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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies Publication Year within 25 Years

91. Strategic Influence Reconsidered: Defence Research and Combat Development in Canada's Early Cold War Army

Author:
Andrew Godefroy
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Throughout the twentieth century, even when not at war, professionally-minded citizen armies continued to think about future conflicts; in particular what they might be like, where they might take place, against whom, and if possible, why. As well, armies that were smart enough to think ahead did what they could to be ready for the next conflict through engagement in strategic foresight activities, the investigation of new ideas and concepts, the examination and assessment of emerging trends, the creation of new doctrines, and the development of robust physical, intellectual, and social capital within their standing armies. Finally, commanders would often seek to train their soldiers for tasks both probable and possible, knowing all the while that despite the best efforts and preparations it would be impossible to fully anticipate every possibility, and therefore, mitigate all future risk.
Political Geography:
Canada

92. Defense at the Forward Edge of the Battle or rather in the Depth? Different approaches to implement NATO's operation plans by the alliance partners, 1955-1988

Author:
Helmut R. Hammerich
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Military historians love studying battles. For this purpose, they evaluate operation plans and analyze how these plans were executed on the battlefield. The battle history of the Cold War focuses first and foremost on the planning for the nuclear clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Although between 1945 and 1989-90 the world saw countless hot wars on the periphery of the Cold War, the "Cold World War," as the German historian Jost Dülffer termed it, is best examined through the operational plans of the military alliances for what would have been World War Three. To conduct such an analysis we must consider Total War under nuclear conditions.
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

93. Preparing for the War of the Future in the Wake of Defeat: The Evolution of German Strategic Thought, 1919-1935

Author:
Mark Shannon
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Germany's defeat in the First World War came as a profound shock. While the nation was stunned by the peace settlement that followed, the military was faced with the inescapable reality that their approach to fighting a prolonged industrialized conflict was flawed. The years following Germany's defeat found the army in search of reasons for its failure. The officer corps sought to analyze its experience with "total war" and to draw the correct lessons from it. In this way, the army could prepare for the war of the future, secure in the knowledge that any repetition of the First World War could be avoided. In short, the German armed forces began the detailed process of distilling relevant military lessons from the conflict and applying them to their perception of a future war. While many of the lessons learned and studied had to do with tactics and technology, it is the purpose of this analysis to examine the strategic debate that ensued. Regardless of how strategy would be formulated in the coming years, it maintained at its heart one simple objective that is best summarized in a conversation between General Walther Reinhardt and Colonel Albrecht von Thaer in January 1919. Thaer expressed his pessimism for the coming years but Reinhardt, a liberal officer who was about to assume command of the War Ministry disagreed. He openly stated that "the goal is and remains a free Germany, hopefully restored to its former borders, with [the] strongest, most modern army with [the] newest weapons. One must not let this goal recede from view for even one moment." Rearmament and conscription would return, he declared, but when Thaer suggested this might be possible in the distant future, Reinhardt assured him that "We must and will be in position to do so in 15 years." Clearly, planning for the next war began at the moment defeat in the First World War was realized.
Political Geography:
Canada and Germany

94. The Past as Future: The US Army's Vision of Warfare in the 21st Century"

Author:
Terry Terriff
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Today the US Army is engaged in the effort to learn the appropriate lessons from the wars it has been engaged in since the autumn of 2001 and to think through what type of force it needs to be, with what kinds of capabilities, in order to prepare for further future conflicts in the 21st Century. Estimating the character of future conflicts, and then preparing one's forces appropriately, is not an easy task. A critical line of argument today is that the vision of future warfare the Army developed in the decade plus following the end of the Cold War left it ill-prepared for the wars it found itself conducting in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an article published in 2007, US Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling very pointedly, and very boldly for a serving officer, contended that, "throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly." The US Army's operational experiences in the first decade of this century, particularly in the early years of the long conflict in Iraq, suggest that it marched eyes wide shut through the decade of the 1990s into the 21st Century.
Political Geography:
United States

95. A Reflection On Leadership: A Comparative Analysis Of Military And Civilian Approaches

Author:
Colonel Bernd Horn
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Leadership is difficult. Similar to any endeavour that involves human interaction it is mired in the complexities of human behaviour, motivation and personality. Leadership is not a one size fits all activity. It is dependent on the approach and personality of the leader, on those being led, as well as the respective situation and circumstance. While everyone appreciates strong leadership, finding true, inspirational leaders is not all that easy or common whether in the military, public or private sector. Importantly, military and civilian leaders each bring their own strengths and weaknesses to bear and a lot can be learned by examining both styles concomitantly.

96. Irene R. Makaryk and Marissa McHugh, ed. Shakespeare and the Second World War: Memory, Culture, Identity. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

Author:
Deji A. Oguntoyinbo
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
All through the ages, Shakespeare's literary oeuvre has occupied a canonical status in world literature, primarily because of its universal relevance in terms of thematic preoccupation, characterization, and setting amongst several literary components. Though widely regarded as the greatest writer in the English language and the world's pre- eminent dramatist, Shakespeare has been translated into every major living language and is performed more often than any other playwright. His dramatic works have been repeatedly adapted and rediscovered by new movements or perspectives in scholarship and performance. Even now, his plays remain highly popular and are constantly studied, performed and reinterpreted in various social, cultural and political contexts throughout the globe. One of these contexts is the Second World War. Regarded as the longest, bloodiest and deadliest conflict in history, World War II was fought predominantly in Europe and across the Pacific and Eastern Asia, pitting the Axis powers of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and Japan against the Allied nations of Great Britain, France, China, United States and the Soviet Union. It is the most widespread war in history with more than one hundred million people serving in military units from over thirty different countries, and death tolls estimated to be between fifty and eighty-five million fatalities. Despite the fact that theatre stands as a “simulacrum of the cultural and historical process itself, seeking to depict the full range of human actions within their physical context, has always provided society with the most tangible records of its attempts to understand its own records” (3), the role of Shakespeare during the Second World War had not yet been given sustained, critical and detailed scholastic documentation. Herein lies the relevance and necessity of Shakespeare and the Second World War – as a writers' quota to fill the scholastic lacuna. Most of the war's belligerents showed affinity with Shakespearean works as a depiction of their society's self-image. Divided into fifteen illuminating, diverse, and yet coherent essays by seasoned and erudite academics, Shakespeare and the Second World War is a small sampling of reviewed and extended essays from “Wartime Shakespeare in a Global Context/Shakespeare au temps de la guerre” – an international bilingual conference that took place at the University of Ottawa in 2009. Within the spatial and temporal context of the war, Shakespeare's oeuvre is recycled, reviewed and reinterpreted in the chapters. In a Manichean manner, these essays cannot be collectively pigeonholed as either pro or anti–war. In fact, there is a sort of ambivalence with vacillating opinions by the writers.
Political Geography:
Britain, United States, Japan, China, France, Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy

97. Jeffrey R. Macris and Saul Kelly, eds. Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012.

Author:
Irakli A Geluk'ashvili
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The history of the Persian Gulf has always been characterized by conflict. It has been an arena for intervention by several world powers at one time or another. Many countries have defended their economic and political interests in this region, in no small part because it is one of the main oil reserves in the world. Moreover, it is also the largest exporter of oil. Therefore, it can be seen as the "jugular vein" of the global energy system, and so it has become an important area from a geostrategic point of view. The interests of several contemporary powers intersect here, from Western countries to emerging powers and neighbouring countries; the potential for conflict is easily imaginable.
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

98. Thomas G. Mahnken, ed. Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies – Stanford University Press, 2012.

Author:
Michael Carl Haas
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Among the grand narratives of international relations in the early 21st century, China's ascendancy and potential challenge to the US-led word order is now the most dominant, and perhaps the most compelling. Ostensibly the latest instalment in an unceasing sequence of great powers' rise and fall, it resonates deeply with specialist and non-specialist audiences alike. Central aspects of the emerging Sino-American competition - diplomatic, economic, and military – have been addressed at length in variety of for a and from widely diverging perspectives. Yet, up to now, few analysts have formulated anything resembling a coherent, prescriptive framework for how the United States and its allies should approach the increasingly confrontational dynamics that mark the defining great power relationship of our time.
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, and Asia

99. Jonathan Boff. Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Author:
Paul M. Ramsey
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For understandable reasons, historians have consistently tried to clear the waters by reducing the complexities of the First World War. This process has been vital in understanding the origins of the war, its conduct, victory and conclusion, and in shaping the historiography. Moving beyond earlier fixed interpretations, for the last twenty years the idea of a 'learning curve' has played a major role in explaining British success in the autumn of 1918. Yet, its explanative power is limited in three significant ways. Firstly, war and strategy is reciprocal; the battlefield is an interactive play of forces, and not simply the play of one side. Secondly, friction resulting from this and multiple other interactions means war is complicated and winning is difficult. Thirdly, learning is often uneven within large institutions and dynamic problems cannot be solved with single solutions. With this in view, Jonathan Boff's book addresses these fundamental issues and reanimates the complexities of the First World War, challenging many assumptions about victory and defeat on the Western Front in 1918. Boff expertly navigates these muddy waters and demonstrates how explaining complexity trumps earlier monocausal explanations; showing as Clausewitz made clear that everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult, especially winning.
Political Geography:
Germany

100. John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The US at War in Afghanistan and Iraq. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012.

Author:
Megan Johnson
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
From Kabul to Baghdad and Back, written by John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, chronicles the conflicts that the United States undertook in Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This book sets out to discuss the strategic and operational actions the United States took in its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, paying close attention to the critical decisions that wentinto planning each of the combat operations and how those decisions affected the outcomes in each of the respective campaigns. Methodically researched and well written, the authors provide in-depth analysis and valuable insight into the complex nature of fighting a two-front war. While the book is not a complete or all-inclusive study of the successes and failures of America’s decade-long war, the authors present a clear analysis of how conducting a two-front war affected the outcomes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Their premise is that much would have been different in America’s war in Afghanistan had the choice not been made to simultaneously go to war with Iraq. This book is full of great detail and covers a topic that is massive in scope and complexity, giving the reader much to absorb and ponder. The layout of the book, however, makes it more manageable with each chapter broken down further by subtitles. The selected bibliography and extensive footnoting of the book are valuable assets and ensure the reader access to a plethora of additional resources.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq