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41. In Harm’s Way: Smart Regulation of Digital & Network Technologies

Author:
Aspen Digital
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Misuse of personal information, manipulation of platforms to influence elections, and failure to extend broadband to underserved areas are a few of the problems facing governments at all levels. Increasingly, policymakers are taking up the challenge of shaping legal solutions to these problems, only to find they lack both the tools and technical expertise to regulate wisely, meaningfully and efficiently. Given the current technological environment, what goals are appropriate to assure that emerging technologies are used to benefit the populace and do not harm society? Participants of the 34th Aspen Institute Conference on Communications Policy, which took place in Aspen, Colorado in August 2019, examined regulatory frameworks that can provide a successful model for future problems as they inevitably appear. The report of the Conference explores approaches to impede harms from digital and network technologies that address user protection, promote consumer choice and competition, and foster access to essential services.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Regulation, and Digitization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

42. Recovery and Renewal: Principles for Advancing Public Education Post-Crisis

Author:
Education and Society Program
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic has upended the school year for 50 million American students, and revealed the best and worst of public education: the best in terms of the heroic response by so many educators, support staff, students, and parents; the worst in terms of the intense light shone upon inequities that plague our system. As policymakers and education leaders plan to re-open buildings for school year 2020-21, they face important questions about how to capitalize on our strengths and finally deal with our weaknesses. We must be clear-eyed that inequity outside of school — like food insecurity, the digital divide, and the uneven experience of stress and trauma — is replicated and exacerbated by pervasive inequity inside of school. Going back to the status quo ante would leave many students and communities without what they need educationally. Therefore, the nation’s response to the pandemic must re-open schools and renew the promise of public education as an engine of opportunity. In this paper, the Institute’s Education & Society Program proposes five principles to guide recovery and renewal
Topic:
Education, Recovery, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

43. Safety First: Serving Food and Protecting People During Covid-19

Author:
Food and Society Program
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
As cities and states prepare to re-open, restaurants and hotels face a new challenge – ensuring safe working and dining environments for employees and customers. Safety First: Serving Food and Protecting People During Covid-19 will help them do just that.
Topic:
Food, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Customer Service
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

44. Black Lives Matter Might Just Rescue American Democracy

Author:
Oona A. Hathaway and Daniel Markovits
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
The past weeks in the United States have produced two horrifying varieties of violence. First, and all too familiar, the police killings of Breonna Taylor in Louisville, George Floyd in Minneapolis, and Rayshard Brooks in Atlanta follow a long and awful tradition of brutal state violence directed against Black Americans, beginning with chattel slavery and extending through the fugitive slave laws, lynchings, and right up to the present. The Black Lives Matter movement, which rose to prominence after earlier police killings of Eric Garner in New York City and Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, rightly emphasizes this terrible lineage and contends that achieving racial justice today requires coming to terms with the past. Second, and less familiar, we see an American president openly embracing tools of authoritarian rule. President Donald Trump has incited violence against peaceful protesters, threatening to use “vicious dogs” and “ominous weapons” against them and demanding that the authorities “dominate” citizens gathered to express their values. At the same time, the police have responded with documented instances of violence against members of the press seeking to cover the protests, while military units and military equipment have been deployed against peaceful protesters in Washington D.C. and threatened against protesters throughout the country. These two injustices — racism and authoritarianism — may seem merely to coincide, perhaps because of the person who happens now to occupy the White House. But they are, at least at this moment in American history, deeply intertwined. The writer Akilah Green observes (in a Tweet) that “Police are now brutalizing everyone just to maintain their ability to brutalize black people.” This is more than a Twitter slogan: it captures a deep and powerful social logic.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Social Movement, Democracy, Protests, and Black Lives Matter (BLM)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

45. Strengthening the Relationship Between Embassies and U.S. Special Operations Forces: Part 1, the Current Environment

Author:
Carter Wilbur
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
The release of the National Security Strategy (NSS)[i] in 2017 and related National Defense Strategy (NDS)[ii] in 2018 shifted the United States’ strategic focus to what has become known as Great Power Competition (GPC). These strategies acknowledge that the almost 20-year long fight against violent extremist organizations (VEOs) will continue, but add the need to address emerging and enduring threats from near-peer competitors such as Russia and China, and those approaching that status, such as Iran and North Korea. To address these authoritarian competitors requires the seamless integration of all aspects of U.S. power. Specifically, this article seeks to examine the current status of the relationship between U.S. embassies and U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF), while Part 2 will propose some specific ways to improve that working relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

46. On Iran: Don’t Snap Back, Step Up

Author:
Alistair Millar
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
The Trump administration was handed a resounding defeat in the United Nations Security Council at the end of last week when it offered a new resolution to indefinitely extend the UN arms embargo on Iran… Not only is the outcome of this vote embarrassing for the United States, it was the first salvo in a dangerous game of brinksmanship that is likely to be the biggest test of the Security Council’s resolve in the 75-year history of the United Nations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, United Nations, UN Security Council, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

47. US Nonproliferation Cooperation with Russia and China

Author:
Robert Einhorn
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The United States has at times worked cooperatively with Russia and China to promote shared nonproliferation objectives. But with no end in sight to the current precipitous decline in Washington’s bilateral relations with Moscow and Beijing, constructive engagement on today’s nonproliferation challenges has become increasingly problematic. Unless the United States and its two great power competitors can find a way to carve out areas of cooperation in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, the remarkably positive record of international efforts to prevent additional countries from acquiring weapons will be difficult to sustain. From sometimes partners to frequent foes, this Occasional Paper examines the history of US cooperation with Russia and China on key issues including Iran, North Korea, Syria, international nonproliferation mechanisms, and nuclear security. It also outlines the obstacles to future nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the growing proliferation threats that require such cooperation. Most importantly, it identifies several possible areas where the United States can hope to find common ground with both countries. With relationships with Russia and China reaching new lows and unlikely to improve for the foreseeable future, finding a way to for the United States to work cooperatively with both countries will not be easy. Bridges to constructive engagement have been burned and will be difficult to rebuild. However, the author points out that constituencies for cooperation remain in all three countries, including in government bureaucracies. “As hard as it may be to find common ground in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, it is imperative that the US administration in office after January 2021 make every effort to do so. Cooperation with America’s two great power rivals will not always guarantee success, but the absence of such cooperation will surely increase the risk of failure.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, United States of America, and North America

48. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. Theories of Democratic Change Phase III: Transitions from Conflict

Author:
Jennifer R. Dresden, Thomas E. Flores, and Irfan Nooruddin
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Education
Abstract:
The notion that robust democracy and violent conflict are linked is commonplace. Many observers of international politics attribute violent conflict in contexts as diverse as Myanmar and Syria to failures of democracy. Conversely, most agree that continuing political violence undermines any effort to build strong democratic institutions in Libya or South Sudan. As a matter of policy, democratization has often been promoted not only as an end in itself but as a means toward building peace in societies scarred by violence. Development professionals tackle these challenges daily, confronting vicious cycles of political violence and weak democratic institutions. At the same time, scholars have dedicated intense scrutiny to these questions, often finding that the interrelationships between conflict and democracy belie easy categorization. This report, the third in a series on democratic theories of change, critically engages with this literature to ask three questions: Under what circumstances do democratic practice or movement toward democracy quell (or exacerbate) the risk of different kinds of violent conflict? Under what circumstances do the risk and experience of violent conflict undermine democratic practice? How can external interventions mitigate risks and capitalize on opportunities inherent in transitions to democracy and peace? To answer these questions, a research team at George Mason University and Georgetown University spent eight months compiling, organizing, and evaluating the academic literature connecting democratic practice and violent conflict, which spans the fields of political science, economics, peace studies, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. This work was funded by USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (the DRG Center), under the Institute of International Education’s (IIE’s) Democracy Fellows and Grants Program. Beginning in May 2018, the authors organized a team of three research assistants, who read and summarized more than 600 journal articles, books, reports, and newspaper articles. The resulting White Paper was the subject of an August 2018 workshop with representatives from USAID and an interdisciplinary group of eight scholars with expertise in conflict and democracy. Based on their feedback, the authors developed a new Theories of Change Matrix and White Paper in October 2018. This draft received further written feedback from USAID and another three scholars. The core team then revised the report again to produce this final draft. This report’s approach to the literature differs from past phases of the Theories of Democratic Change project. While past reports detailed the hypothesized causes of democratic backsliding (Phase I) and democratic transitions (Phase II), this report focuses on the reciprocal relationship between democratic practice and conflict. The report therefore organizes hypotheses into two questions and then sub-categories within each question.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, Education, Democracy, Conflict, Political Science, and USAID
Political Geography:
Libya, Syria, North America, Myanmar, South Sudan, Global Focus, and United States of America

50. A Long-Term Perspective on NATO and the Multinational Order

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The evolving external threat environment is impacting the internal political dynamics of NATO nations and is accentuating a series of already existing trends – differences in threat perceptions, burden-sharing difficulties, challenges to respond to sub-threshold threats and the rise of populism – which altogether affect the cohesiveness and potentially the effectiveness of NATO as a political and military alliance. NATO’s operational future over the next decades will be shaped by the ingenuity of the transatlantic leadership in developing new arrangements of institutional cooperation between the Alliance and the burgeoning forms of the “coalition of the willing”. The Alliance should nonetheless remain the main transatlantic political forum, given Brexit as well as the rising need for a common political response to the many challenges ranging from migration to failed states. NATO has been relatively successful in adapting to the changing security environment. Its military capabilities remain unparalleled and unrivalled. The more interesting question is however the political one. Namely how the politics of sustaining this Alliance are being shaped by the underlying dynamics that are transforming the global political, economic and military context. The paper is divided in three chapters.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, Institutions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and European Union