« Previous |
1 - 10 of 62
|
Next »
Number of results to display per page
Search Results
2. Defense Priorities in the Open-Source AI Debate
- Author:
- Masao Dahlgren
- Publication Date:
- 08-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- A spirited debate is taking place over the regulation of open foundation models—artificial intelligence models whose underlying architectures and parameters are made public and can be inspected, modified, and run by end users. Proposed limits on releasing open foundation models may have significant defense industrial impacts. If model training is a form of defense production, these impacts deserve further scrutiny. Preliminary evidence suggests that an open foundation model ecosystem could benefit the U.S. Department of Defense’s supplier diversity, sustainment, cybersecurity, and innovation priorities. Follow-on analyses should quantify impacts on acquisition cost and supply chain security.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Regulation, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
3. Refocusing U.S. Public Diplomacy for a Multipolar World
- Author:
- Daniel F. Runde and Philip Arceneaux
- Publication Date:
- 11-2024
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- China and Russia leverage technology, social media, and big data as tools to deceptively present information for hostile purposes. The United States must embrace a bold approach to public diplomacy to protect the ideas, values, electoral processes, and all the elements that make a free and open society possible and prevent it from becoming a casualty in the information war.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Data, Multipolarity, Public Diplomacy, and Information Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
4. Strengthening a Transnational Semiconductor Industry
- Author:
- James Lewis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- If data is the new oil, it could be said that chips are the new steel—a fundamental component of national power similar to the foundational role steel production played in the industrial age. As such, semiconductor chips are a natural focus for government intervention and support to accelerate growth and build secure supply chains. The specific goals for U.S. semiconductor policy are to increase reliability and trust in supply, reinforce all elements of chip-making capacity, and reduce China’s role in the supply chain. Chip production is based on complex, globally distributed, specialized supply chains involving many stages in production, including specialized materials, production equipment, design and related software, fabrication, testing, and packaging. In some stages of production, labor costs are important; in others, it is capital costs because a cutting-edge fabrication plant, or fab, can cost more than $12 billion. Taiwan, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China are the leading chip-producing nations. There are also important facilities (often subsidiaries of a leading producer) in Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, and Israel. This global distribution has led some to push for greater production in the United States, but trying to “reshore” a global supply chain spread across many countries would be counterproductive if the goal is a reliable and more productive supply chain. The problem is China, not global production. The politics of the chip industry are generally favorable to the United States. One leading producer, South Korea, is a treaty ally and faces less risk of disruption from China than does Taiwan. Another leading producer, Japan, is one of the most important U.S. security partners and, with the United States, dominates the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME). ASML, another leading producer of SME, based in the Netherlands, is also an important ally. Singapore, while it would prefer not to be caught in a battle between giants, is also a dependable partner. These countries share democratic values and in many instances are treaty allies. The global distribution of chip-making in countries friendly to the United States is an advantage.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, transnationalism, Emerging Technology, and Semiconductors
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
5. Genomes: The Era of Purposeful Manipulation Begins
- Author:
- Carol Kuntz
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- The purposeful manipulation of genomes is now possible. Such manipulation has great promise and broad strategic implications; it is creating useful molecules of various sorts and, over time, it could eliminate genetic disease. Like many emerging technologies, genome manipulation could grow into an important economic sector, contributing to a replicating cycle of innovation and enabling the United States to favorably shape its strategic future at home and abroad. Advances in these technologies are fueled by a global commercial and academic community. The United States should ensure that it fully remains a member of that community, but also that key capabilities—such as large, well-curated databases and biofoundries—are created and sustained domestically. The United States needs to rationalize its policy on heritable human genome editing, allowing legitimate types of edits but contributing to international norms against illegitimate ones. A robust biotechnology sector at home would yield many benefits—economic, technological, medical—and provide the critical reservoir of expertise within which national security interests could be secured. The Department of Defense needs to make structural reforms in its approach to emerging technologies, particularly by creating career paths for uniformed practitioners. Otherwise, it will continue failing in its effort to incorporate emerging technologies into its operational concepts, budgets, and programs—leading to diminished capabilities in the United States, particularly as compared to China. In time, falling behind on these key areas of science could lead to many problems, including failures in deterrence and, ultimately, in war.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, and Medicine
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
6. The Digital Literacy Imperative
- Author:
- Romina Bandura and Elena I. Mendez Leal
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Reading, writing, and numeracy: these are foundational skills people learn at school and continue using throughout their lifetimes. But as societies evolve and technology progresses, the learning needs and demands of one generation change for the next. Curriculums in educational institutions must keep up with these changes to reflect the new realities. They do so by removing outdated content, incorporating new disciplines, and innovating with new educational tools and techniques. While previous American generations learned Latin and shorthand, current generations learn Spanish or French and practice typing. In many public schools across the United States, cursive handwriting is no longer taught. Children now practice writing and typing using new technology such as tablets and computers, not typewriters. In advanced countries, educational equipment such as blackboards, chalkboards, and even whiteboards have been replaced with high-tech tools such as Promethean boards. While numeracy and basic literacy are still fundamental to learning, digital literacy has emerged as another critical life skill and is now, per the World Economic Forum, part of the twenty-first-century toolkit (see Figure 1). Beyond basic literacy, digital skills have become indispensable for every global citizen, whether to communicate, find employment, receive comprehensive education, or socialize. More than 90 percent of professional roles in across sectors in Europe require a basic level of digital knowledge and understanding. This need has become even more evident during the Covid-19 pandemic, making it more urgent for countries to embrace digital technologies and their associated skills.
- Topic:
- Education, Science and Technology, Digitalization, and Digital Literacy
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
7. Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains: An Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation
- Author:
- William Alan Reinsch, Emily Benson, and Aidan Arasasingham
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Technological innovation has been a driving force for U.S. global leadership and economic prosperity for over a century. This legacy of innovation largely stands on the foundation of a key component: semiconductor chips, found today in almost all electronic products. Semiconductors are an integral component of various consumer products across industries, including cars, smartphones, and household appliances. But semiconductors can also be used in dual-use goods—products that have both military and civilian applications—such as air guidance systems for both civilian and military aircraft. The tension between economic gain and security risk inherent within dual-use semiconductor goods is heightened in fields with national security implications, such as supercomputing and artificial intelligence (AI). How the government and private sector manage the global value chains (GVCs) of chips will directly affect U.S. global competitiveness and national security going forward. Given the evolving security relationship between the United States, the Quad, and the European Union, this paper focuses on both Quad and EU countries and the possibilities for friend-shoring in both. It assesses how the EU and U.S. governments can collaborate to avoid duplicative policies that fail to enhance the overall resiliency of transatlantic semiconductor supply chains.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Science and Technology, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
8. Hard Choices in a Ransomware Attack
- Author:
- Emily Harding and Harshana Ghoorhoo
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- Ransomware attacks started as a novelty but have now become a clear and present danger to entities of every size and function. The number of ransomware attacks and the price of demanded ransoms have escalated steeply since 2018. Legislation and policy have not kept up. Policymakers have sought to shape the incentive structure for victims to incentivize defense and disincentivize ransom payments. While they are sympathetic to businesses who fall victim to these attacks, which can sometimes be existentially threatening, few policymakers (or their staff) have ever experienced the shock of an attack firsthand and, as a result, are searching with incomplete information for the right combination of carrots and sticks that will help victims and hurt attackers. This report aims to put the reader in the shoes of the victim—the shocking, powerless moment of realization of a ransomware attack. It walks through a set of decisions that victim must make on their worst day and in the weeks to follow. How well an entity succeeds in navigating that peril depends on decisions made well before an attack, so the report also makes recommendations for both government and industry on how to encourage preparation and simple defensive steps.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Cyberspace
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
9. Reshoring Semiconductor Manufacturing: Addressing the Workforce Challenge
- Author:
- Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- On August 9, 2022, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, sweeping legislation that seeks to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, encourage investments in semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the United States, stimulate semiconductor research and development (R&D), and disincentivize U.S. investments in chip-making plants in China. Among other things, the legislation will provide $52.7 billion in federal outlays over five years for loans, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial support for domestic chip-making investments, as well as a 25 percent tax credit for semiconductor investments in the United States. Bolstered by this unprecedented level of federal support, six major chip makers are investing in new wafer fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the United States: Intel, Samsung, TSMC, GlobalFoundries, Texas Instruments, and Micron Technology.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Industrialization, and Semiconductors
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
10. Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI
- Author:
- Gregory Allen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration announced a new export controls policy on artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technologies to China. These new controls—a genuine landmark in U.S.-China relations—provide the complete picture after a partial disclosure in early September generated confusion. For weeks the Biden administration has been receiving criticism in many quarters for a new round of semiconductor export control restrictions, first disclosed on September 1. The restrictions block leading U.S. AI computer chip designers, such as Nvidia and AMD, from selling their high-end chips for AI and supercomputing to China. The criticism typically goes like this: China’s domestic AI chip design companies could not win customers in China because their chip designs could not compete with Nvidia and AMD on performance. Chinese firms could not catch up to Nvidia and AMD on performance because they did not have enough customers to benefit from economies of scale and network effects. Because of the new export controls, revenues that formerly flowed to U.S. chip companies will now go to Chinese chip companies, offering a viable path to economies of scale and competitive performance. In the short term, this policy will significantly harm Chinese AI data center companies. However, blocking U.S. AI chip designers from selling their world-leading chips is actually good for China in the longer term because it will strengthen China’s domestic chip design ecosystem. While the reasoning in this criticism is sound, it does not imply that the Biden administration’s actions are self-defeating. Rather, it shows how the policy as disclosed in September was incomplete. A policy like this would not make sense if that is the only step the administration planned to take. Clearly something was missing, and industry experts have been waiting for the other shoe to drop ever since. On October 7, the other shoe dropped. The Biden administration announced a massive policy shift on semiconductor exports to China as well as revised rules for how the lists of restricted parties are managed. In recent decades, U.S. semiconductor policy has been primarily market driven and laissez faire. With the new policy, which comes on the heels of the CHIPS Act’s passage, the United States is firmly focused on retaining control over so-called “chokepoint” (or as it is sometimes translated from Chinese “stranglehold”) technologies in the global semiconductor technology supply chain. The most important chokepoints in the context of this discussion are AI chip designs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and equipment components. The Biden administration’s latest actions simultaneously exploit U.S. dominance across all four of these chokepoints. In doing so, these actions demonstrate an unprecedented degree of U.S. government intervention to not only preserve chokepoint control but also begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Hegemony, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Emerging Technology
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America