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21. Turkey’s Changing Posture on Russia and America

Author:
Hasan Unal
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
As of this writing, tensions between Russia and Ukraine appeared to continue unabated, despite the Putin‑Biden online meeting and the exchange of several messages between Washington and Moscow aimed at reducing them. The crisis has kept almost everyone guessing as to where all this is heading: will they subside or spiral out control? Will Russia invade Ukraine? If it does, how will America and its allies respond? As things stand at present, it sure seems as though Russia and the U.S. and its allies have gridlocked themselves into a crisis without any sensible way out. The former was emboldened by the feckless handling of the crisis by the Biden Administration such that Moscow now wants to dictate terms to America and NATO that amount to something like this: “give us proper, preferably written assurances that Ukraine and Georgia will not be admitted to NATO.” Team Biden, which has inadvisably goaded Ukraine against Russia for a second time in less than a year with its much‑hyped ‘America is back’ slogan cannot simply comply with the request. At the same time, America cannot stand up to Russia militarily in that part of the world. Moreover, neither the United States nor its NATO allies that have considerable military clout are prepared to make a promise to Ukraine regarding admission to NATO. Indeed, just as this edition of Baku Dialogues was going to press, the hectic diplomacy between NATO and Russia on the one hand and the U.S. and Russia on the other, climaxing in the latest meetings of 11‑12 January 2022, broke up with no agreement. This has given rise to further concern that the ongoing conflict is going to perpetuate. From Turkey’s perspective, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has turned insoluble— akin in not unimportant ways to the Turkish‑Greek dispute, with its clusters of psychologically combustible elements freely circulating across the board. Should Russia invade Ukraine, it would presumably trigger a harsh package of sanctions by both the EU and the U.S.; this would likely hurt Moscow considerably, albeit hardly enough to budge it from staying the course. Should the U.S. and NATO simply give in to Russia’s ultimatum, then this would amount to a complete surrender of the Western powers— particularly after the disastrous U.S. debacle in Afghanistan. At the same time, the likelihood that Russia will step back entirely from its position—that, in other words, it will calmly accept the prospect of the admission of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO—is close to zero. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the one hand, and the U.S.‑led West and Russia on the other, will perpetuate.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

22. Terms, Conditions, Intersecting Interests Turkey and Regional Cooperation After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Ayça Ergun
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This essay should be understood as a series of reflections on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War and how this has provided Turkey with a great opportunity to revisit, redefine, and even consolidate its newfound role and mission in the region. It is predicated on the assessment that, starting in July 2020, Turkey became more proactive and involved in the region, which in turn laid the foundation for a game‑changing development; Turkey’s stature then grew even further in the wake of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War. Now Ankara is taking on a balancing role—if not quite a mediating one—in the region. The situation is not straightforward: the well‑consolidated empowerment of the Russian Federation in the wake of the war has ensured its continuing status as the main mediator in conflict resolution as well as open the possibility for it to become a genuine peacemaker. Turkey is considered the main balancing power to potentially check or restrain Russia’s dominant position, at least down the road. But for now, Russia can be considered as “being fully back” on the ground: its armed forces are present in each of the three South Caucasus states—by invitation or otherwise. This lends a certain pallor of instability to the newly achieved status quo, although this is not widely recognized, much less pronounced in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. It is thus too early to speak about full‑on regional integration, which will take time to bring about. Yet already today there is potential for the realization of regional cooperation. The ideas related to the latter are being discussed in various fora, yet the feasibility of the implementation of these ideas remains open to interpretation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

23. Achieving Full Resolution to the Karabakh Conflict

Author:
Steven J. Klein
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Azerbaijan’s decisive de­feat of Armenia in the Second Karabakh War is certainly cause for optimism that any remaining issues be­tween the two countries can be resolved through diplomacy rather than military might. After all, Azerbaijan managed to re­cover all the territories outside the Karabakh enclave captured and occupied by Armenia since the 1990s—as well as parts of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast itself—in addition to forcing Armenia to withdraw all its troops from sovereign Azerbaijani terri­tory. However, past indisput­able successes in other conflicts indicate that Azerbaijan must be careful not to overestimate its capabilities to translate the recent military triumph into full resolution of the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. While it is tempting to declare the conflict over and to talk strictly of post‑conflict construction and development, a handful of coun­tries have painfully learned that such declarations can be prema­ture. For instance, in August 1982 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin predicted that the immi­nent defeat of the Palestine Liber­ation Organization (PLO) in Leb­anon portended 40 years of peace; and in May 2003 U.S. President George W. Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” after ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Both of these declarations came back to haunt the respective countries that had believed they had put behind them the conflict at issue. The crucial element that both of the aforementioned leaders had missed was that they did not control completely the fate of the conflict they chose to treat as being resolved. In Israel’s case, the PLO relocated to Tunis, from where it was able to rebuild its power base and receive support from the Soviet Union, while Hezbollah—which didn’t even exist at the time of the defeat of the PLO in 1982—arose with the sup­port of Iran to become a much more formidable and menacing force in southern Lebanon than the PLO had been. In the case of America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the re­sulting power vacuum allowed nu­merous external forces to enter the picture and disrupt the plans of the United States. Moreover, corruption and disorganization within the gov­ernments established with American help contributed to the deterioration of stability in the region.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

24. Spotlight on Normalization Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Wake of the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Gulshan Pashayeva
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
More than half a year has passed since the end of the Second Karabakh War and the signing of the Mos­cow‑brokered trilateral statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, and the President of the Russian Federation on a complete ceasefire and a ces­sation of all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict. These developments have ended the almost 30‑year‑long illegal Armenian occupation, restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. They have also contributed to the ultimate implementation of nu­merous decisions and resolutions adopted by various international organizations, including four resolutions of the UN Security Council (822, 853, 874, and 884) demanding the immediate, com­plete, and unconditional with­drawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani ter­ritories. At the same time, a new political reality has emerged in the region as a result of the war. This has brought about at least seven implications:
Topic:
Conflict, Peace, Normalization, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

25. Winning the Peace Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Reintegration Challenges

Author:
F. Murat Ozkaleli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The Karabakh conflict was not resolved peacefully. Decades of unfruitful negotiations held under the aus­pices of the Co‑chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (France, Russia, and the United States) produced no dip­lomatic solution. The 30‑year‑long stalemate ended when Azerbaijan re‑gained its occupied territories with a decisive military victory after 44 days of fighting. After the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity in conformity with four UN Security Council resolutions. Formally, Azerbaijan’s sover­eignty over all Karabakh was re­stored through the signing of a tri­lateral settlement that was reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia on November 10th, 2010, with Russia being the facilitator and third signatory. The settlement, which is more than a conventional truce but less than a full peace agreement, ensured the return of the remaining five occupied Azerbaijani areas immediately. A five‑kilometer‑wide corridor con­necting Armenia to Karabakh was opened through Lachin, with con­trol granted to a newly‑established Russian peacekeeping force, which also took over control of Khan­kendi and some surrounding areas populated by ethnic‑Armenians. Despite some delays, the trilat­eral settlement is being enforced and the Armenian occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territo­ries came to an end in early 2021. Other provisions of the settlement, such as the establishment of the free movement of all Azerbaijani persons, services, and capital to the region, is to follow.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, and Reintegration
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

26. Georgia After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The outcome of the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly trans­formed the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, with im­plications for the wider Black Sea‑Caspian region. The unsettled political geography of the South Caucasus and the ethno‑political separatism fueled by external actors since the early 1990s left bleeding wounds on the bodies of the newly re‑emerged sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These conflicts have determined the trajectory of the geopolitical developments of the region for the last 30 years, including on the for­eign policy orientations of these new states. The conflicts in the South Caucasus were the primary challenge for transforming the strategic assets of this region into greater political and economic success. Three major conflict areas in the South Caucasus were former autonomous regions, created in the early Soviet period: Nagorno‑Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, what was called South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s as a name for the newly created autonomous area in Georgia, popu­lated by Ossetians alongside ethnic Georgians. The historic homeland of Ossetians is located to the north of the Greater Caucasus mountains. Following the Soviet tradition of planting ethno‑political time bombs, Ossetia proper—located in the Russian Federation—was named North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali region of Georgia—with the Ossetian population at the time concentrated in the border areas with Russia—was named South Ossetia.) As of today, all three of these areas are self‑proclaimed indepen­dent states, are formally ruled by de facto governments, and saw fierce military confrontation in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region became the battleground between Russian and Georgian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan regained through a combination of military action and diplomatic brinksmanship all seven regions outside of Nagorno‑ Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenia, as well as one‑third of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh region. In the case of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, as of mid‑2021, these ter­ritories remain, in reality, governed by Russian occupational forces. The Russian military influence was in­serted into Karabakh after the war that ended on November 10th, 2020, with Russian peacekeepers playing an increasing role in the governance of the region. In terms of geopolitical orienta­tion, Armenia willingly allowed Russian troops onto its territory, seeing them as a security guar­antee and deterrent against Azer­baijan. Georgia aligned itself with the Western powers, determined to join NATO and the EU. The conflicts on Georgian territory are seen as punishment from Russia for Georgia’s pro‑Western focus. As a result, there has been a heavy Russian military presence in the separatist areas of Georgia since the Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

27. Azerbaijan’s Pathways After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Laurence Broers
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
n the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan stands at a critical moment in its history. The war has re­solved many of the issues driving Azerbaijani grievances over the last three decades. Yet it leaves others both unresolved and entangled within a new regional configura­tion that more than ever hinges on the interactions of external great powers and the fractured local politics of the South Caucasus. The regionalization of the Armenian‑Azerbaijani conflict— meaning its transition to a Russian‑Turkish condominium— ultimately links the conflict to the vagaries of what Pavel Baev and Kemal Kirişci call the “serpentine” relations between Moscow and Ankara in the era of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. The conflict is now one link in a string of conflict theatres where Russia and Turkey are involved, and across which Moscow and Ankara may negotiate trade‑offs that have little to do with the in­terests of local parties. To be sure, Azerbaijan’s closeness to Turkey assuages concerns over Russian in­fluence for now. And the strategic, rather than tactical, outlook on Azerbaijani‑Turkish partnership means that few in Azerbaijan be­lieve that Turkey would ever engage in trade‑offs that cross Azerbaijani red lines. This belief is reflected in the experience of the Turkish‑ Armenian “football diplomacy” normalization initiative that took place in in 2008‑2009. Nevertheless, while the Armenian‑Azerbaijani conflict is now seen by many in Azerbaijan as resolved, it has in fact been re­packaged and embedded in a new, highly complex, and unpredict­able web of linkages.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan

28. From Struggle to Permanent Failure Why the Karabakh Attempt at Secession Failed

Author:
Azer Babayev
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
After 44 days of fighting, the Second Karabakh War came to an end on 10 November 2020 as a result of a Russian‑brokered ceasefire agree­ment. The most important questions here appear to be: what led to this dangerous military escalation, and what does it mean for the conflict, given that it seems to have now entered into a (new) political phase, again? In the declining Soviet Union, what was originally a status dispute over the autonomous Nagorno‑Karabakh region escalated into an international violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Following the end of a bloody war in 1994 (the First Karabakh War, 1992‑ 1994), a fragile situation around the conflict region took root: the “frozen conflict,” as it came to be known, lasted for nearly three decades and led to conditions of neither war nor peace. And during this period, it was feared that the longer the sides had to wait for a peace agreement to be reached, the more likely the conflict would re‑escalate and even­tually erupt again into a hot war. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened: an all‑out six‑week war erupted again unexpectedly between the conflict parties in late September 2020, and, as a result, the Armenian side more or less capitulated. But first things first: in the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan suffered a major defeat, ceding to Armenian forces not only the secessionist region itself but also seven surrounding territo­ries. These other lands were, as a whole, twice the size of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself and contained five times the old oblast’s population, the entirety of which was expelled by the time an armistice was signed in 1994. And that is why during this war the UN Security Council re­sponded by passing four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Arme­nian forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. However, the UN res­olutions failed to have any effect. Since that time, no international protagonists felt a strong, compelling need to try to resolve the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. In addition, all in­ternational actors dismissed the idea of “power mediation.” Moreover, although Russia as a key international actor is directly involved in all the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, its involvement in the Nagorno‑Karabakh dispute has been rather indirect: in the Karabakh case, Moscow has been both a critical and a questionable actor. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a central position in me­diating a peaceful settlement to the conflict while, on the other hand, it has been delivering weapons to both sides. This last represents perhaps the most striking situation regarding the international dimension of the con­flict. Russia is militarily allied with Armenia and has a military presence in the country. It has provided secu­rity guarantees to Yerevan, primarily through their shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which neu­tralized to a certain extent the poten­tial effects of Russian arms being sold to financially strong Azerbaijan on a purely commercial basis.
Topic:
Security, War, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

29. Hydrocarbon Energy Complexes Central Eurasian Keystone Triangles

Author:
Robert M. Cutler
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The editorial statement of Baku Dialogues posits a certain geographic defini­tion of what is called the “Silk Road Region,” namely “the geographic space looking west past Anatolia to the warm seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down around in the direction of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent.” When I served on the Executive Board of the Central Eurasian Studies Society 20 years ago, its website provided a lengthy but useful geographic definition of “Central Eurasia.” This definition included “Turkic, Mongolian, Ira­nian, Caucasian, Tibetan, and other peoples in a broad area that geo­graphically extends from the Black Sea region, the Crimea, and the Caucasus in the west, through the Middle Volga region, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and on to Siberia, Mongolia, and Tibet in the east.” To clarify the term “Black Sea re­gion,” which appears in that defini­tion, I adopt the European Union’s characterization of that region as stretching from Romania and Bul­garia, through northern Turkey and on to Georgia, but including only a thin coastal strip some 20‑60 kilo­meters wide within the EU itself, in­cluding the Danube delta. From that definition, it would follow that the Silk Road Region is largely em­bedded in Central Eurasia. The name “Central Eurasia” was sometimes used in the 1990s as a shorthand for the 15 former So­viet republics together (Russia in­cluded), but this usage has faded away. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not assure the even­tual geoeconomic consolidation of Central Eurasia, but the condi­tions for that consolidation have now been established. This has oc­curred thanks to the confluence of international financial and indus­trial interest in the region’s energy resources, the political will of the United States (the only remaining superpower), and the freedom and rapidity of networked information exchanges made possible by the internet.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Regionalism, and Silk Road
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

30. The Strategic Benefits of the Southern Gas Corridor

Author:
Vitaliy Baylarbayov
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
At the end of 2020, the Southern Gas Corridor became fully operational. This marked the completion of a journey that began a decade ago when the government of Azerbaijan and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) took a strategic decision to launch a major natural gas export project. The Southern Gas Corridor is one of the largest and the most expen­sive gas supply projects in the world built to date. In December 2013, SOCAR and its partners signed a Final Investment Decision (FID) to establish a gas pipeline corridor from Azerbaijan through Georgia, Turkey, Greece, and Albania be­fore ending in Italy. A branch pipe­line is now under construction to Bulgaria, which is expected to be completed in the second half of 2021. In July 2018, the project supplied its first gas to the Turkish market and went on to change the dynamics of that country’s gas market, whereby Azerbaijan is now one of its top gas suppliers. On December 31st, 2020, inaugural commercial gas supplies arrived from the Caspian into Europe, signaling the commencement of the Southern Gas Corridor’s full operations. For Azerbaijan, the Southern Gas Corridor provides a major source of revenue unlinked to the global oil market; the project also strengthens Baku’s links with its neighbors and Europe. For SOCAR—as operator of components of the project and investor in all its segments—the project’s success represents a major step in the company’s transition from a national to an international energy company. The Southern Gas Corridor provides new gas supplies to Turkey, Georgia, and Europe and is a platform for in­creased supplies to these markets and also can be extended to reach additional markets in Europe. With the completion of the first stage of the Southern Gas Corridor, Azerbaijan and SOCAR, together with their partners, are examining strategies for the next phase of the corridor’s development.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Azerbaijan