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1. Hypocritical Inhospitality: The Global Refugee Crisis in the Light of History

Author:
Luke Glanville
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Political authorities often claim that states have an absolute right to decide for themselves who enters their territory and the conditions on which they enter by mere virtue of their sovereignty. In 2018, for example, the then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, responded to the UN’s criticism of the Donald Trump administration’s practice of separating children from parents entering the United States without documentation, including those claiming asylum, with a typical appeal to sovereign prerogative: “We will remain a generous country, but we are also a sovereign country, with laws that decide how to best control our borders and protect our people. Neither the United Nations nor anyone else will dictate how the United States upholds its borders.”1 A brief glance at the history of sovereignty, however, reminds us of two crucial things. First, sovereignty is socially constructed, and its meaning and implications have changed and continue to change over time. Sovereignty need not entail, and historically has not entailed, an absolute right to regulate the movement of people in and out of one’s territory.2 Second, we are reminded of the deep and problematic ties between the history of sovereignty’s construction and the history of the European colonial project.3 Sovereignty was for a long time considered a privilege enjoyed only by Europeans and those non-Europeans whom Europeans deigned to acknowledge as civilized members of the “family of nations.” It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that Europe’s widespread empires were finally dismantled, self-government was granted to formerly colonized peoples, and the institution of the territorially bounded sovereign state spread across the globe. More than that, for centuries, the wealth of Europe’s sovereign powers was augmented, and the territories of their soon-to-be-sovereign settler colonies beyond Europe were acquired by means of violent conquest, subjection, enslavement, displacement, and, often, slaughter of nonsovereign indigenous peoples. The powerful once demanded hospitality from the vulnerable. They now deny it to them. That much is well known. What is less well known is that one justification that European imperial powers offered for the violent subjection of nonsovereign non-Europeans, at least for a time, was indigenous peoples’ violation of a supposedly natural and enforceable duty of hospitality. Today, many of these same powers—including European Union member states and former settler colonies, such as the United States and Australia—work tirelessly and expend billions of dollars to resist granting hospitality to forcibly displaced people seeking asylum at their borders or waiting in refugee camps and urban centers in developing regions of the world. The powerful once demanded hospitality from the vulnerable. They now deny it to them. This essay examines the hypocritical inhospitality of these wealthy and powerful states in four stages. I first outline how the notion of a duty of hospitality was deployed as a justification for European colonialism. Second, I contrast this historical demand for hospitality with the denial of hospitality by former colonial powers today, noting that they legitimate this denial by again imposing an expectation of hospitality on others. Third, I consider the justified limits to the duty of hospitality, explaining how Immanuel Kant and others usefully sought a formulation of the duty that would protect the vulnerable from the predations of powerful intruders while still requiring the powerful to provide relief to the displaced vulnerable. And fourth, I argue, given that certain states accrued vast wealth and territory from the European colonial project, which they justified in part by appeals to a duty of hospitality, these states are bound now to extend hospitality to vulnerable outsiders not simply as a matter of charity or even reciprocity, but as justice and restitution for grave historical wrongs.
Topic:
Refugee Crisis, Colonialism, Humanitarian Crisis, and Hospitality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Democracy: The Keystone of our Society

Author:
You Young Kim
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Hearing my grandfather state, "I'm forever grateful to Kim Il-sung," baffled me. His words of gratitude to the first supreme leader and the eternal president of North Korea did not match his heartbreaking tale of defecting to the South during the Korean War. Recalling his stories of hiding in the mountains and his relatives trapped in the isolated dictatorial communist state, I couldn't fathom being grateful for a man who pushed my grandfather to make such a difficult choice when he was only a few years older than I am now.
Topic:
International Affairs and Democracy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Secessionist Conflict: A Happy Marriage between Norms and Interests?

Author:
Rafael Biermann
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
This roundtable debates how norms, values, and interests are balanced and harmonized in a world of conflict. My contribution focuses on one specific policy field: secessionist conflict. Like Megan Bradley’s contribution on the international refugee regime,1 this essay takes a metaperspective and does not investigate any one specific case or actor.2 I assume a political science perspective, paying attention first to social norms (as standards of appropriate behavior), which encompass but go beyond legally codified norms of international law;3 and second to interests, whether they be national, group, personal, or other. My perspective here is a critical social constructivist one, investigating the dialectic relationship of norms, interests, and power. I introduce the concept of “norm selection” in a policy field, which offers choice within a cluster of competing norms. Finally, following Bernd Bucher’s call to bring back agency into what he terms international “norm politics,” this contribution prioritizes agency, arguing that it is actors with diverging interests who do the balancing of norms, values, and interests.4 This was one of the major insights we gained from the workshop preceding this roundtable.5 The central argument of my contribution is that the policy field of secessionist conflict is structured around a set of five rival norms, of which territorial integrity and self-determination form the core. This normative structure permits the parties involved in a secessionist conflict to select from a menu of norms those that best suit their interests. The selection displays remarkable regularities, indicating default positions for each type of actor. However, significant outlier cases signal that interests do not simply trump norms but that actors accord different values to those norms. This attribution is influenced by the dynamics of a normative environment in which norms rise and fall. In particular, since the Cold War ended, discourse as well as state practice have shifted away from the traditional taboo on secession toward more revisionist concepts, such as remedial secession or earned sovereignty, providing an opening for the secessionist wave that started with the breakup of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia. I present my argument in three steps. First, I introduce the above-mentioned cluster of norms that shape discourse and policies on secession, distinguishing the two core norms and the three circumjacent ones of noninterference, human rights, and democratic good governance. Second, I identify five major types of actors in secessionist conflicts and investigate how each balances those norms. Since this balancing is actor-specific and conforms to the interests that each pursues, I arrive at distinct default positions for each actor type. Whereas this analysis suggests that norms serve primarily as legitimation devices to advance the diverging interests of various actors, the last section discusses outlier cases where norms and interests do not match as presumed.
Topic:
International Law, Self Determination, Norms, and Secession
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. The Case for Foreign Electoral Subversion

Author:
Cecile Fabre
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Most foreign policy is not implemented through war. Yet, with a few recent exceptions—like James Pattison’s 2018 monograph The Alternatives to War—political and moral philosophers have yet to explore all options between war and doing nothing.1 Here I consider one such option: subversive interference in a democracy’s nationwide elections. In that regard, the years 2016–2017 have proved rich in controversies. In France, Russian banks with close ties to the Kremlin provided cash loans to the National Front in the run-up to the 2017 presidential elections. In December 2017, the Australian premier announced a tightening of restrictions on foreign funding of political parties out of concern with alleged and undue Chinese influence on some Australian politicians. Last, but far from least, in the United States the Office of the Director of National Intelligence along with the CIA, FBI, and NSA all take the strong view, backed in part by social media data, that Russian authorities actively sought to undermine Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign and to bolster Donald Trump’s.2 Interestingly, however, some of President Putin’s critics are vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy. To give but two examples, the United States has a long history of interfering in the institutions and elections of its Latin American neighbors and, indeed, at the height of the Cold War, of its European allies. More recently, many believe that, absent U.S.-driven assistance, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia would have lost the 2000 Yugoslavian presidential election to Slobodan Milošević.3 Attempting to subvert the democratic elections of a putatively sovereign country is a time-honored way of bending the latter’s domestic and foreign policy to one’s will. However, it seems to elicit far more condemnation than war and, indeed, other forms of coercive diplomacy. Perhaps this is because, to many people, the rights of democratic participation have primacy over all other rights; or because most often electoral subversion takes place covertly. Either way, given how destructive those other modes of interference are, this is puzzling. I frame my inquiry as follows. I focus on the state-sponsored, nonviolent, nonkinetic subversion of nationwide elections (for short, subversion). Moreover, because I am interested in exploring whether there are any situations in which subversion may be justified, I consider cases in which subversion is used as a means to prevent or end large-scale human rights violations, though my argument also has implications for subversion as a tool of foreign policy in general. In addition, my aim is not to evaluate subversion as an alternative to war or, for that matter, to other measures, such as economic sanctions. Due to space constraints, I simply wish to show that, under certain conditions and subject to certain constraints, subversion is pro tanto justified. Whether it is justified all things considered—and, in particular, once one has taken into account other options—is another matter and one that I cannot settle here. Finally, although subversion affects election candidates, it above all undermines a citizen’s right to vote. Accordingly, in what follows I focus on the latter and not the former. Attempting to subvert the democratic elections of a putatively sovereign country is a time-honored way of bending the latter’s domestic and foreign policy to one’s will. However, it seems to elicit far more condemnation than war. Before I begin, let me outline the overall normative framework on which my arguments rely. I take it for granted that all individuals, wherever they reside in the world, have rights to the freedoms and the resources they need to lead a minimally flourishing life—in other words, human rights. Moreover, they hold those rights against all human beings and their respective governments. Put differently, on this cosmopolitan view, all of us, wherever we reside in the world, are under duties to all other individuals, wherever they reside, to respect their human rights. How precisely we discharge those duties partly depends on the institutional structures under which we live. Be that as it may, I am not under a stronger duty to respect my compatriots’ human rights—for example, not to be killed or to be given means of subsistence—than I am to respect those same rights of noncompatriots, and vice versa
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sovereignty, Elections, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Seventy: Progress and Challenges

Author:
Ş. İlgü Özler
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the most significant statement from the global community regarding what constitutes the ideal human life in any society and the rights to which all people are entitled. On the basis of the principles laid out in the UDHR, the international community has since negotiated a large number of human rights treaties and conventions and has developed plans of action in relation to all aspects of living a dignified life. The UDHR is arguably one of the most important documents in the history of human civilization; and to the extent that words on paper can change the world, the impact of the UDHR has been profound. However, despite providing a solid foundation for our collective understanding of the rights to which human beings are endowed, today we are still far from realizing these goals, and threats to the very principles enshrined in the UDHR continue to emerge. The declaration has now endured for seventy years, roughly the global average human life span. Thus, this occasion presents a good opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved, what has yet to be accomplished, and to consider the future longevity of this seminal declaration. As with any interpretation of something as complex as the impact of a document on the world, assessments of the UDHR and its ongoing role are mixed. Many in the field of human rights see a glass half full, characterizing the UDHR as a powerful tool that has dramatically shaped political and economic development throughout the world.1 Others focus on the space that remains empty, emphasizing the flaws that inhibit the realization of the document’s goals.2 Indeed, it must be admitted that, even given the indisputable progress that has been made over seven decades, there are today growing threats to human rights. These threats are the consequence of a number of global developments, including shifting geopolitical balances, extreme economic and social inequality, climate change, and a weakening of democratic institutions. These threats are very real, and it is important that human rights proponents monitor and respond to them. But here I argue that the threat to human rights is ever present. And thus, rather than focus on the advances and setbacks of this particular moment, this anniversary is an opportunity to consider the overall historical progression toward human rights as embodied in the UDHR and the obstacles that stand in the way of its full realization. Taking this broader view, there are two issues in particular that stand out as barriers to be overcome. The first is tied to the Westphalian state system, which has come to dominate human political organization. State sovereignty presents a fundamental challenge to any effort to establish universal norms. Implementing universal human rights will always be tremendously difficult in a system that affords final authority to state leaders who lack the necessary incentives. This is nothing new or surprising, of course, and it is not unique to human rights. But it nonetheless requires a careful consideration of how international declarations make their way from ideas on paper to practice. A declaration is only significant to the extent to which it is adhered. As a document with universal endorsement, the UDHR does indeed have power, and it can shape the behavior of actors who otherwise risk appearing to stand against history and human civilization. It can also be used as a normative weapon, both by citizens and by the international community, to shame hypocrites who violate the principles to which they and every nation in the world have agreed. But it is, nonetheless, just a document, and without correspondingly strong global institutional mechanisms to ensure implementation and compliance, its impact is limited. The second major issue is the way in which human rights ideals have been segmented. The separation of rights into social/economic and civil/political has enabled states to focus on some rights to the neglect of others. Global power shifts, especially under the hegemony of the post–Cold War United States, have led to exaggerated selective emphasis on just some of the rights embedded in the UDHR, when in fact none can be fully realized without a comprehensive approach. Political rights cannot be effectively exercised by those lacking access to basic economic necessities. And those meeting their economic needs may find that their voices as citizens are meaningless in a system characterized by vast inequality or in which national institutions are infected by mechanisms that leave them politically marginalized. Rights must be recognized as interconnected and they must be advanced in tandem. Emphasis on some principles to the exclusion of others undermines the comprehensive advancement of human rights. Thus, the current state of affairs is a product of the collective failure to address human rights holistically and to implement real monitoring and accountability measures for states, which are directly charged with upholding them within their borders.
Topic:
Human Rights, United Nations, Hegemony, and State Formation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Top Risks & Ethical Decisions 2017 with Ian Bremmer

Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group, discusses his company’s annual top political risks for 2017 and their ethical implications. Topics include the potential challenges from a Trump administration, the moral legacy of President Obama’s foreign policy, human rights in the Middle East, the fate of liberalism in Europe and the world, and the dangers of populism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Middle East and Global Focus

7. A Better Process, a Stronger UN Secretary-General: How Historic Change Was Forged and What Comes Next

Author:
Yvonne Terlingen
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
When on October 13, 2016, the General Assembly appointed by acclamation António Guterres of Portugal as the United Nations’ ninth secretary-general, there was a sense of excitement among the organization’s 193 members. For once, so it seemed, they felt they had played an important role not only in choosing the secretary-general but also in appointing a man generally considered to be an outstanding candidate for a position memorably described as “the most impossible job on this earth.”1 The five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council (Perm Five) still exercised the greatest power in the selection process, as they always had in the past. Yet the candidate chosen appears, surprisingly, not to have been the first choice of either the United States or Russia, two of the Perm Five that until then had effectively chosen the secretary-general between them in an opaque and outdated process. It is doubtful that António Guterres would have been appointed if the General Assembly had not embarked on a novel process to select him. All previous secretaries-general were chosen on the basis of a haphazard and secretive process that occurred behind closed doors and was not merit based. The method to select the UN secretary-general is laid down in a few words in the UN Charter. Article 97 allocates responsibility for appointing the secretary-general to all members of the General Assembly acting on the recommendation of the Security Council. However, for the last seventy years—with one circumstance-specific exception2—the General Assembly has had no say in the selection: its member states merely rubber-stamped the decision of the Perm Five, which recommended just one candidate each time for the General Assembly to appoint. All previous secretaries-general were chosen on the basis of a haphazard and secretive process that occurred behind closed doors and was not merit based. The process was geared toward appointing the lowest common denominator candidate,3 but nevertheless produced a few outstanding secretaries-general. There has never been a female secretary-general, and until 2016 only three women had ever made it on a Security Council shortlist.4 The entire process lacked transparency and accountability and fell far short of the UN’s own standards and ideals, let alone the current recruitment practices for top international positions. Selections of all previous secretaries-general were made without appointment criteria, without a call for nominations or for CVs, without a timeline for nominations, and without public hearings or other effective methods of public scrutiny. In recent selections, candidates were often pushed into horse trading with the Security Council’s permanent members to gain their support in exchange for making promises of senior UN posts for their nationals. This has led to some countries holding monopolies over key posts.5 Moreover, the tradition of appointment for a five-year, once-renewable term, with reappointment controlled by the Perm Five, has effectively secured a secretary-general beholden to the Council’s most powerful members. The whole process “would be rejected as a bad joke by any serious institution in the private sector,” noted one senior UN authority who worked under multiple secretaries-general.
Topic:
United Nations, Leadership, Diversity, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order

Author:
Amitav Acharya
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
“The dominance of a single great power,” wrote American scholar Robert Keohane in his widely acclaimed book After Hegemony, “may contribute to order in world politics, in particular circumstances, but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary.”1 This proposition has never been put to a greater test as it is now. Since the election of Donald J. Trump as U.S. president in November 2016 there has been a vast outpouring of anxiety over the future of the liberal world order.2 But the myths, limitations, and decline of this order have been anticipated and forewarned for some time, even though its proponents have not acknowledged it. The “first myth” about the U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order, as I have written elsewhere, is “how far it extended for much of its history, especially during the Cold War period.” I pointed out that “the Soviet bloc, China, India, Indonesia, and a good part of the ‘third world’ were outside of it . . . . Despite the exalted claims about its power, legitimacy, and public goods functions, that order was little more than the US-UK-West Europe-Australasian configuration.”3 Noting that the liberal order was hardly benign for many countries in the developing world, I argued that it should be seen as a limited international order, rather than an inclusive global order. Joseph S. Nye, one of the staunchest champions of the liberal order, made a similar point when he wrote in the January/February 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs that the liberal order “was largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral” and “did not include many large countries such as China, India, and the Soviet bloc states, and . . . did not always have benign effects on nonmembers.”4 The liberal order did expand and strengthen with the economic reforms in China and India, and with the end of the cold war. And while the champions of that order celebrated its expansion, they still generally assumed that the main challenge to it would come from the rising powers, led by China. Their assumptions notwithstanding, precisely at a time when many of these powers today are not doing all that well, the liberal order appears to be imploding. Trump’s victory and Brexit suggest that the current challenge to the liberal order is as much, if not more, from within as from without. Precisely at a time when many of the rising powers are not doing all that well, the liberal order appears to be imploding. The domestic challenges to the liberal order led by Trump and his supporters could be overstated, however. After all, Hillary Clinton won a majority of the popular vote, and the Brexit referendum only passed by a slim margin. More importantly, however, the crisis of the liberal order has deeper roots, owing to long-term and structural changes in the global economy and politics. As such, Trump’s ascent to power is a consequence—not a cause—of the decline of the liberal order, especially of its failure to address the concerns of domestic constituents left behind by the global power shift. Given these factors, Trump is unlikely to reverse the decline of the liberal order even if he wanted to. Instead, he may well push it over the precipice. In what follows, I first describe the foundations of the liberal order, and show that the ground on which it was built has been eroding for some time, though Trump’s rhetoric and policies are also damaging. Next, I argue that for now the rising powers are not in a position to overturn the current order completely, and in fact they may wish to preserve some elements of it in the near and medium term. I describe a “multiplex world” in which elements of the liberal order survive, but are subsumed in a complex of multiple, crosscutting international orders. Finally, I offer some suggestions on how scholars and policymakers can manage the transition to such a multiplex world.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Reform, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. The Need for Governance of Climate Geoengineering

Author:
Janos Pasztor
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Sooner rather than later, policymakers around the world will need to confront an uncomfortable reality: that despite the best efforts of national governments and thousands of mayors and other civic leaders, we can no longer contain global average temperatures to below 1.5–2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels through mitigation of carbon emissions alone. It is widely acknowledged that even if the world stopped all emissions today, there would still be a rise in global temperatures to a level that would stay for hundreds of years (the lifetime of the carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere) before temperatures began to drop, thus constituting a temperature “overshoot.” For many experts the question is no longer whether the world can keep the temperature rise below the goals stipulated in the Paris Agreement, but by how much will the world miss that target and how long will the overshoot last. For many experts the question is no longer whether the world can keep the temperature rise below the goals stipulated in the Paris Agreement, but by how much will the world miss that target and how long will the overshoot last. The acknowledgement of this temperature overshoot—alongside a growing appreciation of its devastating impact on people’s lives, the global economy, and the environment—may mark a new inflection point in our efforts to manage the risks of climate change.1 When you add to this the U.S. president’s announcement in June 2017 that the nation would withdraw from the Paris Agreement, it comes as no surprise that a growing number of scientists are thinking about additional approaches to managing the risks of an overshoot. Perhaps most dramatically, we have seen a resurgent interest in a field that once resided at the fringes of science or on the pages of sci-fi novels, but which is now being taken quite seriously in academic circles: geoengineering. As this interest develops, it is becoming more likely that a group of countries or cities or even one or more wealthy individuals might decide to deploy geoengineering technologies during the coming decades. We need to be ready for any such eventuality; and being ready means considering a host of pressing questions. How would we govern such actors? Who assesses the balance of risks and rewards when deploying geoengineering technologies? What safeguards and what compensation mechanisms need to be built in? If we start deliberately altering global temperatures, who controls the global thermostat? It was to address these questions that the Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative was born: to bring the profoundly complex issues of geoengineering governance and ethics to a much wider audience.2 We are potentially at the dawn of an age of geoengineering. It is time for policymakers to start discussing whether geoengineering is to go forward and, if so, how.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Governance, and Geoengineering
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. Defining Down Sovereignty: The Rights and Responsibilities of Nations

Author:
Amitai Etzioni
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
Defining down sovereignty" refers to the normative thesis that sovereignty should not grant a state absolute protection against armed intervention in its internal affairs by other states, and that instead the international community should condition such immunity on states living up to particular standards. This essay suggests two modifications to this thesis. First, the international community should spell out the kinds of failures to protect civilians that can justify armed interventions by other states, as well as which agency has the authority to determine when such failures have occurred. In other words, the international community should determine how low to set the bar for intervention, and who makes the rules. Second, the international community needs to establish an additional international responsibility, namely, a responsibility to prevent international terrorism. The essay treats both of these modifications as shared international normative understandings; it does not attempt to translate these changes into international law.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Terrorism, Leadership, State Building, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus