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1. Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence

Author:
Bart Hogeveen, Arindrajit Basu, Isha Suri, and Baani Grewal
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is delighted to share its latest report – the result of a multi-year project on Artificial Intelligence (AI), technical standards and diplomacy - that conducts a deep-dive into the important, yet often opaque and complicated world of technical standards. At the heart of how AI technologies are developed, deployed and used in a responsible manner sit a suite of technical standards: rules, guidelines and characteristics that ensure the safety, security and interoperability of a product. The report authors highlight that the Indo-Pacific, including Australia and India, are largely playing catch-up in AI standards initiatives. The United States and China are leading the pack, followed by European nations thanks to their size, scope and resources of their national standardisation communities as well as their domestic AI sectors. Not being strongly represented in the world of AI governance and technical standards is a strategic risk for Indo-Pacific nations. For a region that’s banking on the opportunities of a digital and technology-enabled economy and has large swathes of its population in at-risk jobs, it’s a matter of national and economic security that Indo-Pacific stakeholders are active and have a big say in how AI technologies will operate and be used. Being part of the conversations and negotiations is everything, and as such, governments in the Indo-Pacific - including Australia and India - should invest more in whole-of-nation techdiplomacy capabilities. Authored by analysts at ASPI and India’s Centre for Internet and Society, this new report ‘Negotiating technical standards for artificial intelligence: A techdiplomacy playbook for policymakers and technologists in the Indo-Pacific' - and accompanying website (https://www.techdiplomacy.aspi.org.au/) - explains the current state of play in global AI governance, looks at the role of technical standards, outlines how agreements on technical standards are negotiated and created, and describes who are the biggest ‘movers and shakers’. The authors note that there are currently no representatives from Southeast Asia (except Singapore), Australia, NZ or the Pacific Islands on the UN Secretary-General Advisory Body on AI – a body that’s tasked to come up with suggestions on how to govern AI in a representative and inclusive manner with an eye to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The capacity of the Indo-Pacific to engage in critical technology standards has historically been lower in comparison to other regions. However, given the rapid and global impact of AI and the crucial role of technical standards, the report authors argue that dialogue and greater collaboration between policymakers, technologists and civil society has never been more important. It is hoped this playbook will help key stakeholders - governments, industry, civil society and academia - step through the different aspects of negotiating technical standards for AI, while also encouraging the Indo-Pacific region to step up and get more involved.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, and Standards
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

2. Australia’s new digital ID system: finding the right way to implement it

Author:
Rajiv Shah
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report reviews the Australian Government's proposed plans for establishing a digital ID, and the ways the new system is expected to work. It explores the planned digital ID system, the key features of the approach, and the privacy and security protections that have been built into the proposals. Australia has had a long and troubled history with national ID systems, dating back to the mid-1980 when the government failed to introduce the Australia Card. Since then, Australia has ended up with a clunky and inefficient process to identify peoples’ identities online. It has led to an oversharing and storage of sensitive personal data. As the Medibank and Optus data breaches has shown, this creates serious cybersecurity risks. Now that Parliament has passed the Digital ID legislation, it’s critical that government gets the implementation right. The report outlines that, although the proposed federated model for a digital ID system is commendable and a needed step-forward, there is a need to still address a range of policy issues that - if left unresolved - would jeopardise trust in the system.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

3. De-risking authoritarian AI: A balanced approach to protecting our digital ecosystems

Author:
Simeon Gilding
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI)–enabled systems make many invisible decisions affecting our health, safety and wealth. They shape what we see, think, feel and choose, they calculate our access to financial benefits as well as our transgressions, and now they can generate complex text, images and code just as a human can, but much faster. So it’s unsurprising that moves are afoot across democracies to regulate AI’s impact on our individual rights and economic security, notably in the European Union (EU). But, if we’re wary about AI, we should be even more circumspect about AI-enabled products and services from authoritarian countries that share neither our values nor our interests. And, for the foreseeable future, that means the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a revisionist authoritarian power demonstrably hostile to democracy and the rules-based international order, which routinely uses AI to strengthen its own political and social stability at the expense of individual human rights. In contrast to other authoritarian countries such as Russia, Iran and North Korea, China is a technology superpower with global capacity and ambitions and is a major exporter of effective, cost-competitive AI-enabled technology into democracies.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

4. Getting regulation right: Approaches to improving Australia’s cybersecurity

Author:
Rajiv Shah
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As well as having a global impact, Cybersecurity is one of the most significant issues affecting Australia’s economy and national security. On the one hand, poor cybersecurity presents a risk to the interconnected digital systems on which we increasingly rely; on the other hand, well-managed cybersecurity provides an opportunity to build trust and advantage by accelerating digital transformation. Cyber threats can originate from a diverse range of sources and require a diverse set of actions to effectively mitigate them. However, a common theme is that much better cyber risk management is needed to address this critical threat; the current operation of the free market isn’t consistently driving all of the required behaviours or actions. Regulation can provide a powerful mechanism to modify incentives and change behaviours. However, securing cyberspace depends on the intersection of many factors—technical, social and economic. Current regulations are a patchwork of general, cyber-specific and sector-specific measures with a lack of cohesion that causes overlaps and gaps. That makes the environment complex, which means that finding the right approach that will truly improve overall security and minimise unwanted side effects is difficult. It’s necessary to analyse the interconnected factors that determine the net effectiveness of cybersecurity regulations. Furthermore, the pace of technological change is so fast today that, even if regulation is successful when first implemented, it needs to be appropriately futureproofed to avoid becoming irrelevant after even a few months. Recent rapid developments in artificial intelligence are an example of the risks here that will need to be anticipated in any changes to the regulatory regimes.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Regulation
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

5. Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations

Author:
Albert Zhang, Tilla Hoja, and Jasmine Latimore
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) embrace of large-scale online influence operations and spreading of disinformation on Western social-media platforms has escalated since the first major attribution from Silicon Valley companies in 2019. While Chinese public diplomacy may have shifted to a softer tone in 2023 after many years of wolf-warrior online rhetoric, the Chinese Government continues to conduct global covert cyber-enabled influence operations. Those operations are now more frequent, increasingly sophisticated and increasingly effective in supporting the CCP’s strategic goals. They focus on disrupting the domestic, foreign, security and defence policies of foreign countries, and most of all they target democracies. Currently—in targeted democracies—most political leaders, policymakers, businesses, civil society groups and publics have little understanding of how the CCP currently engages in clandestine activities online in their countries, even though this activity is escalating and evolving quickly. The stakes are high for democracies, given the indispensability of the internet and their reliance on open online spaces, free from interference. Despite years of monitoring covert CCP cyber-enabled influence operations by social-media platforms, governments, and research institutes such as ASPI, definitive public attribution of the actors driving these activities is rare. Covert online operations, by design, are difficult to detect and attribute to state actors. Social-media platforms and governments struggle to devote adequate resources to identifying, preventing and deterring increasing levels of malicious activity, and sometimes they don’t want to name and shame the Chinese Government for political, economic and/or commercial reasons.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Social Media, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. Australia's semiconductor manufacturing moonshot: securing semiconductor talent

Author:
Bronte Munro, Alex Capri, and Robert Clark
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Semiconductors are a critical component in all modern technologies, from personal communication devices and medical devices to weapons systems. Crucial to producing semiconductors is the availability of a highly skilled workforce, managing clean-room facilities and highly specialised equipment to execute the hundreds of unique steps needed to manufacture a single wafer, depending on the complexity of the chip. ASPI’s 2022 report, Australia’s semiconductor national moonshot, laid out the strategic reasons why Australia must embark on a capacity-building initiative to create a homegrown semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. Every item on the Australian federal government’s List of Critical Technologies in the National Interest is dependent on semiconductors. By committing to growing a semiconductor-manufacturing industry from a mature-process-scale baseline, policymakers would position Australia to manufacture chips relevant to the energy, transport, health, IT and defence sectors. Such an industry would enable Australia to execute long-term critical technology strategies in areas such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence, to mitigate supply-chain risk against disruption from conflict or natural disaster, and provide highly skilled jobs in affordable locations, enriching the Australian economy. It’s important to note that both AUKUS Pillar 2 and the Albanese government’s April 2023 publication of the Defence Strategic Review reflect a shift in Australia’s strategic thinking on defence and national security, and the important correlation and greater cooperation between industry, education and defence priorities, particularly when it comes to technology. Delivering on that shift will be difficult and often costly, but this report provides a series of recommendations of what that correlation and cooperation could look like. For Canberra, such an endeavour is of the same magnitude as America’s historic ‘moonshots’ during the 1960s and 1970s. It’s a once-in-a-generation challenge that will determine Australia’s place in the world, and human capital is central to ensuring success. Opting out of semiconductor manufacturing for the long term would severely constrain Australia’s growth as a technological nation and consign it to second-tier status. This report expands on the recommendations made in the 2022 ASPI report for establishing a semiconductor-manufacturing capability in Australia and focuses on the importance of creating a talent pipeline that can support a scaled industry. Achieving a semiconductor moonshot requires stepping up Australia’s very respectable semiconductor device fabrication R&D to industry-compatible prototyping via a dedicated facility, together with attracting (through that capability and by government incentives) a semiconductor manufacturer to locate a mature-process-scale foundry in Australia—which will require support from an upskilled Australian talent pipeline. This is an ambitious move but is an essential step in growing such a capability. The ability to grow and maintain a high-skilled workforce is a foundational challenge for Australia that can be addressed through close examination of trailblazing public–private partnerships (PPPs) that aim to provide talent-pipeline security in the US, Taiwan and Japan. Australian governments, industry and academia can emulate and engage with the examples highlighted through case studies in this report to attract semiconductor industry investment, boost talent-pipeline development and strengthen industry R&D. Australia’s states and territories all have varied capacity to o›er support to a semiconductor-manufacturing capability.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Manufacturing, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Australia

7. Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda

Author:
Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores how the Chinese party-state’s globally focused propaganda and disinformation capabilities are evolving and increasing in sophistication. Concerningly, this emerging approach by the Chinese party-state to influence international discourse on China, including obfuscating its record of human rights violations, is largely flying under the radar of US social media platforms and western policymakers. In the broader context of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor speech, promote disinformation and seed the internet with its preferred narratives, we focus on a small but increasingly popular set of YouTube accounts that feature mainly female China-based ethnic-minority influencers from the troubled frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, hereafter referred to as ‘frontier influencers’ or ‘frontier accounts’. Despite being blocked in China, YouTube is seen by the CCP as a key battlefield in its ideological contestation with the outside world, and YouTube’s use in foreign-facing propaganda efforts has intensified in recent years. Originally deployed on domestic video-sharing platforms to meet an internal propaganda need, frontier-influencer content has since been redirected towards global audiences on YouTube as part of the CCP’s evolving efforts to counter criticisms of China’s human rights problems and burnish the country’s image. Alongside party-state media and foreign vloggers, these carefully vetted domestic vloggers are increasingly seen as another key part of Beijing’s external propaganda arsenal. Their use of a more personal style of communication and softer presentation is expected to be more convincing than traditional party-state media content, which is often inclined towards the more rigid and didactic. For the CCP, frontier influencers represent, in the words of one Chinese propaganda expert, ‘guerrillas or militia’ fighting on the flanks in ‘the international arena of public opinion’, while party-state media or the ‘regular army’ ‘charge, kill and advance on the frontlines’. The frontier accounts we examine in this report were predominantly created in 2020–21 and feature content that closely hews to CCP narratives, but their less polished presentation has a more authentic feel that conveys a false sense of legitimacy and transparency about China’s frontier regions that party-state media struggle to achieve. For viewers, the video content appears to be the creation of the individual influencers, but is in fact what’s referred to in China as ‘professional user generated content’, or content that’s produced with the help of special influencer-management agencies known as multi-channel networks (MCNs). For the mostly young and female Uyghur, Tibetan and other ethnic-minority influencers we examine in this report, having such an active presence on a Western social media platform is highly unusual, and ordinarily would be fraught with danger. But, as we reveal, frontier influencers are carefully vetted and considered politically reliable. The content they create is tightly circumscribed via self-censorship and oversight from their MCNs and domestic video platforms before being published on YouTube. In one key case study, we show how frontier influencers’ content was directly commissioned by the Chinese party-state. Because YouTube is blocked in China, individual influencers based in the country aren’t able to receive advertising revenue through the platform’s Partner Program, which isn’t available there. But, through their arrangements with YouTube, MCNs have been able to monetise content for frontier influencers, as well as for hundreds of other China-based influencers on the platform. Given that many of the MCNs have publicly committed to promote CCP propaganda, this arrangement results in a troubling situation in which MCNs are able to monetise their activities, including the promotion of disinformation, via their access to YouTube’s platform. The use of professionally supported frontier influencers also appears to be aimed at ensuring that state-backed content ranks well in search results because search-engine algorithms tend to prioritise fresh content and channels that post regularly. From the CCP’s perspective, the continuous flooding of content by party-state media, foreign influencers and professionally supported frontier influencers onto YouTube is aimed at outperforming other more critical but stale content. This new phenomenon reflects a continued willingness, identified in previous ASPI ICPC reports,1 by the Chinese party-state to experiment in its approach to shaping online political discourse, particularly on those topics that have the potential to disrupt its strategic objectives. By targeting online audiences on YouTube through intermediary accounts managed by MCNs, the CCP can hide its affiliation with those influencers and create the appearance of ‘independent’ and ‘authoritative’ voices supporting its narratives, including disinformation that it’s seeking to propagate globally. This report (on page 42) makes a series of policy recommendations, including that social media platforms shouldn’t allow MCNs who are conducting propaganda and disinformation work on behalf of the Chinese party-state to monetise their activities or be recognised by the platforms as, for example, official partners or award winners. This report also recommends that social media platforms broaden their practice of labelling the accounts of state media, agencies and officials to include state-linked influencers from the People’s Republic of China.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Social Media, Propaganda, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8. 'With a little help from my friends': capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022

Author:
John Coyne and Grace Stanhope
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The annual Australia-US Ministerial Consultations have been the primary forum for bilateral engagement since 1985. The Australian Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs will meet with their American counterparts in Washington in 2022, in the 71st year of the alliance, and it’s arguably never been so important. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is proud to release ‘With a little help from my friends’: Capitalising on opportunity at AUSMIN 2022, a report featuring chapters from our defence, cyber and foreign policy experts to inform and guide the Australian approach to the 2022 AUSMIN consultations. In this report, ASPI harnesses its broad and deep policy expertise to provide AUSMIN's principals with tangible policy recommendations to take to the US. The following chapters describe Australia's most pressing strategic challenges. The authors offer policy recommendations for enhancing Australian and US collaboration to promote security and economic prosperity. The collection of essays covers topics and challenges that the US and Australia must tackle together: defence capability, foreign affairs, climate change, foreign interference, rare earths, cyber, technology, the Pacific, space, integrated deterrence and coercive diplomacy. In each instance, there are opportunities for concrete, practical policy steps to ensure cohesion and stability.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Space
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

9. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity

Author:
Gatra Priyandita, Bart Hogeveen, and Ben Stevens
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As part of a multi-year capacity building project supporting governments in the Indo-Pacific with defending their economic against the risk of cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, ASPI analysed public records to determine the effects, the actual scale, severity and spread of current incidents of cyberespionage affecting and targeting commercial entities. In 2015, the leaders agreed that ‘no country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.’ Our analyses suggests that the threat of state-sponsored economic cyberespionage is more significant than ever, with countries industrialising their cyberespionage efforts to target commercial firms and universities at a grander scale; and more of these targeted industries and universities are based in emerging economies.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Economy, Espionage, and Commerce
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

10. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia