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1051. In Dire Straits? Implications of U.S.-Iran Tensions for the Global Oil Market

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Kaleigh Thomas, and Jessica Schwed
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
In recent months, Iran has responded to rising tensions with the United States—particularly the US launch of the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran—by attacking oil tankers and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region around the Strait of Hormuz (the Strait). These actions have been designed to signal to the United States, the Gulf states, and the international community that the American strategy of strangling Iran economically will not be cost-free, and to Saudi Arabia in particular that it is highly vulnerable to Iranian retaliation. As the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, the implications of Iran’s efforts merit close scrutiny and analysis. This study was designed to examine three scenarios for military conflict between Iran and the United States and assess the potential impacts on global oil prices—as one specific representation of the immediate economic impact of conflict—as well as broader strategic implications.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Oil, and Global Markets
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1052. Not Enough Maritime Capability: The Challenge of Reinforcing Europe

Author:
Colin Smith and Jim Townsend
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014 marked a clear shift in Russian foreign policy, with the Kremlin pursuing a more assertive and aggressive approach to Europe and the West. Russia’s resurgence has meant that the United States again must seriously consider a possible conflict in Europe in its military plans. Central to the defense of NATO allies is a requirement for U.S. reinforcement of Europe, and U.S. reinforcement in turn depends on U.S. maritime shipping, which faces a number of critical challenges. This paper examines the current capability and availability of U.S. shipping to meet U.S. strategic sealift needs. It describes efforts by the United States to modernize and sustain the capacity required for strategic goals, including the reinforcement of Europe, and examines how the United States could leverage allied commercial and sealift capacity to address potential gaps. Finally, the paper identifies recommendations for addressing these challenges. U.S. logistical capabilities that are required to reinforce Europe, including sealift capabilities, have atrophied since 1989. Competing naval requirements make addressing future sealift shortages unlikely to be a top funding priority, while complicated laws hamper quick solutions to filling maritime shortfalls. Until U.S. shipbuilding can fill the gaps, workarounds such as using allied maritime assets to ship U.S. reinforcements must be considered. The requirement to reinforce Europe is too urgent not to consider all alternatives to addressing future shortfalls.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

1053. Strengthening Delhi’s Strategic Partnerships in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Darshana M. Baruah
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The Indian Ocean region (IOR) is a critical juncture of the wider Indo-Pacific. It is one of the most crucial trade corridors that links the Middle East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast and Northeast Asia. As outlined by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indian Ocean is "[h]ome to nearly 2.7 billion people … carrying half of the world’s container ships, one third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic, and two thirds of the world’s oil shipments." After the Cold War, the Indian Ocean remained relatively peaceful, with minimal geopolitical competition. India and the United States have been the primary actors in the theater and largely accepted each other’s presence and operations. After the Cold War, Washington welcomed a greater Indian role, with then–U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates encouraging India to be a "net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond." However, as China continues to expand its presence and deepen its engagements across the Indo-Pacific, there is a new geopolitical competition emerging in the Indian Ocean. While India perceives a growing Chinese presence as competition to its strategic and security role in the IOR, Beijing is determined to stake its claim and emerge as a key player in the IOR. This ambition feeds into China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power. India has a vital interest in the Indian Ocean, and as one of the IOR’s most prominent resident naval powers, its role in the IOR has been critical to maintaining peace and security. As China continues to expand its engagements and presence across the IOR, Delhi is beginning to review its maritime engagements and policies. Much of Delhi’s advantage is rooted in geography and operational experience, whereas it suffers from serious capacity constraints. Should China manage to find the means and ways to sustain itself in the region and gain experience operating there, it will be able to quickly overcome India’s advantages. Given that neither India nor China is looking to engage in a military conflict to establish dominance, strategic signaling, positioning, power projection, and enhanced operational capabilities will be key to enabling India to maintain a favorable position in the IOR in the next decade or so. As India continues to modernize its military, engaging with key partners will strengthen its ability to address emerging threats and China’s expanding presence in the IOR. This paper first explores India’s current approach to IOR chokepoints and how Delhi can leverage strategic partnerships to shore up its advantages in the IOR. It then identifies presence, maritime domain awareness, strategic collaborations, innovation, and nontraditional threats as the key areas where India can maximize its maritime partnerships to prepare for, deter, and respond to a more assertive China in the IOR.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Partnerships, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Indian Ocean

1054. A More Focused and Resilient U.S.-India Strategic Partnership

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States has made a “strategic bet” on India. This bet—“that India’s greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security"—was a central pillar of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia, and it remains a central pillar of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. For nearly two decades, Washington has embraced the strategic logic that it should facilitate the rise of India as a great power because a stronger India is indispensable in counter-balancing Chinese power and ambitions. In this policy of strategic altruism, Washington should not be overly concerned with specific Indian preferences, strategies, or capabilities—the general growth in Indian power would help to uphold a favorable regional balance of power. Recently, this strategic logic has begun to show signs of strain. In part, this is the result of emerging policy divergences on a range of issues from bilateral trade to Indian arms purchases from Russia.4More fundamentally, aside from differences in policy preferences, analysts question whether India will have the capacity to play a significantly greater role in global and regional security. India’s economy and military capabilities have expanded, but only incrementally and arguably at a pace insufficient to keep up with China’s growing power and assertiveness—or with American expectations. Even the firmest proponents of this strategic bet, like senior analyst Ashley Tellis, have openly pondered, “if India continues along this path, does our bet on it become a failed bet?"6 As Indian capabilities and U.S. expectations evolve, how can the two countries work together to uphold a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific? It is time for Washington to reframe its strategic bet on India. A close U.S.-India strategic partnership remains critical to meet the challenge a revisionist China poses. But the United States must adjust its policy approach to ensure the partnership is more focused on priority goals, and more resilient to inevitable disruptions. A more focused and resilient partnership would prioritize certain strategic tasks and geographic areas; in particular, the United States and India should cooperate to develop a denial strategy in the Indian Ocean.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

1055. Imbalance of Power: India’s Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China

Author:
Daniel Kliman, Iskander Rehman, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
The United States has made a strategic bet: that India will decisively shape the military balance in Asia.1 In an era of avowed great power competition with China,2 at a time when the U.S. military’s edge over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to erode,3 this wager will have an outsized impact on the future trajectory of the region. If India can maintain an advantage over China along its Himalayan frontier and sustain its dominance in the Indian Ocean, U.S. efforts to deny Beijing a regional sphere of influence are far more likely to succeed—as is the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific shared by Washington and Delhi. If India fails to realize its military potential, the United States, caught in between its many global commitments, will struggle to uphold a favorable balance of power. Today, America’s wager has yet to fully pay off. The trend lines in the India-China military equation are broadly negative. Despite very real improvements in Delhi’s defense capabilities and a significant advantage conveyed by India’s maritime geography, its longstanding superiority over China in the Indian Ocean is at risk of slipping away. Beijing has enhanced the capability and capacity of the naval forces it can project into the Indian Ocean and pursued overseas military facilities to support a more regular People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) presence there. Moreover, China’s long-range precision strike complex, though constructed primarily with the United States as the intended adversary, extends into the Indian Ocean—presenting a threat to Delhi’s maritime operations. The state of play along India’s Himalayan frontier is more mixed. Delhi possesses a clear advantage in localized military strength, but China has made significant infrastructure improvements in Tibet to enhance PLA mobility to surge troops forward, while folding the entire border with India under a single unified theater command—a major organizational restructuring that could yield an operational edge. India has not stood still amid growing military competition with China. Delhi has sought to provide its forces with greater mobility and operational awareness along the Himalayan frontier, while giving increased focus to maritime domain awareness, logistics, and subsurface monitoring across the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean. To weather a potential PLA attack, India has placed greater emphasis on infrastructure hardening; base resiliency; redundant command, control, and communications systems; and improved air defense. At the same time, India has shifted to a more punitive deterrence posture: Having invested in long-range strike capabilities suitable to both land and maritime warfare, it conducted a recent trial of a new anti-satellite weapon. It has also refined an operational concept for the Himalayan theater that aims to take the battle into China’s territory. Lastly, Delhi has begun taking steps to promote greater military jointness through new forms of defense organization.
Topic:
Power Politics, Military Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

1056. Risk Realism: The Arms Control Endgame for North Korea Policy

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
While the reasons for seeking North Korean denuclearization are sensible, continuing to pursue that goal makes the United States and its allies less secure. In word and deed, North Korea has shown it has no interest in nuclear disarmament. Because denuclearization is antithetical to Kim Jong Un’s bottom line, U.S. attempts at diplomacy to that end are self-sabotaging. As long as disarmament of North Korea remains America’s professed goal, Kim Jong Un has every incentive either to avoid the negotiating process or favorably manipulate it at America’s expense—by stalling for time, making unfulfilled promises, and securing concessions without reciprocity. Worse, as the 2017 nuclear confrontation showed, making denuclearization an actionable goal of U.S. policy creates real risks of crisis instability—justifying extreme measures and extreme rhetoric in the name of what has become an extreme aim. But policymakers can avoid the pitfalls of the past by attempting something more realistic than denuclearization—an arms control approach to North Korea. The United States has significant unexploited margin to take diplomatic and political risks aimed at probing and potentially shifting North Korea’s approach to its nuclear arsenal. An arms control approach would seek to reorient U.S. North Korea policy to prioritize what matters most: reducing the risk of nuclear or conventional war without forsaking other U.S. interests at stake in Korea. Using diplomacy to enhance regional stability and foreclose the possibility of an avoidable nuclear war requires pursuing a negotiated outcome that both sides can accept, and that tests North Korea’s willingness to uphold commitments short of disarmament. U.S. policy often seeks to test North Korean intentions, but without offering the accommodations and concessions that would serve as a meaningful test. Remedying this problem through an arms control approach requires taking considerable unilateral actions consistent with U.S. interests before proceeding to a phased negotiating process.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Risk, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

1057. Enhancing Congressional Intelligence Committee Effectiveness

Author:
Carrie Cordero
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
In fall 2018, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) initiated a foundation-funded project focused on bolstering bipartisan national security decision-making in Congress. As part of that effort, CNAS is focusing on challenges in conducting intelligence oversight. The project includes written reports, roundtables, engagement with congressional members and staff, and additional outreach bringing attention to the importance of bolstering meaningful and effective congressional intelligence oversight. The first paper in this series, Intelligence Oversight Priorities for the 116th Congress, was published in April 2019. This is the second paper in the series and intends to reboot the policy dialogue regarding steps the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) can take to enhance their effectiveness at overseeing the intelligence community’s activities and bolster public confidence in both their own activities and those of the intelligence community.1 The goal of this working paper is to provide a fresh assessment regarding whether the committees need significant structural reforms, assess which proposals previously generated are politically feasible, and identify areas for future research.
Topic:
Government, Intelligence, and Reform
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1058. Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Robert O. Work and Greg Grant
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
During the Cold War, the U.S. military relied on technological superiority to “offset” the Soviet Union’s advantages in time, space, and force size. Our military-technical edge allowed the U.S. Joint Force to adopt force postures and operational concepts that largely compensated for the Soviet military’s numerical conventional advantage without needing to match it man-for-man or tank-for-tank. After the Cold War ended, this same military-technical advantage provided the U.S. military a decisive conventional overmatch against regional adversaries for over two decades. Now, however, the “rogue” regional powers that have preoccupied U.S. attention for so long have been replaced by two great powers with substantially greater capabilities. A resurgent and revanchist Russia and a rising, increasingly more powerful China are taking aggressive actions that threaten regional security and stability and challenge the existing international order. Without question, of these two great-power competitors, China poses the greater challenge over the long term. Since about 1885, the United States never has faced a competitor or even group of competitors with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) larger than its own. China surpassed the United States in purchasing power parity in 2014 and is on track to have the world’s largest GDP in absolute terms by 2030. In comparison, our Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, was hobbled by unsustainable economic contradictions that ultimately crumbled under pressure. At the height of its power, its GDP was roughly 40 percent the size of the United States’. If that is not concerning enough for U.S. strategic planners, Chinese technological capabilities are growing as rapidly as its economic power. The Soviets were never able to match, much less overcome, America’s technological superiority. The same may not be true for China—certainly not for lack of trying. Indeed, China is keenly focused on blunting the U.S. military’s technological superiority, even as it strives to achieve technological parity, and eventually technological dominance. Chinese strategists do not explicitly describe their aims in this manner. Nevertheless, after considering what the Chinese military has accomplished technologically in little more than two decades and what they plan to do in the decades to come, any objective assessment must at least consider the possibility that the U.S. Joint Force is close to becoming the victim of a deliberate, patient, and robustly resourced military-technical offset strategy. The purpose of this paper is to describe this strategy and outline its key lines of effort.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Cold War, National Security, Military Affairs, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1059. Why America Needs a New Way of War

Author:
Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
For the first time in decades, it is possible to imagine the United States fighting—and possibly losing—a large-scale war with a great power. For generations of Americans accustomed to U.S. military superiority and its ability to deter major wars, the idea of armed conflict between great powers may seem highly improbable. The idea that the United States—with the most expensive armed forces in the world by a wide margin—might lose such a war would seem absolutely preposterous. Nevertheless, the possibility of war and U.S. defeat are real and growing. Given that U.S. armed forces’ last major conventional combat operations were the massively lopsided victories against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and 2003, many Americans might be wondering how this could come to pass. This report makes the case that one salient issue is that the American way of war—the implicit and explicit mental framework for U.S. military strategy and operations—that coalesced after the Gulf War is no longer valid. China and Russia have spent almost two decades studying the current American way of war. While the Department of Defense (DoD) has taken its military superiority for granted and focused on defeating nonstate adversaries, China and Russia have been devising strategies and developing new concepts and weapons to defeat the United States in a war should the need arise. They have offset their relative weakness versus the United States by using time and geography to their advantage and by focusing their weapons- and concept-development efforts on finding ways to attack vulnerable nodes in U.S. military operations. The goal of these strategies and concepts is to create a plausible theory of victory whereby China or Russia avoid a “fair fight” with the Joint Force and could therefore defeat the United States and its allies and partners in a regional war. These Chinese and Russian strategies, which once seemed implausible or far in the future, are beginning to pay off. They are shifting military balances in key regions and pushing allies and partners to reconsider U.S. security guarantees.
Topic:
War, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1060. Escalation or Negotiation? Conclusions of a Tabletop Exercise on the Future of U.S.-Iran Relations

Author:
Elisa Catalano Ewers, Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
On May 21, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) hosted an all-day tabletop exercise (TTX) in Washington, D.C., to game out three scenarios related to the crisis surrounding U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and destabilizing regional policies. The intent was to understand how key players would respond and act in these potential scenarios. The TTX included seven teams: the United States, Iran, Europe (representing primarily France, Germany, and the United Kingdom but also the European Union), China, Russia, Israel, and the Gulf Arab States (one player as Saudi Arabia/UAE and the other player as Oman). Teams featured American and foreign regional and functional experts with a deep experience in their respective areas. Players were asked to play the most realistic version of their government.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America