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11. Turkey and the Bomb

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Though most states that want a nuclear weapon can get one through determined effort, the fact remains that most choose not to proliferate. Turkey is no exception. Not even the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to push Ankara to develop its own nuclear weapons. The only circumstance where such a scenario would acquire a degree of likelihood is a breakdown in Turkey's security relationship with the United States.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Turkey, and Middle East

12. The Future of Russia: Modernization or Decline?

Author:
Adam Balcer and Nikolay Petrov
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and nuclear power remains a key player in Eurasia with a substantial leverage in the post Soviet space and, at the same time, the most important neighbour of the EU. However, in the coming decades Russia will face serious challenges to its internal prospects and international position. The further rise of China, negative demographic trends (shrinking population, emigration of well-educated people), substantial increase of the share of Muslim population, degradation of its infrastructure, unsustainability of the current economic model and rampant corruption are the most important factors which will impact on Russia's future and by default on the EU's. Certainly, Russia's democratization would substantially increase its ability to face these challenges and impact positively on EU-Russia relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Soviet Union, and United Nations

13. Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO

Author:
George Perkovich, Steven Pifer, Malcolm Chalmers, Paul Schulte, and Jaclyn Tandler
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will meet for a summit in Chicago this May to conclude their Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which was intended to be a vehicle for resolving key questions about the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO policy. However, NATO is unlikely to resolve the question of what to do about its forward deployed nuclear weapons before the summit.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Europe and Chicago

14. Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control

Author:
Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, and Moscow

15. The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War

Author:
Karim Sadjadpour
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions through economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has come to play a critical yet often ambiguous role. The UAE, namely the emirate of Dubai, is a top source of Iranian imports and a key transshipment point for goods-legal and illegal-destined for the Islamic Republic. Dubai's bustling and loosely regulated ports have repeatedly frustrated international sanctions against Iran.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Dubai

16. Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S. policy seeks to create the conditions that would allow for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. This report offers a practical approach to reducing the U.S. and Russian stockpiles to 500 nuclear warheads each and those of other nuclear armed states to no more than about half that number. This target would require Washington and Moscow to reduce their arsenals by a factor of ten.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Washington, and Moscow

17. The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Author:
Mark Hibbs
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After the first Indian nuclear explosive test in 1974, seven nuclear supplier governments were convinced that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) alone would not halt the spread of nuclear weapons—a view that developments in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and elsewhere would later underscore. The seven governments formed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and over the course of more than three decades, it has become the world's leading multilateral nuclear export control arrangement, establishing guidelines that govern transfers of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology. Yet, as a voluntary and consensus- based organization of 46 participating governments, the NSG today faces a host of challenges ranging from questions about its credibility and future membership to its relationship to the NPT and other multilateral arrangements.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, India, Asia, and North Korea

18. China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China is increasingly factored into U.S. nuclear strategy. When President Obama released the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—a document that guides America's nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities, and force posture for the next five to ten years—in April 2010, China was named 36 times. By contrast, China was barely mentioned in the last NPR completed in 2002. The United States expressed its desire to enhance strategic stability with China, but there needs to be a better understanding of how China perceives America's nuclear posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Israel

19. Iran: A View From Moscow

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin and Alexey Malashenko
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Iran's emergence as a rising power is straining its relations with Russia. While many outside observers assume the two countries enjoy a close relationship, in reality it is highly complex. Although Iran and Russia have strong economic and military ties, Moscow is increasingly wary of Tehran's growing ambitions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Tehran, and Moscow

20. Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime

Author:
Pierre Goldschmidt
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Today's nuclear nonproliferation regime is increasingly challenged by states that exploit ambiguity in rules and rifts in the international community to pursue nuclear weapon capabilities without fear of reprisal. At present, lax and inconsistent compliance practices threaten nonproliferation efforts by giving some states more leeway for evading rules than should be tolerable in an effective nonproliferation regime.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Organization, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction