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22. Peace Operations: the Civilian Dimension Accounting for UNDP and the UN Specialized Agencies
- Author:
- Susan Woodward
- Publication Date:
- 06-2004
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- Complex, multidimensional peacekeeping is a creature of the 1990s. The civilian tasks are those set out in Agenda for Peace (1992), and its 1995 Supplement, while the lessons of the 1990s for UN operations were only codified in the Brahimi Report of August 2000 and its proposed reforms. The explicit contribution to peacekeeping missions of UNDP and the Specialized Agencies, with the important exception of those with an established humanitarian mandate such as UNHCR and WFP, is thus little more than a decade old. Capacity-building reforms within UNDP and the agencies for this conflict-related and post-conflict role date to 2001-2002 at best. Accommodation by the UN system for peacekeeping operations of their now integral role has not begun.
- Topic:
- Development, International Organization, Peace Studies, and United Nations
- Political Geography:
- United States
23. Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan
- Author:
- Barnett Rubin, Abby Stoddard, and Humayan Hamidzada
- Publication Date:
- 06-2003
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- A year and a half after the defeat of the Taliban, anger is rising in Afghanistan at the slow pace of reconstruction. Success in reconstruction means meeting goals, not fulfilling pledges or being generous. The overriding goal is enabling Afghans to build a country that contributes to, rather than threatens, their own and global security. As the government of Afghanistan becomes better organized and articulates both this goal and what is needed to reach it more clearly, it has become evident that donors underestimated the amount of assistance required. Initial pledges fell short even of underestimates of the needs and were far less than in other comparable cases. Initial disbursements, which in past cases have always exceeded subsequent ones, came relatively quickly and nearly met pledges, as donors have highlighted (see figure 1). But most of these disbursements went for emergency humanitarian needs, not reconstruction. Implementation of those reconstruction projects that have been funded has been exceedingly slow, leaving little to show on the ground. As of May 2003, donors reported that in 17 months they had completed reconstruction projects with a total expenditure of only $191 million, out of $2.1 billion pledged to reconstruction for the first twelve months. Furthermore, according to Afghan government figures, only 16 percent of the total disbursements (including for humanitarian purposes) had passed through channels controlled by the struggling Afghan government and had thus failed to build that government's capacity or legitimacy. The pervasive insecurity outside of Kabul prevented implementation of major projects and sapped the public's confidence in the new authorities. Failure to strengthen the government and provide security will doom the reconstruction effort even if contributions increase. The government has articulated an ambitious policy framework for reconstruction and asked for both reconstruction and security assistance. Success is possible, and at a modest cost. Failure by the US and other major states to respond will doom Afghanistan, the region, and the world to a repetition of anarchy that gave birth to the Taliban and refuge to al-Qaida.
- Topic:
- Development, International Cooperation, and Peace Studies
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Asia, and Taliban
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