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2021. Safeguards-by-Design for Advanced Nuclear Systems

Author:
Lance Kim
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The emergence of an advanced nuclear industry has renewed the pursuit of small modular and advanced reactor technologies to supply low carbon energy. By the same token, these developments potentially expose gaps in current safeguards practices, particularly for reactor designs utilizing novel coolants and fuel forms–underscoring calls for the early application of Safeguards-by-Design to effectively and efficiently detect diversion and misuse. Other innovations may necessitate additional measures to credibly assure the absence of undeclared activities. This paper discusses three types of advanced nuclear and nuclear-related technologies as illustrations of these challenges: 1) micronuclear reactors, 2) molten salt reactors, and on the balance-of-plant side, 3) thermal energy storage and dry cooling. It then identifies high-level safeguards development needs associated with these on-the-horizon technologies so as to elevate safeguards considerations in the minds of reactor developers and investors.
Topic:
Science and Technology and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2022. The Ramifications of Rouhani's Re-election

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Summary of Findings 1. Rouhani’s Re-election Seen as Endorsement of His Foreign Policy and JCPOA, Not Revolutionary Change There is no consensus among Iranians about what type of mandate Rouhani was given by the 57 percent of Iranians who voted to give him a second term. Fewer than 12 percent offered the same answer when asked an open-ended question. When presented with alternative interpretations, large majorities agree that Rouhani's re-election means that most Iranian people approve of his foreign policy and the nuclear deal he negotiated with the P5+1 countries. They disagree with the assertion that his re-election means most people disapprove of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, or that they want religion to play a lesser role in policy making. 2. Approval of Nuclear Deal Increased during Presidential Campaign, Despite Disappointment with its Economic Benefit After steady declines in enthusiasm for the JCPOA prior to the May 2017 presidential election, approval of the agreement rose during the election process. Two in three Iranians approve of the agreement, while about a third oppose it. The agreement divides those who voted for Rouhani from those who did not. While eight in ten Rouhani voters approve of the deal, only four in ten of those who voted for Raisi approve of the agreement. Two years since the signing of the agreement, majorities believe that Iran has not received most of the promised benefits and that there have been no improvements in people’s living conditions as a result of the nuclear deal. A plurality thinks that the agreement for Iran to purchase passenger airplanes from the United States will likely have little impact on Iran’s economy. Still, there is some optimism that the deal will eventually improve people’s living conditions. 3. U.S. Seen as Actively Obstructive, Contrary to Commitment under JCPOA Most Iranians lack confidence that the United States will live up to its obligations under the JCPOA. They believe either that the United States is finding other ways to keep the negative effects of sanctions that were lifted under the deal, or that the United States has not even lifted the sanctions it was supposed to lift. A growing majority also believes that contrary to the terms of the agreement, the United States is trying to prevent other countries from normalizing their trade and economic relations with Iran. While a majority still express some confidence that other P5+1 countries will abide by the agreement, most say Europeans are slow in investing and trading with Iran primarily due to fear of punishment by the United States. 4. Majority Support Retaliation if U.S. Abrogates JCPOA Iranians expect President Donald Trump to be more hostile toward Iran than was former President Barack Obama. Seven in ten Iranians believe it likely that Trump may decide not to abide by the terms of the nuclear agreement. Attitudes about how Iran should respond if the United States violates the JCPOA have hardened: A clear majority now thinks that instead of taking the matter to the UN, Iran should retaliate by restarting the aspects of its nuclear program it has agreed to suspend under the JCPOA, if the United States abrogates the deal. A large majority see the new sanctions that Congress is likely to impose on Iran as being against the spirit of the JCPOA, with half saying it would violate the letter of the agreement as well. 5. No Appetite for Renegotiating the Nuclear Deal with Trump Large majorities say that Iran should refuse to increase the duration of the special nuclear limits it accepted under the JCPOA, or to terminate its nuclear enrichment program, even if offered more sanctions relief in return. 6. Majority Opposes a Halt to Missile Testing, Even in Return for More Sanctions Relief Over three in five say that Iran should continue testing ballistic missiles despite U.S. demands for Iran to halt such tests and find the proposition that Iran reduce testing missiles in return for the lifting of more sanctions unacceptable. Two thirds reject the notion that Rouhani’s re-election means most Iranians oppose testing of missiles by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 7. Greater Support for Self-Sufficiency An increasing majority think Iran should strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency rather than focusing on increasing its trade with other countries. Six in ten say current changes in the world make it necessary for Iran to have a president who will stand up for Iran’s rights and refuse to compromise. Majorities reject offering various steps in exchange for more sanctions relief—steps such as Iran reducing its missile testing, or recognizing Israel, or ceasing its aid to the Syrian government and Hezbollah. Rejection of these steps is significantly lower, though, among those who think the nuclear deal has improved the living condition of ordinary Iranians. 8. Economy is Seen as Bad, and Reducing Unemployment is Given the Highest Priority Large majorities say Iran’s economic situation is bad, and less than a quarter think the economic condition of their family has improved over the last four years. Half think that the country’s economic situation is getting worse. Eight in ten say reducing unemployment should be a top priority for Rouhani in the next four years. 9. Rouhani Seen as Successful in Foreign Policy, not in Reducing Unemployment Majorities see Rouhani as being successful in improving Iran’s relations with other countries and getting international sanctions on Iran lifted. Majorities also see his re-election to mean that most Iranians approve of his foreign policy and the JCPOA. In fact, the nuclear agreement is regarded as Rouhani’s most important accomplishment during his first four years in office. Rouhani, however, gets low marks on the unemployment situation in Iran. Six in ten say he has been unsuccessful in reducing unemployment and half say he has thus far failed to improve the economy. 10. Rouhani's Reelection was Not Certain until Ghalibaf Left the Race Election polls were quite accurate in predicting the outcome of the election. Pre-election polls suggested that if Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had been Rouhani’s main opponent rather than Raisi, the election results would have been much closer. After the second presidential debate, Rouhani was ahead of Ghalibaf by less than 6 percentage points, while his lead over Raisi was more than 20 points. While an overwhelming majority of Raisi supporters said that if Raisi pulled out they would vote for Ghalibaf, less than half of Ghalibaf supporters said they would vote for Raisi if their candidate pulled out. Indeed, when Ghalibaf pulled out of the race nearly half of his supporters switched to Rouhani and helped him pass the 50 percent threshold. 11. Turnout Helps Rouhani About a quarter of those who said they rarely vote in Iranian presidential elections reported that they voted in the May 2017 election, and seven in ten said they voted for Rouhani. Large majorities believe that both the Guardian Council and the Interior Ministry were fair and impartial as they fulfilled their election-related responsibilities. About five percent, however, say that they went to their voting stations but for one reason or another were not ultimately able to cast their ballots. 12. Rouhani and Zarif's Popularity Increase after Re-Election, but General Soleymani is Most Popular Political Figure The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is the most popular politician in Iran, with President Rouhani coming in second. Although Rouhani’s popularity increased somewhat during the recent election, it is still substantially lower than the first time he ran for office and after he signed the JCPOA. 13. Post-election Terrorist Attacks: ISIS Seen as Primary Culprit, but Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States Likely Helped A large majority of Iranians thinks that ISIS conducted the June 7 attacks in Tehran. Most Iranians also think that Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States probably provided guidance or support to the perpetrators. 14. Strong Support for Fighting ISIS, but Not for Collaboration with U.S. The June 7 attacks seem to have increased support for Iran playing a more active role in the Middle East. More than eight in ten call increasing Iran’s security a top priority; seven in ten say this about fighting ISIS and increasing Iran’s influence in the region. A growing majority of Iranians support their government helping groups that are fighting ISIS, although the number that favors sending troops has remained roughly constant. Two in three support Iran sending military personnel to Syria to help the Assad government against armed Syrian rebels, including ISIS. Support for Iran and the United States collaborating with one another to help Iraq’s government counter ISIS is at its lowest, with an increasing majority saying they would oppose such cooperation. 15. Views of P5+1 Countries Majorities regard Russia, China, and Germany—half of the P5+1—favorably, and the other half—the U.S., France and Britain—unfavorably. While six in ten believe that most P5+1 countries (but not the United States) will fulfill their obligations under the JCPOA, views toward all the Western powers that took part in the JCPOA negotiations are now less positive. Though a majority believes that Iran’s relations with European countries have improved as a result of the deal, only a quarter say that about the United States. Still, far from showing implacable hostility toward the West, a majority continues to think it is possible for the Islamic world and the West to find common ground.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Elections
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

2023. KEDO: How Multilateral Cooperation Helped an Unprecedented North Korean Project

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang promised to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid and improvement of relations with Washington. An international consortium led by the United States was created to implement the key provisions of the deal, including the delivery of two light water reactor (LWR) units. While multi-national efforts are common in commercial nuclear projects, the case of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was unique. KEDO’s challenges ranged from the lack of diplomatic relations between its main members and North Korea, to the country’s poor infrastructure. This paper examines KEDO’s experience and concludes that cooperation among its member states—Japan, South Korea, the United States and others—helped ensure the project’s financial and political feasibility, even if work did not proceed smoothly. While the construction of the LWRs was never completed due to larger political changes, KEDO’s experience offers lessons for future nuclear projects that face similar hurdles. EXPLORE:
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2024. International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Agreements

Author:
Nilsu Gören and Theresa Hitchens
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Cybersecurity transcends national boundaries in many ways: The internet’s technical infrastructure is global in scope; threat actors based in one country can disguise their identities by taking control of computers in other countries; global businesses sell software, hardware, and security services that may introduce or combat vulnerabilities; and the consequences from a disruptive attack can spread far beyond the initial victim. Even the most cyber-savvy country cannot protect itself completely unless it wants to disconnect from the global internet and strictly limit who can use information technology and for what purposes inside its own borders. And this course of action is infeasible because it would result in dire consequences for the national economy, military, and all other systems that depend on advanced information technology. International cooperation to improve cybersecurity is a much more realistic and viable path. Information sharing is the most commonly promoted type of international cooperation, but very little is known about what type of cybersecurity information is currently being shared with whom, for what purposes, and under what conditions. As a first step towards answering this larger question, the International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Project undertook to survey, catalog, and analyze publicly available government-to-government cybersecurity-related sharing agreements to determine what types of information various governments have committed to share, and to identify gaps in information sharing. The ultimate aim of the larger project is to assess how multilateral cybersecurity sharing practices can be encouraged and improved in order to strengthen global cybersecurity. The project team started from the assumption that formal cyber sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoU) are an important part of the foundation for the development of norms on cyber cooperation. Over the past several years, various international fora have reiterated that sharing information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities, national approaches to cyber protection, best practices, incidents of concern, and response mechanisms could increase mutual cybersecurity while reducing risks of misunderstandings and conflict. Different types of information sharing can be used to improve cybersecurity in various ways. By sharing threat perceptions and national policies, states can better understand each other’s concerns and priorities. By conducting multilateral exercises and sharing best practices for protection of networks, critical infrastructure, and software/hardware, states can help each other ensure safe data transfer across borders. Cooperation to build capacity in states with weaker infrastructure for managing the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) can help in identifying threats and responding to crises. This research found that cybersecurity information agreements are more numerous, but less specific than anticipated. The project documented and analyzed 196 agreements involving 116 different countries and 2,349 signatures. Extensive signature of agreements and associated commentary shows widespread accord on the principle that information sharing is necessary. However, it is unclear how much and what type of information sharing occurs in practice. Few agreement texts are public, and those that are often use vague language. And, despite the potential benefits of sharing more cyber-security information, many disincentives and logistical barriers remain. This project collected as much information as possible, not only about what states have agreed to do, but also what they actually do, and why they make those choices. After a brief summary of the approach taken and some limitations encountered, the study provides summary statistics about international cyber information sharing agreements. It then looks in more detail at sharing agreements and behaviors by some of the most active and/or important countries in regional organizations, and in multilateral fora that have focused on this topic. A summary of key findings, conclusions, and next steps is followed by annexes with more methodological information and texts for some of the most important agreements.
Topic:
Science and Technology and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2025. Contrasting Russian Perspectives on Coercion and Restraint in Russia’s Security Relations with the West

Author:
anya Loukianova fink
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This discussion paper analyzes a sample of 2014-2016 Russian-language publications focused on Russia’s security relations with the United States. It characterizes the Russian expert debate at that time as dichotomous in nature, where security policy analysts proposed either coercive or restrained policy approaches in dealing with perceived threats. It assesses similarities and differences of these two perspectives with regard to the nature of Russia’s political-military relationship with the West, as well as past challenges and then-future opportunities in nuclear arms control and strategic stability.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

2026. The Last Straw: Responding to Russia’s Anti-Western Aggression

Author:
Mieke Eoyang, Evelyn Farkas, Ben Freeman, and Gary Ashcroft
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election is just one part of a wide-ranging effort by Moscow to undermine confidence in democracy and the rule of law throughout countries in the West. Russia has engaged in this effort because, in both economic and demographic terms, it is a declining power – the only way it can “enhance” its power is by weakening its perceived adversaries. Because Russia’s aim is to erode the health of Western nations, we argue it is time for America and its allies to employ a comprehensive, non-kinetic response to contain Russia.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

2027. Guide to Section 702 Reform

Author:
Gary Ashcroft and Roger Huddle
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Before the end of the year, Congress must revisit the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), a law which, together with its provision known as Section 702, is one of the U.S.'s most valuable and controversial tools to combat threats to the nation. Lawmakers are considering a number of reform proposals as they decide how to reauthorize the law. While we believe it is an important tool, it has some serious flaws when it comes to Americans’ privacy. We would ask members of Congress to ensure that any reform address two problem areas in Section 702: (1) domestic law enforcement access to foreign intelligence records and (2) the international distrust of U.S. tech companies that comply with Section 702. This paper is a primer on Section 702 and reforms for that law. Part I explains how government surveillance works generally. Part II explains Section 702 specifically. Part III details reasons to reform the law to address civil liberties and economic concerns. And Part IV examines potential reforms that have been under discussion.
Topic:
Security, Privacy, Surveillance, and Civil Liberties
Political Geography:
United States and North America

2028. The Abuse of Obligatory Presidential Broadcast in Latin America

Author:
Andrés Cañizález
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
When Venezuelan opposition leader Jesús Torrealba held a much anticipated rally in September 2016, only one television channel, Globovisión, was willing to broadcast it. By then, the 24-hour news channel stood alone as the one major broadcaster daring enough to air critical coverage of the government. he speech was particularly newsworthy because Torrealba that day was planning to call for nation-wide protests in favor of a referendum on President Nicolás Maduro. The Venezuelan constitution allows for what is essentially a recall by plebiscite if citizens can marshal enough signatures in favor of one, but the country’s electoral commission, Torrealba alleged, was stonewalling the process in spite of the opposition’s success at collecting the signatures. He had hoped his speech could provoke demonstrations of irrefutable public support for the referendum. After only a few minutes at the podium, however, the transmission of his speech was interrupted without warning.1 President Maduro had ordered a blanket broadcast across all radio and television stations–what is known in Spanish as a cadena nacional. These presidential broadcasts resemble a US Oval Office address in style, but in Venezuela the law obliges both state‑owned and private media to carry the transmissions, which have lasted as long as eight hours. When Maduro invoked this law to interrupt Torrealba’s speech, Venezuelans had no choice but to listen to Maduro or simply switch off their TVs and radios. This is not an isolated event. The abuse of presidential broadcast laws, which was first witnessed in Venezuela under Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, has become a source of concern in several countries in the region, including in Argentina and Ecuador.2 This report looks at how obligatory presidential broadcasts have risen with a wave of populist authoritarian governments in Latin America, and how the abuse of such transmissions, coupled with other efforts to suppress independent press, has been a significant detriment to democratic deliberation. By looking at legal restrictions on this practice in the region, the report also provides some insight into how the abuse of obligatory presidential transmissions could be curtailed.
Topic:
Government, Media, Propaganda, and The Press
Political Geography:
Argentina, South America, Latin America, Venezuela, and Ecuador

2029. International Standards for Freedom of Expression: A Basic Guide for Legal Professionals in Latin America

Author:
Silvia Chocarro
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
The rise of violent attacks on journalists and government harassment of reporters underscores the fragility of press freedoms in Latin America. The resurgence of such threats in Latin America, however, confronts a legal environment that has never been more favorable to the freedom of expression, and judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals can provide a strong defense against those who would seek to silence independent journalists. “One way to end these abuses is to ensure that justice is implemented,” said Edison Lanza, Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “For that, it is vital that international and inter-American legal frameworks are well known and, above all, applied… That is why this guide is such an important tool for professionals in the judicial sector.”
Topic:
Media, Freedom of Expression, Journalism, and Freedom of Press
Political Geography:
Latin America and Caribbean

2030. Pathways to Media Reform in Sub‐Saharan Africa Reflections from a Regional Consultation

Author:
Herman Wasserman and Nicholas Benequista
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
When Mali in 1991 ended more than two decades of one-party rule, it embraced media freedom and pluralism as an essential part of its democratic transition. For two decades the country was considered a success story of democracy in Africa. The greater freedom enjoyed by the media and the flourishing of radio stations in the country was seen as part of a wider growth of independent and plural media in Africa during the 1990s, following earlier periods of control over the media by post-colonial governments. Unfortunately, the link between media and democracy in Mali works both ways: reversals to Mali’s democratization have frequently been accompanied by setbacks to media freedom. In 2000, the government passed a law allowing journalists found guilty of defamation to be fined or imprisoned, and journalists came under pressure to self-censor reports on sensitive topics. And when a coup d’état in 2012 and conflict in the country’s north threatened the country’s democracy, the space for media was further constrained. According to Freedom House, in the country’s north, it is dangerous for journalists, bribery of journalists is commonplace, and working conditions for journalists have worsened. Everywhere in the world, democracy and press freedom have been natural companions, but as the case of Mali illustrates so well, the relationship between the two has been closely entwined in sub-Saharan Africa. In the struggles for independence from colonial rule, in the wave of post-colonial movements that ended military regimes and dictatorships, and in the efforts today to keep governments accountable, the demands for press freedom, citizen voice, and pluralism have frequently been at the vanguard. Conversely, as democratic institutions in the region have been slowly hollowed out in recent years by colluding political and economic elites, so too have we seen media pluralism eroded by the influence of the powerful: authoritarians have left standing the facade of democratic institutions and press freedoms in the region, while disabling them from within. This report lays out a vision for how the continuing struggle for vibrant, independent, and plural media systems in the region might more effectively bolster efforts of democratic revitalization. The report draws on the input of 36 experts in media and governance from 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa who met in Durban, South Africa, in July 2017, and it deepens the insights and ideas that came from this group by documenting previously successful media reforms in sub-Saharan Africa.
Topic:
Reform, Media, Journalism, and Freedom of Press
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, and Sub-Saharan Africa