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1881. A Catalyst for Change: Engaging Youth in Transitional Justice

Author:
Virginie Ladisch
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
Although youth are key political and social stakeholders who have much to contribute to—and gain from—transitional justice processes, they often remain marginalized from such processes or are given only a limited and predetermined space in which to engage. In recent years, the peacebuilding field, in reflecting on what it means to meaningfully engage youth, has advanced a more nuanced framework that focuses on youth as agents of change.
Topic:
Youth, Youth Movement, Participation, and Marginalization
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Tunisia, and Côte d'Ivoire

1882. Legal Frameworks for Specialized Chambers: Comparative Studies for the Tunisian Specialized Criminal Chambers

Author:
Howard Varney and Katarzyna Zdunczky
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
In some contexts, the global community has resorted to international tribunals to prosecute the most serious past crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against of humanity, and genocide. While these international efforts contributed significantly to international justice, they were resource draining and located outside the countries in which the crimes took place. To overcome these issues, the so-called hybrid court was developed that combines domestic and international law and personnel. Tunisia has adopted a purely domestic hybrid court.
Topic:
Genocide, Transitional Justice, International Crime, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

1883. Transitional Justice in Tunisia: Tension Between the Need for Accountability and Due Process Rights

Author:
Howard Varney and Katarzyna Zdunczky
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
Pursuing justice in a transitional context may take the form of multiple measures and goes beyond the pursuit of criminal prosecutions. Tunisia’s Basic Law on Transitional Law, adopted in December 2013, is a case in point. Despite its flaws, the the law introduced a fairly comprehensive framework to redress past abuses and to hold perpetrators to account.
Topic:
International Law, Law, and Transitional Justice
Political Geography:
Africa and Tunisia

1884. The Role of Victims in Criminal Proceedings

Author:
Howard Varney and Katarzyna Zdunczky
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This briefing paper focuses on the role of victims of human rights violations in criminal proceedings. This paper will provide examples of recent developments in the advancement of victim participation in criminal proceedings in international criminal law and domestic jurisdictions.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Transitional Justice, Domestic Policy, and Human Rights Violations
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1885. Justice for Syrian Victims Beyond Trials: The Need for New, Innovative Uses for Documentation of Human Rights Violations in Syria

Author:
Nousha Kabawat and Fernando Travesi
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
By looking at the documentation efforts of Syrian civil society organizations, this paper challenges the notion that criminal prosecution is the sole avenue of justice available for alleged crimes in Syria. Documentation could be used for important other avenues of justice, such as acknowledgement, fulfilling victims’ right to truth, and informing and preparing future transitional justice processes. This paper makes several recommendations for what can be done with documentation to support Syrian victims.
Topic:
Civil Society, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, and Victims
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

1886. The Shadow Sector: North Korea’s Information Technology Networks

Author:
Andrea Berger, Cameron Trainer, Shea Cotton, and Catherine Dill
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s commercial information technology (IT) industry has operated overseas, largely unnoticed, for decades. It sells a range of products and services including website and app development, administrative and business management software, IT security software, and biometric identification software for law enforcement applications. Its global network includes a myriad of front companies, intermediaries, and foreign partnerships. Yet despite the attention currently paid to North Korea’s overseas revenue streams and its offensive activities in cyberspace, the spotlight has yet to illuminate the money-spinning North Korean IT firms whose offerings seem to have found their way into corporate supply chains and potentially even Western-allied law enforcement agencies. Drawing upon extensive open-source investigations by the authors, this paper examines several nodes in North Korea-linked IT networks and considers the implications for current and future policy efforts to stem North Korean revenue and mitigate the cyber-security threats the country poses.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Information Age, Disinformation, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

1887. All the World is Staged

Author:
Jack O Nassetta and Ethan P. Fecht
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Though much of the scrutiny into foreign interference in US political debates focuses on long-term election operations, foreign actors have now turned to social media to conduct short-term tactical operations. These operations aim to affect American attitudes toward specific US foreign and military policy, and ultimately affect the policy itself. In recent years, state actors and loosely affiliated patriotic operators have inorganically inserted themselves into the political discussion surrounding US intervention in Syria following the use of chemical weapons. Through continually evolving techniques, these “synthetic actors” are likely the main driving force behind shaping the character of the counternarrative discussion surrounding the use of chemical weapons in Syria. “All the World is Staged: An Analysis of Social Media Influence Operations against US Counterproliferation Efforts in Syria,” CNS Occasional Paper #37, seeks to analyze the tradecraft, trends, themes, and possible effects of disinformation produced by suspected synthetic actors (i.e., bots, trolls, and cyborgs) on Twitter concerning chemical weapons use in Syria. Although it is highly likely these synthetic actors exist on other social media platforms as well, this analysis focuses exclusively on Twitter, since the open nature of the platform allows for study without special access. Furthermore, we aim to improve public and academic awareness of foreign, inorganic disinformation efforts against our domestic decision-making processes. We hope that this text contributes to the efforts to prevent the erosion of the integrity of the political conversations that matter most. It concludes with salient recommendations for both policy makers and social network companies, focusing on how they can prevent synthetic actors from abusing their platforms for influence operations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

1888. Geo4Nonpro 2.0

Author:
Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The most impressive discovery was North Korea’s Kangson uranium-enrichment facility. CNS believes it to be the first time this facility has been identified or analyzed in the open-source literature. It represents the possibility that North Korea has been producing—and can continue to produce—as much, if not more, fissile material for nuclear weapons than it could have using the only previously known enrichment site at Yongbyon. The first section of this report discusses the evolution of the platform: from the conception of Geo4Nonpro 1.0 and the initial training of G4N team members, to the lessons learned during the first phase of the project and how these lessons fed into the platform’s continued development. The second section describes the launch of Geo4Nonpro 2.0, its new features, and highlights news stories that featured Geo4Nonpro and the central role that it played in many of these discoveries. This is followed by an analysis of each campaign. Lastly, the team proposes the next steps and future applications for this innovative platform.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

1889. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1890. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in China and North Korea through Remote Sensing Imagery

Author:
Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although uranium mining and milling constitute the first step in any nuclear-weapons program, nuclear nonproliferation analysts have devoted surprisingly little attention to monitoring these processes. Understanding and monitoring uranium mines and mills can provide deeper insight into fissile-material production. This report focuses on the insights gleaned from remotely sensed images of known Chinese uranium mines and mills to understand the current status of uranium mining and milling in North Korea.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea