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1. Reclaiming leadership: Australia and the global critical minerals race

Author:
Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Climate policy, geopolitics and market forces are coalescing to deliver Australia a global leadership opportunity in critical minerals. To grasp that opportunity, Australia needs both to utilise its domestic mineral endowment and its mining knowledge and technology and to leverage the global footprint of Australian companies to help build a global supply chain network. How Australia responds will not only determine economic benefits to the nation but will also affect the world’s ability to achieve minerals security and the sustainability required for the global energy transition and inclusive economic growth. The global energy transition and other high-technology applications have increased demand for critical minerals, particularly in countries that have strong complex manufacturing industries. At the same time, the concentration of production of many critical minerals, the dominance of China in supply chains and its actions to restrict supply and influence markets, are disrupting both minerals production and availability. In response, developed nations have formulated critical minerals strategies and entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements, involving supplier nations and customer nations, to build alternative supply chains that are more diverse, secure and sustainable. Australia has committed in multiple agreements to work with like-minded nations to achieve this. This report is intended to provide the government with a road map to ‘step up’ to (re)activate Australia’s global mineral leadership.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Leadership, Alliance, Emerging Technology, Minerals, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

2. AUKUS Pillar 2 critical pathways: a road map to enabling international collaboration

Author:
George Henneke and Roland Stephens
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The AUKUS trilateral partnership presents Australia with an unprecedented opportunity to achieve national-security goals that have eluded it for decades. It could offer access to cutting-edge technologies. It can further integrate Australian, US and UK military forces, allowing more unified action to maintain deterrence against national and transnational actors who threaten the global rules-based order. Perhaps most importantly, AUKUS—in particular its Pillar.2 objectives—is an opportunity for Australia to pursue the long-sought industrial capacity necessary to defend its borders and its interests across a range of probable conflict scenarios.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Partnerships, Emerging Technology, Collaboration, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

3. Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

Author:
Bart Hogeveen, Arindrajit Basu, Isha Suri, and Baani Grewal
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy - that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards. At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product. The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors. Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used. Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific - including Australia and India - should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities. Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific' - and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) - explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’. The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important. It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders - governments, industry, civil society and academia - step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, and Standards
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

4. Australia’s new digital ID system: finding the right way to implement it

Author:
Rajiv Shah
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report reviews the Australian Government's proposed plans for establishing a digital ID, and the ways the new system is expected to work. It explores the planned digital ID system, the key features of the approach, and the privacy and security protections that have been built into the proposals. Australia has had a long and troubled history with national ID systems, dating back to the mid-1980 when the government failed to introduce the Australia Card. Since then, Australia has ended up with a clunky and inefficient process to identify peoples’ identities online. It has led to an oversharing and storage of sensitive personal data. As the Medibank and Optus data breaches has shown, this creates serious cybersecurity risks. Now that Parliament has passed the Digital ID legislation, it’s critical that government gets the implementation right. The report outlines that, although the proposed federated model for a digital ID system is commendable and a needed step-forward, there is a need to still address a range of policy issues that - if left unresolved - would jeopardise trust in the system.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

5. Australia’s north and space

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report examines opportunities for the development of sovereign space capability in the Northern Territory, Queensland, and Western Australia. Given that those northern jurisdictions are closer to the equator, there’s a natural focus in the report on the potential opportunities offered by sovereign space launch, particularly in the Northern Territory and Queensland. However, I also consider the potential for other aspects of space besides launch, including space domain awareness, the establishment of satellite ground stations, and space industry. I explore the potential for the co-location of space industry—domestic and international—within or close to launch sites, which would result in the development of ‘space hubs’ in strategic locations in Australia. Benefits are gained by situating space-launch sites as close to the equator as possible, and two sites—Nhulunbuy near Gove in the Northern Territory and Abbot Point near Bowen in Queensland—are now under development. The closer a launch site is to the equator, the greater the benefit in terms of reduced cost per kilogram of payload to orbit, due to velocity gained by a rocket from the Earth’s rotation. The report then explores the transformation of Australia’s space sector that’s occurred within the past decade, from one solely dependent on foreign-provided satellite services and locally developed ground-segment capabilities, including for space domain awareness, to the growth of sovereign space industry and the establishment of the Australian Space Agency in 2018. I note that, since the establishment of the agency, Australia’s commercial space sector has expanded rapidly, but now faces headwinds, with the recent cancellation of the National Space Mission for Earth Observation being a serious blow to Australia’s space industry. The Australian space industry sector must now fight to sustain funding. In this report, I argue that the best way to achieve success is to emphasise sovereign launch as a focus for Australian space activities and to reinforce the potential opportunities offered by the north, including for defence and national-security requirements in space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Space, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia

6. Developing Australia’s critical minerals and rare earths: implementing the outcomes from the 2023 Darwin Dialogue

Author:
John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Critical minerals and rare earths are the building blocks for emerging and future technologies, inseparable from the supply chains of manufacturing, clean energy production, medical technology, semiconductors, and the defence and aerospace industries. Despite their criticality, their supply chains are exposed to numerous vulnerabilities – threatening the production and development of vital technologies. This report—based on closed-door, invitation-only discussions at ASPI’s new Darwin Dialogue, a track 1.5 meeting between Australia, Japan and the US—makes 24 recommendations for government and the private sector to support the development of viable, competitive alternative markets that offer products through supply chains secure from domestic policy disruptions and economic coercion. These recommendations are derived from analysis of the challenges embedded in critical minerals supply chains, including the inability for global production to meet projected demand, and dependency upon China and politically unstable nations as at times near singular sources of production. Australia’s natural endowments of critical minerals and rare earths provide a unique opportunity to achieve intersecting economic, environmental, and strategic objectives. But, as detailed in this report, effective coordination between Australia’s state, territory and federal governments, mining and industry, and international partners will be pivotal to developing this opportunity. Further still, achieving our critical minerals objectives will require a bold new policy approach from all stakeholders.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Emerging Technology, Minerals, and Rare earth elements (REEs)
Political Geography:
Australia

7. Australia's semiconductor manufacturing moonshot: securing semiconductor talent

Author:
Bronte Munro, Alex Capri, and Robert Clark
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Semiconductors are a critical component in all modern technologies, from personal communication devices and medical devices to weapons systems. Crucial to producing semiconductors is the availability of a highly skilled workforce, managing clean-room facilities and highly specialised equipment to execute the hundreds of unique steps needed to manufacture a single wafer, depending on the complexity of the chip. ASPI’s 2022 report, Australia’s semiconductor national moonshot, laid out the strategic reasons why Australia must embark on a capacity-building initiative to create a homegrown semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. Every item on the Australian federal government’s List of Critical Technologies in the National Interest is dependent on semiconductors. By committing to growing a semiconductor-manufacturing industry from a mature-process-scale baseline, policymakers would position Australia to manufacture chips relevant to the energy, transport, health, IT and defence sectors. Such an industry would enable Australia to execute long-term critical technology strategies in areas such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, to mitigate supply-chain risk against disruption from conflict or natural disaster, and provide highly skilled jobs in affordable locations, enriching the Australian economy. It’s important to note that both AUKUS Pillar 2 and the Albanese government’s April 2023 publication of the Defence Strategic Review reflect a shift in Australia’s strategic thinking on defence and national security, and the important correlation and greater cooperation between industry, education and defence priorities, particularly when it comes to technology. Delivering on that shift will be difficult and often costly, but this report provides a series of recommendations of what that correlation and cooperation could look like. For Canberra, such an endeavour is of the same magnitude as America’s historic ‘moonshots’ during the 1960s and 1970s. It’s a once-in-a-generation challenge that will determine Australia’s place in the world, and human capital is central to ensuring success. Opting out of semiconductor manufacturing for the long term would severely constrain Australia’s growth as a technological nation and consign it to second-tier status. This report expands on the recommendations made in the 2022 ASPI report for establishing a semiconductor-manufacturing capability in Australia and focuses on the importance of creating a talent pipeline that can support a scaled industry. Achieving a semiconductor moonshot requires stepping up Australia’s very respectable semiconductor device fabrication R&D to industry-compatible prototyping via a dedicated facility, together with attracting (through that capability and by government incentives) a semiconductor manufacturer to locate a mature-process-scale foundry in Australia—which will require support from an upskilled Australian talent pipeline. This is an ambitious move but is an essential step in growing such a capability. The ability to grow and maintain a high-skilled workforce is a foundational challenge for Australia that can be addressed through close examination of trailblazing public–private partnerships (PPPs) that aim to provide talent-pipeline security in the US, Taiwan and Japan. Australian governments, industry and academia can emulate and engage with the examples highlighted through case studies in this report to attract semiconductor industry investment, boost talent-pipeline development and strengthen industry R&D. Australia’s states and territories all have varied capacity to o›er support to a semiconductor-manufacturing capability.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Manufacturing, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Australia

8. Weaponised deep fakes

Author:
Hannah Smith and Katherine Mansted
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Fakes are all around us. Academic analysis suggests that they’re difficult to spot without new sensors, software or other specialised equipment, with 1 in 5 photos you see being fraudulent. The exposure of deep fakes and the services they facilitate can potentially lead to suppression of information and a general breakdown in confidence in public authorities and trust. We need to react not just to false or compromised claims but to those who would try to exploit them for nefarious purposes. We should not assume the existence of fake news unless we have compelling evidence to the contrary, but when we do, we should not allow the propaganda. I’ve never been more sure of this point than today. —GPT-2 deep learning algorithm The foreword to this report was written by a machine. The machine used a ‘deep fake’ algorithm — a form of artificial intelligence (AI) — to generate text and a headshot. Deep fakes are increasingly realistic and easy to create. The foreword took us approximately five minutes to generate, using free, open-source software.1
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

9. Mapping more of China's tech giants: AI and surveillance

Author:
Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has updated the public database that maps the global expansion of key Chinese technology companies. This update adds a further 11 companies and organisations: iFlytek, Megvii, ByteDance (which owns TikTok), SenseTime, YITU, CloudWalk, DJI, Meiya Pico, Dahua, Uniview and BeiDou. Our public database now maps 23 companies and organisations and is visualised through our interactive website, Mapping China’s Technology Giants. The website seeks to give policymakers, academics, journalists, government officials and other interested readers a more holistic picture of the increasingly global reach of China’s tech giants. The response to phase 1 of this project—it quickly became one of ASPI’s most read products—suggests that the current lack of transparency about some of these companies’ operations and governance arrangements has created a gap this database is helping to fill. This update adds companies working mainly in the artificial intelligence (AI) and surveillance tech sectors. SenseTime, for example, is one of the world’s most valuable AI start-ups. iFlytek is a partially state-owned speech recognition company. Meiya Pico is a digital forensics and security company that created media headlines in 2019 because of its monitoring mobile app MFSocket.1 In addition, we’ve added DJI, which specialises in drone technologies, and BeiDou, which isn’t a company but the Chinese Government’s satellite navigation system. We also added ByteDance—an internet technology company perhaps best known internationally for its video app, TikTok, which is popular with teenagers around the world. TikTok is also attracting public and media scrutiny in the US over national security implications, the use of US citizens’ data and allegations of censorship, including shadow banning (the down-ranking of particular topics via the app’s algorithm so users don’t see certain topics in their feed). Company overviews now include a summary of their activities in Xinjiang.2 For some companies, including ByteDance and Huawei, we are including evidence of their work in Xinjiang that has not being reported publicly before. For most of these companies, the surveillance technologies and techniques being rolled out abroad—often funded by loans from the Export–Import Bank of China (China Eximbank)3—have long been used on Chinese citizens, and especially on the Uyghur and other minority populations in Xinjiang, where an estimated 1.5 million people are being arbitrarily held in detention centres.4 Some of these companies have actively and repeatedly obscured their work in Xinjiang, including in hearings with foreign parliamentary committees. This project now includes evidence and analysis of those activities in order to foster greater transparency about their engagement in human rights abuses or ethically questionable activities in the same way Western firms are held to account by Western media and civil society actors, as they should be. In this report, we include a number of case studies in which we delve deeper into parts of the dataset. This includes case studies on TikTok as a vector for censorship and surveillance, BeiDou’s satellite and space race and CloudWalk’s various AI, biometric data and facial recognition partnerships with the Zimbabwean Government. We also include a case study on Meiya Pico’s work with China’s Public Security Ministry on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aid projects in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Those projects include the construction of digital forensics labs and cyber capacity training, including for police forces across Asia. We have also investigated the role that foreign investment plays in the global expansion of some of these companies, particularly in China’s surveillance and public security sector.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

10. The Australian Defence Force and contested space

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This new Strategy report looks at war on the high frontier of outer space, and what the implications such a development might have for the ADF. It highlights that space is not a sanctuary from geopolitical rivalries. The report notes that Australia is heavily dependent on the space environment, both for its national prosperity and societal well-being, and for its defence and national security, and the report examines Australia’s current approach to use of space for Defence. The report then examines emerging counterspace threats. China and Russia are moving towards deploying a suite of ‘counterspace capabilities’ to deny access to essential space systems used by the US and its allies, including Australia, prior to, or at the outset of a military conflict. These include direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that physically destroy satellites in orbit after being launched from Earth’s surface; they are testing technologies that could be applied towards a co-orbital ASAT system designed to attack satellites from space; and have a range of ‘soft-kill’ ground-based technologies to disrupt, damage, and disable – but not destroy - satellites. Author Malcolm Davis notes that, 'China is developing the ability to rapidly attack US and allied (including Australian) critical space infrastructure prior to or at the outset of a future military conflict, in what amounts to the risk of a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ that would be designed to leave the US and its allies ‘deaf, dumb and blind.’ Such an outcome would severely erode the ADF’s ability to undertake information-led joint, integrated and coalition operations.' The report highlights the risks posed by ‘soft-kill’ systems described above. These don’t generate space debris, and thus have greater operational utility and anonymity, and they raise the threat of ‘grey zones in orbit. The report also examines efforts towards legal and arms control measures to constrain space weaponization and explores how these can contribute to reduce the prospect of warfare in space. The report finally makes a number of recommendations on how Defence should respond to this challenge to maintain freedom of action in space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Space, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific