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21. Reforming the Department of Homeland Security Through Enhanced Oversight & Accountability

Author:
Carrie Cordero
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
In November 2002, 14 months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the department) was created by Congress to make America safer from terrorism.1 At the time, the policy focus was on international terrorism, in particular al Qaeda. Since then, not only has the terrorism landscape evolved—from al Qaeda and its affiliates to ISIS to the present increased attention to domestic terrorism linked to white supremacist violence2—but the scope and complexity of national security threats have evolved. The new department centralized border security, immigration enforcement, transportation security, emergency management, and critical infrastructure protection, plus additional functions, with an intent to protect against future terrorist attack. The fundamental activities of the department, however, have always been broader than terrorism. And over the years, attention to the department has quickly shifted depending on the critical events of the time, whether a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or persistent cyberattacks and other malign cyberactivity since the mid-2000s, or the emergence of a global pandemic.3 Meanwhile, due to a variety of factors, the size and complexity of DHS’s law enforcement functions have grown, while recent attention has focused primarily on the border and immigration functions. The department is arguably the most operational agency in the federal government in terms of its routine activities that affect and directly touch millions of people each day. These varying and disparate missions across the department are focused domestically and therefore require substantial attention to whether and how they are carried out in accordance with law and respect for constitutional protections. This report, issued as part of a Center for a New American Security (CNAS) project4 on enhancing DHS oversight and accountability, posits that 18 years into the department’s existence, the functions of border security and immigration enforcement, as well as the law enforcement functions of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in particular, have grown disproportionately large in size and broad in scope, without the necessary oversight and accountability structures that must accompany such activities.5 And DHS’s border and immigration functions are under tremendous strain as they are tasked with increased policy directives, humanitarian challenges on the southern border, intense political pressure, and growing public scrutiny about these functions. The department is in severe need of legislative attention and policy coordination. If it does not reform to address the issues identified in this report, it is likely the department will face calls for partial or full dismantlement under a future administration.6 Such a result would undo nearly 20 years of effort to better protect the nation from terrorism and emerging homeland threats, and risk returning to a pre-9/11 era of dis-jointed homeland security coordination.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Homeland Security, Accountability, and Oversight
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Dangerous Synergies Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Daniel Kliman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt, and Carisa Nietsche
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2018 and 2020 Taiwanese local and presidential elections crystallized that Russia and China are using digital interference to shape the contest between democracies and autocracies. While foreign information operations are time-tested methods of authoritarian influence, the digital space has increased the scope and speed with which these operations can be waged. Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Beijing and Moscow explicitly coordinate their information operations, the two countries are increasingly finding common cause as their interests align on a number of issues and in strategic regions.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

23. A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive Economic Measures in the U.S.-China Relationship

Author:
Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States and China have long used coercive economic measures to advance both economic and foreign policy objectives. In recent years, however, both countries have turned to coercive economic measures as mainstream instruments of foreign policy and national security policy, and increasingly have deployed coercive economic measures against each other. For the United States, China’s economic scale and global interconnections make it a fundamentally different type of target for coercive economic measures than the comparatively smaller and less sophisticated economies that have been primary targets of U.S. economic coercion in the past. The United States cannot simply isolate China from the global economy. Instead, it must adopt a more strategic focus on limiting Chinese actions in areas significant to U.S. national security and shoring up economic and technology arenas where the United States maintains lasting leverage. Over the past several years, the United States has deployed an array of coercive economic measures against China. The most prominent of these have been the tariffs on approximately two-thirds of U.S. imports from China. The tariffs remain largely in place despite implementation of the Phase One trade deal that the United States and China signed in January 2020. But the United States also has developed and deployed an increasingly sophisticated set of other coercive economic tools that will play a prominent role in U.S.-China relations over the years ahead, regardless of whether the United States and China fully implement the Phase One deal and reach a broader Phase Two trade agreement. Those other coercive economic tools include export controls, restrictions on U.S. imports to secure U.S. supply chains, heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, sanctions, and stepped-up law enforcement measures against Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft and other Chinese activities in the United States. This expanding set of measures serves a broadening array of U.S. policy goals, including economic objectives, foreign policy goals, and the maintenance of America’s technological edge. The U.S. record of success in the use of these coercive economic measures has been mixed. While tariffs and other measures have succeeded in putting some macroeconomic pressure on China, they have not extracted fundamental concessions from Beijing. Targeted sanctions and law enforcement measures similarly have had economic impacts on some Chinese companies, but other Chinese companies have demonstrated an ability to weather U.S. economic coercion. To be effective in translating economic coercion into policy change by China, the United States needs to better integrate its coercive measures with each other and with other policies, better signal intentions and escalation, more rigorously assess impacts and costs, and galvanize allied support and coordinated action. For its part, China appears to recognize a balancing act between limiting economic ties with foreign partners in some domains and maintaining them in others. China has sought to distance certain Chinese economic sectors, particularly high-tech manufacturing, from the United States in some areas, investing heavily in domestic capacity development. In other areas where China must rely on foreign partners for technology, IP, or manufacturing, or where China does not appear to see a clear interest in severing trade, Beijing has sought to keep trade and investment flows moving in an unencumbered fashion. As for the United States, this is a dynamic policy environment.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Countering Iran in the Gray Zone: What the United States Should Learn from Israel’s Operations in Syria

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, Kaleigh Thomas, and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and especially since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has become highly proficient in using its surrogates and proxies across the Middle East as a tool to achieve its interests while avoiding direct conflict with the United States. Successive U.S. presidents have sought options for pushing back against this Iranian strategy but have struggled to find approaches that could deter Iran’s actions or degrade its capabilities. In most cases U.S. administrations have been hesitant to respond at all, for fear of starting a larger conflict. The recent killing of Qassim Soleimani represents the opposite problem, in which the United States and Iran came unnecessarily close to a much larger war. In contrast, Israel’s “campaign between the wars” (the Hebrew acronym is mabam) against Iran and Iranian-backed groups in Syria has been one of the most successful military efforts to push back against Iran in the “gray zone.” Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and especially since early 2017, Israel has conducted more than 200 airstrikes inside Syria against more than 1,000 targets linked to Iran and it’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGCQF), and against IRGC-QF backed groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. This campaign has slowed Iran’s military buildup in Syria while avoiding a broader regional conflagration that would have been damaging to Israel’s interests.1 This study examines Israel’s mabam campaign and asks what lessons the United States can draw and how they may be applied to future U.S. actions in gray zone conflicts, both against Iran and more broadly.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

25. Forging an Alliance Innovation Base

Author:
Daniel Kliman, Ben Fitzgerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
This report presents a blueprint for a community of technology innovation and protection anchored by America and its allies. Unless the United States builds this community—an “alliance innovation base”—it will steadily lose ground in the contest with China to ascend the commanding technological heights of the 21st century. Given that technology will increasingly determine future military advantage, underpin economic prosperity, and function as a tool for promoting liberal and illiberal visions of domestic governance, the stakes could not be higher. To compete, China is leveraging its formidable scale—whether measured in terms of research and development (R&D) expenditures, data sets, scientists and engineers, venture capital, or the reach of its leading technology companies. The only way for the United States to tip the scale back in its favor is to deepen cooperation with allies. The global diffusion of innovation also places a premium on aligning U.S. and ally efforts to protect technology. Unless coordinated with allies, tougher U.S. investment screening and export control policies, for example, will feature major seams that Beijing can exploit. America’s current approach to allies on technology innovation and protection remains a work in progress. In recent years, animated by concerns about China, the United States has made a concerted effort to step up engagement with allies in both areas. Existing mechanisms for deepening innovation with allies include technology scouting programs, multilateral cooperative frameworks, rapid innovation initiatives, and bilateral projects. However, these mechanisms at times lack sufficient resourcing, move too slowly, or feature rigid constraints on participation. U.S. instruments for working with allies on technology protection also contain major points of weakness. Multilateral export control regimes, though inclusive, are ponderous. The extraterritorial reach of U.S. export control laws can generate unintended obstacles to technology collaboration with allies. Bilateral and minilateral consultations on protection lack positive incentives to motivate allies to incur immediate costs such as forgoing technology sector investments from China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Combating Populism: A Toolkit for Liberal Democratic Actors

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Carisa Nietsche
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The rise of populism in Europe and the United States is well documented. Although studies may disagree about the relative importance of populism’s drivers, there is broad consensus that rising inequality, declining bonds to established traditional parties, increasing salience of identity politics, and economic grievance have played a role in fueling populism’s rise. Although populism is a symptom of democracy’s larger problems, the strategies and tactics populist parties and leaders use also provide their own, direct threat to liberal democracy. Many of the tactics that populist leaders use weaken democratic institutions and constraints on executive power. Populism is also detrimental to democracy because it exacerbates political polarization, which makes it hard for democracy to effectively function. As societies grow more polarized, people become willing to tolerate abuses of power and sacrifice democratic principles if doing so advances their side’s interests and keeps the other side out of power.1 The polarization that populism fuels, in other words, increases the risk of democratic decline. This report offers recommendations for combating populism. It translates key findings from cutting-edge academic research in the political science, political psychology, sociology, and communications disciplines into practical, evidence-based recommendations. The first set of recommendations is intended to equip political parties, politicians, and candidates to create a political context more conducive to the success of liberal democratic actors. Research shows that context matters—although many people may hold populist attitudes, these attitudes must be activated by the political context to translate into votes for populist leaders.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Populism, Liberalism, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

27. Protracted Great-Power War: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
FEBRUARY 05, 2020 Protracted Great-Power War A Preliminary Assessment By Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. Print Download PDF Executive Summary This study provides preliminary observations and insights on the character and conduct of protracted great-power war.1 It finds the U.S. Department of Defense is giving insufficient attention to preparing for such wars. While the probability of an extended great-power war may be low, the costs involved in waging one would likely be extraordinarily high, making it an issue of strategic significance for senior Defense Department leaders. Arguably the best way to avoid these costs is to demonstrate to great-power rivals that the United States is capable of prevailing in a protracted conflict. Once the United States became an active world power, in the early 20th century, a great deal of intellectual effort and considerable resources were devoted to planning for an extended great-power war. The primary purpose of these efforts was not to fight such a war but to avoid one, by discouraging prospective enemies from believing they could win. Even during the Cold War, when both superpowers possessed large nuclear arsenals, successive U.S. administrations sought to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the United States could wage an extended conventional war. Following the Cold War, planning for protracted great-power war contingencies was essentially abandoned. Now, however, with the rise of revisionist China and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict and how to wage it successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility and hoping for the best. Should they choose the former course of action, U.S. defense leaders and planners must understand the characteristics of contemporary protracted great-power war, which are likely to be far different from those of both recent conflicts and World War II—the last protracted great-power conflict.
Topic:
Cold War, Power Politics, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States of America

28. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, ​Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

29. Total Competition: China’s Challenge in the South China Sea

Author:
Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
China’s bid for ascendancy remains anchored in the South China Sea and surrounding Southeast Asian countries. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deems it economically and militarily vital to dominate the resources and sea lines of communication of a body of water twice the size of Alaska. Achieving this goal requires tethering neighboring countries into Beijing’s ambit while making the existing ruleset more favorable to China and displacing the dominant power behind the existing regional order. Some may find comfort in describing the scenario underway as a return to a “China-centered” rather than “Sino-centric” region.1 However, an authoritarian China’s coercive attempts to wield hegemonic control of the South China Sea threatens the sovereignty of Southeast Asian states and international freedom of the seas, both of which are of fundamental national interest to the United States. Yet the South China Sea and Southeast remain the least defended and most bountiful region susceptible to Chinese predations and inducements. The CCP leadership is obsessed with the idea that outside forces intend to contain China’s development, foment internal unrest, and prevent it from retaking what it considers to be its rightful place center stage in regional and global affairs. In partial response to deep-seated insecurities and renewed great-power ambitions, Xi Jinping and the CCP are in the process of attempting to exercise control over the entire nine-dash line claim covering the vast majority of the South China Sea and to turn Southeast Asia into a latter-day tributary system. CCP propaganda casts China’s quest for control over maritime Asia as an inexorable outcome of China’s rise and America’s decline. Curiously, the only government speaking seriously about “stopping” China is Beijing, suggesting that its policies are influenced more by subjective internal fears than by objective external realities. China wants nothing to stop it from consolidating its maximalist historic claims, from denying the United States the ability to intervene in regional conflicts, and from dismantling America’s postwar alliance system.
Topic:
Leadership, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South China Sea

30. Rebooting Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight

Author:
Carrie Cordero and David Thaw
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Cybersecurity oversight is due for a reboot. This paper explores the need for refreshed congressional oversight of cybersecurity. After laying out why cybersecurity oversight presents special challenges, this paper suggests that the disparate nature of the cybersecurity policymaking legal framework is mismatched to the nature of the cybersecurity problem, resulting in difficulty legislating in this space. It then provides two key recommendations to guide a congressional cybersecurity oversight reboot. Cybersecurity is a broad challenge spanning many disciplines and industries. This paper argues that the current “patchwork” legal framework is ill suited to address cybersecurity questions either for legislative oversight or effective policymaking. The paper provides an overview of the nature and scope of the cybersecurity problem, with a focus on how the complexity of the field affects congressional oversight activities. Congress has been conducting a substantial amount of oversight in this area in recent years. Those efforts, however, have not yet resulted in legislative actions that have demonstrably improved national cybersecurity. This paper seeks to aid the effort to craft legal authorities that deal with an increasingly complex set of cyberthreats. This short exposition provides a path to rebooting Congress’ approach to cybersecurity oversight in a way that would allow these issues to be addressed more comprehensively.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus