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6331. Assessing Hizballah's West Bank Foothold

Author:
Matthew Levitt and Zohar Palti
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, Hizballah realized that it had to change direction somewhat, primarily because it had lost its avowed justification (and any hint of international legitimacy) for carrying out attacks from Lebanon. Accordingly, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, the group's secretary-general, instantly changed his rhetoric, focusing less on Lebanon and more on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In one speech, for example, he told Palestinians that it took Hizballah eighteen years to force Israel out of Lebanon, and that they could accomplish the same feat in even less time through armed struggle and suicide bombings.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Washington, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

6332. Sharon's Disengagement Plan: A Likud Perspective

Author:
Zalman Shoval
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On June 6, the Israeli government approved a plan for unilateral separation by a 14 to 7 vote. The plan includes complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (with the exception of the so-called "Philadelphi Corridor" on the Egypt-Gaza border) and from certain West Bank settlements. It is scheduled to be implemented beginning in March 2005 and should be completed by the end of that year.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arabia

6333. Whither the Sharon Coalition? Implications of the Latest Cabinet Vote on Gaza

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On June 6, 2004, the Israeli cabinet authorized (by a 14-7 margin) preparations for a possible Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The authorization called for a final decision to be made about the Gaza settlements by March 2005. In the meantime, Israeli national security advisor Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland is heading a ministerial panel to discuss different aspects of withdrawal. The cabinet vote has triggered changes in Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government. On the eve of the vote, Sharon fired two ministers from the National Union Party (NU) for opposing the plan. That move led the staunchly pro-settler NU to withdraw entirely from Sharon's government, decreasing his coalition's 68-seat Knesset majority by 7 seats. Following the cabinet vote, a minister and a deputy minister from the pro-settler National Religious Party (NRP) resigned, and both have stated that they would individually leave Sharon's coalition as well. If they do so, Sharon would for the first time preside over a minority coalition of 59 in the 120-member Knesset.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Gaza

6334. After the Likud Referendum: The Future of the Sharon Government

Author:
Yosef (Tommy) Lapid
Publication Date:
06-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 17, 2004, Israeli justice minister Yosef (Tommy) Lapid addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. Mr. Lapid became head of the Shinui Party in 2000. Under his leadership, Shinui has rapidly grown in popularity and is now the third-largest faction in the 120-member Knesset and the second-largest in Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's coalition. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks. Recent polls show that 70 to 80 percent of Israelis support Sharon's Gaza withdrawal initiative. Therefore, they are unlikely to accept the Likud Party referendum of May 2, 2004, rejecting this initiative. At the same time, Israel cannot afford to allow a post-withdrawal vacuum to emerge in the territories, which the Iranians could potentially fill (Tehran supports Hizballah, which in turn supplies Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ]). Therefore, the withdrawal initiative must be altered somewhat from its original concept. Such a change would allow Sharon to say that he is accepting the ruling of his party while nevertheless moving forward with disengagement. His Gaza plan may turn out to be a three-stage process that is acceptable to Shinui. In any case, if an alternative formula is not proposed soon, Shinui will be forced to reconsider its participation in the government. We cannot sit idly and hope that Washington holds out on Israel's behalf against the interventionist tendencies—or so-called "goodwill"—of the Quartet. Shinui's formula for conflict management differs from that of both Sharon and the Israeli left, coming as it does from the center of the Israeli political spectrum. Shinui is well aware of the Roadmap's stipulation that measures must be taken against terrorism. Although Israel should indeed resume the reciprocal processes outlined in the Roadmap, it must also recognize that Palestinian Authority (PA) prime minister Abu Ala cannot dismantle Hamas and PIJ under the current circumstances without causing a civil war. Yasir Arafat does not want to make peace. Hence, Abu Ala must unite the PA's sixteen security organizations under one entity, which he should then head rather than allowing these forces to remain under Arafat's leadership. In the past, Shinui opposed talking to Abu Ala until he put a stop to terrorism, but the party has changed its stance for the time being. When Likud rejected Sharon's initiative, Shinui realized that the right was attempting to create a stalemate. Shinui cannot subscribe to any such policy. If these delay tactics continue, international parties may attempt to enter the arena both politically and physically. Israelis must therefore take the initiative to speak with Abu Ala based on the acknowledgment that he is unable to wage a comprehensive fight against terrorist organizations. If Likud does manage to move forward with disengagement in the near term, however, Shinui will rethink its policy toward Abu Ala.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, and Gaza

6335. Political Troubles between Turkey and Israel? Implications of Booming Bilateral Trade for the Two Countries and the Middle East

Author:
Pemra Hazbay
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Following Israel's recent raid in Rafah, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned Israel's actions as "state terrorism" while Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul hinted that strains had emerged in the Turkish-Israeli relationship. In general, Turkey's governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has lately adopted an alarmingly critical attitude toward Israel. Will Turkey seek to alter its ties with Israel? From an economic point of view, such a development would seem highly unlikely; Turkey ranks thirteenth on Israel's list of trading partners, while Israel ranks ninth among Turkey's trading partners. Yet, the question remains: do the deep economic ties between Turkey and Israel (which also share close political and military relations) provide a reason for optimism that economic initiatives can help improve political relations elsewhere in the region?
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

6336. Learning from Past Experience: Sinai to Gaza

Author:
Ben Thein
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Amid anticipation that Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon will soon get his Gaza withdrawal plan back on track, it is important to examine the only other instance of Israeli settlement evacuation—namely, Israel's withdrawal from Sinai in the wake of the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. How was evacuation handled at that time? Where did the settlers go? What were their options? Moreover, in light of the Sinai withdrawal, what role, if any, might the international community play in a Gaza withdrawal? What legal factors will the Israeli government face in its efforts to move settlers from their homes?
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Arabia, Gaza, and Egypt

6337. A Roadmap for Revived Palestinian Reform?

Author:
Nabil Amr
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 13, 2004, Nabil Amr addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. Mr. Amr, an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, served in previous Palestinian Authority cabinets as minister of information and minister for parliamentary affairs. A former member of the Palestinian delegation to peace talks with Israel, he is currently a visiting fellow at the Institute. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Norway, Palestine, and Arabia

6338. Security, Peace, and Israel's Strategy of Disengagement

Author:
Giora Eiland
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 7, 2004, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland of the Israel Defense Forces addressed The Washington Institute's Nineteenth Annual Soref Symposium. General Eiland is Israel's national security advisor. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks.
Topic:
Security and Religion
Political Geography:
Washington, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

6339. Shaykh Yassin and Hamas Terror

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
03-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Responding to Monday's assassination of Hamas founder Shaykh Ahmed Yassin, Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qurei stated, "Yassin is known for his moderation, and he was controlling the Hamas" from being more radical. Though frequently called the group's "moderate" leader, Yassin has been directly implicated in authorizing, directing, funding, and providing foot soldiers for Hamas terrorist operations. In August 2003 concrete evidence of such activity led the United States to list Yassin and five other Hamas leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. In so doing, the U.S. government froze the assets of these leaders and banned U.S. nationals from engaging in transactions with them.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Palestine, and Arabia

6340. Hamas Ceasefire Proposal: Peace or Pause?

Author:
Jeff Cary
Publication Date:
03-2004
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Has the radical Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas adopted a new, more moderate view on peace with Israel? In recent months, elite news organizations -- from the Economist to National Public Radio -- have highlighted interviews by Hamas leaders such as founder Shaykh Ahmed Yassin suggesting a willingness on the part of the organization to negotiate a "long-term truce" with Israel. On December 1, 2003, Yassin declared that Hamas was "ready to reach or to go with this enemy [Israel] into a long-term . . . truce. But the enemy . . . must pull out from all the Palestinian territories and . . . remove all shapes and kinds of occupation."
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arabia