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441. The Consequences of COVID-19: Reduced Chances of Achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development?

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the second in a series of papers analysing the ways COVID-19 is affecting stability across the world, this paper explores how the pandemic has affected the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and undermined progress towards global economic, social and political stability. The COVID-19 pandemic is a major setback on the path towards achieving the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 ASD), making the challenge even greater for international organisations, governments and all relevant stakeholders. Moreover, when the health crisis hit, progress towards development goals was already patchy. The impacts of the pandemic and the consequences of the lack of progress in certain areas are mutually reinforcing, and require a combination of immediate responses to the damage done by COVID-19 and broader, longer-term efforts aimed at increasing resilience to future crises of similar proportions.
Topic:
United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

442. The COVID-19 pandemic: Scenarios to Understand the International Impact

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 spread around the world in a matter of a few short months in 2020. Its long-term effects, as well as the ultimate duration and severity of the pandemic itself, are marked by deep uncertainty. While it is too early to forecast the consequences of COVID-19 with precision, it is possible to systematically explore plausible trajectories for the medium-term future. This research paper uses scenarios to address the following question: what could be the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global political, economic and military balance of power over the course of the next five years? The paper focuses on six clusters of drivers of change to build scenarios. In the realm of politics, the two clusters are governance and geopolitics. The governance cluster straddles the divide of domestic and international politics, combining social cohesion in societies, populism as a political force, the role of the state, nationalism and state capacity. The geopolitics cluster focuses on aspects of international leadership and alliances. In the economic arena, clusters formed around the themes of economic reordering and recovery. In the former, regionalism, protectionism, supply-chain dynamics and Chinese technological leadership are considered. In the latter, the pace of the recovery is set in the context of employment, public debt, finance and energy issues. In the military realm, drivers relating to armed conflict and to military posture were combined to form clusters. The armed-conflict cluster considers projections for threat perceptions, major-power war, conflict among middle powers and intra-state violence. Military posture is captured by examining issues around force projection, the digitisation of armed forces, defence-industrial dynamics, strategic stability and the role of nuclear weapons. Scenarios in this paper are not designed to predict the future, but they are meant to help bound the range of possible futures for which decision-makers may need to prepare. In the scenario Silver Linings, geopolitics in 2025 are characterised by cooperation and the recession of domestic governance challenges. The economic recovery was swift and comprehensive, and although the pandemic modified aspects of globalisation its basic tenets remained intact. Armed conflict of the inter-state and intra-state kind has declined, and military postures are increasingly driven by advanced technologies and a smaller number of overseas operations. In the Downfall scenario, a weakened societal fabric has generated governance challenges at home and geopolitics are characterised by conflict. Economic recovery following the collapse triggered by the pandemic remains slow and incomplete, and economic reordering leads to the fragmentation of pre-existing international ties at the state and commercial levels. Great-power war has become a realistic probability and growing state fragility brought about by the pandemic leads to an increase in armed conflict. The scenario Lost in Transition is full of countervailing forces introducing challenges and a sense of instability. In the realm of politics, the geopolitical situation is marred by conflict, but domestic governance structures are not particularly challenged. Economically, recovery is slow and there are attempts to decouple − leading to bifurcated economic activity − with each strand led by China and the United States respectively. Militarily, new alliances emerge but a key concern is the near-perfect storm that the pandemic has created for security and stability in Africa. The scenario Home Alone outlines a future world in which the economic recovery is highly uneven. Attempts to generate momentum for renewed international cooperation fail as great-power rivalries intensify – however, the European Union emerges as a more confident geopolitical actor. Globalisation is disrupted by a drive to create regional and local supply chains and China forces a bifurcation of production for some sectors. Armed conflict linked to state fragility increases markedly, while the ability and willingness of international actors to provide humanitarian assistance and crisis-management resources fall dramatically. The pandemic itself is an event of world-shattering proportions. Yet many of its political and military implications are likely to be evolutionary in nature. In the period considered here, the potential for radical change (and a break with past practice and assumptions) is perhaps greatest in the economic realm. Furthermore, the scenarios can be helpful in recognising courses of actions that appear to be robust in the sense that they would appear to yield beneficial results across a range of alternative futures. Of course, even ‘future history’ marches on and it will remain crucial to consider the impact of unfolding events to maintain a sense of the direction of travel. The scenario implications will be useful to policymakers seeking to identify particular developments that may be desirable or undesirable. This will in turn facilitate discussion about the levers available and the extent to which such developments can be influenced. The most important point to take away from a European perspective is that across the scenarios a coherent and cohesive Europe is a prerequisite to exploit opportunities and avoid becoming, if not the battleground, than at least the playground for the political and economic policies of others.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

443. COVID-19 and the battle against poverty in the Southern Cone

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the third in a series analysing the ways COVID-19 is affecting stability across the world, this paper explores how governments in the Southern Cone of Latin America have responded to the devastating impact of the pandemic on poverty and social indicators in the region. The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a huge human, economic and social toll in Latin America − and the Southern Cone in particular − against a backdrop of high levels of informality and urbanisation, underdeveloped social-security nets, and fragmented and underfunded healthcare systems. Despite fiscal constraints, most countries in the Southern Cone have been quick to adopt fiscal-stimulus packages to mitigate the impact of the economic downturn on the most vulnerable. Countries with pre-existing, effective social-safety nets have proven more successful at fighting pandemic-induced poverty. Looking beyond the immediate measures, the pandemic has highlighted the need to address poverty in a durable way in the region. This can be achieved in part by establishing more sustainable development models that emphasise inclusivity.
Topic:
Poverty, Social Services, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South America, Latin America, and North America

444. The Strategic and Geo-economic Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 will have enduring effects on geopolitics and geo-economics in the Middle East, the Gulf and beyond. In this IISS Manama Dialogue 2020 Special Publication we explore the regional and global implications of the pandemic, including essays on Gulf defence economics, global and great-power politics, the Gulf states’ development models, strategy and geo-economics.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

445. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

446. The impact of COVID-19 on organised crime in the Western Balkans

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The fourth in a series analysing the ways COVID-19 is affecting stability across the world, this paper explores the impact on organised crime in the Western Balkans of the health and economic crisis brought about by the pandemic. Criminal organisations active in the Western Balkans have proved very apt at exploiting the evolution of the pandemic and related government responses to expand their activities regionally and globally. The key role played by the European Union in recent times to promote the rule of law and institutional reforms against organised crime in the region is at risk of setback given its limited economic firepower post-COVID-19 and China’s increasing influence through its economic and investment diplomacy. Law-enforcement agencies will struggle to prevent criminal groups from further infiltrating the region’s economies amid increasing budgetary constraints. Western Balkans governments should use the current challenging circumstances as an opportunity to redefine medium- and long-term priorities in their efforts against organised crime. However, for these efforts to be successful, the sustained political and operational support of other countries will be needed, given the expanding international reach of regional criminal groups.
Topic:
Political stability, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

447. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

448. Promoting and Projecting Stability: Challenges and Perspectives

Author:
Amanda Lapo, Bastain Giegerich, and James Hackett
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The ambition to promote stability and foster peace in an increasingly volatile security environment is an established element of EU and NATO policy. There is a risk that the coronavirus pandemic will increase the demand for stabilisation measures while at the same time complicating their supply. This paper focuses on the role that military and security actors can play in supporting stabilisation efforts. The ambition to promote stability and foster peace in an increasingly volatile security environment is an established element of European Union and NATO policy. This ambition is also reflected in many of their member states’ national-level policy and strategy documents. The direction and implementation of these policies are influenced by a range of motivations including security worries, humanitarian concerns and historical ties. Stability is a challenging endeavour at the best of times, and there is a risk that the coronavirus pandemic will increase the demand for it while at the same time complicating its supply.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Political stability, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

449. After the Trump “Peace Plan”: One-State Solution is the Only Way Forward

Author:
Diana Buttu
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Last month, a Palestinian think tank, the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, revealed its survey results following the release of the Trump/Netanyahu plan. In announcing the results, Dr Khalil Shikaki, the head of the polling centre, noted that 94 percent of Palestinian respondents opposed the plan: “I don't think we've ever seen such a level of consensus among the Palestinian public,” he said. These results are unsurprising, of course, as the Trump/Netanyahu plan effectively seeks Palestinian approval for Israeli land theft, ethnic cleansing and continued subjugation. But alongside the results of the question pertaining to the Trump/Netanyahu plan was a more important question: “Do you support the two-state solution?” A mere 39 percent of surveyed respondents answered affirmatively, while 37 percent indicated that they support a one-state solution. These results should be placed in their proper light: for more than two decades, as the Palestinian leadership and the international community have repeatedly called for the implementation of the two-state solution, increasing numbers of Palestinians have moved away from this view and increasingly supported one state, even though there is not a single Palestinian party – whether inside ‘48 borders or in the occupied territories – advocating for it. In fact, Palestinian leaders and the international community both espouse the common view of decrying the concept of one state and adamantly holding that “There is no Plan B.” The reason for this steadily increasing Palestinian support for one state has both everything and nothing to do with the Trump/Netanyahu plan. This plan makes clear that it aims to ensure that Palestinians will never have a state and instead remain forever under Israel’s boot. But it isn’t just the Trump plan. Over time, Palestinians increasingly have seen that the version of “two states” that the international community will support – and indeed press for – is not the version of two states that Palestinians demand. To the contrary, while the world spoke of a two-state settlement, Palestinians witnessed a tripling of the number of Israeli settlers living on their land. The international community appears content with allowing Israel to build and expand settlements, while at the same time allowing it to demolish Palestinian homes and schools and imprison Palestinians into cantons. This approach condones Israel holding our economy hostage and mercilessly besieging the Gaza Strip, with only the mildest, mealy-mouthed international condemnations. The world community has blocked attempts to press for a condemnation of Israeli settlements in the International Criminal Court and has, in some cases, criminalized support for boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS). Even the European Union has been loath to uphold its trade agreement with Israel, under which Israeli settlement products should be labelled separately and should not benefit from free trade status. It has become clear that while the international community speaks of wanting a two-state settlement, it has shown itself wholly unwilling to do anything to make that happen. As someone who participated in the peace negotiations, I observed that a state for Palestinians was the furthest thing from the Israeli public and political leadership’s thinking. Instead, they were concerned with how to forever contain and control Palestinians, and how to maintain longstanding international community support in this endeavour. In short, the concept of two states has become devoid of all meaning, with the focus instead on form – whether labelled as a “state” and however dysfunctional and lacking any of the powers that actually define a state. This increasing realization has led many Palestinians to abandon the statehood project. This may sound like a defeatist position or the expression of frustration. Indeed, over the years, we have heard PLO leaders threaten to abandon the two-state project and, separately, threaten to dissolve the Palestinian Authority. Some support for one state is undoubtedly borne of that feeling. But not all. To be clear, my support for one state grew not from the futility of negotiations – even though they were indeed futile – but from a sense that the approach was incorrect. The attempt to divide land simply modelled the power structures I was attempting to fight – economic and political structures that aim to maintain Israeli power and control over Palestinians lives. Therefore, rather than focus on land – where Israel always has an advantage –, the focus should be on people and how we, as people, should live. The time has come to look to a model that focuses on equal rights for all, irrespective of religion; a model which seeks reconciliation and not separation and where people are protected and not viewed as subjects of control or, in the case of refugees, of wholesale and heartless exclusion. Today Israel and the occupied territories function as one territory, with rights and privileges granted to some and not to others. There are no separate border crossings for “Palestine” and no separate Palestinian currency. Yet Palestinians, including Palestinian citizens of Israel, are denied the same rights and privileges as Israeli Jews. I am under no illusion that achieving this equality will be easy. Power is never voluntarily given up by those who wield it but taken through pressing for rights. Palestinians will be better able to break down the system of ethnic-religious privilege that plagues Palestinians (a similar system ruled apartheid South Africa) by getting to the root cause – that of Zionism, a nationalist project that favours one group over another –, by pushing for BDS and for accountability internationally and by challenging racist Israeli laws. In short, we can and must create a just system for all, irrespective of whether we demand one or two states. History demonstrates that ethnic privilege ultimately fails in a multi-ethnic world. And given that Palestinians and Israelis are fated to live together, the real question is whether we will continue to allow this system of ethno-religious privilege to prevail or whether we will press for equality, irrespective of religion. Borders, flags, and currencies can wait.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Borders, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

450. After the Trump “Peace Plan”: Two Perspectives on Palestinian Options

Author:
Diana Buttu and Mouin Rabbani
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The “Peace Plan” presented by Trump and his administration as the ultimate solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been overwhelmingly rejected by Palestinians and their leadership. But what comes next? What strategy should Palestinians adopt? These two papers, written by two leading Palestinian analysts, lay out two distinct approaches for attaining Palestinian rights and aspirations. Diana Buttu argues that it is time for Palestinians to push for a one-state solution focusing on equal rights for all, while Mouin Rabbani contends that a one-state approach will not succeed given the current power dynamics and, therefore, favours a renewed Palestinian strategy to preserve the pre-Trump international consensus focused on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and a just resolution of the refugee question.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Borders, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine