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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Content Type Special Report

11. U.S. Policy in the Arctic

Author:
Paweł Markiewicz
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Arctic has become another contested area between the U.S., Russia, and China. The region’s growing importance for global trade and American security means the U.S. goal is largely to maintain freedom of navigation in the Arctic. For this reason, the Trump administration strives to increase American capacities to operate in the Arctic. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will delay implementing these plans; nevertheless, they will be achieved in the long term and the U.S. will also expect support in the Arctic from NATO allies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

12. National Security Update 12: Status of 2020 Defense Authorization/Appropriations and NDAA Highlights

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
Our twelfth IFPA National Security Update examines the current status of the U.S. defense authorization, appropriations, and budget process with a focus on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and assesses its strengths and weaknesses in light of key programs and policies discussed in previous Updates. Topics addressed in our National Security Update series include hypersonic missiles, missile defense priorities, nuclear modernization issues, President Trump's Executive Order on Electromagnetic Pulse, the status of the Space Force, China’s actions in the South China Sea and U.S. options, and the military applications of artificial intelligence. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, National Security, Budget, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, North America, South China, and United States of America

13. Thailand’s strategic drift: Domestic determinants amidst superpower competition

Author:
Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
After more than five years of military-authoritarian government following its 13th successful coup in May 2014, Thailand’s most recent elections on 24 March 2019 yielded a controversial parliament and a fractious post-election coalition government, headed by incumbent Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha. This report argues that despite the challenges of domestic political preoccupations and the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, Thailand’s strategic role in the Indo-Pacific is too important to be marginalized and that the country is an indispensable piece of the regional jigsaw puzzle in an era of global power shifts and transitions. The current Sino-US competition involves far-reaching battleground between democracy and authoritarianism, and Thailand – one of America’s oldest treaty ally with increasingly close ties with China – is strategically consequential. The report explains the complexity of Thai’s foreign policy and implications for Australia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Asia, Australia, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

14. Winning Hearts and Likes: How foreign affairs and defence agencies use Facebook

Author:
Damien Spry
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For defence and diplomacy, digital media, and specifically social media, have become an unavoidable aspect of their operations, communications and strategic international engagement, but the use of those media isn’t always understood or appreciated by governments. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Defence (DoD) both use social media, including accounts managed by diplomatic posts overseas and by units of the ADF, both departments can improve how they reach and engage online. It’s important to note, however, that their use cases and audiences are different. DFAT’s audience is primarily international and varies by geographical location. Defence has a more local audience and focus. More importantly than the content, online engagement is dependent on the strength of the ties between the senders or sharers and the recipients of the content. For both departments, improving those online ties is vital as they seek to influence. The Australian Government should use social media far more strategically to engage international audiences—particularly in the diplomatic and defence portfolios. Both DFAT and Defence should review outdated digital strategies, cross-promote more content and demonstrate transparency and accountability by articulating and publishing social media policies. Both departments should create more opportunities for training and the sharing of skills and experiences of public diplomacy staff. They should refrain from relying solely on engagement metrics as success measures (that is, as a measure of an individual’s, usually senior staff’s or heads of missions’, level of ability or achievement). Instead, by changing the emphasis from the producers of social media content to the audiences that interact with it, the engagement data can be usefully regarded as a proxy for attention and interest. This can tell us what kinds of audiences (mostly by location) are engaged, and what types of content they do and don’t engage with. This information indicates the (limited) utility of social media; this should guide online engagement policy. This report also highlights and recognises the value of social media for the defence community — especially as a means of providing information and support for currently serving personnel and their families—by supporting the use of Facebook for those purposes by all defence units. DFAT should remove the direction for all Australian heads of mission overseas to be active on social media. While this presence is indeed useful and boosts the number of global government accounts, if our ambassadors aren’t interested in resourcing those accounts, the result can be sterile social media accounts that don’t engage and that struggle to connect with publics online. Instead, both departments should encourage those who are interested in and skilled at digital diplomacy to use openness, warmth and personality to engage.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Social Media, and Facebook
Political Geography:
Australia

15. The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system

Author:
Alex Joske
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
What’s the problem? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is strengthening its influence by co-opting representatives of ethnic minority groups, religious movements, and business, science and political groups. It claims the right to speak on behalf of those groups and uses them to claim legitimacy. These efforts are carried out by the united front system, which is a network of party and state agencies responsible for influencing groups outside the party, particularly those claiming to represent civil society. It manages and expands the United Front, a coalition of entities working towards the party’s goals.1 The CCP’s role in this system’s activities, known as united front work, is often covert or deceptive.2 The united front system’s reach beyond the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—such as into foreign political parties, diaspora communities and multinational corporations—is an exportation of the CCP’s political system.3 This undermines social cohesion, exacerbates racial tension, influences politics, harms media integrity, facilitates espionage, and increases unsupervised technology transfer. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reinvigoration of this system underlines the need for stronger responses to CCP influence and technology-transfer operations around the world. However, governments are still struggling to manage it effectively and there is little publicly available analysis of the united front system. This lack of information can cause Western observers to underestimate the significance of the united front system and to reduce its methods into familiar categories. For example, diplomats might see united front work as ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘propaganda’ but fail to appreciate the extent of related covert activities. Security officials may be alert to criminal activity or espionage while underestimating the significance of open activities that facilitate it. Analysts risk overlooking the interrelated facets of CCP influence that combine to make it effective.4 What’s the solution? Governments should disrupt the CCP’s capacity to use united front figures and groups as vehicles for covert influence and technology transfer. They should begin by developing analytical capacity for understanding foreign interference. On that basis, they should issue declaratory policy statements that frame efforts to counter it. Countermeasures should involve law enforcement, legislative reform, deterrence and capacity building across relevant areas of government. Governments should mitigate the divisive effect united front work can have on communities through engagement and careful use of language. Law enforcement, while critically important, shouldn’t be all or even most of the solution. Foreign interference often takes place in a grey area that’s difficult to address through law enforcement actions. Strengthening civil society and media must be a fundamental part of protecting against interference. Policymakers should make measures to raise the transparency of foreign influence a key part of the response
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

16. Eyes wide open: Managing the Australia-China Antarctic relationship

Author:
Anthony Bergin and Tony Press
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
Given recent broader tensions in the China–Australia relationship, China’s global ambitions, lack of progress on key Antarctic policy initiatives and the potential for significant geopolitical consequences for the future of Antarctica and for Australia’s strategic interests, it’s important that Australian policymakers reconsider our long-term Antarctic policy settings. The report found no clear evidence that China is violating the Antarctic Treaty. But it argues we should apply a more sharply focused assessment of the costs and benefits of cooperation, given China’s more assertive international posture and increasing interests in Antarctica. The recommendations in the report are designed to maximise the value and mitigate the downside risks of China engagement for our Antarctic and broader national interests. Overall, we should adopt a more transactional approach in our Antarctic engagement with China, making it clear what we require from cooperation and what we expect from China. Given the track record Beijing has in moving rapidly on a broad front, as it’s done in the South China Sea, we need to be prepared to respond to a rapid increase in the speed and scale of China’s actions in Antarctica.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, Australia/Pacific, and Antarctica

17. Australia's implementation of women, peace and security: Promoting regional security

Author:
Louise Allen
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
Australia’s implementation of women, peace and security examines the benefits of Australia strengthening its implementation of the women, peace and security agenda to bolster its regional stability and national security efforts. Since its formal establishment by the UN Security Council in October 2000, the women, peace and security agenda has become the central framework through which to advocate for women’s participation across all peace and security decision-making processes, to promote the rights of women and girls in conflict and crisis settings, and for the integration of gender perspectives into conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict rebuilding efforts and throughout disaster and crisis responses. The agenda, when implemented holistically, can also complement states’ national security efforts and strategies aimed at promoting regional stability. The report highlights that while Australia has a positive story to tell particularly about its mainstreaming of the agenda across the Australian Defence Force, within international operations of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and in its aid program. There are, however, significant inconsistencies and resourcing gaps in how Australia approaches the implementation of its commitments on the women, peace and security agenda.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, United Nations, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

18. Disrupted: The Reproductive Rights Issue

Author:
Katie Washington
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
Abstract:
This journal began with the aim to reject and disrupt the ‘single-story’ of mainstream foreign policy through highlighting both experienced and emerging voices from across the globe. Throughout the last four issues of Disrupted, we have sought to understand, challenge, and critique mainstream foreign policy. Through a post-colonial feminist analytical lens, our contributors from all around the world, have questioned the unquestioned objectivity of elitist, Western-centric foreign policy, and unpacked the complex connections between gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality that are embedded in the everyday actions and politics of people from across the world. We truly believe that Feminist Foreign Policy brings all voices to the table, through whichever medium they choose to express themselves, and alongside our expertly written articles, we aimed to challenge the academic and un-inclusive paradigm that foreign policy is embedded in by including artwork, poetry, and more. Regrettably, this issue will be the last of its kind and - for now - Disrupted as a project will be on hold. Disrupted was a passion project that was started with lots of good intentions but no budget. Until very recently, CFFP has been an entirely volunteer-run organisation, so the volunteer-run journal fit within that scope. No one, including CFFP volunteers and staff, has ever been reimbursed for this project. However, we strongly believe that we cannot continue producing a feminist journal without paying all editors and contributors for their labour. While members have received access to the journal in the past, in no way does the money generated from membership come even close to covering the cost of producing even a part of the journal. The small pot of money generated by Disrupted purchases/membership has only ever covered the cost of printing the journal, but even printing became very unsustainable (financially and environmentally) so we decided to go digital. Charging a small amount for access (£5 for a digital issue) was a path we thought we could use to generate money to offset project and event costs and pay for labour, but again, the numbers haven't got close to balancing out. It's been a bit of trial and error to see how we could make Disrupted sustainable. Indeed, over the past year, we've gotten done a wonderful job at figuring out how to source sustainable funding for projects and pay people for their time. However, Disrupted is one of the pieces of the CFFP puzzle that we haven't quite figured out a solid funding model for, nor found someone willing to fund it (yet!). This brings us to our final issue of Disrupted in its current form. With a thematic focus on Sexual and Reproductive Health, Rights, and Justice, our contributors tackle issues from decriminalising abortion to menstrual equity and sustainability, to reproductive health conditions, to the Trump Administration’s global gag rule, and more. Across the world there is an urgency of providing a platform within foreign policy and beyond for women and minorities’ voices on these issues that directly, and often violently, impact and oppress their daily lives. We hope that we have contributed to building this platform, making foreign policy more feminist, more transparent, and more intersectional. Thank you to every single one of the contributors and volunteer Editors, past and present, who have helped make Disrupted a reality. A special thank you to Louise Scarce – without you, this issue wouldn’t have been possible. And, finally, thank you to you, our members and readers, for supporting us. With your support, we have amplified a different and more nuanced conversation that can better inform policy decisions and begin to alleviate global inequality. I am extremely proud to have been Editor-in-Chief of Disrupted, and I hope that this is only goodbye for now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gender Issues, Women, Feminism, Decolonization, and Reproductive Rights
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. Turkey's NATO Future: Between alliance dependency, Russia, and strategic autonomy

Author:
Jakob Lindgaard, Moritz Pieper, and Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Turkey-NATO relations are still sufficiently strong to keep the relationship from the brink, a new DIIS-report finds. But more dynamics are also gaining strength to render further troubles increasingly likely. The future of Turkey’s NATO membership has been the subject of heated debate of late, from both outside and within Turkey. What ramifications will Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air anti-missile system have for Turkey’s NATO future? Has the Syrian conflict exposed deep strategic differences between Turkey and other key NATO members? In response to such questions, a number of foreign policy practitioners as well as researchers and long-standing Turkey watchers have cautioned that a number of centripetal forces – dynamics that keep member states together - remain sufficiently strong at a structural level to keep Turkey-NATO relations on track. There seems to be widespread agreement on both sides that the alternative is simply worse. At the same time, the report also argues that these centripetal forces are losing their strength, and that centrifugal forces pulling the alliance apart are gaining strength and salience. Barring wild card developments, the net result is that this will increase the likelihood of further troubles ahead for Turkey-NATO relations The report is based on an analysis of the published policy commentary, scholarly literature, as well as a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with practitioners and academic experts during the course of 2019.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Denmark

20. Restoring democracy in Nicaragua: Escalating efforts against the Ortega-Murillo regime

Author:
Ryan C. Berg
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Daniel Ortega’s suppression of protestors and civil society continues unabated. Since April 2018, Nicaragua’s security forces have killed hundreds of people, thousands have been injured or held as political prisoners, and more than 100,000 Nicaraguans have fled to neighboring countries or the United States. Ortega’s authoritarian consolidation began well before April 2018; the keys to his regime’s ruthless survival strategy are the National Police and Nicaraguan Army, co-optation of the judiciary, domination of the media, and a highly complicit private sector that long ago embraced a modus vivendi with his socialist government, among others. The US should ramp up its sanctions against the Ortega regime; target individuals and industries, especially those connected to Ortega or the military; sequence its sanctions rollout; and synchronize external pressure with the domestic opposition to develop an effective strategy for achieving key political and electoral reforms ahead of the general elections in 2021. Reinvigorated diplomacy, particularly with the European Union and other Latin America governments, should seek to expand the international coalition against Ortega’s repression to maintain steady pressure for a definitive change in the character of the regime.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Civil Society, Sanctions, and Protests
Political Geography:
Central America, Nicaragua, North America, and United States of America