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11. Beyond Treaties: Immediate Steps to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The U.S. political parties are divided on nuclear weapons policy. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia have reached an arms control impasse and no new agreement is on the horizon. Confidence-building measures could help reduce nuclear risks between the United States and Russia, advancing the goals of both countries and both U.S. presidential candidates.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

12. Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict

Author:
Marina Ottaway and Mai El-Sadany
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Less than a year after the old “greater” Sudan split into the northern Republic of Sudan and the new Republic of South Sudan—or North and South Sudan, for clarity—the two countries were again in a state of war. Years of international efforts to bring an end to decades of conflict by helping to negotiate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and later efforts to ensure a smooth separation of North and South appear to have come to naught.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Genocide, Islam, Treaties and Agreements, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Africa and South Sudan

13. Creating New Facts on the Ground

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Although meaningful cooperation in the region surrounding Afghanistan is of vital importance, it has been elusive because Afghanistan\'s key neighbors have significantly divergent aims. Engineering a successful regional solution would require the United States to fundamentally transform either these actors\' objectives or their dominant strategies. Achieving the latter may prove more feasible, most crucially vis-à-vis Pakistan. The region\'s history of discord is mainly rooted in the troubled relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistan\'s involvement in Afghanistan is colored by its rivalry with India, its relations with Afghanistan are a geopolitical challenge independent of India because of its fears of disorder along its western borders, the unwelcome idea of “Pashtunistan,” and a related long-standing border dispute. Pakistan\'s reaction to these problems has only exacerbated them. As Islamabad, by supporting the Taliban insurgency, has sought to exercise preponderant, if not overweening, influence over Kabul\'s strategic choices, it has earned Kabul\'s distrust, deepened the Kabul–New Delhi partnership, and increased the risk to its relations with Washington—not to mention threatening the lives of U.S. and other coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. Despite widespread support in Afghanistan for ending the war through a negotiated settlement if possible, the Afghan Taliban leadership is unlikely to consider reconciliation unless it is faced with the prospect of continued losses of the kind sustained as a result of coalition military operations in 2010. A regional solution is similarly unlikely as long as Afghanistan and its neighbors, including India, perceive Islamabad as bent on holding Kabul in a choking embrace. Solving these problems lies beyond the capability of American diplomacy, and right now even of the promised diplomatic surge. The best hope for progress lies in continuing military action to alter the realities on the ground— thereby inducing the Taliban to consider reconciliation, while simultaneously neutralizing the Pakistani strategy that is currently preventing a regional solution. To increase the probability of military success, however, President Obama will need to forgo the politically calculated drawdown of combat troops this summer and instead accept the advice of his field commanders to maintain the largest possible contingent necessary for the coming campaign in eastern Afghanistan. Hard and unpalatable as it might be for the president, this course alone offers a solution that will protect the recent gains in Afghanistan and advance American interests over the long term.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, America, and Washington

14. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control

Author:
Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, and Moscow

15. The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Author:
Mark Hibbs
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After the first Indian nuclear explosive test in 1974, seven nuclear supplier governments were convinced that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) alone would not halt the spread of nuclear weapons—a view that developments in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and elsewhere would later underscore. The seven governments formed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and over the course of more than three decades, it has become the world's leading multilateral nuclear export control arrangement, establishing guidelines that govern transfers of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology. Yet, as a voluntary and consensus- based organization of 46 participating governments, the NSG today faces a host of challenges ranging from questions about its credibility and future membership to its relationship to the NPT and other multilateral arrangements.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, India, Asia, and North Korea

16. Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap

Author:
Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The historic normalization between Armenia and Turkey has stalled and it is critical to prevent relations from deteriorating further. If Armenia and Turkey eventually succeed in opening their closed border, it will transform the South Caucasus region. But the concerns of Azerbaijan, Turkey's ally and the losing side in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, need to be taken into account. The international community needs to pay more attention to the conflict and work harder to break the regional deadlock it has generated.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

17. Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles: Where Do They Stand?

Author:
Sven Behrendt
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become dominant players in global finance and world affairs, controlling considerable financial assets. Their investment behavior continues to resonate across the world economy and their increasingly extroverted investment policy prompted a political backlash in mature economies. Reacting to this backlash, in October 2008 a group of 26 SWFs commit-ted themselves to transparency, good governance, and accountability standards by signing a voluntary code of principles, the “Generally Accepted Principles and Practices,” for SWFs (GAAP), also known as the “Santiago Principles.”
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Treaties and Agreements, and Sovereign Wealth Funds

18. Afghanistan: Searching for Political Agreement

Author:
Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The coalition strategy has reached an impasse. None of the efforts attempted since the summer of 2009 has halted the deterioration of the political and security situation. Although a few tactical successes might be possible, the coalition cannot defeat the Taliban or rally local commanders to its side. Moreover, the Karzai government enjoys very limited legitimacy and appears incapable of rebuilding a state that can assume responsibility for its own security in the foreseeable future. The coalition faces the risk of an endless engagement accompanied by an intolerable loss of life and treasure.
Topic:
Government, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban

19. Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime

Author:
Pierre Goldschmidt
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Today's nuclear nonproliferation regime is increasingly challenged by states that exploit ambiguity in rules and rifts in the international community to pursue nuclear weapon capabilities without fear of reprisal. At present, lax and inconsistent compliance practices threaten nonproliferation efforts by giving some states more leeway for evading rules than should be tolerable in an effective nonproliferation regime.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Organization, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

20. The Impact of the Doha Round on Kenya

Author:
Eduardo Zepeda, Mohamed Chemingui, Hedi Bchir, Christopher Onyango, and Bernadette Wanjala
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the first decade of the twenty- first century comes to an end, Kenya's economy is being confronted with a number of challenges that call for carefully crafted, well- informed policies. After fifteen years of stagnation—when the country witnessed zero increase in its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and investment at levels below 20 percent of GDP—it has risen to become one of Africa's fast growing economies (see Arbache and Page 2008). Between 2004 and 2007, Kenya's economy showed signs of revitalization, and the average annual growth rate climbed above 5 percent, allowing Kenyans to finally enjoy an increase in GDP per capita. However, the political turmoil of 2008 slowed growth, and the current global financial and economic crisis has made it difficult to return to high growth rates. Thus, Kenya now faces shrinking export markets, rising protectionist measures worldwide, and meager financial flows.
Topic:
Agriculture, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa