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1. Arms Control Tomorrow: Strategies to Mitigate the Risks of New and Emerging Technologies

Author:
Shannon Bugos
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Over recent years, the topic of new and emerging technologies with military applications has ignited a dynamic debate among defense officials, political leaders, diplomats, policy experts, and technical experts. This report provides an overview of the potentially destabilizing effects of several new and emerging technologies and their respective military applications. It aims to provide decision-makers with a better understanding of how to mitigate the risks and reduce the chances that a major power conflict or confrontation escalates to the nuclear level through a range of arms control and risk reduction measures. This report focuses on six significant, distinct emerging military capabilities: hypersonic weapons systems, direct offensive cyberoperations, offensive counterspace capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled capabilities, drones, and lethal autonomous weapons systems. This report distills information and ideas from a series of workshops, involving dozens of technical and policy experts in each technology area, that the Arms Control Association conducted in 2021 and 2022. It identifies four overarching themes that highlight the greatest concerns over how the military employment of new and emerging technologies might increase the risk of nuclear weapons use. Increasing the pace of conflict. Increasing uncertainty. Reducing the human role. Incentivizing arms racing. This report identifies near-term risk mitigation measures that are likely achievable now or within the next five years: crisis communications systems, definition establishment, norms, unilateral declarations and actions, and confidence-building measures. This report also outlines long-term measures that are achievable within the next 10 years or beyond: arms control and risk reduction arrangements (e.g., treaties, agreements) that involve more than one country and are more formal than confidence-building measures, although not necessarily legally binding.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Risk, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability

Author:
Michael T. Klare
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
RESEARCH & REPORTS Increasingly in recent years, advanced military powers have begun to incorporate and rely on new kinds or new applications of advanced technologies in their arsenals, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, cyber, and hypersonics, among others. The weaponization of these technologies may potentially carry far-ranging, dangerous consequences that expand into the nuclear realm by running up the escalation ladder or by blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear attack. Arms control, therefore, emerges as a tool to slow the pace of weaponizing these technologies and to adopt meaningful restraints on their use. This report examines four particular new kinds or new applications of technologies— autonomous weapons systems, hypersonic weapons, cyberattacks, and automated battlefield decision-making—and proposes a framework strategy aimed at advancing an array of measures that all contribute to the larger goal of preventing unintended escalation and enhancing strategic stability.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Instability, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Reinforcing the Global Norm Against Chemical Weapons Use

Author:
Julia Masterson
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In recent years, the global norm against chemical weapons use has eroded, and it is critical that responsible states take action to reinforce it. Systematic violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the malign use of chemical agents have continued for nearly a decade without adequate accountability. These incidents risk growing in severity and becoming more widespread for as long as the issue remains unaddressed. Reinforcing the norm against chemical weapons use necessitates a unified global effort to utilize all CWC provisions and to strengthen the consequences that violators face under the treaty and in accordance with international law.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Law, Weapons, Norms, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Nuclear Challenges for the New U.S. Presidential Administration: The First 100 Days and Beyond

Author:
Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Upon taking office, the new presidential administration of Joseph Biden will confront a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Tensions between the world’s nuclear-armed states are rising; the risk of nuclear use is growing; billions of dollars are being spent to replace and upgrade nuclear weapons; and key agreements that have kept nuclear competition in check are gone or are in serious jeopardy. The situation has been complicated by the neglect and poor policy choices of President Donald Trump and his administration. Over the past four years the Trump administration made nearly every nuclear policy challenge facing the United States worse. Fortunately, Biden has a long and distinguished track record when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons-related security issues. Unlike his predecessor, Biden possesses a strong personal commitment to effective nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament that dates back to his early days in the Senate and continued through his last days as vice-president under President Barack Obama. In this analysis we have outlined what we believe to be the five most important sets of nuclear weapons policy challenges and decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days and beyond, along with recommendations for effectively dealing with each of these policy challenges: Reviving and Advancing the Nuclear Arms Control Enterprise Reducing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Excess Stabilizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jump-starting Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy with North Korea Restoring U.S. Leadership on Multilateral Nonproliferation and Disarmament If pursued, these actions and decisions would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons. These initial steps would also put the administration in a better position to pursue more lasting and far-reaching nuclear risk reduction and elimination initiatives over the next four years.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, Denuclearization, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

5. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2016-2019 Report Card

Author:
Alicia Sanders-Zakre and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
This new report is the fourth in a series that assesses the extent to which 11 key states are fulfilling, promoting, or undermining 10 standards identified as critical elements of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Collectively, states fared worse on the majority of criteria when compared with the prior edition covering the 2013–2016 period.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry Into Force

Author:
Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
More than two decades after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. The nuclear testing taboo impedes the development of new and more advanced nuclear warhead designs, which helps prevent dangerous nuclear competition, and maintain international security. Although the CTBT has created a norm against testing and a robust technical organization responsible for the operation and maintenance of a highly sensitive global nuclear test monitoring system, the treaty has not entered into force due to the failure of eight key states, including the United States and China, to ratify. The CTBT is and will continue to be an essential pillar in the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament enterprise. Moving closer to the goal of the CTBT’s formal entry into force is the task of every CTBT state party, every nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) state-party, every state that supports the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and any other state that considers itself a “responsible” nuclear actor. But in order to realize the full potential of the treaty and to close the door on testing, friends of the CTBT will need to rejuvenate and update their efforts to achieve its entry into force and reinforce the taboo against nuclear testing.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. The Future of the ICBM Force: Should the Least Valuable Leg of the Triad Be Replaced?

Author:
Ryan Snyder
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the replacement program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s. A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure) on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035. Many have questioned the need for this program, including former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs. The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars), while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion. This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars). Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget. Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs. The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s cost-effectiveness and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Missile Defense, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

8. The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010–2016

Author:
Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit brought to a close President Barack Obama’s high-level initiative to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and secure weapons-usable nuclear materials. The four biannual summits from 2010-2016 played a significant role in bringing high-level political attention to the threat posed by vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world and strengthening the global nuclear security regime. As part of the summit process, states were encouraged to make national commitments, known as house gifts, to take specific actions to strengthen nuclear security. Building on this concept, the 2012 summit began the tradition of offering multilateral joint statements, known as gift baskets, in which groups of states came together to address key gaps in the nuclear security architecture. The national commitments and joint statements resulted in some of the most tangible and innovative nuclear security improvements over the course of the summit process. This report offers a comprehensive assessment of the national commitments states undertook as part of the summit process. While these commitments represent significant advances, effective nuclear security requires continuous improvement to address gaps and new threats. States must continue to build on the accomplishments of the summit process to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

9. The Naval Nuclear Reactor Threat to the NPT

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has long been a critical bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons. Although preventing the production and accumulation of fissile material is an important part of this effort, the NPT does not explicitly regulate the production, use, and disposition of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for naval nuclear reactors. This exclusion poses a growing risk to achieving the nonproliferation goals of the treaty. While seeking to advance prospects for a fissile material cutoff treaty, the United States is continuing to design naval reactors for the world’s largest nuclear submarine fleet that are powered with weapons-grade uranium. While proclaiming its renunciation of any nuclear weapons ambitions, Brazil plans to build six nuclear submarines powered by uranium fuel that may be close to weapons grade. Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor important NPT member states have fully confronted the proliferation implications of excluding naval reactor fuel from safeguards. The IAEA and NPT members should take steps to minimize the use of HEU for any reason—a goal they declared just this month at a nuclear security conference in Vienna.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Brazil, Global Focus, and United States of America

10. CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects

Author:
Arms Control Association
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has already helped to bring an end to nuclear testing, reduced nuclear arms competition, and improved global capabilities to detect and deter nuclear testing in the future. But until the CTBT enters into force, the door to renewed testing is still open. Entry into force requires ratification by a handful of key states. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), ACA organized a high-level conference on the CTBT in Vienna, Austria involving senior government representatives and leading technical experts. The participants reviewed the progress of the CTBTO and the International Monitoring System, examined the role of the CTBT in advancing disarmament and curbing proliferation, and evaluated the obstacles and pathways to the Treaty’s entry into force. This conference report includes formal conference presentations and summarizes the discussions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Political Geography:
Global Focus