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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Content Type Special Report

21. Special operations forces and great-power competition in the 21st century

Author:
Hal Brands and Tim Nichols
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
America is moving from one era of foreign policy to another: The primacy of counterterrorism has faded, and competition with authoritarian great powers is the dominant concern. While special operations forces (SOF) understand that they must play a role in great-power competition, they often lack a clear understanding of what that entails. SOF can support great-power competition in five ways: gathering information, working with allies and partners, imposing costs, handling crisis response, and undertaking strategic raids. In addition, retaining competency in counterterrorism is itself a crucial contribution to great-power competition, because suppressing non-state threats is the prerequisite to allowing the rest of the American government to focus on other things.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Vicious cycles: How disruptive states and extremist movements fill power vacuums and fuel each other

Author:
Emily Estelle
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Great-power competition and the terrorist threat intersect and interact with one another in Africa and the Middle East. US disengagement from these regions to prepare for great-power competition in other theaters will increase a growing vacuum that is drawing more regional and global actors—states and non-state extremist groups—into a series of vicious cycles that will pose grave threats to American national security in the coming decades. Breaking the vicious cycle will require the US and its allies to separate the Libyan and Syrian conflicts and disentangle and discourage proxy conflict by external players while supporting the development of responsive governance in the two countries. Preventing similar crises will require a proactive strategy to seal off localized conflicts and prevent them from becoming larger competitions between external players while taking action to improve governmental responsiveness in at-risk areas.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Power Politics, Violent Extremism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

23. A short history of the Iranian drone program

Author:
Michael Rubin
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Iran has embraced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a major pillar of its military strategy. Iranian officials may exaggerate their capabilities, but Western analysts should not dismiss the threat posed by Iranian drones. Iranian authorities have invested in and experimented with drones for 35 years. Iranian authorities use drones for two main purposes: surveillance and attack. Iranian controllers now have the ability to conduct missions over the horizon and in most weather. Attack drones fall in two categories: Those with the ability to drop bombs or launch missiles and return to base and “kamikaze” drones that seek targets of opportunity. Iranian authorities have had more success with the latter. The biggest danger posed by Iranian UAVs, however, in years to come may be the result of Iranian proliferation of its drones to proxy groups, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, and the transfer of the ability to manufacture those drones. This will create some ambiguity in the operational environment as uncertainty about the identity of the drone’s controller can undercut momentum to hold that controlling country or group to account. This ability to escape accountability might actually make the use of drones more likely in surprise and terrorist attacks in the coming years.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

24. The evolution of the revolution: The changing nature of Iran’s Axis of Resistance

Author:
Kenneth Pollack
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
For the first two to three decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” was little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity of effort to an amalgam of states, semi-states, and non-state actors that opposed the Middle Eastern status quo than was ever the reality. Because of the events of 2014–16, when key Shi’a groups and governments faced severe threats, there has been a significant shift in the Axis’ composition and effectiveness. Today, the Axis is comprised of an increasingly cohesive coalition of groups functioning more directly under Iranian guidance. Iranian support for these groups has also shifted from covert terrorist collusion, funding, intelligence sharing, rhetorical support, and tacit diplomacy to overt force deployments, joint military operations, economic assistance, deterrence, and alliance solidarity. Nevertheless, Iran’s successes have led to additional problems. The Axis of Resistance strategy was born out of necessity, and it is unclear, especially without Soleimani, whether Iran will be able to adapt moving forward.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

25. Breaking out: Brazil’s First Capital Command and the emerging prison-based threa

Author:
Ryan C. Berg
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Much of Brazil’s deadly urban violence is the direct result of territorial battles involving the country’s powerful transnational organized crime groups, many of which trace their origins to the country’s dangerous and overcrowded prisons. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), or First Capital Command, took shape in São Paulo during the early 1990s, as inmates organized against poor prison conditions to impose order and preserve lives. Eventually, the PCC developed an ability to project its influence and control well beyond prison walls and into Brazil’s sprawling urban slums. The PCC has vanquished many of its domestic rivals, enjoys a footprint in every state in Brazil, runs operations in almost every country of South America, and is now more globally minded than ever before, recruiting guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Venezuelan refugees and partnering with European mafia groups and Lebanese Hezbollah. Law-and-order strategies that “stuff” Brazil’s crowded prisons with new inmates may actually exacerbate the problem, given that the PCC has effectively converted the country’s prisons into logistical hubs and training centers of illicit activity. To fight the PCC, the US should designate it as a transnational organized crime group to confer the benefits of multiple pieces of legislation and seek extradition of key PCC leaders.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, Law Enforcement, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Violence
Political Geography:
Brazil and Latin America

26. Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel

Author:
Katherine Zimmerman
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Sahel-based Salafi-jihadi groups including al Qaeda and the Islamic State coordinate and cooperate across organizational divides united by common objectives, shared histories, and ethnic ties, creating a unique ecosystem of ideology and terror. The Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel is strengthening rapidly. The number of attacks will continue to rise and will become deadlier as groups’ capabilities improve. The groups’ coordinated effort to transform Sahelian society and governance into their vision under Islam has helped destabilize the region and has created additional opportunities for Salafi-jihadi growth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Salafism, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Sahel

27. Partial decoupling from China: A brief guide

Author:
Derek Scissors
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Partial decoupling from China is overdue. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) suppresses foreign competition and infringes intellectual property. It is an ugly dictatorship at home and increasingly aggressive overseas. Decoupling involves a range of tools and economic activities. Policymakers should quickly move to document and respond to Chinese subsidies, implement already legislated export control reform, monitor and possibly regulate outbound investment, and provide legal authority to move or keep supply chains out of the PRC. Decoupling has costs—higher prices, lower returns on investment, and lost sales. But they are dwarfed by the costs of continued Chinese economic predation and the empowerment of the Communist Party.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. China’s global investment vanishes under COVID-19

Author:
Derek Scissors
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
As expected given COVID-19, China’s construction and, especially, investment around the world plunged in the first half of 2020. The decline may be exaggerated by Chinese firms not wanting to report global activity, but Beijing’s happy numbers are not credible. From what little can be discerned, the Belt and Road Initiative is becoming more important, primarily because rich countries are more hostile to Chinese entities. American policy needs to shift. Incoming Chinese investment is now extremely small, but technology is still being lost due to lack of implementation of export controls. Growing American portfolio investment in China is unmonitored and may support technology thieves, human rights abusers, and other bad actors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. China’s global investment in 2019: Going Out goes small

Author:
Derek Scissors
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Chinese investment and construction around the world contracted in 2019, regardless of Beijing’s claims to the contrary. However, the decline is concentrated in large, headline-winning deals, and Chinese firms remain active on a smaller scale. A contraction in acquisitions in rich economies has boosted the relative importance of greenfield spending. The number of countries in the Belt and Road continues to expand, and power plant and transport construction continues to be preeminent. American policymakers were initially spurred to act by intense Chinese investment in 2016. This has dropped sharply, but there are challenges related to investment review that are more important, starting with strengthening export controls.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

30. Iran’s reserve of last resort: Uncovering the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces order of battle

Author:
Frederick W. Kagan, Nicholas Carl, and Marie Donovan
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces are organized around headquarters that are meant to coordinate the operations of Iranian paramilitary forces and support the Quds Force’s use of proxy groups such as Iraqi Shi’a militias abroad. Their basing in Iran indicates a primary focus on suppressing internal unrest and waging irregular warfare in the rear of an invader rather than on defending against an invasion conventionally. Their organizational structure and the pattern of their operations in Syria suggest that they might be challenged to coordinate large-scale (multi-division) operations abroad and possibly at home. The fact that the Iranian leadership has not yet had to use them on a large scale to suppress growing domestic unrest suggests that the regime still has a potent reserve force to ensure its survival even if the unrest grows considerably, as long as it does not also face a requirement for large-scale military operations abroad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Qassem Soleimani, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria