This analysis first appeared in the November 2006 issue of Current History. “The most effective route in dealing with nuclear and missile proliferation threats may be through creative diplomacy, not military technology.”
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its various policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government (FMS) transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
The Center for Defense Information is proud to announce that Philip E. Coyle III, a senior advisor at the center, has been appointed by President George W. Bush to serve on the independent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 commission.
There is a principle of engineering that says that when what you're doing isn't working, and trying harder makes the situation worse, you may be solving the wrong problem. With the attacks on London proving that occupying Iraq is not making the world safer, it is time for a radically new approach.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and London
Many of you are aware of CDI's 30-year history of research and commentary on U.S. defense topics. You may also have noticed the expanding breadth of our international projects and activities, such as our ground-breaking China Security Bulletin featuring contributions from a retired Chinese general, and a forthcoming report on Russia's defense spending by a Russian scholar who heads our Moscow office. To better reflect our global scope and project diversity, we have created the World Security Institute — which can be thought of as our “holding company.” We felt that this title better describes all of our activities that now encompass a wider definition of “security.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Disaster Relief, Government, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Moscow
Marcus Corbin, Michael Donovan, Winslow T. Wheeler, and Ivan Safranchuk
Publication Date:
02-2005
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
The new fiscal year (FY) 2006 defense budget from President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is riddled with contradictions and duplicity. By the time Congress is finished, the problems will be worse.
If made 63 years and one day earlier – Dec. 7, 1941 – that assertion would have reflected reality as the United States suddenly found itself an active participant in World War II. It arguably was the case on Oct. 8, 2001, when U.S. cruise missiles targeted Taliban and al-Qaida installations and personnel in Afghanistan following the Sept. 11 attacks.
In addition to abuse, or alleged abuse, by U.S. and allied forces against detainees in Iraq, allegations have surfaced of Iraqi-on-Iraqi abuse by Iraqi government agents, such as Iraqi police, against Iraqi prisoners. Such reports are especially troubling given that a primary rationale advanced for the U.S. and allied invasion of Iraq was humanitarian intervention: to overthrow a brutal dictatorship and attempt to replace it with a government founded upon principles of democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights. Additionally troubling is the question of whether the U.S.-led alliance “bit off more than it could chew” by taking on such a daunting task, with detainee abuse by the alliance and the Iraqis perhaps exemplifying not only moral and legal challenges but also tests to the logistical limits of selecting, training, and holding accountable large numbers of personnel in such a monumental undertaking. The same poor planning and lack of capacity resulting in shortages of armor arguably could be said to be exemplified by the chaos at Abu Ghraib and apparent problems at staffing the Iraqi police forces fully with law-abiding professionals.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Human Rights, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arab Countries
Spc. Charles A. Graner, Jr., on Jan. 14, 2005, became the fifth U.S. soldier convicted for Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse, all of them reservists. Graner, a prison guard in civilian life, was convicted at a general court martial for maltreatment of persons subject to his orders, conspiracy, assault, indecent acts and dereliction of duty. Unlike several earlier trials for Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse, this trial took place not in Iraq but at Fort Hood, Texas. The jury of 10 officers and enlisted men, all of whom had served in Iraq or Afghanistan, sentenced Graner on Jan. 15, 2004, to 10 years in prison (five less than the maximum possible) and to reduction in rank to private, dishonorable discharge and forfeiture of pay and allowances.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Human Rights, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, Arabia, and Arab Countries
Participant countries of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led effort to stem the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems, met on the first anniversary of the initiative, from May 31 to June 1 in Krakow, Poland. Russia announced on the first day of the meeting its decision to participate in the PSI, a move that U.S. officials had supported as an important step in augmenting the effectiveness of the initiative. However, Russia's participation will only occur, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, as long as PSI activities do not violate national or international law. Russian officials have similarly expressed concerns that the PSI's land, sea, and air-based WMD interdiction activities could endanger international commerce, and give unwarranted powers to the U.S. Navy to act as a global police force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction