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1. Nobody wins unless everybody wins: The Coles review into the sustainment of Australia’s Collins-class submarines

Author:
Andrew Davies
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In 2003, Australia became the proud owner of the last of six new-build Collins-class submarines. Less than a decade later, the fleet was in a poor state of repair, and at times only one or two of the boats were available to the Royal Australian Navy. This account by Andrew Davies explains how the situation was remediated by bringing in a team of highly experienced naval professionals to take an uncompromising look at the arrangements in place to manage a vital national defence asset. Despite a public perception that the submarines were inherently defective, the problems were in fact almost entirely due to dysfunctional and often rancorous organisational dynamics between the key players. In the space of just a few years, and with remarkably little required in the way of additional funding, the situation took a dramatic turn for the better. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, Nobody wins unless everybody wins is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips and sustains its defence force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Defense Industry, and Submarines
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

2. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence budget brief 2024-2025

Author:
Bec Shrimpton
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia needs to spend more on defence—and it needs to do so immediately. The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents. The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations and this is only going to intensify. But as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s latest Cost of Defence report finds, the rhetorical urgency is not being matched by action in the form of defence investment. The May budget is the latest demonstration of this mismatch, lacking spending for swift increases in capabilities that the Australian Defence Force would need if our region were to deteriorate quickly. In particular, this year’s budget priorities are not directed towards strengthening the Australian Defence Force’s ability to fight in the next decade. This is not doom-mongering; the government has acknowledged that the warning time before any conflict, which had long been set at 10 years, has shrunk to effectively zero time. We have war in Ukraine and the Middle East, aggression and increasingly dangerous and unprofessional behaviour from China causing instability and confrontation in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, erosions of the rule of law and revisionist agendas from authoritarians. Instability is heightened by foreign interference, economic coercion and artificial intelligence-enabled dangers such as cyber attacks and disinformation. If war were to break out at any time in the next 10 years, our military would essentially fight with the force it has today. Based on current resourcing, nothing significant will change over the decade. Most of the major new capabilities in the government’s defence investment blueprint are two decades away from being fully fielded. That blueprint does contain some shorter-term enhancements, but these will not be fielded until the 2030s. The welcome $5.7 billion in new defence spending over the four-year forward estimates period is devoted to just three priorities: the AUKUS submarines, the next fleet of surface warships and investment in long-range strike, targeting and autonomous systems. But two thirds of this funding doesn’t arrive until 2027-28. The relatively impressive longer term plan leaves us vulnerable in the immediate period ahead. More money immediately is not a silver bullet, and ambition must be balanced with how much Defence can actually spend each year. But the nation’s security requires a two-pronged strategy of enhancing our existing force to meet threats within the decade while investing in long term capabilities. Other countries are furiously pursuing new capabilities that can be put into action quickly—such as creating masses of small drones and prototyping and developing new technologies. We talk about technology and asymmetric advantage—playing to your strengths and finding effective means to exploit an opponent’s weaknesses–yet we lack a credible pathway to bring them into operation to bolster the force we have today. Over the longer term, the picture starts gradually to improve. The $50 billion in additional spending over the next decade is an important commitment, even if far away. The plan for a complete recapitalisation of the surface combatant fleet will eventually give us the biggest and most capable navy Australia has had since World War Two. But, so far, we are failing to grasp the opportunity to link our traditional large platforms such as submarines and warships to more modern developments in warfare—drones and various small uncrewed and smart capabilities. AI, robotics, electronic warfare and space capabilities remain aspirational, without any pathway for inclusion and integration into a truly focused force capable of meaningful deterrence and warfighting. That is why it is so important to realise AUKUS Pillar II, which is dealing with these capabilities. It’s easy to criticise; harder to do. All governments are grappling with tight budgets amid competing demands and the unremitting expectations of voters and taxpayers. As a nation, we need to accept the need for higher defence spending. Hoping that conflict won’t come is not a viable strategy. If we are prepared for war, we have a better chance of deterring and hence averting it. Europe is living that lesson now, having put all hope in the judgment that global trade and economic entanglement would bring security. Now it is clear that military investment is imperative to deter war or best prepare nations for it. The government has a vital responsibility to speak plainly to the nation about the geopolitical risks and the possibility of conflict. We need to grasp the challenge that is in front of us today, not in three or five years’ time. Otherwise, we risk delivering on Macarthur’s famous two word warning: “The history of failure in war can almost always be summed up in two words: “Too late.” Too late in comprehending the deadly enemy. Too late in realizing the mortal danger. Too late in preparedness. Too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance.” Why take the risk of only acting after a crisis and saying better late than never? The world in turmoil demands we act in real time to both deter crises and be best prepared for them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Budget, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

3. A national strategic warning intelligence capability for Australia

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia’s strategic warning time has collapsed—in response to profound geopolitical shifts. As the ADF is adapting to the hard implications of this change, so must the national intelligence community (NIC). Australian Government decision-makers need time and insight to identify and prioritise threats (and opportunities) and devise effective responses. Strategic warning intelligence enables and empowers them to do so. But it must be done in a way that keeps up with the rapid pace of geopolitical and technological change, and a widening array of non-traditional strategic threats, and in a fashion best suited to Australia’s circumstances. To meet this need the NIC should develop a discrete, institutional strategic warning intelligence function—an Australian Centre for Strategic Warning (ACSW). This would recognise the distinct skills, analytical focus and interface with decision-making entailed—and the vital national interests at stake. In implementing an ACSW, much can be learned from our own and other intelligence communities’ ongoing efforts to adapt to threats other than invasion—notably terrorism and pandemics. This will be especially pertinent in its application to grey-zone threats such as economic coercion. Done right, an ACSW would be an important addition to the suite of Australia’s statecraft tools.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Intelligence, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Australia

4. US land power in the Indo-Pacific: opportunities for the Australian army

Author:
Marcus Schultz
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The US Army is undergoing its most consequential period of transformation since the end of the Cold War. The re-emergence of great power competition and a deteriorating strategic environment is forcing the US Army to rethink not just its approach to land warfare but also its future role alongside the US Marine Corps in key regions around the globe. In the Indo-Pacific, this doctrinal and structural transformation is informing a new approach to joint exercises and 'no gaps' defence collaboration to deter Chinese aggression. These developments hold important insights for key US allies and partners, including Australia and Japan. Australia’s new unifying strategic approach to national defence and the high degree of convergence this has with US defence strategy offers a timely window of opportunity for the Australian Army to explore the combined use of land power in a heighten threat environment. This work should be mutually reinforcing and constitute part of Australia’s approach to managing risk and threats and balancing its contributions to deterrence. This report aims to provide the Australian defence establishment and military leaders with well-considered options for engaging the US on matters of mutual interest. The report provides an overview of the US Army’s changing force posture and approach to land warfare, followed by a brief analysis of its evolving role as an essential enabler of joint force operations in a maritime environment. The report then explores the US Army’s ‘campaigning’ activities in the region and its efforts to increase allied and partner capacity for high-end military contingencies in all domains. Finally, the report highlights opportunities for the Australian Army to enhance interoperability with US land forces in a deepening US-Australia alliance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

5. An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy

Author:
Jennifer Parker
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia is a maritime nation. The sheer scale of our sovereign maritime territory and responsibilities, our dependence on maritime trade for our prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment must all be recognised in our maritime strategy. In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation. In this report, the author argues that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests. This concern isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and that domain’s significance for the nation’s prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced. In this report, the author examines whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in our strategic circumstances, as articulated in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), also requires a structural change and an expansion of the RAN. The author argues that both are needed, through both an increased surface-combatant fleet that’s designed on the principle of a balanced fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure. Such a structural review should include consideration of bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet. This report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet, noting the recent finalisation of the surface-combatant fleet review. In the light of the Australian Government’s consideration of that review’s recommendations, the report makes eight recommendations for government consideration. The author also argues that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of Australia having 10 years warning time of military conflict. That problem has become more acute today, given the new era of strategic competition and the capability and size of our potential adversaries, in particular China, as recognised in the DSR. The report recommends that a major surface-combatant fleet structure of 16–20 ships is needed.
Topic:
National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Australia

6. The Hunter frigate: an assessment

Author:
David Shackleton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Powerful and survivable large surface combatants, in numbers commensurate with the expected threat and national budgetary limitations, remain central in the order of battle of any navy of a middle-power such as Australia, but they need to be fit for purpose. Australia’s government policy has acknowledged deteriorating geostrategic circumstances since 2009, culminating in its 2020 Strategic Update where we are not left in any doubt of the concern over China’s intentions and a stretched United States. The warships Australia acquires should be suitable for the circumstances it finds itself in. Doctrine describes how the fighting will be done; policy determines which fight to prepare for. This report explores the disconnect between doctrine and policy, which has led Australia to building a warship that is unsuited for its purposes. It offers better alternatives, and suggestions to prevent being in a similar situation in the future, including using AUKUS to form a relationship with the USN to participate in its forthcoming new large destroyer program.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Navy
Political Geography:
Australia

7. Building genuine trust: A framework and strategy for Indigenous STEM and cyber pathways

Author:
Huon Curtis, Dion Devow, Khwezi Nkwanyana, Matthew Page, and Meg Thompson
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Indigenous recruitment and retention in the Australian Defence organisation is defined by a high target of 5% participation in the armed services and 3% in the Australian Public Service component of the Defence Department by 2025. The participation target is a point of pride and a source of clear goodwill and has provided momentum in several areas of Defence for Indigenous employment and pathways. However, the individual areas of success and effort are yet to translate into an effective whole-of-Defence framework with cohesive lines of effort. This policy report suggests how that can change. It provides a framework and strategy for Defence to support science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) recruitment and retention and cybersecurity careers, particularly through engagement with the vocational education and training system and through targeted relationship building with university- and school-based Indigenous STEM initiatives. We propose that Defence should enact a wider set of supporting measures—particularly in data and reporting to track professional development—that’s more likely to create more sustainable success that delivers organisational improvements and outcomes for Defence. That should include mechanisms to enhance the achievements of the Indigenous Procurement Policy. Defence must ensure that it meets its immediate skills shortfalls as well as its long-term obligations under the Closing the Gap initiative and the Defence Reconciliation Action Plan to foster genuine and meaningful relationships built upon trust with Indigenous peoples. We suggest how that’s possible through a framework and 56 recommendations focusing on 12 areas of activity: data, reporting and user-experience web design; career pathways; defence and technology contractors; community engagement; procurement and business development; veterans’ employment and procurement; the vocational education sector; universities; recruitment; retention; coordination with other public agencies; and international partnerships. Action on those recommendations will ensure that Defence is an employer of choice and fosters genuine and meaningful trust with Australia’s Indigenous peoples. And it will also build Defence’s capability to keep our nation safe and secure in a more dangerous world.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Cybersecurity, Indigenous, Recruitment, and STEM
Political Geography:
Australia

8. Delivering a stronger Navy, faster

Author:
Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Serious risks are being realised in the Royal Australian Navy’s twin transitions in its surface combatant and submarine fleets. As Australia’s strategic circumstances become more dangerous, Defence needs to adopt hedging measures to actively address the capability risks in its acquisition plans. The government’s recent announcement regarding the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) is about addressing capability risk in the long term, but with delivery of the first future submarine now delayed probably to the late 2030s, in the short to medium term the proposal exacerbates those risks.1 To address those risks, this paper details an approach that will: deliver valuable additional maritime capability to the Navy significantly earlier than the current plan; sustain, and indeed grow, the workforce that will be essential to our long-term ship and submarine plans; develop the industrial ecosystem needed for naval construction in Adelaide and nationally; and provide a timely return on the funding that the Australian government has already planned to invest in naval capability this decade without requiring additional funding.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Australia

9. Submarines: Your questions answered

Author:
Peter Jennings and Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Prime Minister John Howard famously coined the term ‘barbeque stopper’ to refer to a political controversy so hot that it was likely to make backyard diners stop mid-shrimp-sizzle to debate the big issue of the day. If ever the specialist world of defence procurement has produced a national barbeque stopper, it would be over the question of Australia’s future submarine. Why are they so expensive? Why do we need 12 of them? Why build them here? Why not nuclear propulsion? Why a French design? Why not an American, German, Japanese or Swedish design? Aren’t submarines obsolete, to be replaced by drones? Won’t technology make the oceans transparent? There are many questions and few, if any, easily accessible, plain-English explanations. This ASPI study attempts to answer the many questions that Australians pose when it comes to the design, acquisition, cost, operational service and strategic implications of submarines. Our writing team includes a vice admiral and former Chief of Navy, two rear admirals—one a distinguished submariner who has served with the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy; the other, one of Australia’s leading naval historians. Other contributors include people steeped in strategy and capability development and with deep industry experience of defence production.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Submarines
Political Geography:
Australia

10. The Bushmaster: From concept to combat

Author:
Brendan Nicholson
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This account of the Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle by Brendan Nicholson is the classic story of the ugly duckling—an ‘armoured Winnebago’—transformed swan-like into the vital lifesaver for Australian and Dutch troops on combat operations in Afghanistan. It was never designed to play that role. Based on South African and Rhodesian experiments with landmine-blast-deflecting V-shaped hulls, the Bushmaster was first conceived as a lightly armoured truck. In 1980s ‘Defence of Australia’ planning, the Bushmaster would move troops around the vastness of northern Australia pursuing ‘thugs in thongs’ bent on harassing locals. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, The Bushmaster: From concept to combat is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips its defence force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific