This article outlines our thoughts on the following three issues. First, will the renminbi become an international currency in the foreseeable future? Second, what does the international use of the renminbi mean for Hong Kong? Third, should the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate be repegged to the renminbi?
Since China revalued its currency against the U.S. dollar by 2.1 percent in July 2005, from RMB 8.27 per US$ to RMB 8.11, the RMB has appreciated by a further 14 per cent percent to about RMB 6.97 per US$ (as of May 2008). On a trade-weighted basis, however, the currency has appreciated less than half this amount. Using J.P. Morgan's trade-weighted index (broad basis) for the RMB, the currency appreciated just 6.1 percent in nominal terms between August 2005 and May 2008. Although the currency has been very gradually appreciating, the flexibility promised by China's leaders has been more illusory than real, and, more importantly, the underlying international payment imbalances have continued to widen both in absolute terms and as a fraction of GDP.
As China's economy has continued its remarkable expansion and gained an increasingly important role in the global economy, China's currency, the renminbi (RMB), has also captured growing attention from investors and policymakers around the world. In this article, I briefly discuss three significant issues concerning the renminbi—namely, the near-term direction of the exchange rate, the renminbi's convertibility in the medium term, and the currency's international role down the road in the future.
This article is intended to be a sort of flyover, examining certain key aspects of monetary and real exchange rate economics from a convenient distance. In it I try to avoid getting into technicalities that are interesting mainly to specialists. I focus instead on essentials that are critical to a proper understanding of the economic processes involved, and on a few real-world examples that show the usefulness and relevance of our fundamental theoretical constructs.
Few topics in macroeconomics are as contentious as capital account liberalization and exchange rate regimes. This article attempts to briefly summarize what we have learned through the turbulent 1990s and the relatively benign 2000s. It is obviously not intended to review the massive literature on these topics, only to distill the main policy conclusions—or at least what I think are the main policy conclusions.
The New Neoclassical Synthesis is a natural starting point for the consideration of welfare-maximizing monetary arrangements in the international context. Alternatively known as the New Keynesian model, this consensus model of monetary policy deserves our attention because it embodies cumulative advances in theory and policy informed by decades of monetary experience from around the world. The consensus model with its prescription for price stability serves today as the foundation for thinking about monetary policy at central banks and universities worldwide.
So many well-deserved tributes have been paid to the memory of Milton Friedman that I propose to pay him tribute in a special way by talking about my long association with him. Before I do so, I note his activities before the 1950s, when we started working together. For the record, Friedman was not a monetarist when our collaboration began.
Milton Friedman did not like the euro. In early 1999 I wrote to him mentioning my daughter Erika's thesis and, in a letter dated March 12, 1999, he wrote back: Erika's thesis on “The Euro and the Dollar” is one of the subjects I have been maintaining a real interest in. As you know, I am very negative about the euro and I am very doubtful about how it will work out. However, I am less pessimistic about it now than I was earlier simply because I never expected that the various countries would display the kind of discipline that was required in order to qualify for the euro. The convergence in inflation rates, interest rates, and so on was greater and more rapid than I would have expected.
With the passing of Milton Friedman on November 16, 2006, we lost one of the great champions of free markets. Friedman's obituaries and commentaries on his life's work and enormous influence have invariably mentioned his advocacy of floating exchange rates, leaving the impression that he always favored floating rates. This was not the case.
A longstanding tradition in economics, dating back at least to Adam Smith, looks askance at statutory monopolies, condemning almost all of them as unnecessary barriers to economic progress. Thanks largely to this tradition most of the monopolies present in Smith's day are no longer tolerated. The few exceptions are found mainly in less developed countries, where they remain a cause of impoverishment. Needless to say, economists have also generally opposed the monopolization by fiat of undertakings that were already at least somewhat competitive in Smith's day.