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1. South Sudan’s peace process stagnates as violence grips Greater Upper Nile region

Author:
Stefan Bakumenko
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In September 2024, South Sudan’s government postponed elections until 2026.1 This and other violations of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) reinforce the country’s deep divisions and continued, widespread violence.2 After a devastating civil war (2013-2018), politicians, generals, and communities have lacked a unifying identity or incentive and have focused on shoring up their political power, undermining their rivals, and diversifying their economic holdings. As South Sudan’s oil fields dry up, wealth and sustenance are carved out wherever they can be found, often violently.3 The central government in Juba deprives national institutions of funding, neither state nor rebel forces are committed to integrating into a unified military, and state officials at all levels exploit their positions to fund expensive lifestyles and large patronage networks.4 Politicians have long plundered South Sudan’s main source of wealth, its state-owned oil company, Nilepet, to fuel their wars and wealth, and the country remains economically destitute.5 Across South Sudan, violence has become more geographically dispersed as armed groups have fractured. Between 1 January 2013 and the signing of R-ARCSS on 12 September 2018, there were conflict events in 718 distinct locations, compared to 1,720 between 13 September 2018 and 17 January 2025 (see maps below). Given these realities, the peace process could hardly address South Sudan’s myriad, local-level contests over borders, resources, and political positions.6
Topic:
Elections, Violence, Armed Conflict, and Peace Process
Political Geography:
Africa and South Sudan

2. India — Expert Comment: Kashmir attack stokes tensions along the India-Pakistan Line of Control

Author:
Pearl Pandya
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 22 April, separatist militants fired at tourists in the resort town of Pahalgam in the Kashmir Valley, killing at least 26, including one foreign national. This was the deadliest attack on civilians in nearly two decades, and a rare attack against tourists, who have thus far been largely spared from separatist violence.1 Local reports attributed the attack to The Resistance Front (TRF), believed to be an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Islamist separatist group.2 While the group has focused its activities against Indian security forces, ACLED data show the TRF’s involvement in at least 21 attacks targeting civilians in Kashmir since the group’s founding in 2019. Similar to Tuesday’s attack, non-Kashmiris and Hindus have borne the brunt of the TRF’s violence.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Violence, Separatism, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, and Kashmir

3. The Violent Politics of Bangladesh’s 2024 Elections

Author:
Pearl Pandya
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Elections in Bangladesh have historically been marked by violence between the country’s two dominant political parties, the ruling Awami League (AL) and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The upcoming elections scheduled for 7 January are no different. Violence has already been on the rise in the months leading up to the elections, in which Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will seek re-election for the fourth consecutive term. Much of the recent unrest has centered around concerns about the AL’s ability to hold a free and fair election. The BNP has called for the formation of a neutral caretaker government to administer the elections. The AL has rejected this demand, giving way to increased BNP-led demonstration events1 that have often turned violent. The BNP’s decision to boycott the elections, motivated by its misgivings over the election process, suggests that the results are likely to be contested, increasing the risk of post-electoral violence. As the AL looks set to hold onto power, violence within the party is also cause for concern. Competition for power among AL factions can be seen in post-election periods as rivals seek party and government appointments.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Violence, Political Parties, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and South Asia

4. Q&A: The Worsening Trend of Violence in Papua New Guinea

Author:
Deborah Alois
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On Sunday, 18 February, intertribal violence in the remote Highlands of Papua New Guinea resulted in the death of at least 49 people. This is the worst death toll in an escalating cycle of violence and political unrest in the past year. In this Q&A, Deborah Alois, ACLED’s Pacific region researcher based in the capital, Port Moresby, suggests that the trend will likely persist.
Topic:
Violence, Tribes, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific and Papua New Guinea

5. Between violence, geopolitical competition, and the quest for social justice: Chad’s road to elections

Author:
Valerio Colosio
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Following three years of transitional government since President Idriss Déby’s assassination, Chad will hold presidential elections on 6 May amid tight political controls by the incumbent leader. In this guest contribution, Dr. Valerio Colosio examines political violence in Chad through two generations of Déby rule and whether the election will confirm the status quo or trigger some deeper transformations, in a moment of big geopolitical changes in the Sahel.
Topic:
Elections, Geopolitics, Social Justice, Violence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, Chad, and Sahel

6. Gang violence in the Caribbean reaches farther than Haiti

Author:
Sandra Pellegrini
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In recent years, Haiti has made headlines for unprecedented levels of gang violence, with gangs increasingly challenging state authorities and expanding their grip over the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and beyond, which exerts a heavy toll on civilians. Yet, this worsening security situation is not confined to Haiti; other countries and territories in the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago, have experienced a surge in gang violence amid their fragmented and volatile gang landscapes.
Topic:
Violence, Gangs, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Latin America, Caribbean, and Haiti

7. Two Years Of Repression: Mapping Taliban Violence Targeting Civilians in Afghanistan

Author:
Asena Karacalti and Elliott Bynum
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 17 August 2021, two days after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban held a press conference promising amnesty for former government officials, respect for women’s rights, and freedom of the press.1 Nearly two years later, it is clear that the Taliban has upheld none of these promises, instead conducting a violent campaign of repression. Since the takeover, the Taliban has targeted former government and security officials, carried out collective punishments in areas where anti-Taliban groups have emerged, and imposed ultraconservative societal restrictions – especially on women and journalists – aimed at maintaining control. ACLED records over 1,000 incidents of violence targeting civilians by the Taliban between the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021 and 30 June 2023, accounting for 62% of all attacks on civilians in the country. This places the Taliban regime in Afghanistan2 among the world’s top government or de facto state perpetrators of violence targeting civilians domestically since August 2021, behind only the military junta in Myanmar. As Taliban rule reaches the two-year mark, this report examines patterns of violence targeting civilians under the regime, with particular attention to the top four most targeted groups: former government and security officials, prisoners, women, and journalists. Taken together, the Taliban’s retaliatory attacks, use of collective punishment, and broad crackdown on women and the press reveal the scale and severity of repression ongoing in Afghanistan. In particular, this report analyzes the continued targeting of former government and security officials, as well as violence against civilians in the country’s northeast, where armed anti-Taliban groups have been active. Both former officials and resistance forces are subject to violence when detained by the Taliban, accounting for a large number of incidents of prisoner abuse recorded by ACLED. Moreover, this report highlights persistent violence against women who oppose a return to the “gender apartheid” of past Taliban rule.3 Women have responded to increased restrictions on their daily lives by holding protests against Taliban policies, with demonstrations featuring women4 nearly doubling in 2022 compared to 2021. Finally, the report concludes with an accounting of attacks on journalists, who remain among the most targeted groups in the Taliban’s Afghanistan – creating further challenges for documenting violence in the country under the new regime.
Topic:
Human Rights, Taliban, Women, Violence, Journalism, Civilians, and Collective Punishment
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

8. Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)

Author:
Sandra Pellegrini and María Fernanda Arocha
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is a Mexican criminal group that emerged as a splinter group of the Milenio Cartel – one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s allies – after the capture of its leader in 2009 led to internal divisions.1 Initially, the group operated as an armed wing of the Sinaloa Cartel. As part of this alliance, it engaged in a deadly turf war against Los Zetas in Veracruz state, where the group stood out for its use of violence and involvement in numerous massacres.2 Under the leadership of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, also known as El Mencho, the CJNG grew as an independent organization and one of the most powerful actors in Mexico’s criminal underworld. Rivaling its erstwhile ally, the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG turned from an armed wing into a complex drug-producing and trafficking structure, which supplies markets across the globe.3 It has diversified its activities and sources of income, relying on extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, illegal mining, and oil theft,4 such as the capture of the avocado and oil trade in Michoacán and Guanajuato states.5 To support its growth and international ambitions, the CJNG has expanded its presence to at least 27 of Mexico’s 32 states.6 The presence of the CJNG has often driven increased violence at the local level, notably in areas of territorial dispute with other criminal groups.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violence, Organized Crime, and Cartels
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

9. Deadly Rio de Janeiro: Armed Violence and the Civilian Burden

Author:
Bhavani Castro and Julia Links Franciotti
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The public security situation in Brazil is complicated, and particularly in Rio de Janeiro state, which has high levels of violence and criminality. The presence of multiple different criminal groups fighting for territory, coupled with abusive government measures to tackle criminal activity, has created a deadly, high-risk environment for civilians in the state. In 2021, Rio de Janeiro registered 27 violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, a rate lower than states like Bahia and Ceará but significantly higher than the national average of 22. Rio de Janeiro also ranked first among Brazilian states in the number of deaths recorded during police interventions, with at least 1,356 people reportedly killed.1 In May 2021, for example, a police operation against drug traffickers in the Jacarezinho community in Rio de Janeiro city resulted in 29 reported fatalities. While authorities claimed that all those killed in the operation were linked to criminal groups, witnesses reported that police officers entered civilian houses and carried out extrajudicial executions.2 The Jacarezinho operation was the deadliest single event recorded by ACLED in Brazil in 2021. A year later, in May 2022, military and federal police forces clashed with the Red Command (CV) in the Vila Cruzeiro community in the Penha Complex, resulting in at least 26 reported fatalities, including civilians. These are not isolated incidents, but rather indicative of the increasing lethality of violence in Rio de Janeiro in 2021 and 2022, and the rising threat to civilians.
Topic:
Crime, Elections, Violence, Civilians, Militias, Gangs, and Public Security
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and Rio de Janeiro

10. Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Violence targeting civilians has increased by 38% in Mali so far this year. The main perpetrators of these attacks are JNIM (over 180 events, 33%), Malian state forces and/or the Wagner Group (nearly 160 events, 29%), and IS Sahel (nearly 90 events, 15%). Battles and attacks have spread to new locations in northern Mali amid joint military and Wagner Group operations and the resumption of hostilities with Algiers Accord signatory armed groups. JNIM has also launched a new offensive, carrying out a series of large-scale attacks on military positions and imposing blockades on towns and major transit routes. Overall, in the wake of successive military coups promising to improve security across the region, political violence levels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have together increased by 5% relative to the same period last year, and by 46% compared to 2021.
Topic:
Security, Violence, Coup, Civilians, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali