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1. Value for money?

Author:
Ronald Makanga Kakumba and Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Governments rely on tax revenue to finance investments in human capital, infrastructure, and public services for their citizens. The quality of government services and a country’s development can be jeopardized if taxes are not collected, are squandered, or are misappropriated by the government. According to statistics from the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), about 2.6 million Ugandans were registered taxpayers as of September 2022, but only about 1 million Ugandans are actively paying taxes (Kayiwa, 2022; Oketch, 2021). Analysts attribute the low tax-revenue collections to inadequate administrative capacity, weak checks and balances, and a lack of social norms for tax compliance, among other factors (Lakuma & Lwanga, 2017). Even so, during the 2021/2022 financial year, the URA collected 21.7 trillion Ugandan shillings (UGX) (USD 5.9 billion), its highest-ever revenue collection, reflecting a 12% increase over the previous year. This amount fell just short of the target of UGX 22.4 trillion (Wanyenze, 2022). However, there is little cause to celebrate, for several reasons.
Topic:
Corruption, Public Opinion, Tax Systems, and Revenue
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

2. Brutality and corruption undermine trust in Uganda’s police: Can damage be undone?

Author:
Ronald Makanga Kakumba and Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The police are responsible for enforcing the law, preventing crime, maintaining public order and security, and protecting people’s lives and property. Yet Uganda’s police have often been criticized for brutality meted out against the very citizens meant to be under their protection. Since 2008, more than 100 civilians have reportedly been killed by Ugandan security officers, while many more have suffered injury, harassment, and abuse, often during protests and recently during aggressive enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions (Taylor, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2021, 2022; Guardian, 2021; 2022). Uganda’s national media also continues to report countless cases of repression by the police, particularly against journalists, political activists, and political opponents. Yet accused officers regularly go unpunished; critics contend that laws and provisions regarding the use of force by police officers in Uganda are lax and protect the police (Kiconco, 2018; The Law on Police Use of Force, 2022), and that internal accountability mechanisms such as the police disciplinary courts, regional police courts, and police council have fallen short of their intended objectives (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006)
Topic:
Corruption, Public Opinion, and Police Brutality
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

3. Can cities cope?

Author:
Francis Kibirige, John Martin Kewaza, Ronald Makanga Kakumba, Stevenson Ssevume Male, Muhammad Ssenkumba, George William Kayanja, Fred Male, and Pius Tibaingana
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
On 1 July 2020, less than a year before January 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, Uganda’s minister of local government, acting under the Local Governments Act and with the approval of Parliament, elevated 10 of the 15 earmarked municipal councils across the country to city status (Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, 1997, 2020). City status, equal in stature to district local government status, is the highest level that local government units can attain under the current law and is synonymous with near-autonomy, including significant political influence and more control over resource mobilisation and use. Residents in the newly elevated city environs celebrated this administrative milestone amid surging expectations of immediate upgrades of public-services infrastructure and jobs. But the respective administrations awoke to the realities of over-stretched, outdated services infrastructure, and inadequate funding incapable of meeting the heightened level of demand. Can these new cities fulfil their mandate – even in the face of COVID-19-related impacts on the economy and personal living conditions – and cope with soaring public expectations? Evidence from the 2022 Afrobarometer survey suggests that it will not be easy, as the public mood, engagement with elected local leaders, and public service-delivery ratings are on the decline while mistrust, perceptions of official corruption, and resentment toward paying taxes are on the rise.
Topic:
Education, Health, Governance, Leadership, Institutions, Social Services, and Public Service
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

4. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Party System, Multi Party System, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

5. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

6. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Multi Party System, Partisanship, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

7. Willing to kill: Factors contributing to mob justice in Uganda

Author:
Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Mob justice is a form of extrajudicial punishment or retribution in which a person suspected of wrongdoing is typically humiliated, beaten, and in many cases killed by vigilantes or a crowd. Mob action takes place in the absence of any form of fair trial in which the accused are given a chance to defend themselves; the mob simply takes the law into its own hands (Ng’walali & Kitinya, 2006). Mob justice is not only criminal but also amounts to a violation of human rights (Uganda Human Rights Commission, 2016). Over the past decade, Uganda has seen a significant rise in the number of cases of mob justice. According to the Uganda Police Force’s (2013-2019) annual crime reports, 746 deaths by mob action were reported and investigated in 2019, compared to 426 in 2013, a 75% increase. “Mob kills 42 in 7 weeks,” the Daily Monitor (2019) reported in March 2019, citing police figures – an average of six lynchings a week. Homicides by mob action in Uganda occur mainly in response to thefts, robberies, killings, and reports of witchcraft (Uganda Police Force, 2018). According to the 2015 Afrobarometer survey in Uganda, one in six Ugandan adults said they took part in mob justice during the preceding year or would do so if they “had the chance.” This suggests that mob justice is not just a fringe problem in Uganda but commands attention and requires collective action. Why would a substantial number of Ugandans resort to taking the law into their own hands as an alternative form of “justice”? Analysts have pointed to a number of factors that might contribute to a willingness to engage in mob justice. One is a lack of trust in the formal criminal justice system to administer fair and timely justice. A 2005 study in Uganda showed that mob actions were often motivated by widespread suspicion or misunderstanding of the justice system, especially concerning the procedure of police bail, under which suspected culprits can be temporarily released before the court process (Baker, 2005). A study in southern Nigeria also reported that a lack of trust in the police was one of the motivations for the alarming incidence of “jungle justice” (Obarisiagbon, 2018). Research has also shown that personal victimization by crime can have a lasting impact on attitudes toward the police, the courts, and the criminal justice system overall (Berthelot, McNeal, & Baldwin, 2018; Dull & Wint, 1997; Koenig, 1980; Sprott & Doob, 1997), as can negative personal experiences with the courts (Olson & Huth, 1998; Kanaabi, 2004). Amid Uganda’s surge in mob justice, Afrobarometer findings tell us that popular trust in the police and courts has been declining while citizens’ perceptions of corruption in these criminal justice institutions has been rising. Statistical analyses show that a lack of trust in the police is associated with a willingness to engage in mob justice, while perceived corruption undermines trust and thus indirectly contributes to a willingness to join others in mob actions. Further, our analysis finds that being a victim of crime (physical assault), encountering problems in the court system, finding it hard to obtain police assistance, and having to pay a bribe to police or court officials are factors that make people more likely to say they would take part in mob action against suspected criminals. Based on these findings, we offer recommendations to mitigate Uganda’s growing problem of mob justice.
Topic:
Human Rights, Courts, Police, Justice, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

8. Slowly growing or stunted? How Delivery of Electoral, Political, and Economic Goods Impacts Support for Democracy in Uganda

Author:
Francis Kibirige
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
After nearly a decade of growth, popular demand for democracy in Africa has shown signs of weakening (Mattes & Bratton, 2016; Lührmann et al., 2017; Cheeseman, 2017)). In Uganda, recent Afrobarometer survey data show that although citizens’ preference for democracy consistently outstrips their perception of how much democracy they’re actually getting, satisfaction with the way their democracy works is on a decade-long slide. In survey responses, Ugandans’ preference for democracy fluctuates around election years, increasing before and decreasing after general elections. At the same time, the disparity between popular preference for and satisfaction with democracy, defined in this paper as the “democracy satisfaction gap,” is growing, from 5 percentage points in 2000 to 34 percentage points in 2017. These patterns pose a number of questions, including what causes popular preference for democracy to fluctuate around election years and whether indeed Ugandans understand and appreciate democracy. Survey data suggest that Ugandans have grown in their knowledge of democracy with the passage of time (Mattes, Kibirige, & Sentamu, 2010). Similarly, the proportion of Ugandans who are “committed democrats” – meaning they prefer democracy over any other form of government and consistently reject authoritarian rule – has increased sharply, although women, less educated citizens, and rural residents lag behind in this group. Our analysis suggests that a preference for democracy is stronger among citizens who perceive the quality of Uganda’s elections as poor, those who are dissatisfied with the government’s delivery of political or economic goods, those who believe strongly in democratic values, and those who are more cognitively engaged in civic and political life.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Governance, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

9. To pay or Not to Pay? Citizens’ Attitudes towards Taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa

Author:
Merima Ali, Odd Helge Fjeldstad, and Ingrid Hoem Sjursen
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper examines factors that determine citizens’ tax-compliance attitude in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and South Africa. Using the 2011/12 Afrobarometer survey data, we find that tax-compliance attitude is positively correlated with the provision of public services in the four countries. However, the correlation depends on the specific service in question and differs between countries. Tax knowledge and awareness are found to be positively correlated with tax-compliance attitude. On the other hand, frequent payment to non-state actors in exchange for security and individual’s perception that their own ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government are negatively correlated with tax-compliance attitude.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Citizenship, Tax Systems, and Social Services
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Africa, South Africa, and Tanzania