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11. Empowering Congress on Nuclear Security: Blueprints for a New Generation

Author:
Jack Brosnan, Andrew Semmel, Nathan Sermonis, and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The global nuclear security enterprise is at a critical crossroads. While the worldwide use of nuclear and radioactive materials has grown, the issue of nuclear security has all but faded from the U.S. national conversation. As these materials become more widespread, they will be vulnerable to criminal and terrorist organizations without sufficient security efforts. This report reveals a concerning loss of congressional leadership and interest in critical efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. While the threat grows more complex, U.S. funding, oversight, and international cooperation to secure nuclear and radiological materials has diminished. By analyzing historic bipartisan initiatives and current congressional staff attitudes on nuclear security, this report offers an important blueprint to revitalize U.S. leadership through Capitol Hill. Providing recommended action items and effective strategies for engaging Congress, the report is a useful tool for both policymakers and educators.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Government, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

12. The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010–2016

Author:
Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit brought to a close President Barack Obama’s high-level initiative to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and secure weapons-usable nuclear materials. The four biannual summits from 2010-2016 played a significant role in bringing high-level political attention to the threat posed by vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world and strengthening the global nuclear security regime. As part of the summit process, states were encouraged to make national commitments, known as house gifts, to take specific actions to strengthen nuclear security. Building on this concept, the 2012 summit began the tradition of offering multilateral joint statements, known as gift baskets, in which groups of states came together to address key gaps in the nuclear security architecture. The national commitments and joint statements resulted in some of the most tangible and innovative nuclear security improvements over the course of the summit process. This report offers a comprehensive assessment of the national commitments states undertook as part of the summit process. While these commitments represent significant advances, effective nuclear security requires continuous improvement to address gaps and new threats. States must continue to build on the accomplishments of the summit process to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

13. The Complex and Increasingly Dangerous Nuclear Weapons Geometry of Asia

Author:
Greg Thielmann and David C. Logan
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
While much of the world’s attention is focused on efforts to halt the nuclear and missile tests of North Korea, the nuclear arsenals and ambitions of India, Pakistan, and China also pose significant dangers and deserve more attention. The complicated nuclear weapons geometry of Asia extends from the subcontinent to the other side of the world. While Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is designed to counter India’s conventional and nuclear forces, New Delhi measures its own nuclear weapons program against that of China. Beijing, in turn, judges the adequacy of its nuclear arsenal against the threat it perceives from the United States’ strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. And in its efforts to mitigate the ballistic missile threat from North Korea, the United States and its allies in the region are expanding their strategic and theater missile defense capabilities. In order to fully understand how the pace and direction of nuclear proliferation can be influenced, the interconnections of these countries must be considered, along with the kinds of nuclear weapons they have at their disposal.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Asia

14. Resuming Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Elizabeth Philipp
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The window of opportunity to prevent North Korea from fielding nuclear-armed ballistic missiles is closing. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea has been scant in recent years. In response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests, the United States and other countries, through actions of the United Nations Security Council and independent policies, have adopted an approach of increasing political and economic isolation. Yet, during this time, Pyongyang has improved its nuclear weapons capability quantitatively and qualitatively. The next presidential administration must prioritize reviewing and renewing Washington’s diplomatic approach to North Korea. With each successive nuclear and missile test, North Korea advances its knowledge and consolidates its capability. History has shown that it is far easier to convince North Korea to negotiate away a military capability it does not yet possess. Washington’s stated primary concern is a North Korean nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Pyongyang will achieve this capability if it is not reined in through a diplomatic agreement or understanding. Once Pyongyang achieves this status, the security balance in Asia will be disrupted and U.S. diplomats will be hard-pressed to convince North Korea to abandon the capability.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and North Korea

15. North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: How to Halt Its Slow but Steady Advance

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In the first five weeks of 2016, North Korea twice defied UN Security Council resolutions designed to stem its pursuit of nuclear weapons. On January 6, it conducted its fourth underground nuclear test; on February 7, it launched a satellite into space for the second time. These two events provided a vivid reminder that North Korea continues to make progress mastering the technology needed for developing long-range ballistic missiles and arming them with nuclear warheads. U.S. leaders have long sought to formulate and implement policies that would secure a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but these efforts have not been successful. U.S. political commentary on North Korea vacillates between taking at face value the regime’s exaggerated claims of technological prowess and reducing its leadership to cartoonish stereotypes. A clearer understanding of North Korea’s motives and the current status of its nuclear and missile programs can lead to a more realistic strategy for enhancing U.S. security. That strategy would involve using enhanced sanctions as leverage for achieving a halt in North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing and production of fissile material, but this can only happen through negotiations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, International Security, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and North Korea

16. 2016 Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament, Nonproliferation Efforts

Author:
Elizabeth Philipp and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The report, "Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2013-2016," is the third in a series that measures the performance of 11 key states in 10 universally-recognized nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear security categories over the past three years. The study evaluated the records of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea—each of which possess nuclear weapons—as well as Iran and Syria, which are states of proliferation concern.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, France, Syria, and United States of America

17. Iran Nuclear Policy Brief: An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal With Iran

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have finalized a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran that will verifiably block Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons development--the uranium-enrichment route and the plutonium-separation route--and guard against a clandestine weapons program. We assess that the final agreement will be a net-plus for nonproliferation and will enhance U.S. and regional security. This two-page Iran Nuclear Policy Brief examines the key provisions and benefits of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

18. Nuclear Cruise Missiles: Asset or Liability?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The future of U.S. and Russian nuclear cruise missiles is at an inflection point. Russia's alleged testing of a ground-launched cruise missile has jeopardized not only the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, but other bilateral nuclear agreements as well, adding further strain to the U.S.-Russian relationship. The U.S. allegation and Moscow's three counter charges should be resolved with the help of the treaty's Special Verification Commission, which was explicitly designed to deal with compliance issues. But the two countries need to take a broader look at nuclear cruise missiles. New strategic cruise missiles are part of an unaffordable drive by Washington and Moscow to simultaneously modernize all three legs of their strategic arsenals. Given the increasingly marginal role that nuclear cruise missiles play in ensuring a U.S.-Russian balance and their destabilizing impact when deployed by emerging nuclear powers such as Pakistan, it is time to consider doing away with them entirely.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

19. Breaking Down Iran’s Breakout Capacity

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As efforts intensify to bring the Iran nuclear negotiations to a successful conclusion by November 24, the issue of breakout continues to occupy center stage. Setting limits on Iran’s nuclear program to dissuade the leaders in Tehran from breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and possibly building nuclear weapons is a central objective of the P5+1 powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Consideration of the effect of agreed limits on the time it would take Iran to build nuclear weapons is, therefore, a necessary step in formulating the P5+1 negotiating position, but is not sufficient for navigating the appropriate course toward a comprehensive agreement. Relying on the narrow definition of the term “breakout”—obtaining enough weapons-grade uranium gas for one bomb—does not fully capture the path that would have to be traveled. It is also necessary to consider “effective breakout”—the time needed to build a credible nuclear arsenal—in order to ensure that the proper balance between verification and limitations can be achieved.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

20. A Win-Win Formula for Defining Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Capacity

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiators prepare to resume talks over Iran's nuclear program, they face a formidable task: to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by November 24. Perhaps the most difficult issue Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) must resolve is how to define the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program. To achieve a win-win outcome the two sides must develop a creative, technically sound formula that increases the time it would take for Iran to enrich uranium to weapons grade, while still providing Tehran with a modest program that allows domestic production of enriched uranium to contribute to fueling future civilian reactors and allows research and development to advance centrifuge technology. In collaboration with the International Crisis Group, the Arms Control Association has developed a proposal to define Iran's uranium enrichment program in a manner that meets the fundamental concerns of both Tehran and the P5+1. The proposal is the product of feedback from a number of technical and political experts. While this may not be "the solution" to the enrichment puzzle, the proposal offers constructive options for the negotiators to consider.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East