America's ongoing battles in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted limitations in our understanding of the complexity of modern warfare. Furthermore, our cultural prism has retarded the institutionalization of capabilities needed to prevail in stabilization and counter-insurgency missions.
On February 6, 2009, CNA China Studies and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University convened a panel discussion on China's sixth defense white paper, which had been released by Beijing on January 20, 2009. The following are the main observations that emerged from that roundtable.
The conflict in Mexico between the government and criminal drug cartels has been in the news lately, particularly because of the horrific levels of violence and its proximity to our border. The U.S. Government is increasingly concerned, and President Barack Obama has turned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for options to provide timely support to Mexico. But the “cartel war” in Mexico, which is increasingly spilling into the United States, is just the latest, most visible indicator of steadily deteriorating civil order south of the border.
Topic:
Crime, Terrorism, War on Drugs, Counterinsurgency, and Narcotics Trafficking
Christopher J. Lamb, Matthew J. Schmidt, and Berit G. Fitzsimmons
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent case study for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon's approach to developing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities. MRAPs first gained prominence for their ability to protect U.S. forces from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and because the Pentagon did not deploy them en masse to Iraq until almost 5 years of fighting had passed. More recently, following extraordinary efforts to field more than 10,000 MRAPs quickly, the program has been criticized as wasteful and unnecessary.
“A'historic economic downturn has put at stake the prosperity that underpins our strength while putting at risk the stability of governments and survival of people around the world. We're threatened by the spread of the world's deadliest weapons, by emerging cyber threats, and by a dependence on foreign oil that endangers our security and our planet. Poverty, disease, the persistence of conflict and genocide in the 21st century challenge our international alliances, partnerships and institutions and must call on all of us to reexamine our assumptions. These are the battlefields of the 21st century. These are the threats we now face. And in these struggles, the United States of America must succeed and we will succeed. We also know that the old approaches won't meet the challenges of our time. Threats now move freely across borders and the ability to do great harm lies in the hands of individuals as well as nations. No technology, no matter how smart, can stop the spread of nuclear weapons. No army, no matter how strong, can eliminate every adversary. No weapon, no matter how powerful, can erase the hatred that lies in someone's heart.”
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and International Security
David R. Mayhew examines U.S. presidential elections from 1788 through 2004. He highlights the importance of incumbency advantage. He concludes that in-office parties have kept the White House two-thirds of the time when they have run incumbent candidates, but they have fared only 50-50 in open-seat elections.
Ethan B. Kapstein argues that in recent years a growing number of activists, scholars, and policymakers have claimed that the global economy and, specifically, the current international trade regime have been ''unfair'' to the developing countries. He concludes that, while the trading system can hardly be considered a level playing field for each and every state, fairness considerations do appear to play a role in shaping trade agreements.
John A. Gentry discusses the nature of U.S. intelligence “failures” He argues that excessive expectations for the performance of intelligence agencies mean that many charges of intelligence failure are misplaced and many reform proposals are misdirected. He concludes that policymakers and policy-implementing agencies often cause intelligence-related failures.
American society, it is now frequently stated, is more politically polarized than at any time in recent memory, and a prominent front in the ideological battle between left and right is foreign policy. Most notable is, of course, the war in Iraq, but divisions between Republicans and Democrats over the proper definition of the national interest have been a feature of the post-Cold War era since its inception. Democrats and the left direct most of their ire at the neoconservatives who, they argue, have masterminded America's grand strategy since the terrorist attacks of September 2001. This partisan conflict, a genuine ideological difference, has somewhat distracted from divisions within the right. Neoconservatives have also faced significant criticism from other factions within the Republican Party. Condemnation from both traditional conservatives and isolationists has been as strident and vicious as that of the left. This raises the question of whether there is any common set of fundamentals that defines the right's foreign policy in the United States, and if not, why these subgroups are considered to be on the same side of the political spectrum.
Byong-Kuen Jhee analyzes Korean public attitudes toward the United States and whether and how voters' anti-American perceptions affect their electoral choices. He concludes that the surge of anti-Americanism in Korea may have a marginal impact on the country's existing favorable relationship with the United States.