and Turkey. Using their 2017 Astana collaborative playbook, these three countries have now embarked on a process of creating new value chains, infrastructures, transport routes and regulatory arrangements in the Caucasus, which are no longer grafted onto the global liberal market economy but intend to form a subsystem of their own. The aim is to turn the Caucasus into an economic hub that ties the three partners together. This requires the establishment of stable security relations. The unresolved issue of control over southern Armenia’s Syunik region, a tense relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan and the war in Gaza are important tests for the nascent economic arrangements between Russia, Turkey and Iran. The brief intends to help Western policymakers understand the impact of sanctions on Russia/Iran, and of their support for the Israeli destruction of Gaza, on the prospects for stability and growth in the Caucasus.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Regional Politics, and Power Dynamics
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Caucasus, Middle East, Gaza, and Syria

7. The New Iraqi Opposition: The anti-establishment movement after the 2021 elections

Author:
Marsin Alshamary
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
At the start of Iraq’s longest government formation process in October 2021, one key question on everyone’s mind was whether Iraq might get its first majoritarian government. The Sadrist Movement tried for months, but ultimately Muqtada Al-Sadr conceded defeat by calling on his MPs to resign. The result was another consensus government with all the traditional political parties sharing the spoils, minus the Sadrists. A second key question on everyone’s mind was whether a genuine parliamentary opposition could develop in Iraq given the election of many independent MPs and the rise of reformist parties. This brief outlines the conditions needed for such a parliamentary opposition to emerge, discusses both technical and political elements, and analyses the challenges facing the ‘new Iraqi opposition’, i.e. veteran independent politicians, civil society activists and even former members of established parties. It argues that a sound electoral environment, unification of reformist parties and a higher turnout can contribute to making meaningful opposition a reality, which is needed to confront Iraq’s collusive democracy.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

8. Time to change track Assessing the UN’s conflict mediation strategy for Syria from 2019 to 2023

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The United Nations (UN) has become largely irrelevant to diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syria conflict. This report shows that the primary reason has been the fact that the main conflict parties never wanted to resolve the Syrian conflict by other than military means. Yet, the report also highlights secondary reasons within this unfavourable context, namely: the frames, methods and choices of the UN Special Envoy and his team at times misjudged or poorly corresponded with the realities of the conflict. Moreover, the capacity of the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) remained too limited. The report suggests that the time is ripe for the OSE to reinvent itself as a principled thought leader and to develop an operational framework that brings a safe, calm and neutral environment (SCNE) closer as a practical conflict management modality.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

9. Unravelling Turkish involvement in the Sahel: Geopolitics and local impact

Author:
Andrew Lebovich and Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In the past decade, Turkey has significantly expanded its engagement in Africa, leading to concerns within the European Union (EU) that this influence might be used to undermine EU policy and member states. This policy brief analyses the strategic motives and evolution of Turkish involvement in the Sahel region, focusing specifically on Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Drawing from interviews conducted with Sahelian and Turkish political, business, diplomatic and educational stakeholders between October and December 2022, the authors contend that Turkey’s foreign policy in the Sahel demonstrates a multifaceted approach that aims to strengthen its presence across economic, cultural, defence and development spheres. However, it is also emphasised that Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel remains relatively limited when compared to its activities in other African countries, for example Libya, Somalia and Algeria. In light of these findings, this policy brief recommends that the EU adopt a pragmatic approach, drawing lessons from Turkey’s strategy while trying to manage, and where possible benefit from, the impact of Turkish security assistance and to foster opportunities for Sahelian populations in Europe through scholarships and employment initiatives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North Africa, and Sahel

10. Protests in Iran in comparative perspective: A revolutionary state in trouble

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Successive protests in 2009, 2019 and 2022 have poignantly laid bare the much reduced social and political legitimacy of Iran’s ruling elites. Reform-from-within is no longer viewed as credible. Even former pro-reform leaders like Mousavi have abandoned hope and call for regime change. While further protests are inevitable, it is nevertheless unlikely that they will produce a revolution that overthrows the regime in the short-term, as long as their national organisation and leadership remain weak, Iran’s ruling elites cohesive, security forces loyal, and the administration continues to function. The country has witnessed hundreds of protests every year for the past few years, in addition to those of 2009, 2019 and 2022, but calls for fundamental change continue to go unheeded. The hope of the ruling elite is that the mix of repression and Iran’s dire economic situation will prevent protests from recurring. At best, quasi-reforms will provide some band-aids. In both scenarios, the Islamic Republic of Iran is no more in the sense that it lacks legitimacy among large segments of the population. It has also shed the elements of republican governance it used to have. And yet it lives on because it remains a capable state with a fairly cohesive ruling elite and ample coercive power. Iran is on course to become a classic one-party authoritarian regime, which may shed some of its religious orientations once its Supreme Leader leaves office for reasons of age. It remains to be seen how sustainable this will be given the crescendo of protests.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Domestic Politics, Protests, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East