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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Center for International Security and Cooperation Publication Year within 25 Years

41. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Next Steps

Author:
Thomas Jr. Graham and Christopher Chyba
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Dr. Sid Drell: With the end of the Cold War there's been a major change in the U.S. nuclear weapons program, because the continuous cycle of developing and testing and deploying new warheads has ended. President George Bush announced in 1992 that we have no need for new nuclear weapons designs for deployment. It was this decision that, of course, opened the possibility of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is why we now have a Stockpile Stewardship Program with the three requirements: we must maintain an enduring stockpile that's reliable, effective and safe for the indefinite future without nuclear explosive testing; we must maintain competence in nuclear weapons; and we must retain a technical capability and a manufacturing infrastructure in order to respond if required to any change in strategic circumstances. This will be one of the factors in our net assessment of whether to enter a CTBT.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, International Law, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

42. How Much Is Enough? A Risk-Management Approach to Computer Security

Author:
Kevin J. Soo Hoo
Publication Date:
06-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
How much security is enough? No one today can satisfactorily answer this question for computer—related risks. The first generation of computer security risk modelers struggled with issues arising out of their binary view of security, ensnaring them in an endless web of assessment, disagreement, and gridlock. Even as professional risk managers wrest responsibility away from the first—generation technologists, they are still unable to answer the question with sufficient quantitative rigor. Their efforts are handicapped by a reliance on non—quantitative methodologies originally developed to address the deployment and organizational acceptance issues that plagued first—generation tools.
Topic:
Security and Science and Technology

43. Impact On Global Warming Of Development And Structural Changes In The Electricity Sector Of Guangdong Province, China

Author:
Michael M. May, Chi Zhang, and Thomas C. Heller
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
This paper examines the impact on global warming of development and structural changes in the electricity sector of Guangdong Province, China, together with the possible effect of international instruments such as are generated by the Kyoto Protocol on that impact. The purpose of the paper is three–fold: to examine and analyze the data available, to put that data into an explanatory economic and institutional framework, and to analyze the possible application of international instruments such as CDMs in that locality. Our plans are to supplement this work with similar work elsewhere in China.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Energy Policy, and Environment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

44. The U.S. Enlargement Strategy and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Michael M. May
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The United States is often accused of lacking a global security strategy. The United States, so the accusation goes, makes foreign policy and security decisions on an ad-hoc basis, prompted by the demands of politics and pressure groups, and in alternating bursts of idealism and realpolitik. Since none of these factors can safely be dismissed, there has to be something to the accusation. In an unpredictable world, a certain respect for the ad hoc may even be a good thing: a global strategy, carried out without regard to circumstances, would confine the United States to a conceptual straitjacket, depriving it of needed flexibility.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

45. A Verification Regime for Warhead Control

Author:
Liu Suping
Publication Date:
01-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
After a brief period of progress, the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction process has reached a stalemate. This situation causes us to rethink the following issues: What is the motivation for the two nuclear superpowers to conduct nuclear reductions? How can the focus of the nuclear arms reduction process be changed from verification of reduction of delivery vehicles to verification of reduction of warheads and nuclear materials? What is the objective for future nuclear reductions? What kind of verification regime will be required for future nuclear reductions?
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

46. An Alternative Framework for the Control of Nuclear Materials

Author:
Robert L Rinne
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The decade of the 1990s has seen renewed concerns over nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical. While many in the arms control community focus on numbers, it is control that is the most important factor—the detonation of just one nuclear weapon would be an international catastrophe. Rather than concentrating on numbers, the regime defined herein centers on enhancing the safety and security being provided nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials. The proposal in the paper is called the Nuclear Weapons Control Treaty (NWCT) and referred to as New Court. The emphasis is on control rather than disarmament, protection from unintended or unauthorized use rather than elimination. New Court, once in place, would provide an environment in which the necessary audits and accountability for undertaking dramatic reductions in the numbers of weapons and the quantities of weapons-usable materials could be made with much greater confidence than exists today. However, it will be decades (if ever) before the number of nuclear weapons goes to zero. In the meantime, it is paramount that comprehensive safety and security be established and maintained.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons