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41. The IAEA’s November Report on Iran: More Confirmation than Revelation

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Loehrke
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on Iran’s nuclear program in early November attracted intense media interest and stimulated strong political reactions in the United States and around the world. The IAEA report and its 14-page annex represented a milestone for the Vienna-based agency in terms of its willingness to present detailed information to the public on activities of concern in Iran’s nuclear program. The Arms Control Association provided an in-depth assessment of the IAEA report on November 8, 2011. Yet much of the subsequent press coverage has been inaccurate in its comparison of the IAEA’s latest report with past characterizations of Iran’s nuclear activities – most notably, the public summary of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate. The following Iran Nuclear Brief elucidates the similarities and differences in those two documents, incorporating an earlier article by ACA’s senior fellow, Greg Thielmann, and Benjamin Loehrke, senior policy analyst for the Ploughshares Fund, which was published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on November 23, 2011.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

42. New START Verification: Fitting the Means to the Ends

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) promises to lock in significant reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals by establishing lower ceilings on deployed weapons. The treaty’s verification provisions are means to that end--providing confidence that the sides are complying with those lower limits. Although the goal is to establish the high confidence levels maintained during the 15 years of the original START (1994-2009), the successor agreement will achieve that goal with more focused and up-to-date methods, including innovative verification provisions for deployed warhead ceilings. START’s multilayered limits and the elaborate verification measures flowing out of them were born of the Cold War. New START verification can be streamlined in accordance with the new, simplified limits and in response to post-Cold War realities. In assessing the new treaty, it is critical that verification provisions be judged by how well they fulfill their core function.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

43. New START Verification: Up to the Challenge

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The multilayered limits of the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the elaborate verification measures flowing out of them were born of the difficult negotiations conducted in the waning days of the Soviet Union. The streamlined verification measures in the New START agreement, finalized in April 2010, are an appropriate response to the replacement treaty’s specific limits, which are designed to address post-Cold War realities. Combining proof-tested measures from 15 years of START implementation with new approaches to contemporary challenges, New START verification provisions are well suited to fulfill their core function. These provisions promise to permit the same high confidence in compliance achieved when the original START was in force, but will do so with more focused and up-to-date methods, including innovative verification provisions for monitoring deployed warhead ceilings.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

44. Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Resource Guide for the 2010 Review Conference

Author:
Cole Harvey
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
This report lays out the debates surrounding this essential treaty on issues such as verification, disarmament, the nuclear fuel cycle, and others. It includes a detailed pictorial timeline of the NPT, as well key treaty-related documents. The report is a useful guide for anyone looking to deepen their understanding of this cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

45. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2009-2010 Report Card

Author:
Peter Crail
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The study, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2009-2010 Report Card gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan—each of which possess nuclear weapons—and North Korea—which maintains a nuclear weapons capability—as well as Iran and Syria, which are under investigation for possible nuclear weapons-related activity.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, France, Syria, and United States of America

46. The Case for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Author:
Tom Z. Collina and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) reduces the bloated Russian and American nuclear arsenals, while ensuring the ability of the U.S. to inspect and monitor Russian strategic nuclear forces. This report lays out the arguments in favor of New START ratification, and addresses the arguments of New START critics.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

47. To Curtail the Iranian Nuclear Threat, Change Tehran's Threat Perceptions

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, and possibly nuclear weapons, stems from its complicated threat environment and the historical grievances it harbors concerning the United States. Tehran now faces large numbers of U.S. troops in its neighbors to the west and east with few regional allies. The most productive path for averting nuclear weapons development in Iran is for Washington to seek to alter Iran’s threat perceptions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

48. Strategic Missile Defense: A Reality Check

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Strategic Missile Defense offers no real disincentive for rogue regimes such as North Korea or Iran to develop or use ballistic missiles, nor does it offer any protection against the more acute threat of terrorist groups smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the United States. Instead, the aggressive pursuit of strategic missile defense makes it more difficult to constrain the potential offensive nuclear threat from Russia and China.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and United States of America

49. Preventive Military Action: The Worst Way to Deal With Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Although the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons is a major concern for Israel and the United States, leaving the "military option" on the table is counterproductive. Preventive military action by either country against Iran's nuclear facilities would only delay, rather than halt, Tehran's nuclear program, and it would cause Iran to retaliate against the United States as well as Israel. The aftermath of such an attack would be disastrous for the U.S. position in the region-particularly for relations with Israel and with Iraq-and its position in the wider world.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and United States of America

50. Is There Time to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The Obama administration has identified September as a time for reassessing its approach to negotiation with Tehran over Iran's nuclear program. It is imperative that this reassessment is based on a realistic appraisal of Iran's weaponization capabilities and limitations and not fall prey to politically motivated hyperbole. Iran's nuclear program is undeniably bringing that country closer to an ability to construct nuclear weapons-bad news for the region, the United States, and the world. Yet, a nuclear-armed Iran is years, not months, away, which is ample time for negotiating an outcome that prevents Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state while strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America